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Abstract	This	thesis	draws	on	the	notion	of	disease	narratives	to	examine	the	manner	in	which	people	who	work	with	poultry	(PWP)	in	live	bird	markets	(LBMs)	construct	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza	A	H5N1,	as	well	as	how	these	constructions	of	risk	inform	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Focusing	on	PWP	in	three	live	bird	markets	in	Indonesia,	this	qualitative	study	employs	a	constructivist	perspective	to	look	at	what	informs	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	in	relation	to	themselves,	their	animals,	their	livelihoods,	and	the	political	authorities	within	their	communities,	and	offers	insight	into	the	extent	to	which	these	constructions	of	risk	underpin	their	behaviours.	Although	not	strictly	designed	as	a	comparative	study,	this	research	draws	out	similarities	and	differences	across	the	three	fieldsites.			Findings	suggest	that	PWP	assess	risk	by	drawing	on	experiential	knowledge	and	observations.	Respondents	across	the	three	sites	suggest	a	theory	of	species-specific	infection	in	relation	to	H5N1,	which	broadly	posits	that	there	are	certain	diseases	that	infect	different	types	of	poultry	and	certain	diseases	that	infect	humans.	For	most	PWP,	diseases	in	birds	are	not	considered	contagious,	even	between	different	species,	and	the	possibility	of	zoonosis	implausible.	The	majority	of	respondents	conclude	that	humans	are	not	susceptible	to	poultry	diseases	because	their	observations	and	experiences	do	not	support	such	a	conclusion.	PWP	do,	however,	indicate	that	other	forms	of	risk,	such	as	the	risk	that	a	disease	outbreak	or	an	intervention	can	threaten	their	livelihood	are	plausible	and	salient.	Behaviours	of	PWP	at	the	human-animal	interface	reflect	their	constructions	of	risk,	in	that	they	prioritize	economic	considerations	over	any	concern	for	mitigating	the	risk	of	disease	in	poultry	or	in	people.		This	thesis	concludes	by	outlining	policy	implications	and	researchable	hypotheses,	and	in	highlighting	the	benefits	as	well	as	the	challenges	of	integrating	qualitative,	social	science	research	into	the	interdisciplinary,	collaborative	study	of	emerging	infectious	diseases.				 	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
Introduction	When	this	study	was	first	conceptualized	in	2008,	fears	about	a	potential	influenza	pandemic	were	elevated.	In	2007,	the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	labelled	the	H5N1	virus	among	“the	most	feared	security	threat[s]”	(World	Health	Organisation	2007,	45).	On	2	May	2009	The	Economist	presented	an	image	of	the	Grim	Reaper	wearing	a	mask	and	thumbing	through	a	world	atlas,	as	if	deciding	where	the	next	outbreak	of	H1N1	should	take	place	(Image	1).				Image	1:	The	Economist	2	May	2009	
		Though	at	that	time,	concerns	about	an	influenza	pandemic	were	global,	they	were	also	focused	on	Indonesia	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	Indonesia	had	the	largest	number	of	reported	human	cases	of	avian	influenza	A	H5N11	and	the	highest	crude	fatality	rate.	Second,	Indonesia	in	relation	to	other	affected	countries	had	received	a	disproportionate	share	of	multilateral	and	bilateral	funding	for	H5N1	programming.	Third,	in	2006,	a	member	of	the	Indonesian	government	responded	to	avian	influenza	in	a	controversial	manner	that	dramatically	captured	the	attention	of	politicians,	scientists,	and	academics.	Former	Indonesian	Health	Minister	Siti	Fadilah	Supari	observed	that	global	supply	for	an	antiviral	used	to	treat	H5N1	had	surpassed	the	supply	and,	motivated	by	a	combination	of	nationalism,	and	a	concern	for	greater	equity	in	international	health	governance	and	access	to	medicines,	announced	that	Indonesia	would	stop	sending	H5N1	virus	samples	through	the																																																									1	The	number	of	reported	cases	in	Egypt	has	recently	surpassed	those	in	Indonesia.		
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Global	Influenza	Surveillance	Network	(GISN)	and	onwards	to	WHO	reference	laboratories.	Following	controversy	and	debate	about	the	fairness	of	existing	International	Health	Regulations,	this	virus-sharing	dispute	concluded	in	2011	with	a	restructured	international	virus-sharing	agreement.2			While	Supari’s	brinkmanship	drew	more	attention	to	the	potential	risks	for	the	emergence	of	an	H5N1	virus	with	the	potential	for	human-to-human	transmission	originating	from	Indonesia,	over	time,	and	as	fears	about	swine	flu	abated	and	no	sustained	human-to-human	transmission	of	H5N1	occurred,	public	interest	in	the	dangers	of	influenza	waned.	Indeed,	during	the	course	of	fieldwork	for	this	study,	I	was	frequently	asked:	“Is	bird	flu	still	a	concern?”	It	appeared	that	by	the	time	this	study	was	completed,	public	attention,	donor	funding,	and	academic	interest	might	have	shifted	elsewhere,	away	from	avian	influenza.		In	2011,	however,	public	and	academic	interest	once	again	spiked	in	response	to	the	release	of	the	Hollywood	movie	Contagion,	which	revolved	around	a	fictional	pandemic	–	a	viral	respiratory	infection	-	which	had	come	to	humans	from	bats,	via	pigs.	This	hypothetical	scenario	was	made	more	realistic	by	the	many	well-known	public	health	experts	employed	as	consultants	for	the	production	(R.	Ellis	2011).	Around	this	time,	actual	developments	within	the	scientific	community	reinvigorated	interest	in	influenza	viruses.		In	late	2011,	two	scientific	papers	described	the	molecular	changes	required	for	H5N1	to	mutate	so	as	to	be	able	to	transmit	between	mammals	via	respiratory	droplets.	Some	argued	that	the	results	may	be	used	by	bioterrorists	to	modify	the	virus,	or	that	the	virus	might	be	accidentally	released	from	the	laboratory	into	the	general	population	(Doherty	and	Thomas	2012).	For	this	reason	the	U.S.	National	Science	Advisory	Board	for	Biosecurity	(NSABB)	asked	the	academic	journals	
Science	and	Nature	not	to	publish	details	from	either	study.	The	lead	authors	agreed	to	a	voluntary	publication	ban	until	the	risks	associated	with	this	research	could	be	reviewed.	Eight	months	later,	in	mid-2012,	the	ban	was	removed	and	each	study	was	published	in	full	(Herfst	et	al.	2012;	Imai	et	al.	2012).	As	the	international	community	came	to	terms	with	the	potentialities	of	such	research,	in	2013	a	novel	influenza	virus	believed	to	have	pandemic	potential	emerged	(Qi	et	al.	2013).			In	March	2013	the	Chinese	Centres	for	Disease	Control	confirmed	diagnosis	of	three	human	cases	of	avian	influenza	A	H7N9,	two	of	which	resulted	in	death.	As	of	July	2015,	H7N9	has	resulted	in	over	678	laboratory-confirmed	human	infections,	with	278	deaths.3	Novel	influenza	viruses	have	also	recently	been	discovered	in	bats	(Tong	et	al.	2013).	These	viruses,	and	their	potential	for	human-to-human																																																									2	While	this	case	is	analysed	in	greater	detail	elsewhere	(Elbe	2010a;	Kamradt-Scott	and	McInnes	2012),	it	is	discussed	in	brief	here	to	underscore	the	very	political	nature	of	the	evidence	and	policies	that	have	been	most	emphasized	in	conceptualizations	of	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.		3	See:	www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/H7N9/	Situation_update.html	Accessed:	July	21,	2015.	
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transmission,	have	reignited	fears	of	an	influenza	virus	evolving	to	become	capable	of	spawning	a	pandemic.			Such	oscillation	in	global	concern	about	influenza	viruses	serves	as	a	reminder	of	how	perceptions	of	pandemic	threats	themselves	wax	and	wane.	This	summary	of	the	headlines	associated	with	influenza	viruses,	and	in	particular	H5N1,	also	illustrates	how	concerns	about	influenza	primarily	focus	on	the	virus	as	a	potential	threat	to	humans.	Though	this	particular	framing	of	H5N1	is	important,	persuasive	and	striking,	it	is	not	the	sole	interpretation	of	the	virus.	As	Leach	and	Dry	argue,	“there	is	always	more	than	one	way	to	tell	a	story,	or	‘frame’	a	particular	issue”.	They	direct	attention	to	different	“disease	narratives”	(Wald	2008;	Leach	and	Scoones	2013;	Sarah	Dry	and	Leach	2010)	that	serve	to	highlight	the	diversity	of	conceptualizations	about	“the	dynamics	of	a	given	disease,	what	counts	as	a	problem,	and	to	who”	(2010,	5).			
Focus	of	this	thesis	This	thesis	draws	on	the	notion	of	disease	narratives	to	reflect	on	the	different	ways	avian	influenza	–	and	H5N1	specifically	-	can	be	interpreted,	and	responded	to,	by	global,	national	and	local	communities.	Of	particular	interest	in	this	thesis	are	disease	narratives	of	people	who	work	with	poultry	(PWP)	in	live	bird	markets	(LBMs)	on	a	routine	basis.	In	certain	conditions	LBMs	can	host	and	facilitate	the	evolution	of	avian	influenza	viruses,	posing	a	potential	risk	for	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people	(Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013).	As	will	be	highlighted	in	more	detail	in	the	following	section	of	this	chapter,	the	focus	on	PWP	in	the	current	study	is	both	because	they	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	and	are	thus	regarded	as	a	potential	“bridge”	population,	facilitating	the	much-feared	jump	between	animals	and	humans	(Gray	and	Kayali	2009;	Gray,	Trampel,	and	Roth	2007),	and	because	live	bird	markets	are	a	primary	site	of	focus	for	interventions	and	responses	aimed	at	limiting	the	spread	and	impact	of	avian	influenza	viruses	in	poultry	and	in	people	(FAO	2011;	FAO	2013b;	FAO	2013a;	Samaan	et	al.	2011;	Samaan	et	al.	2012).	Though	PWP	are	often	the	subject	of	commentaries,	studies,	and	policy	prescriptions,	few	qualitative	studies	to	date	have	examined	PWP’s	perceptions	and	behaviours	with	regards	to	avian	influenza	at	the	human-animal	interface.		Of	particular	interest	in	this	study	is	the	manner	in	which	PWP	construct	the	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza.	The	term	“construct”	is	used	advisedly	throughout	this	thesis,	alongside	the	more	commonly	employed	“risk	perceptions”,	as	a	way	of	drawing	attention	to	the	formation	of	assessments	of	risks	as	active,	dynamic	processes.	In	attempting	to	account	for	why	some	individuals	or	communities	may	not	believe	that	avian	influenza	poses	a	significant	threat	to	humans,	some	have	singled	out	individuals’	levels	of	knowledge	as	a	key	site	for	intervention	(Fielding	and	Lam	2007;	Q.	Yu	et	al.	2012).	Thus,	when	individuals	suggest	that	they	do	not	personally	feel	at	risk	from	avian	influenza,	as	many	respondents	do	in	this	thesis,	it	is	often	viewed	as	an	indication	of	the	need	for	remedial	communications	initiatives.	
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In	contrast,	this	study	draws	on	Keck’s	notion	of	“rationalities	of	risk”	(2008)	to	highlight	both	the	validity	of	multiple,	divergent	constructions	of	risk	as	well	as	the	expectation	that	such	constructions	will	exhibit	an	internal	coherence	with	the	context	in	which	they	have	developed.	This	study,	therefore,	focuses	on	exploring	how	PWP	conceptualize	the	risks	posed	by	H5N1	to	themselves,	while	also	considering	the	other	dimensions	of	risk	–	such	as	risks	to	animals	or	economic	risks	stemming	from	disease	outbreaks	or	disease	interventions	–	that	may	be	familiar	or	salient	for	PWP.	This	thesis	also	investigates	the	extent	to	which	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	underpin	their	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface.	These	behaviours	are	implicated	in	increasing	the	potential	for	infection	and	disease	spread	(Janes	et	al.	2012)	and	as	such,	aligning	PWP’s	behaviours	with	dominant	constructions	of	risk	is	a	focus	of	interventions	(Samaan	et	al.	2012).		Situated	in	this	way,	as	a	community	of	people	who	may	play	a	central	role	in	efforts	to	contain	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	in	poultry	and	in	people,	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	and	behaviours	are	significant,	and	raise	important	ethical	questions.	The	prevention	and	containment	of	communicable	diseases	such	as	avian	influenza	is	seen	as	a	global	public	good	in	that	the	benefits	of	effective	containment	are	both	non-excludable	-	they	are	available	to	everyone	-	and	non-rival	in	consumption	-	because	consumption	by	one	person	does	not	limit	consumption	by	others	(Nordhaus	2005).	Viewed	through	this	lens,	PWP	have	the	potential,	and	perhaps	an	obligation,	to	contribute	towards	the	attainment	of	this	global	public	good.	Yet	PWP	may	fail	to	do	so,	motivated	by	their	own	constructions	of	risk.	Attention	to	the	issue	of	global	public	goods	means	that	PWP’s	behaviours	cannot	be	considered	purely	private;	their	behaviours	are	not	simply	their	own	(Kaul,	Grunberg,	and	Stern	1999),	as	what	they	do	at	the	human-animal	interface	may	have	implications	for	others	in	their	communities,	their	country	and	ultimately,	the	world.	This	thesis	explores	how	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	inform	their	notion	of	what	societal	obligations	they	bear	with	regards	to	their	own	behaviours.		Having	introduced	the	key	focus	of	this	study,	discussion	will	now	turn	to	the	justification	for	the	focus	population	of	this	research.	To	understand	why	and	how	existing	research	and	attention	has	focused	on	people	who	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	requires	an	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	poultry	industry	in	Indonesia.	The	following	section	will	outline	this	context	before	introducing	the	research	questions	guiding	this	study.		
	
Poultry	in	Indonesia:	from	farms	and	backyards	to	live	bird	markets	Poultry	provide	valuable	income	and	nutrition	to	millions	of	Indonesians.	Poultry	production	systems	across	the	archipelago	are	diverse,	ranging	from	large	commercial	poultry	production	of	broiler	chickens,	to	small-scale,	backyard	producers	with	only	a	few	village	chickens,	ducks,	or	geese.	Poultry	production	is	near	entirely	nationally	consumed,	with	very	few	exports	(USAID	2013).	Estimates	suggest	three	million	people	are	formally	employed	in	the	country’s	commercial	
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poultry	industry,	and	that	more	than	22	million	households	in	Indonesia	raise	village	chickens	(USAID	2013).	Alongside	different	types	of	chickens,	duck	and	geese	are	also	reared	for	their	meat	and	eggs	across	Indonesia	(CIVAS	and	FAO	2006).	Taken	together	these	birds	provide	income	for	millions	of	Indonesian	families,	as	well	as	the	majority	of	meat	protein	in	a	country	where	most	do	not	meet	daily	caloric	needs,	and	where	more	than	one-third	of	children	are	stunted	(WFP	2015;	FAO	2012).			The	actual	number	of	birds	raised	for	their	meat	or	eggs	in	Indonesia	is	difficult	to	determine	(Rushton	et	al.	2005),	as	numbers	no	doubt	shift	frequently	as	supply	and	demand	rises	and	falls.4	Conservative	estimates	suggest	a	standing	population	at	more	than	620	million,	with	the	annual	turnover	for	broiler	chickens	alone	estimated	at	over	1	billion	birds	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a).	Others	suggest	the	national	standing	population	is	closer	to	2	billion	(Simmons	2006).	Of	the	22	million	households	that	have	village	chickens,	or	ayam	kampung,	more	than	one	million	raise	more	than	30	birds	(USAID	2013).	While	chicken	are	the	most	common	bird	raised	for	consumption,	estimates	suggest	there	are	more	than	30	million	ducks	(CIVAS	and	FAO	2006).	Although	the	number	of	poultry	in	Indonesia	is	difficult	to	determine,	at	any	point	in	time,	there	are	likely	hundreds	of	millions	of	birds	raised	for	consumption	across	the	archipelago.			The	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	(FAO)	of	the	United	Nations	delineates	the	poultry	trade	into	four	sectors	(FAO	2004).	Sector	1	refers	to	industrial	integrated	production	where	birds	and	their	by-products	are	marketed	commercially.	Sector	2	includes	commercial	poultry	production	systems	with	birds	sold	through	slaughterhouses	or	live	bird	markets.	Sector	3	indicates	smallholder	commercial	poultry	production	with	birds	sold	in	live	bird	markets.	Sector	4	refers	to	village	or	backyard	production	with	birds	consumed	and	sold	locally.	In	Indonesia	these	sectors	are	not	so	clearly	distinguished,	and	are	often	more	blended	and	integrated	than	these	discrete	categories	suggest	(Forster	and	Charnoz	2013).	Ultimately,	the	majority	of	all	birds	raised	for	consumption	in	Indonesia	–	roughly	80-90	percent	–	are	slaughtered	and	sold	at	one	of	over	13,000	live	bird	markets	found	across	Indonesia	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a;	USAID	2013).	As	this	study	is	concerned	generally	with	the	live	bird	market	environment,	in	the	remainder	of	this	study,	I	do	not	continually	delineate	between	each	of	these	four	sectors.5																																																										4	Along	with	birds	raised	for	consumption,	many	Indonesians	also	raise	birds	such	as	songbirds,	pigeons,	quail,	and	fighting	cocks	for	personal,	cultural,	and	economic	reasons	(Forster	2012;	Naysmith	2011).	As	the	focus	of	interest	is	on	birds	sold	primarily	for	consumption	via	live	bird	market	systems,	I	do	not	speak	specifically	about	birds	other	than	chickens,	including	village	chickens,	broilers,	and	layers,	as	well	as	ducks	and	geese;	I	also	interview	PWP	who	raise	fighting	cocks.		5	These	crude	categories	do	not	necessarily	capture	the	variety	of	birds	that	are	reared	for	consumption	in	Indonesia,	and	nor	do	they	illustrate	the	range	of	birds	that	are	kept	for	other	reasons	than	consumption.	This	discussion	is	limited,	in	part	because	the	aim	here	is	to	show	that	there	are	a	large	number	of	birds	raised	for	consumption	across	the	archipelago,	and	that	regardless	of	where	they	are	raised	or	how	they	are	kept,	the	majority	of	all	these	birds	will	be	sold	via	live	bird	market	structures	–	the	primary	place	of	interest	in	this	study.	For	more	detail	on	the	general	poultry	
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	Mirroring	changes	in	demand	for	livestock	across	much	of	Asia	in	the	past	few	decades	(Liverani	et	al.	2013;	P.	K.	Thornton	2010),	in	Indonesia	the	demand	for	poultry	products	has	increased	steadily,	with	total	poultry	meat	consumption	in	the	country	estimated	to	have	risen	from	1,243,545	metric	tons	in	2007	to	1,613,683	metric	tons	in	2011	(USAID	2013).	Much	of	this	increase	is	attributed	to	demand	for	broiler	and	layer	chickens,	and	their	by-products:	in	2011	approximately	1,628,720	metric	tons	of	eggs	were	consumed	in	Indonesia	(USAID	2013).	There	are	around	ten	large	companies	that	dominate	the	broiler	market,	but	the	three	largest	-	
Charoen	Pokphand,	Japfa	Comfeed,	and	Sierad	Produce	-	maintain	roughly	70	percent	of	the	market.	Most	of	these	companies	rely	on	a	system	of	contract	farming,	wherein	they	sell	day-old	chicks	(DOCs)	and	supplies	to	farmers	who	raise	these	broilers	until	they	are	ready	for	slaughter	-		about	30-35	days	-	and	then	move	them	on	to	local	markets	(Simmons,	Winters,	and	Patrick	2005;	USAID	2013).	Alternatively,	these	companies	also	sell	DOCs	directly	to	individuals	who	raise	the	birds	independently	to	sell	at	local	markets	in	a	similar	time	frame	(Forster	2012).	Commercial	layer	chickens	are	reared	on	farms	across	the	country	for	around	18	weeks	before	they	start	laying,	a	phase	lasting	up	to	around	18	months:	over	this	time	each	bird	may	lay	400	eggs.	After	this,	most	layer	chickens	are	sold	for	consumption	in	live	bird	markets	(USAID	2013).	Taken	together,	estimates	of	the	number	of	farms	in	Indonesia	that	raise	broilers	and	layers	exceed	80,000	(Rushton	et	al.	2005).		Backyard	poultry	production	is	common	in	Indonesia,	contributing	protein	and	a	degree	of	economic	security	for	households	raising	poultry	(USAID	2013).	Roughly	60-70	percent	of	households	on	Java	raise	birds	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a).	In	Bali,	90	percent	of	households	surveyed	kept	birds	at	home	(Santhia	et	al.	2009).	The	majority	of	those	who	keep	birds	at	home	keep	ayam	kampung6	-	native	or	village	chickens	-	with	fewer	people	raising	ducks	or	geese	in	this	way.7	The	size	of	these	flocks	can	vary	greatly,	from	a	few	birds	to	several	hundred	at	more	semi-intensive	farms.	Backyard	birds	are	often	raised	for	eggs	and	meat	for	in-house	consumption,	yet	there	is	also	a	high-demand	for	these	domestically-reared	birds,	especially	during	religious	holidays	in	Indonesia,	and,	many	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	will	either	be	taken	to	market	by	their	owner	or	bought	by	independent	poultry	traders	to	be	sold	through	live	bird	markets.			While	there	is	debate	about	whether	commercial	or	backyard	poultry	are	more	responsible	for	maintaining	and	facilitating	the	spread	of	H5N1	in	Indonesia																																																																																																																																																																						trade	in	Indonesia	see,	for	example:	(USAID	2013;	Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a;	Forster	2012;	Simmons	2006).	6	There	are	many	different	breeds	of	chickens	that	are	considered	to	be	ayam	kampung.	I	do	not	differentiate	between	these	breeds.	For	more	on	ayam	kampung	in	Indonesia	see:	(Diwyanto	and	Iskandar	1999)	7	Although	not	routinely	differentiated	in	this	study,	there	are	a	three	predominant	local	duck	breeds	in	Indonesia:	Tegal,	Alabio,	and	Bali.	For	more	on	local	breeds	and	traditional	duck	rearing	in	Indonesia	see:	(Setioko	1997;	CIVAS	and	FAO	2006).	
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(Forster	and	Charnoz	2013;	Loth	et	al.	2011;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010),	taken	together	these	two	broadly	defined	sectors	provided	myriad	potential	hosts	when	H5N1	entered	the	archipelago,	sometime	around	2002-2003.	Once	introduced,	the	extensive	and	intensive	nature	of	the	wider	poultry	trade	in	Indonesia	helped	shuttle	the	virus	across	the	archipelago	(Lam	et	al.	2012),	enabling	it	to	become	entrenched	in	the	wider	poultry	population	system:	along	with	poultry	in	Egypt,	Bangladesh,	parts	of	India,	China,	and	Viet	Nam,	H5N1	is	considered	endemic	in	Indonesian	poultry	(FAO	2011).	Indeed,	the	trade	in	live	birds	is	considered	a	“major	pathway”	(Fournié	et	al.	2013,	1)	for	the	spread	of	H5N1	viruses,	and	has	been	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry	(Santhia	et	al.	2009)	and	people	(Zhou	et	al.	2009),	and	with	introducing	these	viruses	into	live	bird	markets	(Wan	et	al.	2011).			In	Indonesia,	the	trade	in	live	birds	has	been	implicated	in	the	spread	of	the	virus	(Santhia	et	al.	2009;	Roche	et	al.	2014),	and	this	trade	coalesces	around	live	bird	markets,	in	which	the	vast	majority	of	birds	slaughtered	and	sold	for	consumption	in	the	archipelago	pass	through	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a;	USAID	2013).	These	markets	act	as	hubs	for	traders,	who	can	introduce	H5N1	viruses	into	these	environments	either	through	the	birds	they	trade	or	on	their	equipment	(Fournié	et	al.	2013).	In	LBMs	in	Indonesia,	H5N1	viruses	have	been	found	in	birds	as	well	as	on	different	surfaces	used	for	the	slaughter	and	sale	of	birds	(Indriani	et	al.	2010;	Santhia	et	al.	2009).	Live	bird	markets	may	provide	repeated	contact	points	for	birds	and	people	to	be	exposed	to	the	virus,	either	via	an	infected	bird	or	a	contaminated	surface	or	material	(Samaan	et	al.	2011),	and	LBMs	have	been	identified	as	the	likely	source	for	infections	in	birds	(Webster	2004;	Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012)	and	in	humans	(Kandun	et	al.	2008,	200;	Zhou	et	al.	2009;	Mounts	et	al.	1999).	Under	the	right	circumstances,	once	H5N1	is	present,	some	live	bird	markets	can	act	as	viral	reservoirs	contributing	to	the	maintenance,	evolution,	and	dissemination	of	these	viruses	(Webster	2004;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013).	With	poultry	traders	coming	and	going	from	markets,	these	LBMs	can	serve	as	a	potentially	“continuous	source	of	infection	for	the	poultry	sector”	(Fournié	et	al.	2013,	1).	Whether	H5N1	viruses	can	persist,	evolve,	and	move	on	to	new	hosts	from	LBMs	depends	on	a	range	of	biological	and	anthropogenic	factors,	such	as	the	particular	type	of	H5N1	virus	involved,	and	the	behaviours	and	trading	practices	of	those	who	sell	and	slaughter	birds.	In	part	for	these	reasons,	LBMs	are	the	location	of	interest	for	the	current	study,	and	the	key	respondents	here	are	people	who	trade,	slaughter,	and	sell	poultry	in	and	around	three	different	LBMs	in	Indonesia	–	two	in	Sumatra	and	one	in	Java.		There	are	three	further	reasons	for	focusing	on	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface	in	LBMs	in	Indonesia.	First,	contact	with	infected	poultry	is	associated	with	most	human	cases	of	H5N1	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011;	M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	Patel	et	al.	2014),	and	human	cases	in	Indonesia	have	been	attributed	to	exposure	in	LBMs	(Kandun	et	al.	2008).	Human	cases	in	Indonesia	are	particularly	severe,	with	a	crude	fatality	rate	exceeding	80	percent	in	some	populations	(Patel	et	al.	2014).	Moreover,	H5N1	viruses	have	been	identified	in	
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poultry	as	well	as	on	multiple	surfaces	in	Indonesian	LBMs	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	And,	despite	the	fact	that	currently	circulating	H5N1	viruses	do	not	appear	to	disproportionately	infect	people	working	in	LBMs	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012),	they	are	still	considered	a	potential	bridge	population	for	disease	transmission	because	they	work	at	the	human-animal	interface,	and	may	be	among	the	first	to	become	infected	should	H5N1	become	more	transmissible	to	humans	(J.	H.	Kim	et	al.	2011;	Bridges	et	al.	2002).			Second,	as	LBMs	are	identified	as	potential	viral	reservoirs	(Fournié	et	al.	2013)	capable	of	contributing	to	the	maintenance,	evolution,	and	dissemination	of	avian	influenza	and	other	zoonotic	pathogens	(Webster	2004;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	Guan	et	al.	2003)	these	markets,	and	those	who	work	in	them,	have	become	a	primary	focus	for	avian	influenza	control	initiatives	in	Indonesia	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Samaan	et	al.	2011;	Santhia	et	al.	2009)	and	elsewhere	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Amonsin	et	al.	2008;	Abdelwhab	et	al.	2010).	These	interventions	can	have	negative	economic	and	nutritional	consequences	for	people	who	rely	on	poultry	for	their	livelihoods,	and	this	may	in	turn	limit	adherence	to	programming	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	Naysmith	2013b),	as	those	negatively	impacted	by	interventions	may	be	“unlikely	to	widely	adopt”	(J.	H.	Kim	et	al.	2011,	2320)	disease	control	efforts	in	LBMs	if	they	are	seen	to	impede	their	interests	or	well-being.			And	third,	despite	this	concerted	focus	on	live	bird	markets,	there	are	limited	qualitative	studies	focusing	on	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	among	people	working	at	this	human-animal	interface	in	Indonesia.	This	population	may	be	central	to	the	success	of	efforts	to	both	prevent	disease	in	birds,	as	well	as	in	limiting	environmental	contamination,	and	ultimately	the	potential	for	zoonotic	transmission.	Having	outlined	the	justification	for	focusing	on	people	who	work	with	poultry	in	Indonesian	LBMs,	the	next	section	will	outline	the	research	questions	guiding	this	study,	followed	by	a	description	of	the	major	contributions	made	by	this	research.				
Guiding	research	questions	This	qualitative	study	broadly	investigates	three	related	topics	of	inquiry:			One,	how	do	people	who	work	with	poultry	construct	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1	for	human	health,	animal	health,	for	their	own	livelihoods,	and	for	external	involvement	from	political	authorities?	Do	these	constructions	vary	significantly	across	the	three	study	sites?			Two,	what	kinds	of	evidence	are	employed	in	order	to	make	these	assessments	about	risk?	What	insights	into	risk	perceptions	are	provided	by	attention	to	the	familiarity	or	timing	of	particular	risks	for	particular	individuals	or	communities?	What	is	the	relationship	between	competing	types	of	risks	–	for	instance,	between	
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the	risks	perceived	to	stem	from	animal	disease	and	those	presented	by	impacts	to	economic	livelihoods?		Three,	to	what	extent	do	these	constructions	of	risk	–	about	human	health,	animal	health,	economic	impacts,	political	pressures	-	inform	or	underpin	PWP’s	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface?	
Research	contributions	This	study	makes	several	original	empirical	and	methodological	contributions	to	existing	knowledge.	First,	by	indicating	how	constructions	of	risk	among	people	who	work	with	poultry	diverge	significantly	from	the	constructions	of	risk	reflected	in	some	dominant	disease	narratives,	findings	from	this	study	lend	empirical	support	to	Rhodes’	challenge	to	a	“single	rationality	of	risk	avoidance”	(2002).	Leach	and	Dry	argue	that	the	constructions	of	risk	represented	in	the	dominant	disease	narratives	creates	“the	appearance	of	a	consensus	about	the	risks	of	global	outbreaks”	(2010,	3)	that	obscures	the	diversity	of	conceptualizations	of	risk	in	relation	to	avian	influenza.	By	highlighting	the	processes	of	risk	assessment	undertaken	by	PWP,	results	from	this	study	align	with	Keck’s	notion	that	various	“rationalities	of	risk”	rather	than	a	single,	correct’	construction	of	risk	are	reflected	in	diverse	disease	narratives.			Second,	in	exploring	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	across	three	different	field	sites,	this	study	provides	insights	into	the	range	of	experiences	with	avian	influenza	within	a	single	country.	Policy	makers	have	been	urged	to	recognize	sub-national	differences	and	design	interventions	accordingly	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2007).	However,	there	are	no	known	qualitative	studies	of	this	nature	across	multiple	sites	in	one	country;	nor	are	there	studies	that	examine	these	topics	across	multiple	sites	with	different	epidemiological	profiles.	Furthermore,	given	that	findings	from	this	study	are	mostly	consistent	across	the	three	sites	suggests	that	certain	aetiological	beliefs,	constructions	of	risk,	and	associated	practices	may	be	common	among	PWP,	a	supposition	that	could	be	investigated	further	in	future	research.		Third,	this	research	provides	empirical	insights	into	factors	that	may	challenge	current	interventions	used	to	impart	information	about	avian	influenza	with	the	aim	of	changing	behaviours.	Such	interventions	are	often	predicated	on	the	notion	that	different	conceptualizations	of	the	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza	reflect	certain	deficits	of	knowledge,	and	as	such,	can	be	remedied	through	the	provision	of	additional	information.	Yet	findings	from	this	study	suggest	that	PWP	derive	their	assessments	of	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	to	themselves,	their	animals	and	their	livelihoods	through	direct	observations	and	experiences.	These	assessments	are,	therefore,	unlikely	to	be	dislodged	in	the	face	of	external	pronouncements.	These	data	further	suggest	that,	as	PWP	do	not	feel	there	are	any	deficits	in	their	knowledge	or	understanding	of	poultry	diseases,	they	may	be	reluctant	to	engage	with	established	veterinary	or	public	health	authorities.	Indeed,	most	PWP	report	little	to	no	contact	with	these	officials,	suggesting	that	as	long	as	they	perceive	the	
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problem	of	avian	influenza	to	reside	exclusively	with	their	poultry,	they	have	no	reason	to	invest	trust	or	confidence	in	external	sources	of	information.			Fourth,	this	study	suggests	a	methodological	approach	that	circumvents	some	of	the	limitations	of	existing	research	on	emerging	infectious	diseases	(EIDs).	In	attempting	to	develop	an	understanding	of	individual’s	perceptions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours,	studies	in	the	extant	literature	often	employ	self-reporting	measures,	which	are	susceptible	to	social-desirability	bias.	By	employing	both	semi-structured	interviews	and	in-depth	observations,	this	study	was	able	to	triangulate	between	data	sources	and	derive	a	more	comprehensive	picture	of	how	PWP	assess	risk	and	what	implications	these	assessments	have	for	their	behaviours.			Fifth,	in	employing	qualitative	methods,	this	research	contributes	to	discussions	on	how	such	studies	can	complement	interdisciplinary,	and	mixed-method	research	on	emerging	infectious	diseases	(Kleinman	et	al.	2008b;	Janes	et	al.	2012).	As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	3,	the	One	Health	agenda	is	the	most	prominent	of	several	initiatives	to	encourage	interdisciplinary	scholarship.	Defined	as	“collaborative	efforts	of	multiple	disciplines	working	locally,	nationally	and	globally	to	attain	optimal	health	for	people,	animals	and	our	environment”	(Coker,	Rushton,	et	al.	2011),	the	One	Health	framework	underscores	the	importance	of	bringing	different	disciplinary	perspectives	into	conversation.	To	date,	however,	there	remain	a	dearth	of	social	science	literature	on	EID	drawing	on	qualitative	methodologies,	leading	some	to	suggest	that	the	presence	of	social	science	in	the	list	of	disciplines	with	important	insights	to	bear	on	EID	is	a	merely	tokenistic	inclusion	(Craddock	and	Hinchliffe	2015,	1).	By	offering	insights	into	the	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	among	a	population	of	interest	to	wider	studies	of	EID,	this	thesis	helps	to	delineate	how	qualitative	social	science	research	can	contribute	to	future	studies	of	emerging	infectious	diseases	at	the	human-animal	interface.	It	further	provides	substantive	reflections	on	the	practice	and	ethics	of	conducting	qualitative	research	in	EID	contexts	where	researchers	must	seek	to	mitigate	opportunities	for	infection	among	themselves	and	their	research	assistants,	while	also	avoiding	stigmatizing	respondents.		
Thesis	outline	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	briefly	discusses	the	organization	of	each	chapter	in	this	thesis.	
	
Chapter	2:	The	science	of	influenza	focuses	on	influenza	viruses	generally,	with	a	specific	focus	on	H5N1.	The	origins	of	the	virus	are	discussed,	and	this	leads	into	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	relative	risks	that	H5N1	poses	to	birds	and	to	humans.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	shows	that	there	are	a	range	of	factors	that	influence	whether	or	nor	a	bird	is	infected,	a	human	is	exposed	and	infected,	and	whether	H5N1	can	persist	in	an	environment	such	as	live	bird	markets.			
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Chapter	3:	Dominant	narratives	introduces	the	concept	of	“epidemic	narratives”	as	a	way	of	viewing	perspectives	on	a	particular	disease	and	the	pathways	of	response	that	stem	from	these	accounts.	Three	different	dominant	narratives	are	highlighted,	pointing,	respectively,	to	avian	influenza	as	a	significant	threat	to	global	public	health	and	security,	as	a	problem	largely	confined	to	animal	health	and	the	livelihoods	of	those	who	depend	on	livestock,	and	as	an	overarching	challenge	to	both	animal	and	human	health	requiring	interdisciplinary	collaboration.	Though	all	these	narratives	draw	attention	to	important	features	of	EID,	limitations	and	omissions	exist	within	each,	and	are	reflected	in	alternative	narratives,	the	subject	of	the	following	chapter.		
	
Chapter	4:	Alternative	narratives	introduces	four	epidemic	narratives	that	diverge	in	important	ways	from	those	presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	drawing	attention	to	different	accounts	of	disease	and	the	various	pathways	of	response	that	follow	from	them.	First,	the	livelihoods	narrative	emphasizes	the	disproportionately	negative	impacts	that	both	disease	and	disease	control	programming	can	inflict	upon	poorer	populations	who	raise,	sell,	and	eat	animals	that	can	harbour	zoonotic	pathogens.	Second,	the	risk	environment	narrative	highlights	the	wider	contextual	environment	in	which	zoonotic	diseases	proliferate.	Third,	the	governance	narrative	draws	attention	to	disjunctures	in	the	presumed	consensus	surrounding	global	governance	of	infectious	diseases,	as	well	as	challenges	faced	by	national	and	local	level	governments	in	calibrating	responses	to	diseases	with	available	means.	Lastly,	the	fourth	alternative	narrative	draws	on	the	notion	that	those	who	live	and	work	in	close	proximity	to	disease	events	and	the	responses	that	aim	to	contain	them	undoubtedly	have	important	insights	and	perspectives	to	offer.	Focusing	on	the	local	realities	of	these	individuals	also	highlights	the	diverse	ways	that	risk	is	conceptualized	and	constructed,	and	allows	for	an	examination	of	their	behaviours	in	light	of	these	insights.		
	
Chapter	5:	Conceptualizing	constructions	of	risk	at	the	human-animal	interface	introduces	the	conceptual	commitments	shaping	this	study.	It	outlines	the	objectivist	tradition	in	risk	perception	research,	which	exhibits	a	tendency	to	represent	risk	as	a	rational,	objectively-established	phenomenon,	and	contrasts	it	with	the	constructivist	perspective,	which	characterizes	risk	as	a	subjective,	contextually-determined	notion.	Drawing	on	the	concept	of	“rationalities	of	risk”	(Keck	2008),	this	chapter	then	outlines	the	key	conceptual	ideas	that	are	employed	in	this	study	to	explore	the	processes	of	deliberation	used	by	lay	populations	to	question	the	source	and	veracity	of	scientific	data	about	risk.	These	include:	the	salience	of	experiential	risk	rationalities	drawing	on	observations	and	experiences;	the	influence	of	heuristics	and	biases	in	the	formation	of	risk	assessments;	the	attention	to	multiple,	simultaneous	risks	in	the	Cultural	Theory	of	risk	(Wildavsky	and	Dake	1990),	and	the	emphasis	on	how	different	constructions	of	risk	lead	to	diverse	pathways	of	response.		
	
Chapter	6:	Methodology	and	methods	explains	the	methodology	of	the	approach	in	this	project,	the	methods	used	during	fieldwork,	and	the	fieldwork	process,	as	well	
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as	offering	reflections	on	my	positionality,	and	that	of	my	research	assistants.	In	particular,	the	advantages	of	a	focused	ethnographic	approach	are	highlighted	and	the	methods,	or	research	tools,	used	to	collect	data	are	outlined,	including	semi-structured	interviews,	participant	observation,	and	photography.	
	
Chapter	7:		Ethical	and	practical	considerations	of	doing	this	research	highlights	some	of	the	challenges	experienced	in	undertaking	this	research,	including	how	to	keep	my	research	assistants	and	myself	safe.	This	chapter	concludes	with	a	more	general	discussion	of	some	of	the	ethical	and	practical	considerations	that	arise	in	qualitative	social	science	research	on	emerging	infectious	diseases.		
	
Chapter	8:	The	research	context	focuses	on	the	wider	environment	in	each	site.	The	first	section	briefly	outlines	general	health	considerations	across	Indonesia.	Following	this,	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	outlines	the	trade,	slaughter,	and	sale	of	poultry	in	each	of	the	three	markets,	starting	with	Aceh,	then	Lampung,	and	finally	Banten.	Similarities	and	differences	between	these	sites	are	discussed,	as	are	different	factors	that	may	contribute	and	amplify	risks	for	humans	and	poultry.	Ultimately	this	chapter	situates	the	research	context	and	provides	a	background	for	data	presented	and	analysed	in	Chapters	9	and	10.		
Chapter	9:	Constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	among	PWP	explores	the	manner	in	which	PWP	construct	the	risks	about	avian	influenza	for	themselves,	their	animals,	and	their	livelihoods.	It	argues	that,	in	general,	PWP	conceive	of	avian	influenza	as	a	new	name	for	a	familiar	disease	that	can	only	affect	poultry	and	as	such,	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1	for	humans	are	considered	implausible.	As	a	result,	the	most	salient	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza	are	the	wider	threats	posed	by	disease	outbreaks	or	by	interventions	to	control	the	spread	of	the	virus.	PWP	assess	these	risks	by	drawing	on	their	long	histories	of	working	with	poultry	and	their	present-day	observations	of	diseases	among	humans	and	animals,	illustrating	how	constructions	of	risk	are	founded	on	PWP’s	experiential	risk	rationalities.		
Chapter	10:	Understanding	behaviours	of	PWP	at	the	human-animal	interface	examines	certain	behaviours	among	PWP	in	LBMs,	juxtaposing	these	practices	with	recommended	behaviours	that	have	been	identified	in	the	WHO’s	recommended	
Measures	to	reduce	transmission	of	avian	influenza	in	wet	markets	in	developing	
countries	(2006).	In	doing	so,	this	chapter	identifies	gaps	that	exist	between	the	WHO	prescriptions	that	reflect	the	dominant	outbreak	narratives’	preoccupation	with	averting	human	exposure	to	H5N1,	and	the	constructions	of	risk	among	PWP	that	frame	avian	influenza	largely	as	a	disease	that	does	not	affect	humans.	Behaviours	among	these	respondents	appear	to	reflect	their	constructions	of	risk,	described	in	Chapter	9,	and	as	such,	seem	not	to	be	significantly	influenced	by	concern	for	human	vulnerability	to	avian	influenza	infection,	or	considerable	concern	about	infection	in	their	birds.	Thus	PWP	do	not	mitigate	the	potential	for	exposure	by	employing	preventative	behaviours,	such	as	wearing	personal	protective	equipment.	Data	from	interviews	and	observations	show	that	economic	
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priorities	to	maximize	profit	and	minimize	loss	are	a	primary	influences	on	PWP’s	behaviour.			
Chapter	11:	Conclusions	summarizes	the	key	findings	from	this	study	as	they	relate	to	the	research	questions	posed	in	Chapter	1,	highlighting	similarities	and	differences	across	the	field	sites,	how	constructions	of	risk	are	formed	by	PWP,	and	with	what	implications	for	behaviours.	It	then	identifies	five	unique	methodological	and	empirical	contributions	from	this	study,	before	examining	policy	implications	of	these	data	for	avian	influenza	control	programming.	Lastly,	it	outlines	two	researchable	hypotheses	stemming	from	findings,	and	concludes	by	outlining	study	limitations,	and	pointing	to	priorities	for	future	research	and	policy.	
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Chapter	2:	The	science	of	influenza	and	associated	risks	for	poultry	and	
people	
Introduction	This	chapter	focuses	on	the	science	of	influenza	viruses,	and	avian	influenza	A	H5N1	specifically,	and	consists	of	four	sections.	The	first	section	establishes	how	influenza	viruses	work,	and	concludes	by	expanding	on	the	evolution	of	H5N1	viruses	since	they	were	first	diagnosed	in	geese	in	southern	China	in	1996.	The	second	section	looks	at	avian	influenza	viruses	in	different	types	of	birds,	and	illustrates	that	the	severity	of	disease	in	birds	depends	on	a	range	of	factors,	and	concludes	that	ducks	may	act	as	viral	reservoirs,	helping	to	maintain	and	disseminate	H5N1	viruses.	The	origin	of	H5N1	is	explored	in	the	third	section,	along	with	how	these	viruses	spread	and	became	entrenched	in	some	poultry	populations,	and	concludes	in	outlining	risk	factors	associated	with	disease	in	poultry.	The	final	section	in	this	chapter	looks	broadly	at	H5N1	infection	in	humans.	A	major	concern	is	that	a	variant	of	H5N1	will	emerge	that	can	both	efficiently	infect	people	and	also	transmit	between	them.	While	sporadic	human	cases	continue	to	be	reported	in	some	countries,	available	evidence	suggests	that	in	its	current	state,	H5N1	viruses	-	although	a	major	risk	for	many	people’s	livelihoods	–	can	neither	readily	infect	people,	nor	transmit	between	them.	
Influenza	viruses	and	the	emergence	of	highly	pathogenic	avian	influenza	A	
H5N1	Influenza	viruses	belong	to	the	family	Orthomyxoviridae,	a	family	made	up	of	RNA	viruses	that	include	five	genera:	Influenza	A,	Influenza	B,	Influenza	C,	Thogotovirus,	and	Isavirus;	for	the	purpose	of	this	study	the	latter	two	genera	will	not	be	discussed	further.8	Influenza	A,	B,	and	C	viruses	can	infect	humans	and	other	mammals,	such	as	seals,	bats,	pigs,	horses,	and	felines,	yet	human	infection	with	influenza	C	is	rare	(Kimura	et	al.	1997).9	Both	influenza	A	and	B	viruses	can	cause	seasonal	epidemics	in	humans,	which	occur	typically	during	the	winter	months,	with	two	distinct	waves	of	infections	in	the	southern	and	northern	hemispheres.	Combined,	these	seasonal	epidemics	can	annually	kill	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	globally	(Shindo	2010;	Molinari	et	al.	2007).	Only	influenza	A	viruses	are	considered	capable	of	spawning	a	pandemic.	Pandemics	can	occur	when	a	novel	influenza	A	virus	–	one	in	which	humans	have	little	to	no	immunity	against	–	emerges	and	has	the	ability	to	infect	people	and	readily	transmit	between	them.	Influenza	viruses	considered	to	have	“pandemic	potential”	include	influenza	A	H5N1	and	influenza	A	H7N9,	both	of	which	occasionally	infect	humans	but	at	present	have	limited	to	no	ability	to	transmit	between	people.																																																										8	For	more	information	on	these	genera	see:	(Jones	and	Nuttall	1989).	9	Influenza	C	infection	in	humans	is	extremely	rare.	Since	this	type	of	virus	does	not	cause	epidemics	or	pandemics	(Drobniewski,	Pogoryelova,	and	Nikolayevskyy	2009),	influenza	C	will	not	be	discussed	further	in	this	thesis.	For	more	on	influenza	C	viruses	see	Kimura	et	al.	(1997).	
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Influenza	A	viruses	are	classified	into	subtypes,	delineated	by	the	presence	of	two	viral	surface	proteins,	haemagglutinin	(HA	or	H)	and	neuraminidase	(NA	or	N),	both	of	which	are	integral	to	disease	spread.	In	brief,	haemagglutinin	enables	infected	cells	to	bind	to	uninfected	cells	and,	once	bound,	facilitates	the	transfer	of	the	virus	into	the	uninfected	cells.	Neuraminidase,	put	simply,	helps	open	the	host	cells,	essentially	releasing	the	virus	and	promoting	its	spread	to	uninfected	cells.10	Influenza	A	viruses	are	continually	evolving	in	this	way	over	time	and	as	they	mix	with	other	viruses.	There	are	currently	eighteen	HA	subtypes	and	eleven	NA	subtypes11	-	a	number	that	recently	grew	with	the	discovery	of	novel	influenza	viruses	in	bats	(Tong	et	al.	2013;	Tong	et	al.	2012).12		Humans	and	other	susceptible	species	can	be	subclinically	infected	with	influenza	A	viruses,	and	also	build	a	degree	of	immunity	to	genetically	similar	variants.	The	genes	of	influenza	A	viruses,	however,	are	continually	evolving,	marked	by	small	and	large	changes	in	their	surface	haemagglutinin	and	neuraminidase.	Small	changes	to	the	haemagglutinin	occur	routinely,	and	can	result	in	variants	of	influenza	A	viruses	that	people	do	not	have	immunity	against.	This	process	is	called	
antigenic	drift,	and	these	minor	changes	are	sufficient	and	frequent	enough	to	amount	to	the	“virological	basis	for	seasonal	epidemics”	(Drobniewski,	Pogoryelova,	and	Nikolayevskyy	2009,	5)	in	humans.	Whereas	antigenic	drift	is	a	continuous	process	that	occurs	in	both	influenza	A	and	B	viruses,	antigenic	shift	is	rare	and	occurs	only	in	influenza	A	viruses.	For	this	reason,	only	influenza	A	viruses	are	capable	of	spawning	a	pandemic.			Antigenic	shift	refers	to	an	abrupt	and	significant	change	in	the	haemagglutinin,	and/or	a	novel	haemagglutinin	and	neuraminidase	combination.	This	can	occur	when	two	distinct	viruses	merge	in	a	host	and	evolve.	Such	processes	can	result	in	a	novel	virus	that	can	both	infect	immunologically	susceptible	humans,	and	consistently	and	efficiently	transmit	between	people	(Drobniewski,	Pogoryelova,	and	Nikolayevskyy	2009).13	The	outbreak	of	influenza	A	H1N1	in	2009,	for	example,	resulted	from	the	reassortment	of	avian,	human,	and	swine	viruses	(G.	J.	D.	Smith	et	al.	2009).	More	recently,	the	emergence	of	influenza	A	H5N6	in	poultry	in	southern	China	(Bi	et	al.	2015),	came	from	the	reassortment	of	H5N1	viruses	and	H5N6	viruses	(Wong	et	al.	2015).	While	at	present	this	novel	virus	primarily	afflicts	birds,	the	first	human	case	of	H5N6	resulting	in	death	was	reported	in	Sichuan	province,	southern	China	in	November	2014.14																																																											10	This	is	a	very	simplified	explanation	of	how	haemagglutinin	and	neuraminidase	facilitate	viral	replication	and	disease	spread.	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	see	Mitnaul	and	colleagues	(2000).	11	See	Influenza	Type	A	Viruses	at:	http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/influenza-a-virus-subtypes.htm	Accessed:	April	22,	2015.	12	Previously,	the	sixteenth	HA	subtype	was	isolated	from	shore	birds	in	2004	(Fouchier	et	al.	2005)	13	CDC.	How	the	Flu	Virus	Can	Change:	“Drift”	and	“Shift”.	http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm	Accessed:	October	2,	2013.	14	Human	cases	are	currently	rare,	yet	there	is	concern	about	more	disease	in	humans	as	H5N6	has	been	isolated	from	poultry	in	Vietnam,	South	Korea,	Japan,	Vietnam	and	Laos	(Heine	et	al.	2015).	
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While	many	vertebrate	and	mammal	species	can	be	infected	with	influenza	A	viruses,	wild	birds	-	geese,	ducks,	swans,	gulls,	shorebirds	and	terns	-	are	the	natural	reservoir	for	most	subtypes	of	influenza	A	viruses	(Webster	et	al.	2007),	and	avian	
influenza,	or	bird	flu,	is	common	nomenclature	for	most	of	these	viruses.15	Infected	wild	birds	are	often	asymptomatic,	with	most	avian	influenza	viruses	showing	little	change	in	these	hosts,	as	if	in	evolutionary	stasis	(Gorman,	Bean,	and	Webster	1992).	After	transmission	to	susceptible	species,	however,	some	avian	influenza	viruses	–	including	H5N1,	as	discussed	more	below	-	can	show	rapid	evolution	and	“extensive	diversity	in	pathogenicity”	in	different	species	of	bird	(Webster	et	al.	2007,	S4).	If	avian	influenza	viruses	cause	severe	morbidity	and	mortality	in	chickens	in	a	laboratory	setting,	they	are	classified	as	highly	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(HPAI).	Conversely,	if	they	cause	limited	or	no	symptoms	in	chickens	in	a	laboratory	setting,	they	are	classified	as	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI).	Although	all	known	HPAI	viruses	come	from	subtypes	H5	or	H7	viruses,	“not	all	H5	or	H7	viruses	are	HPAI”(Q.	Liu,	Liu,	and	Yang	2013,	1258).	Moreover,	as	exhibited	with	rising	incidence	of	LPAI	H7N9	infection	in	humans,	LPAI	viruses	can	concurrently	reside	as	a	subclinical	infection	in	some	poultry	while	posing	a	significant	risk	to	susceptible	human	populations.		H5N1	was	first	identified	in	geese	in	the	southern	Chinese	province	of	Guangdong	in	1996	(Chen	et	al.	2005;	Xu	et	al.	1999).	Thereafter	H5N1	spread	to	poultry	stocks	across	the	Eastern	Hemisphere	(Wallace	et	al.	2007),	and	has	since	evolved	into	multiple	genetic	lineages,	all	of	which	retain	part	of	the	progenitor	virus.	These	different	variations	of	H5N1	are	organized	into	clades	(WHO/OIE/FAO	H5N1	Evolution	Working	Group	2012).	A	clade	is	a	group	of	organisms	from	a	genetically	common	ancestor,	and	can	be	described	here	simply	as	a	sub-family	of	H5N1	viruses	(Drobniewski,	Pogoryelova,	and	Nikolayevskyy	2009).	There	are	three	first-order	clades	–	Clade	1,	Clade	2	and	Clade	7	–	and	20	distinct	subclades	defined	as	second-,	third-,	or	fourth-order	clades	(WHO/OIE/FAO	H5N1	Evolution	Working	Group	2012).16	As	discussed	below	in	relation	to	the	risk	H5N1	poses	to	poultry	and	people,	depending	on	the	susceptible	population	or	species,	some	H5N1	clades	may	be	more	pathogenic	than	others	and,	over	time,	some	clades	may	go	out	of	circulation	while	new	variants	emerge.			H5N1	clade	2.1	was	first	detected	in	Indonesian	poultry	in	2003,	and	thereafter	diversified	into	three	distinct	lineages	–	clades	2.1.1;	2.1.2;	2.1.3.	From	2004,	however,	viruses	of	clades	2.1.1	and	2.1.2	“apparently	disappeared”	(Fournie,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012),	while	clade	2.1.3	continued	to	evolve,	necessitating	reclassification	into	fourth-order	clades	-	2.1.3.1;	2.1.3.2;	2.1.3.3.	In	recent	years,	the	majority	of	H5N1	viruses	isolated	in	Indonesia	belong	to	clade	2.1.3.2,	suggesting																																																									15	Although	all	avian	influenza	viruses	are	influenza	A,	not	all	influenza	A	viruses	are	avian	influenza.	Two	distinct	influenza	A	viruses	have	recently	been	found	in	bats	(see	Tong	and	colleagues	(2013;	2012).	16	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	on	the	designation	of	H5N1	clades	see	the	WHO:	http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/h5n1_nomenclature/en/	Accessed:	October	4,	2013.	
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that	this	is	now	the	dominant	genotype	circulating	in	Indonesian	poultry	(Koel	et	al.	2014).	As	this	research	was	undertaken	in	Indonesia	over	the	years	2009-2012,	H5N1	viruses	circulating	in	poultry	across	the	archipelago	at	that	time	likely	belonged	to	clade	2.1.3.2.	H5N1	viruses	in	Indonesia	and	elsewhere	will	continue	to	evolve.			In	recognizing	their	dynamic	nature,	for	the	purpose	of	the	current	study,	HPAI	H5N1	viruses	may	sometimes	be	discussed	as	a	monolithic	entity.	However,	to	establish	a	foundation	for	understanding	relative	risks	associated	with	H5N1	in	birds,	the	next	section	outlines	the	contextual	nature	of	H5N1	infection	and	disease	severity	in	different	birds,	underscoring	that	H5N1	does	not	uniformly	afflict	all	birds,	and	nor	does	it	spread	between	them	in	a	consistent	pattern.	While	the	following	discussion	outlines	existing	knowledge	about	avian	influenza	in	different	birds,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	serious	gaps	in	knowledge	persist	(Forrest	and	Webster	2010).			
Avian	influenza	viruses	in	different	birds	Avian	influenza	infection	in	birds	can	occur	through	direct	and	indirect	contact	with	the	virus,	with	transmission	mainly	via	a	faecal-oral	route,	although	viruses	may	also	transmit	via	the	respiratory	route	(Webster	et	al.	1992;	Webster	et	al.	2007).	Infected	birds	can	shed	live	virus	in	bodily	fluids,	such	as	saliva,	nasal	secretions,	and	faeces	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013).	Virus	in	these	secretions	and	excretions	may	remain	infectious	for	days	and,	in	certain	conditions,	these	viruses	can	contaminate	environments	and	create	fomites	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Nicholls,	et	al.	2012;	Spekreijse	et	al.	2012;	Horm	et	al.	2013).	The	persistence	of	H5N1	outside	of	a	host	hinges	on	many	environmental	factors,	including	temperature,	moisture,	and	salinity,	if	the	virus	is	in	water	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007).	H5N1	may	be	sustained	in	the	faeces	of	infected	birds	for	multiple	weeks,	with	time	increasing	as	temperature	decreases	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013).	H5N1	viruses	can	also	persist	in	feathers	(Yamamoto	et	al.	2008),	as	well	as	the	meat	and	by-products	of	slaughtered	poultry	(Mase	et	al.	2005;	Nazir	et	al.	2011).	In	part,	it	is	for	these	reasons	that	live	bird	markets	where	poultry	are	housed,	slaughtered,	and	sold,	are	considered	exceptional	environments	for	the	maintenance	and	spread	of	avian	influenza	viruses	and	other	pathogens	(Webster	2004).			H5N1	can	infect	both	domestic	and	wild	birds,	including	migratory	birds,	free-ranging	ducks,	free-ranging	native	chickens,	fighting	cocks,	commercial	breeders	and	layers,	quail,	and	pigeons,	among	other	species	and	breeds	(Alexander	and	Brown	2009).	The	majority	of	H5N1	outbreaks	in	poultry,	for	example,	are	found	to	occur	between	January	and	March	(Durand	et	al.	2015),	suggesting	a	seasonal	pattern	of	infection	in	some	birds,	with	disease	events	associated	with	decreasing	temperature.	H5N1	infection,	however,	does	not	affect	all	birds	equally.	Field	studies	and	observations,	as	well	and	laboratory	studies,	show	that	the	severity	of	disease	resulting	from	H5N1	infection	in	birds	depends	on	a	range	of	factors	including	the	clade	and	the	species,	as	well	as	the	age	of	the	bird,	with	variation	in	
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disease	ranging	from	subclinical	enteric	infection	in	some	ducks	to	high	mortality	in	some	chickens	(Mary	Pantin-Jackwood	et	al.	2013;	Martin,	Pfeiffer,	et	al.	2011;	Martin,	Zhou,	et	al.	2011;	Sturm-Ramirez	et	al.	2004;	M.	J.	Pantin-Jackwood	and	Swayne	2007).	The	amount	of	virus	shed	by	infected	birds	also	depends	on	the	species	that	is	infected,	and	the	condition	and	health	of	the	bird	in	question	(Spickler,	Trampel,	and	Roth	2008;	J.	G.	B.	van	Dijk	et	al.	2015).			In	most	wild	birds	avian	influenza	A	viruses	reside	subclinically,	causing	limited	morbidity	and	mortality;	H5N1,	however,	has	proven	an	exception,	with	extensive	diversity	in	the	range	of	pathogenicity	in	infected	wild	birds,	extending	between	non-pathogenic	subclinical	infection	to	highly	pathogenic	and	lethal	(Webster	et	al.	2007).	The	exceptionality	of	H5N1	in	wild	birds	was	made	apparent	in	May	2005,	when	more	than	6000	wild	birds	died	in	Qinghai	Lake,	in	western	China,	a	mass	die-off	attributed	to	avian	influenza	A	H5N1	(J.	Liu	et	al.	2005);	further	die-offs	in	this	region	underscore	the	potential	impact	of	H5N1	in	wild	birds	(Y.	Li	et	al.	2011).	The	severity	of	disease	in	wild	birds,	however,	varies	between	species	and	can	depend	on	many	biological	and	contextual	factors.	In	experimentally	infected	swans	and	geese,	for	example,	H5N1	causes	higher	mortality	in	swans,	with	marked	difference	in	the	amount	of	virus	shed	and	clinical	illness	experienced	depending	on	species	(J.	D.	Brown,	Stallknecht,	and	Swayne	2008).	Some	pigeons	infected	with	high	concentrations	of	H5N1	virus	show	only	limited	morbidity	and	mortality	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2009).	Indeed,	some	wild	birds,	such	as	pigeons	and	starlings,	for	example,	may	have	partial	resistance	to	H5N1	viruses	(Boon	et	al.	2007).	Conversely,	H5N1	viruses	in	some	sparrows	can	lead	to	high	morbidity	and	mortality	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2009).	Wild	ducks	infected	with	H5N1	viruses	can	also	develop	severe	clinical	disease,	with	infection	ultimately	resulting	in	death	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2006).	Along	with	differentiation	of	disease	severity	by	species,	different	H5N1	viruses	may	be	more	or	less	severe	for	wild	birds	(Boon	et	al.	2007).	Whereas	earlier	clades	produced	clinical	disease	in	geese	(Leigh	Perkins	and	Swayne	2002),	more	recent	clades	have	been	found	to	be	less	pathogenic	for	geese	(J.	D.	Brown,	Stallknecht,	and	Swayne	2008).	Infected	wild	birds	also	shed	different	amounts	of	virus,	and	are	thus	not	all	equally	capable	of	contaminating	environments	and	potentially	infecting	other	species.	Starlings,	for	example,	may	shed	more	virus	than	pigeons	(Boon	et	al.	2007).	The	duration	of	viral	shedding	can	depend	on	the	severity	of	clinical	infection	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2006).	In	brief,	H5N1	viruses	do	not	impact	wild	birds	equally,	with	the	likelihood	of	infection,	the	severity	of	disease,	and	the	amount	of	virus	shed,	dependent	on	a	range	of	considerations.	And	while	wild	birds	have	been	implicated	in	the	transmission	of	H5N1	to	other	birds	(Kilpatrick	et	al.	2006)	and	to	people	(Gilsdorf	et	al.	2006),	many	infected	wild	birds	do	not	efficiently	transmit	virus	(M	Pantin-Jackwood	and	Swayne	2009),	and	are	thus	likely	less	of	a	risk	for	the	maintenance	and	inter-species	dissemination	of	H5N1	than	domesticated	ducks	and	chickens.		Ducks	can	be	infected	with	avian	influenza	viruses	without	presenting	clinically	(Sturm-Ramirez	et	al.	2005;	Songserm	et	al.	2006;	Wibawa	et	al.	2013),	and	some	duck	species	may	be	naturally	resistant	to	H5N1	viruses	(J.	K.	Kim	et	al.	2009).	H5N1	
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viruses,	however,	have	been	found	to	cause	severe	morbidity	and	mortality	in	some	ducks,	notably	in	two	Hong	Kong	parks	in	2002	(Sturm-Ramirez	et	al.	2004).	H5N1	infection	in	ducks	is	not	uniform,	and	the	severity	of	disease	depends	on	many	factors.	Muscovy	ducks,	for	example,	may	exhibit	more	severe	symptoms	and	higher	mortality	than	Peking	ducks	(Mary	Pantin-Jackwood	et	al.	2013).	The	age	of	the	duck	may	also	help	determine	the	severity	of	H5N1	infection;	so	too	may	the	particular	clade	responsible	for	infection	(M.	J.	Pantin-Jackwood	and	Swayne	2007),	and	the	health	of	the	duck	prior	to	infection	(J.	G.	B.	van	Dijk	et	al.	2015).			Aerosol	transmission	of	avian	influenza	between	ducks	is	not	likely.	Most	ducks	are	probably	infected	with	avian	influenza	viruses	through	an	oral-faecal	route	(Webster	et	al.	1992),	with	susceptible	ducks	likely	ingesting	the	virus	in	water	or	feed	contaminated	with	faeces	or	other	excretions	from	an	H5N1	infected	host.	The	primary	site	of	avian	influenza	infection	in	ducks	is	the	intestine,	although	some	ducks	test	positive	for	upper	respiratory	tract	infection	(J.	K.	Kim	et	al.	2009).	H5N1	was	found	to	cause	paralysis	and	sudden	death	in	some	ducks	in	Cambodia	(Theary	et	al.	2012).	In	Indonesia,	for	example,	systemic	viral	spread	has	been	found	in	H5N1	infected	ducks	during	histological	examinations	post	mortem	(Wibawa	et	al.	2014).	Whether	or	not	a	duck	infected	with	H5N1	presents	clinically,	they	can	shed	virus	that	contaminates	environments	and	poses	a	risk	to	other	birds	and	people.	Experimentally	infected	ducks	reportedly	shed	infectious	virus	for	2-5	days	following	inoculation,	though	some	ducks	may	shed	for	upwards	of	17	days	after	infection	(Hulse-Post	et	al.	2005).	Ducks	have	also	been	found	to	efficiently	transmit	disease	to	uninfected	birds.	For	example,	5	ducks	experimentally	infected	with	an	Indonesian	H5N1	virus	efficiently	spread	the	disease	to	5	ducks	that	were	placed	in	close	contact	(Wibawa	et	al.	2014).	Indeed,	as	ducks	shed	higher	concentrations	of	virus	than	chickens,	ducks	have	been	identified	as	playing	a	crucial	role	in	the	maintenance	and	spread	of	H5N1,	and	may	act	as	asymptomatic	reservoirs	of	infection	–	a	so-called	“Trojan	horse”	(J.	K.	Kim	et	al.	2009).	Further	discussed	below	in	relation	to	risk	factors	for	H5N1,	it	is	in	part	for	these	reasons	that	ducks	are	associated	with	disease	events	in	other	birds	(Tiensin	et	al.	2009;	Henning	et	al.	2010).		H5N1	can	infect	different	breeds	of	chicken	including	broilers,	layers,	free	ranging	village	chickens,	and	fighting	cocks	(Alexander	and	Brown	2009).	H5N1	infection	in	chickens	is	particularly	severe,	however,	as	the	virus	moves	quickly	between	most	breeds,	resulting	in	high	morbidity	and	morality	in	chicken	flocks	following	disease	introduction	(Perkins	and	Swayne	2001).	The	severity	of	infection	in	chickens	can	depend	on	the	clade	responsible	for	infection	(Suzuki	et	al.	2009),	as	well	as	the	type	of	chicken	infected.	Some	suggest	native	chicken	breeds	are	more	resilient,	and	not	as	severely	impacted	by	H5N1	as	commercially	bred	broiler	and	layers	(Suba	et	al.	2015).	This	is	the	case	in	Indonesia,	for	example,	where	commercial	broilers	are	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry	(Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Loth	et	al.	2011).	Nonetheless,	H5N1	causes	high	morbidity	and	mortality	in	most	chickens,	and	clinical	manifestations	may	include:	ruffled	feathers	and	comb,	neurologic	dysfunction,	diarrhoea,	paralysis	and	organ	failure	(Perkins	and	Swayne	2001;	
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Theary	et	al.	2012).	Avian	influenza,	however,	has	no	pathognomonic	signs,	with	clinical	presentation	of	H5N1	infection	in	chickens,	for	example,	similar	to	that	resulting	from	infection	with	Newcastle	Disease	(Balasubramaniam	et	al.	2012;	Gardner	and	Alders	2014;	Alders	and	Bagnol	2007),	making	it	difficult	–	if	not	impossible	-	to	correctly	identify	H5N1	infection	in	birds	without	laboratory	diagnosis.	Newcastle	disease	is	not	uncommon	in	Indonesia,	and	is	mostly	found	in	backyard	poultry	(Sonaiya	and	Swan	2004).17		H5N1	infected	chickens	can	begin	to	shed	virus	in	their	faeces	and	respiratory	secretions	in	one	or	two	days	after	infection	(Spickler,	Trampel,	and	Roth	2008),	during	which	time	they	may	release	high	concentrations	of	virus	(Wibawa	et	al.	2013).	Along	with	a	short	latency	period,	estimates	suggest	that	H5N1	infected	chickens	may	only	remain	infectious	for	a	few	days	before	most	birds	succumb	to	the	virus	(Bouma	et	al.	2009).	While	seroprevalence	studies	in	chickens	have	identified	sufficient	antibodies	to	indicate	past	infection	with	H5N1,	there	are,	for	example,	far	fewer	chickens	found	with	antibodies	than	there	are	ducks	(Henning	et	al.	2011),	further	confirming	that	most	chickens	infected	with	H5N1	likely	die.			The	above	discussion	on	H5N1	and	different	birds	suggests	that	regardless	of	the	species	or	breed,	a	combination	of	factors	help	to	determine	the	severity	of	disease	in	different	birds,	and	the	amount	of	virus	that	an	infected	bird	can	shed	in	different	environments.	Although	these	myriad	factors	make	it	difficult	to	generalize,	available	data	identify	ducks	as	playing	a	pivotal	role	in	the	maintenance	and	dissemination	of	H5N1.	The	next	section	identifies	some	of	the	wider	contextual	factors	that	helped	maintain	and	disseminate	H5N1	following	emergence	in	China	in	1996,	paying	particular	attention	to	the	factors	found	to	be	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry.		
The	dissemination	and	maintenance	of	H5N1	H5N1	likely	started	as	a	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	virus	in	wild	birds	that	spread	to	susceptible	domesticated	birds	in	southern	China	and	then	underwent	significant	mutations	in	becoming	HPAI	H5N1	(Vijaykrishna	et	al.	2008).	While	this	initial	viral	introduction	to	domestic	poultry	is	unclear,	contact	between	wild	birds	and	domestic	poultry	may	be	frequent,	providing	myriad	instances	for	such	viruses	to	spill	into	susceptible	populations	(Prosser	et	al.	2013;	Henning,	Pfeiffer,	and	Vu	2009;	Kung	et	al.	2007).	Once	H5N1	emerged	the	virus	quickly	exploited	immunologically	naïve	poultry.			In	1997	the	virus	was	identified	in	poultry	in	Hong	Kong,	followed	by	the	first	human	cases	of	H5N1	(de	Jong	et	al.	1997;	Subbarao	et	al.	1998).	While	this	disease	event	was	promptly	contained,	afterwards,	H5N1	continued	to	circulate	extensively																																																									17	While	I	do	not	seek	to	identify	different	diseases	in	different	birds,	poultry	are	susceptible	to	many	diseases,	including	viruses,	mycoplasma,	bacteria,	and	fungus.	See,	for	example:	(Sonaiya	and	Swan	2004).	For	more	on	Newcastle	Disease	in	village	chickens	see:	(Alexander,	Bell,	and	Alders	2004).	
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in	southern	China,	and	spread	throughout	the	region	(Wallace	et	al.	2007).	In	2001	there	were	isolated	cases	identified	in	poultry	in	live	bird	markets	in	Viet	Nam	(D.	C.	Nguyen	et	al.	2005),	and	again	in	poultry	and	captive	wild	birds	in	Hong	Kong	in	2001-2003	(T.	M.	Ellis	et	al.	2004).	From	November	2003	to	February	2004,	H5N1	was	identified	in	poultry	in	Cambodia,	China,	Indonesia,	Japan,	Laos,	South	Korea,	and	Thailand	(K.	S.	Li	et	al.	2004).	Genetic	analysis	of	H5N1	viruses	in	Indonesia	suggest	H5N1	likely	entered	the	archipelago	through	a	single	introduction	to	poultry	somewhere	in	East	Java	between	November	2002	and	October	2003	(Lam	et	al.	2012).	From	east	and	south	east	Asia,	H5N1	was	identified	across	the	Eastern	Hemisphere,	and	was	soon	isolated	in	wild	birds	and	poultry	in	parts	of	south	Asia,	Russia,	the	Middle	East,	Europe,	and	Africa.			To	date,	over	60	countries	have	report	H5N1	disease	events	in	birds.	And	while	most	of	these	countries	eliminated	the	virus	and	have	been	able	to	limit	and	control	viral	reintroduction,	H5N1	remains	endemic	in	poultry	stocks	in	parts	of	Bangladesh,	China,	Egypt,	India,	Viet	Nam,	and	Indonesia.	Disease	introduction	in	most	countries	likely	occurred	through	some	combination	of	migratory	birds	and/or	the	extensive	and	intensive	trade	in	birds	and	their	by-products	(Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012).18	Regardless	of	the	initial	route	of	introduction,	in	countries	where	H5N1	remains	entrenched,	poultry	are	the	primary	hosts	for	H5N1	viruses.	In	these	places,	the	structure	of	the	poultry	sector	plays	an	integral	role	in	the	dissemination	and	maintenance	of	these	viruses.		The	emergence	of	H5N1	coincided	with	rapid	changes	in	livestock	production	systems,	characterized	by	an	increased	demand	for	protein	and	a	concomitant,	and	rapid	rise	in	the	numbers	of	animals	raised	for	consumption	(Liverani	et	al.	2013).	This	“second	livestock	revolution”	started	around	the	1980s	with	the	intensification	of	poultry	and	pig	production,	and	was	facilitated	by	developments	in	therapeutic	and	preventative	veterinary	medicine,	which	allowed	for	densely	housed	animals,	and	expedited	turnover	(Coker,	Rushton,	et	al.	2011).	While	the	growth	in	livestock	production	has	been	global,	there	have	been	particularly	pronounced	changes	in	poultry	production	systems	in	much	of	Asia	(P.	K.	Thornton	2010).	In	China,	for	example,	between	1985	and	2005	the	number	of	ducks	and	chickens	bred	for	trade	and	consumption	increased	from	approximately	1.98	billion	birds	in	1985	to	5.33	billion	in	2005	(FAO	2008).	The	spectacular	increase	in	the	number	of	birds	bred	provided	ample	potential	hosts	for	H5N1	viruses	after	they	emerged.			A	defining	feature	of	this	livestock	revolution	is	the	industrialization	of	poultry	production	systems,	made-up	of	large-scale	industrial	farms	that	intensively	raise	large	numbers	of	birds.	Yet	the	poultry	sector	in	many	countries	that	have																																																									18	The	exact	role	that	both	wild	birds	and	trade	played	in	the	initial	spread	of	H5N1	remains	debated.	However,	as	the	current	study	is	primarily	focused	on	what	happened	following	disease	introduction	and	the	further	entrenchment	of	H5N1	in	poultry,	this	debate	on	the	early	spread	of	the	virus	is	not	discussed	at	length	here.	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	see	(Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012).	
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experienced	this	revolution	remains	diffuse	and	diverse,	with	the	majority	of	birds	raised	for	consumption	still	sold	through	traditional	marketing	structures	such	as	live	bird	markets	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008b).	In	Indonesia,	for	example,	although	large-scale	poultry	production	companies	may	initially	hatch	the	majority	of	birds	raised	for	consumption,	most	of	these	birds	will	be	sold	to	smaller	contract	farmers	for	finishing,	and	then	perhaps	to	other	poultry	traders	and	farms,	and	eventually	on	to	consumers	through	LBMs	(Forster	2012;	USAID	2013).	What	this	can	amount	to	in	countries	like	Indonesia	and	China,	with	billions	of	poultry	at	any	one	time,	is	a	diffuse	and	extensive	trade	network	where	poultry	traders	and	farmers	move	birds	between	rural	and	urban	environments,	between	farms	and	trading	yards	and	markets,	and	further	afield,	across	both	domestic	and	international	boundaries.			This	trade	likely	facilitates	the	spread	of	disease	between	flocks	(Sims	2007),	and	poultry	traders,	who	may	move	between	multiple	farms	and	communities	each	day,	have	been	implicated	with	spreading	H5N1	between	farms	and	poultry	trading	yards	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2009).	In	Hong	Kong,	an	increased	risk	for	disease	transmission	at	farms	was	associated	with	poultry	traders	visiting	(Kung	et	al.	2007).	In	Viet	Nam,	traders	may	spread	H5N1	between	divergent	administrative	units	(Magalhães,	Pfeiffer,	and	Otte	2010).	In	Indonesia,	disease	events	in	village	chickens	have	been	associated	with	the	transport	of	poultry	to	and	from	communities	(Santhia	et	al.	2009).	Illegal	inter-island	trade	in	birds	in	Indonesia	is	considered	a	potential	source	for	disease	spread	(Millar	et	al.	2015).	Trade	in	poultry	between	countries	is	also	responsible	for	disseminating	H5N1	viruses.	The	border	between	southern	China	and	northern	Viet	Nam,	for	example,	is	a	particularly	busy	transfer	point	for	poultry	traded	in	both	legal	and	illegal	ventures	(T.	Nguyen	et	al.	2009;	Sims	et	al.	2005;	Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012),	and	this	route	has	been	identified	as	a	key	point	of	entry	for	H5N1	viruses	into	south	east	Asia	(T.	Nguyen	et	al.	2009;	C.	T.	Davis	et	al.	2010),	with	H5N1	isolated	in	Malaysia,	Thailand,	Laos,	and	Cambodia	traced	back	to	Viet	Nam	and	their	poultry	trade	with	China	(G.	J.	Smith	et	al.	2006;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2009;	Buchy	et	al.	2009).			The	diffuse	and	extensive	structure	of	the	contemporary	poultry	trade	facilitated	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	between	and	across	countries,	and	is	also	considered	a	primary	factor	in	the	maintenance	and	circulation	of	H5N1	in	endemic	countries	(FAO	2011).	Indeed,	poultry	sectors	in	endemic	countries	are	generally	characterized	by	increasing	demand	for	all	type	of	poultry,	rapid	growth	in	poultry	production	and	distribution,	a	significant	proportion	of	ducks,	and	complex	trade	networks	where	most	birds	are	sold	through	traditional	marketing	structures.	Other	contextual	features	common	to	endemically	infected	countries	include	limited	resources	and	relatively	weak	public	and	private	animal	health	services,	as	well	as	inadequate	commitment	to	H5N1	control	and	eradication	programming	among	officials	and	the	public	(FAO	2011).	In	identifying	features	of	the	wider	poultry	sector	that	help	maintain	and	disseminate	H5N1	viruses	in	endemic	countries,	the	question	arises:	are	there	other	variables	–	or	risk	factors	-	associated	with	virus	persistence	and	disease	outbreaks	in	poultry?			
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	Discussed	in	further	detail	in	the	last	section	of	this	chapter,	contact	with	infected	poultry	is	a	primary	risk	factor	for	human	infection	with	H5N1	(M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013),	and	thus	identifying	the	pathways	associated	H5N1	spreads	through	poultry,	may	help	reduce	zoonotic	risk.	Although	different	clades	may	be	linked	to	variations	in	transmission	and	pathogenicity	in	different	birds	(Pfeiffer	et	al.	2011),	studies	across	endemic	countries	identify	a	broad	range	of	factors	generally	associated	with	H5N1	in	poultry	across	different	countries.	These	can	be	demarcated	into	three	broad	categories:	anthropogenic	factors,	such	as	roadways	and	human	density;	the	presence	of	ducks;	and,	abundance	of	water	and	proximity	to	water	(Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012).19			Human	population	density	in	urban	and	rural	environments	is	associated	with	H5N1	risk	in	poultry	(Farnsworth	et	al.	2011;	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012;	Loth	et	al.	2011;	Loth	et	al.	2010;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Martin,	Zhou,	et	al.	2011).	Other	anthropogenic	factors	include	the	density	of	road	networks,	(Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012),	which	are	identified	as	risk	factors	in	Bangladesh	(Loth	et	al.	2010),	China	(Fang	et	al.	2008),	Thailand	(Paul	et	al.	2010),	and	Viet	Nam	(Pfeiffer	et	al.	2007).	Road	density	is	also	significantly	associated	with	outbreaks	in	poultry	in	West	Java,	Indonesia	(Yupiana	et	al.	2010,	e803).	In	Java,	Sumatra,	and	Bali,	road	length,	human	settlements,	market	locations,	and	transport	were	significantly	related	to	H5N1	disease	events	in	backyard	poultry	(Loth	et	al.	2011).	In	Bali,	frequent	transport	of	poultry	in	and	out	of	villages	is	a	risk	factor	for	outbreaks	among	domestically	raised	chickens	and	ducks	(Santhia	et	al.	2009).			Ducks	can	harbour	H5N1	asymptomatically	and	can	shed	high	concentrations	of	virus	for	extended	periods.	In	analysing	existing	studies	on	risk	factors,	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	state	that,	while	not	all	studies	found	associations	between	the	density	of	ducks	and	H5N1,	the	“factor	found	to	be	most	frequently	associated	with	HPAI	H5N1	presence	was	the	density	of	ducks”,	with	a	positive	association	found	across	most	countries	(2012).	In	brief,	ducks	appear	to	act	as	reservoir	for	H5N1	viruses,	and	are	likely	central	to	the	maintenance	and	dissemination	of	these	viruses	in	endemic	countries.			A	final	risk	factor	identified	across	studies	was	the	presence	of	water.	Discussed	above	in	relation	to	environmental	contamination,	H5N1	viruses	can	live	for	days	in	water.	As	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	(2012)	suggest,	this	may	help	explain	why	water	is																																																									19	This	is	not	an	exhaustive	review	of	risk	factors	for	poultry.	Indeed,	other	studies	identify	several	additional	factors	associated	with	H5N1	outbreaks	in	poultry,	including,	for	example,	the	presence	of	fighting	cocks	(Tiensin	et	al.	2009),	cultural	holidays,	such	as	Chinese	New	Year	(Soares	Magalhães	et	al.	2012)	and	Vietnamese	New	Year	(Pfeiffer	et	al.	2007;	Minh	et	al.	2009),	interactions	between	wild	birds	and	poultry	(Biswas	et	al.	2008),	and	bird	slaughtering	in	live	bird	markets	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	The	aim	of	this	section	is	not	to	identify	every	factor	associated	with	disease	in	poultry,	but	to	identify	broad	patterns	and	factors	associated	with	risk	across	countries.	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	and	analysis	of	these	different	factors	associated	with	H5N1	risk	in	poultry	see	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	(2012).	
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associated	with	H5N1	risk:	perhaps	ducks	shed	virus	into	streams	and	waterways	in	which	other	birds,	and	in	particular	chickens,	rely	on	for	drinking	water.	Having	established	prominent	factors	associated	with	disease	in	poultry,	the	next	section	focuses	on	avian	influenza	A	H5N1	in	humans,	highlighting	that	while	occasional	poultry-to-human	transmission	continues,	there	is	considerable	debate	about	the	actual	risks	associated	with	H5N1	and	human	health.	
H5N1	and	risks	to	human	health	In	human	history,	there	have	been	several	infamous	influenza	pandemics	resulting	from	the	genetic	reassortment	of	human	and	avian	influenza	viruses	(Q.	Liu,	Liu,	and	Yang	2013).	There	is	great	concern	about	avian	influenza	A	H5N1	because	it	continues	to	infect	humans	with	a	high	fatality	rate	and	is	considered	to	have	the	potential	to	mix	with	another	influenza	virus	and	evolve	into	a	strain	that	readily	transmits	between	people.	The	first	known	human	case	of	H5N1	was	identified	in	a	child	in	Hong	Kong	in	May	1997,	and	was	followed	later	in	the	year	with	17	additional	human	cases,	and	6	resulting	deaths	(Claas	et	al.	1998).	The	next	human	case	was	not	diagnosed	until	late	2003,	and	from	then	to	June	2015	there	have	been	842	diagnosed	human	infections	with	H5N1	reported	to	the	WHO,	with	447	deaths	(Table	1).	Most	reported	infections	and	deaths	have	been	in	three	countries:	Egypt,	Indonesia,	and	Vietnam.	While	Indonesia	long	reported	the	highest	number	of	human	H5N1	infections,	cases	in	Egypt	now	surpass	those	in	Indonesia,	following	a	surge	of	new	infections	in	late-2014	and	2015.20			There	are	debates	as	to	whether	the	numbers	presented	in	Table	1	accurately	represent	the	number	of	people	who	have	been	infected	with	H5N1,	and	those	who	died	as	a	result.	These	debates	focus	in	large	measure	on	the	case	fatality	ratio	(CFR)	-	the	number	of	deaths	from	the	disease	divided	by	the	number	of	known	cases	of	the	disease	confirmed	using	WHO	guidelines.21	The	CFR	is	important	because	it	is	used	to	provide	an	indication	about	how	dangerous	a	virus	is	to	humans,	which	is	in	turn	used	to	inform	policy	makers.22	The	CFR	for	humans	infected	with	H5N1	is	over	fifty	percent	globally,	and	exceeds	80	percent	for	those	infected	in	Indonesia	(M.	D.																																																									20	Source:		http://www.emro.who.int/surveillance-forecasting-response/surveillance-news/avian-influenza-ah5n1-in-egypt-9-april-2015.html	Accessed:	April	9,	2015.	21	Source:	WHO	case	definitions	for	human	infections	with	influenza	A(H5N1)	virus,	available	at:	http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/case_definition2006_08_29/en/	Accessed:	April	10,	2015.	For	a	human	case	of	H5N1	to	be	confirmed	along	these	WHO	guidelines,	they	must	be	presenting	with	unexplained	acute	respiratory	illness	with	temperatures	about	38	degrees	Celsius,	and,	in	the	previous	seven	days,	for	example,	have	had	contact	with	somebody	infected,	exposure	to	infected	poultry,	their	by-products,	or	a	potentially	contaminated	environment,	or	consumed	uncooked	poultry	in	an	area	with	known	outbreaks	in	animals.	As	discussed	above,	these	guidelines	are	critiqued	by	Palese	and	Wang	(2012)	as	too	restrictive,	failing	to	capture	many	cases	that	do	not	seek	medical	assistance	at	hospitals,	or	assistance	at	hospitals	that	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	accurately	diagnose	H5N1	infection	or	draw	samples	to	send	to	a	WHO-approved	laboratory.	22	The	CFR	of	H5N1	was	at	the	centre	of	considerations	of	whether	or	not	to	publish	the	controversial	studies	on	the	modification	of	the	H5N1	virus	that	made	it	more	readily	able	transmit	between	ferrets	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012).	For	extrapolating	human	health	implications	of	influenza	A	viruses	like	H5N1,	ferrets	are	the	most	ideal	laboratory	mammal	for	studying	virus-host	interactions	of	infection	(Belser,	Katz,	and	Tumpey	2011).	
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Van	Kerkhove	2013;	Adisasmito	et	al.	2013;	Patel	et	al.	2014).	Such	numbers	suggest	that	H5N1	is	an	exceptional	risk	to	human	health,	especially	in	Indonesia,	with	most	of	those	infected	likely	to	die.			Table	1:	Cumulative	number	of	confirmed	human	H5N1	cases	and	resulting	deaths	reported23	to	WHO	2003	–	23	June	201524	
Country	 Cases	 Death	Azerbaijan		 8	 5	Bangladesh	 7	 1	Cambodia	 56	 37	Canada	 1	 1	China	 52	 31	Djibouti	 1	 0	Egypt	 344	 114	Indonesia	 199	 167	Iraq	 3	 2	Lao	People’s	Democratic	Republic	 2	 2	Myanmar	 1	 0	Nigeria	 1	 1	Pakistan	 3	 1	Thailand	 25	 17	Turkey	 12	 4	Vietnam	 127	 64	
Total	 842	 447			There	is	considerable	debate,	however,	about	whether	the	case	fatality	rate	is	accurate.	Both	the	numerator	–	the	number	of	known	deaths	from	the	disease	–	and	the	denominator	–	the	number	of	known	cases	–	used	to	calculate	the	CFR	are	subject	to	error.	These	numbers	can	be	affected	by	the	capacity	of	different	health	systems	and	populations’	utilization	and	access	to	health	care,	in	that	not	all	hospitals	will	be	able	to	provide	accurate	diagnosis	of	H5N1	cases	and	not	all	people	will	be	willing	or	able	to	seek	medical	assistance.	Some	argue	that	the	CFR	of	H5N1	reported	by	the	WHO	is	“likely	orders	of	magnitude	too	high“	(Palese	and	Wang	2012,	2212),	failing	to	capture	potentially	“millions”	of	subclinical	cases	that	go																																																									23	Reporting	of	H5N1	cases	in	humans	to	WHO	varies	by	country.	Indonesia	reports	bi-annually	whereas	other	countries	report	each	month.	This	has	the	effect	of	delaying	true	comparisons	across	countries	to	the	mid-point	and	end	of	each	year.		24	Source:	http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_	archives/en/Accessed:	July	4,	2015;	Updated	numbers	from	Egypt	reported	at:	http://www.emro.who.int/surveillance-forecasting-response/surveillance-news/avian-influenza-ah5n1-in-egypt-9-april-2015.html	Accessed:	April	9,	2015.			
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undiagnosed,	many	of	which	may	occur	in	rural	areas	away	from	medical	systems	equipped	to	diagnose	H5N1	infection	or	send	specimens	to	WHO-approved	laboratories	for	confirmation	(T.	T.	Wang,	Parides,	and	Palese	2012).	The	inclusion	of	missed	cases	could	alter	both	the	numerator	and	the	denominator	significantly	and	may,	as	a	result,	lead	the	CFR	to	drop	dramatically.	While	there	is	broad	agreement	that	some	infections	and	deaths	of	human	H5N1	are	being	missed	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012),	others	argue	that	there	is	little	evidence	to	suggest	a	substantial	number	of	infections	are	going	undiagnosed	or	unreported	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012;	Osterholm	and	Kelley	2012;	Toner	and	Adalja	2012).	In	short,	the	reported	CFR	is	challenged	by	observations	about	the	reliability	of	existing	data	on	diagnosed	cases	and	deaths.			One	way	of	checking	whether	a	vast	number	of	cases	are	being	missed	is	through	serological,	or	seroprevalence	studies.	In	humans,	seroprevalence	studies	seek	to	determine	how	many	people	have	serologic	evidence	of	past	infection	with	H5N1	by	analysing	their	sera	for	the	existence	of	antibodies	(van	Kerkhove	et	al	2012).25	In	doing	so,	seroprevalence	studies	can	provide	an	indication	of	past	infections	in	humans,	and	suggest	whether	the	denominator	in	the	CFR	is	accurate.	Seroprevalence	studies	are,	however,	subject	to	their	own	limitations	and	weaknesses:	they	cannot	precisely	identify	when	or	how	somebody	was	infected,	and	they	may	not	be	sensitive	enough	to	pick	up	all	past	infections	as	the	presence	of	antibodies	may	become	undetectable	over	time	(Buchy	et	al.	2010).	Furthermore,	seroprevalence	tests	for	H5N1	are	not	always	reliable:	“Some	tests	are	plagued	by	false	positives,	others	by	false	negatives;	some	may	cross-react	with	other	influenza	viruses,	and	there	may	be	limited	correlation	among	the	different	tests”	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012,	238).	Some	caution	against	“over-interpretation”	of	limited	seroprevalence	data,	underscoring	that	serological	evidence	alone	does	not	confirm	acute	infections	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012).	They	are	also	rarely	generalizable	across	populations,	as	most	studies	examine	a	particular	demographic	considered	at	an	elevated	risk	for	exposure	and	infection	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013)26,	such	as	people	who	raise	or	work	with	poultry	(Ahsan	et	al.	1999;	Santhia	et	al.	2009;	M.	Wang,	Fu,	and	Zheng	2009;	Huo	et	al.	2012;	Schultsz	et	al.	2009;	Uyeki	et	al.	2012;	Ortiz	et	al.	2007;	Kwon	et	al.	2012;	Nasreen	et	al.	2015),	health	care	workers	and	social	contacts	exposed	to	known	human	cases	(Bridges	et	al.	2000;	Schultsz	et	al.	2005;	Apisarnthanarak	et	al.	2005;	Liem	and	Lim	2005),	and	households	and	communities	with	known	outbreaks	in	humans	and	poultry	(Vong	et	al.	2009;	Katz	et	al.	1999;	Dejpichai	et	al.	2009).	Nonetheless,	while	much	remains	unknown	about	H5N1	in	humans,	seroprevalence	studies	provide	an	important	retrospective	analysis	about	the	extent	to	which	a	particular	demographic	has	been	infected.																																																										25	Different	methods	are	used	in	different	serological	studies	in	humans.	The	criteria	for	serosurveys	promoted	by	the	WHO	is	considered	most	likely	to	identify	“true	positives”	(Toner	et	al.	2013,	2),	and	thus	upheld	as	the	standard.	For	more	on	this	see	Toner	and	colleagues	(2013).	26	In	a	seroprevalence	study	in	China	that	can	be	extrapolated	more	widely,	no	antibodies	to	H5N1	were	identified	(Zhang	et	al.	2011).	
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Regardless	of	demographic,	most	studies	find	either	no	evidence,	or	low	levels	of	seroprevalence	-	<3%	-	even	among	those	who	are	consistently	in	the	presence	of	poultry	in	endemic	countries	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013).	For	example,	seroprevalence	studies	in	Indonesia	–	one	in	Bali	(Santhia	et	al.	2009),	and	one	in	Java	(Robert	et	al.	2010)	-	found	no	evidence	of	previous	infection	with	H5N1,	despite	routine	exposure	to	poultry	among	participants.	Indeed,	“even	intense	serological	investigations”	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012,	1506–b)	following	human	cases	of	H5N1	found	very	few,	if	any,	undiagnosed	cases.	That	people	who	rear,	sell,	and	slaughter	poultry	in	endemic	countries	do	not	show	more	systemic	evidence	of	past	infections	in	seroprevalence	studies	suggests	that	currently	circulating	H5N1	viruses	cannot	easily	infect	humans.		Seroprevalence	appears	to	be	higher	in	studies	that	examine	early	genotypes	of	H5N1,	such	as	Clade	O,	the	virus	responsible	for	disease	events	in	poultry	and	humans	in	Hong	Kong	in	1997	(Toner	et	al.	2013).	Looking	at	seroprevalence	among	poultry	workers	in	Hong	Kong	at	that	time,	Bridges	and	colleagues	(2002),	for	example,	found	roughly	3	percent	of	their	sample	to	have	evidence	of	past	infection.	Similar	rates	were	isolated	among	health	care	workers	who	were	exposed	to	H5N1	positive	patients	in	1997	-	evidence	that	the	virus	was	then	potentially	capable	of	transmitting	between	people	(Bridges	et	al.	2000).	Clade	0,	however,	has	not	been	detected	since	1997.	And	while	currently	circulating	strains	are	thought	to	have	reassorted	from	this	virus,	serological	studies	since	that	time	identify	few	positive	cases,	suggesting	that	Clade	0	may	have	been	more	infectious	for	people	than	contemporary	H5N1	viruses	(Toner	et	al.	2013).	Although	there	appear	to	be	“differences	in	the	death	rates	associated	with	these	different	clades”	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012,	237),	and	by	age	and	by	country	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012),	whether	these	differences	are	in	part	or	wholly	attributed	to	genetic	features	or	to	differences	in	utilization	and	quality	of	health	care	is	unclear.			Existing	serologic	evidence	suggest	it	is	unlikely	that	there	are	large	numbers	of	mild	or	asymptomatic	-	and	unreported	-	human	H5N1	infections	(Patel	et	al.	2014),	and	that,	at	present,	H5N1	viruses	do	not	easily	transmit	to	humans.	Nonetheless,	the	severity	of	illness	and	mortality	associated	with	H5N1	infection	in	humans	remains	concerning:	“Even	if	infections	were	being	under-ascertained	by	a	factor	of	60…	natural	H5N1	viruses	would	still	be	100	times	as	lethal	as	the	2009	H1N1	pandemic	virus”	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2012,	1506–b).	Despite	the	relatively	low	likelihood	of	becoming	infected	with	H5N1,	the	high	fatality	rate,	and	concerns	that	only	a	few	mutations	may	make	H5N1	more	capable	of	human-to-human	transmission	(Horby	et	al.	2013),	makes	it	important	to	question	whether	there	are	certain	characteristics	associated	with	infection	and	mortality.			There	is	variability	in	the	clinical	presentation	of	human	infections	with	different	influenza	viruses.	When	humans	are	infected	with	H5N1,	the	incubation	period	–	the	time	when	somebody	is	infected	but	not	presenting	clinically	–	is	around	four	days	to	one	week.	Common	to	H5N1	infections	is	severe	pneumonia,	and	progression	to	respiratory	failure	that	requires	assisted	ventilation,	with	many	patients	dying	from	
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organ	failure	(Q.	Liu,	Liu,	and	Yang	2013).	Men	may	be	more	at	risk	for	infection	with	H5N1	than	women,	however,	among	those	diagnosed,	women	appear	to	be	more	at	risk	of	dying	from	infection	(Mertz	et	al.	2014).	The	median	age	of	human	cases	is	18	years.	There	is	a	greater	likelihood	of	survival	for	those	who	are	infected	and	under	4.5	years	of	age,	especially	in	Indonesia	(Patel	et	al.	2014).	Overall,	people	who	are	infected	in	Egypt	are	more	likely	to	survive	than	those	infected	elsewhere	(Patel	et	al.	2014),	suggesting	disease	severity	and	mortality	may	be	in	part	related	to	different	clades.	There	appears	to	be	increased	disease	severity	and	mortality	associated	with	delays	in	seeking	medical	treatment	in	Indonesia	(Adisasmito	et	al.	2013)	and	China	(Yuen	et	al.	1998);	it	is	not	known	if	this	is	the	case	elsewhere.	Starting	antiviral	therapeutics	early	is	associated	with	decreased	disease	severity	and	mortality	(Chan	et	al.	2012;	Adisasmito	et	al.	2010);	the	topic	of	treatment	for	human	H5N1	infection	is	taken	up	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	3.	Smoking	does	not	appear	to	be	associated	with	increased	risk	of	death	from	H5N1,	although	it	may	increase	risk	of	infection	(Bridges	et	al.	2002).	There	may	also	be	genetic	and	immunologic	determinants	that	influence	disease	transmission	and	the	severity	of	human	infection	with	influenza	viruses,	although	this	remains	largely	understudied	(Horby	et	al.	2013).	Ultimately,	as	few	data	are	generalizable,	much	remains	unknown	about	different	demographic	indicators,	comorbidities,	and	other	risk	factors	associated	with	human	H5N1	infection	and	mortality	across	different	countries,	and	different	clades	(Patel	et	al.	2014;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013).	Wider	environmental	and	seasonal	factors	may,	however,	play	a	role	in	avian	influenza	transmission	in	both	human	and	avian	cases	(Mathur	et	al.	2014;	Durand	et	al.	2015).			Consistent	with	increased	disease	events	in	poultry,	the	majority	of	human	H5N1	infections	occur	during	the	winter,	when	temperatures	decrease	(Mathur	et	al.	2014).	Epidemiological	studies	find	that	the	majority	of	human	H5N1	infections	are	generally	associated	with	exposure	to	live	virus	from	sick	or	dead	birds,	contact	with	contaminated	fomites,	or	indirect	transmission	in	contaminated	environments	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011;	Patel	et	al.	2014).	Though	contact	with	infected	wild	birds	is	a	risk	for	human	infection	(Gilsdorf	et	al.	2006),	most	human	cases	come	from	exposure	to	sick	or	dead	domesticated	poultry.	In	Viet	Nam,	for	example,	preparing	sick	poultry,	or	having	sick	or	dead	poultry	in	the	household,	are	factors	associated	with	human	H5N1	infection	(Dinh	et	al.	2006;	Thorson	et	al.	2006).	Similar	findings	are	reported	from	Thailand	(Areechokchai	et	al.	2006),	and	China	(Zhou	et	al.	2009).	The	majority	of	human	H5N1	infections	in	Indonesia	are	also	associated	with	contact	with	sick	or	dead	poultry	(Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Sedyaningsih	et	al.	2007).		Human-to-human	transmission	of	most	influenza	A	viruses	primarily	occur	via	exposure	to	respiratory	droplets	of	infected	individuals	that	are	aerosolized	when	they	cough	or	sneeze	(Cowling	et	al.	2013).	Whether	H5N1	can	transmit	between	humans	in	this	way,	however,	is	debated.	Of	the	few	suspected	cases	of	human-to-human	transmission,	most	have	occurred	between	blood	relatives	(Aditama	et	al.	2012;	Aditama	et	al.	2011;	H.	Wang	et	al.	2008;	Gilsdorf	et	al.	2006;	Kandun	et	al.	
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2006).	It	is	not	certain,	however,	if	these	clusters	of	infections	resulted	from	human-to-human	transmission	or	exposure	to	a	common	non-human	source.	Some	challenge	suspected	cluster	infections,	urging	consideration	of	the	many	indirect	ways	that	humans	can	become	exposed	to	virus	from	sick	poultry,	for	example,	through	touching	unwashed	hands,	cooking	utensils,	and	consuming	food	(Lee	2007).	In	this	way,	a	number	of	infections	can	occur	within	a	family	that	resembles	a	cluster	infection	–	suggesting	human-to-human	transmission	–	though	the	true	cause	may	be	environmental	contamination.	However,	as	most	suspected	cluster	infections	occur	between	blood	relatives,	there	may	also	be	genetic	and/or	immunological	influences	on	transmission	(Horby	et	al.	2013).	While	aerosol	transmission	of	H5N1	remains	a	potential	threat	and	great	concern	(Herfst	et	al.	2012;	Cowling	et	al.	2013),	H5N1	has	not	been	found	to	readily	transmit	via	an	airborne	route	(Lee	2007).27		More	indirect	routes	are	not	well	understood	but	there	is	evidence	of	human	infections	resulting	from	contact	with	virus	in	contaminated	environments,	such	as	water	used	for	swimming	and	bathing	(Cavailler	et	al.	2010;	Vong	et	al.	2009).	Faeces	from	infected	birds	that	is	used	for	fertilizer	may	also	present	a	risk	for	human	infection	(Kandun	et	al.	2010).	Such	contamination	results	from	the	fact	that	H5N1	can	live	outside	of	a	host	species,	for	example,	on	fomites	(Indriani	et	al.	2010),	in	rainwater	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Nicholls,	et	al.	2012),	dust	(Spekreijse	et	al.	2012),	and	mud	and	soil	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Sorn,	et	al.	2012)	for	days,	depending	on	a	range	of	factors	such	as	temperature.	Live	bird	markets	that	house	and	slaughter	birds	on	site	can	provide	an	optimum	environment	for	viral	maintenance	and	replication,	and	have	been	associated	with	avian	influenza	transmission	in	poultry	and	in	people	(Webster	2004;	Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	T.	Anderson	et	al.	2010;	Mounts	et	al.	1999).	When	Hong	Kong	experienced	the	first	outbreak	of	H5N1	in	1997,	6	of	18	infected	individuals	were	believed	to	have	been	infected	in	LBMs.	Exposure	to	poultry	at	these	markets	has	been	associated	with	a	four-fold	increase	of	risk	for	infection	(Mounts	et	al.	1999).28	Indonesian	live	bird	markets	have	been	linked	with	human	cases	of	H5N1	(Kandun	et	al.	2008),	and	in	LBMs	across	the	archipelago	surfaces	used	for	housing,	selling,	and	slaughtering	poultry	have	tested	positive	for	H5N1	contamination	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	Indonesian	LBMs	most	commonly	contaminated	were	those	that	have																																																									27	The	debate	over	transmission	routes	is	contentious	partly	because	its	conclusions	would	require	very	different	public	health	responses	to	H5N1;	as	Brakston	and	colleagues	2007	point	out,	“Necessitating	the	use	of	airborne	precautions	[i.e.	respirators]	during	a	pandemic	would	require	extraordinary	resources	and	substantial	advance	planning;	acknowledgement	of	a	significant	contribution	of	airborne	transmission	will	affect	where	patients	should	be	treated,	how	they	would	be	triaged,	the	use	of	antiviral	agents,	and	the	choice	of	personal	protective	equipment”	(2007,	257).	Gardam	and	Lemieux,	two	authors	of	the	above	paper,	further	urge	caution	in	relation	to	interventions:	“We	remain	concerned	that	billions	of	dollars	will	be	spent	worldwide	on	respirators,	with	little	understanding	of	their	relative	risks	and	benefits	over	surgical	masks	and	control	measures	such	as	hand	hygiene	and	neuraminidase	inhibitors”	(2007,	763).	28	The	virus	responsible	for	this	outbreak	in	Hong	Kong	was	avian	influenza	A	H5N1,	clade	0.	As	discussed	above,	this	clade	may	have	been	more	infectious	and	caused	more	severe	disease	in	humans	than	other	H5N1	clades.		
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slaughtering	facilities	and	those	that	market	ducks.	Other	factors	associated	with	H5N1	contamination	included	the	presence	of	pigeons,	as	well	as	mixed-bird	species	caged	together.	The	areas	found	to	be	most	heavily	contaminated	in	Indonesian	LBMs	were	those	where	birds	are	slaughtered	and	defeathered,	and	where	birds	are	sold	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	The	emergence	of	SARS	in	2003,	as	well	as	the	outbreak	of	H7N9	in	early	2013	underscore	the	central	role	that	LBMs	continue	to	play	in	zoonotic	disease	processes	(H.	Yu	et	al.	2013;	Guan	et	al.	2003).			Behaviours	often	associated	with	human	H5N1	infections	include	visiting	or	working	in	a	LBM,	rearing	poultry,	making	contact	with	sick	and	slaughtered	birds,	swimming	in	contaminated	water,	and	cleaning	faeces	from	bird	cages	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011).	That	these	common	behaviours	–	undertaken	myriad	times	daily	in	many	countries	-	have	not	resulted	in	greater	numbers	of	human	infections	indicates	that	H5N1	still	does	not	easily	transmit	from	poultry	to	people,	or	between	people.	Although	transmission	risk	may	increase	for	those	in	routine	contact	with	high	concentration	of	virus	shed	by	poultry	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013),	human	cases	are	not	diagnosed	near	exclusively	among	people	who	slaughter	and	sell	birds	in	LBMs.	Whether	PWP	have	built-up	immunity	from	past	exposure	to	influenza	viruses,	is	but	one	important	data	gap	that	remains	in	understanding	H5N1	in	humans.			As	this	section	demonstrates,	establishing	the	risk	posed	to	humans	by	H5N1	is	contingent	upon	a	host	of	questions.	The	CFR	provides	one	indication	of	this	risk,	but	is	subject	to	several	key	weaknesses	regarding	an	accurate	calculation	of	the	number	of	known	cases	and	the	number	of	known	deaths.	Seroprevalence	studies	provide	important	data	about	disease	prevalence,	but	are	open	to	distortion	or	error.	From	what	is	known	about	H5N1,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	humans	are	not	highly	susceptible	to	infection.	Yet,	when	human	cases	occur,	they	often	lead	to	death,	especially	in	Indonesia.	And	while	most	people	who	are	infected	with	H5N1	have	contact	with	a	diseased	or	dead	bird,	much	remains	unknown	about	precisely	how	and	when	people	are	infected.	PWP	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	and	are	of	interest	for	understanding	disease	processes,	not	only	because	their	habitual	contact	with	poultry,	but	because	if	sustained	human-to-human	transmission	were	to	occur,	they	may	be	among	the	first	infected.		The	data	discussed	in	this	chapter	represent	available	scientific	evidence	of	the	risks	posed	by	H5N1	for	animals	and	humans.	But	these	data	do	not	exist	in	scientific	isolation	–	they	are	incorporated	into	disease	narratives,	invoked	to	justify	particular	priorities,	and	operationalized	into	policy	responses.	These	narratives	and	their	associated	policy	responses	will	be	the	subject	of	the	next	two	chapters.				
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Chapter	3:	Epidemic	narratives	for	H5N1:	Implications	for	framing	and	
responses			
Introduction	This	chapter	introduces	the	concept	of	“epidemic	narratives”	as	a	way	of	viewing	perspectives	of	a	particular	disease	and	the	pathways	of	response	that	stem	from	these	accounts.	There	are	two	dominant	narratives	of	H5N1.	The	first	focuses	on	the	public	health	implications	of	the	virus	and	frames	avian	influenza	as	a	significant	threat	to	global	public	health,	and	also	global	security	and	the	economy,	with	policy	responses	primarily	emphasizing	the	importance	of	mitigating	human	exposure	and	infection.	The	second	narrative	–	the	animal	health	narrative	-	draws	on	the	absence	of	widespread	animal-to-human	or	human-to-human	transmission	of	the	virus	and	contends	that	the	main	threat	posed	by	H5N1	continues	to	be	in	relation	to	animals,	and	by	extension	the	livelihoods	of	those	dependent	on	poultry	for	production	and	marketing,	and	the	well-being	of	consumers.	Building	on	the	insights	and	priorities	of	both	of	these	narratives,	a	third,	more	recent	narrative	-	the	One	Health	narrative	-	emphasizes	the	importance	of	tackling	the	challenges	posed	by	EID	through	interdisciplinary	collaborative	research	and	programming.	Though	all	of	these	narratives	draw	attention	to	important	aspects	of	avian	influenza,	and	EID	more	generally,	there	are	limitations	and	omissions	within	each	that	are	reflected	in	alternative	narratives,	the	subject	of	the	following	chapter.	
	
Epidemic	narratives	Throughout	history,	disease	events	in	humans	have	triggered	a	range	of	familiar	narratives,	involving	aspects	of	risk,	fear,	blame,	control,	and	prevention,	to	name	but	a	few.	Termed	epidemic	narratives	by	Leach	and	Dry	(2010),	these	accounts	vary	in	how	a	disease	threat	is	defined,	who	is	seen	as	most	affected,	and	what	is	viewed	as	the	most	desirable	response.	These	narratives	are	not	uniform:	different	actors	and	organizations,	professions	and	populations,	can	invoke	divergent,	and	sometimes	competing	narratives	around	the	same	pathogen.	These	narratives	can	also	stigmatize	certain	people,	places,	and	sectors	who	are	seen	as	“at	risk”	of	disease	or	potential	vectors,	all	part	of	an	othering	processes	which	can	lead	to	negative	social,	health	and	economic	impacts	(Leach	and	Dry	2010).	They	can	also	have	other	material	consequences,	in	that	some	narratives	are	elevated	above	others,	and	ultimately	utilized	to	distinguish	and	justify	particular	“pathways	of	response”	(Leach	and	Dry	2010)	-	policies	and	interventions	for	containing	and	controlling	the	spread	and	impacts	of	infectious	diseases.			In	this	thesis,	I	utilize	the	term	epidemic	narratives	as	an	overarching	framing	tool,	under	which	a	range	of	narratives	focusing	on	avian	influenza	can	be	distinguished	and	discussed.	Attention	to	dominant	and	policy	informing	narratives	circulating	around	H5N1	–	the	subject	of	this	chapter	-	highlights	those	which	remain	
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marginalized,	including	narratives	about	avian	influenza	among	those	working	at	the	human-animal	interface;	these	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	4:	Alternative	
epidemic	narratives.	Notably,	these	narratives	often	differ	significantly	in	their	constructions	of	the	risk	associated	with	H5N1,	in	what	Keck	conceptualizes	as	different	“rationalities	of	risk”	(2008,	209).	There	is	indeed	no	agreed	upon	typology	for	epidemic	narratives.			Though	many	epidemic	narratives	exist,	dominant	conceptualizations	of	emerging	infectious	diseases	are	as	“outbreak	narratives”	(Wald	2008).	“In	its	scientific,	journalistic,	and	fictional	incantations”	outbreak	narratives	“follow	a	formulaic	plot	that	begins	with	the	identification	of	an	emerging	infection,	[and]	includes	discussion	of	the	global	networks	throughout	which	it	travels,	and	chronicles	the	epidemiological	work	that	ends	with	its	containment”	(Wald	2008,	2).	Often	commonly	embedded	within	outbreak	narratives	are	the	identification	of	risk	groups	and	localities	where	disease	is	said	to	flourish.	Particular	populations	and	places	become	framed	as	diseased	or	as	potential	vectors	and,	in	a	globalized	era	of	interconnectedness	and	rapid	transport,	the	communities	and	localities	from	where	pathogens	are	said	to	emerge	become	discussed	as	near-neighbours	that	can	threaten	global	public	health	security	and	the	wider	economy;	HIV	and	AIDS	and	severe	acute	respiratory	syndrome	(SARS)	are	prime	examples	of	how	a	once	localized	disease	event	can	spread	globally	to	impact	divergent	societies	and	economies.			Narratives	about	avian	influenza	(H5N1)	have	followed	this	tradition,	with	dominant	outbreak	narratives	focused	on	the	disease	as	a	significant	threat	to	global	health	and	security.	Scoones	and	Forster	(2010)	identify	several	different	outbreak	narratives	circulating	around	H5N1.29	The	two	most	dominant	narratives	focus	on	human	public	health	and	animal	health	respectively.	Of	these	narratives,	public	health	commands	the	most	attention	and	resources.	This	chapter	identifies	and	discusses	the	implications	of	these	two	dominant	narratives,	paying	particular	attention	to	their	material	consequences	by	examining	–	and	problematizing	-	the	pathways	of	response	(Leach	and	Dry	2010)	that	stem	from	them;	when	appropriate,	I	make	reference	to	these	programmes	in	Indonesia.	In	doing	so,	following	Leach	and	Dry,	I	aim	to	“make	explicit	some	of	the	implicit	assumptions	that	shape	scientific	and	policy	perspectives”	(2010,	4).	While	these	two	dominant	narratives	characterize	early	responses	to	avian	influenza,	more	recently	they	have	coalesced	around	a	third	narrative,	found	in	the	One	Health	approach.	Apart	from	these	dominant	narratives,	alternative	narratives	have	also	been	documented,	with	most	focusing	on	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	people	at	the	human-animal																																																									29	Scoones	and	Forster	(2010)	identify	a	third	dominant	narrative	they	term	preparedness.	For	them,	this	narrative	centers	on	the	notion	that	“a	major	economic	and	humanitarian	disaster	is	around	the	corner	and	we	must	be	prepared”,	and	is	represented	by	a	wide	network	of	businesses,	different	government	agencies,	humanitarian	organizations,	and	civil	society	groups.	While	preparedness	planning	for	avian	influenza	has	been	impressive	–	and	extensive	–	I	do	not	elaborate	further	on	this	narrative	here	because	I	see	the	preparedness	narrative	as	representing	perspectives	and	response	pathways	that	largely	dovetail	with	the	other	two	dominant	narratives.	
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interface.	This	chapter	concludes	the	discussion	of	dominant	narratives	about	H5N1	and	leads	into	the	following	chapter’s	discussion	of	some	alternative	narratives	in	order	to	identify	a	unique	contribution	that	this	research	makes	towards	understanding	the	construction	of	risk	and	behaviours	among	people	who	work	in	live	bird	markets	in	Indonesia.		
The	public	health	narrative	The	public	health	narrative	for	H5N1	focuses	on	the	potential	for	the	virus	to	evolve	to	a	form	that	readily	transmits	between	humans,	and	derives	from	projections	of	potential	mortality	rates,	coupled	with	knowledge	of	influenza’s	infamous	past.	Though	influenza	viruses	have	been	a	regular	feature	in	recorded	human	history,	the	scale	of	the	1918-1919	pandemic,	where	estimates	suggest	40	to	100	million	people	died	(Johnson	and	Mueller	2002),	has	cast	a	long	shadow	over	public	debate	and	policy.	Consideration	of	the	contemporary	ease	of	mass	transport	and	the	increasing	interconnectedness	of	the	global	economy	has	fuelled	attempts	to	estimate	how	many	people	may	die	from	a	pandemic	similar	to	that	of	1918-1919	if	it	occurred	today:	these	range	from	175-350	million	deaths	(Osterholm	2005).30			Alongside	projections	of	potential	mortality	rates	are	wider	fears	that	the	virus	poses	an	existential	threat	to	global	public	health,	the	wider	economy,	and	security,	with	some	concerned	over	the	potentially	for	avian	influenza	to	be	deployed	as	a	bioweapon.31	Taken	together,	these	concerns	have	helped	align	the	human	public	health	narrative	with	the	securitization	of	the	virus.	Securitization	is	defined	as	the	process	by	which	an	issue	is	“presented	as	an	existential	threat	requiring	emergency	measures	and	justifying	actions	outside	the	normal	bounds	of	political	procedure"	(Buzan,	Waever,	and	de	Wilde	1998,	23–24).	The	securitization	of	avian	influenza	has	helped	shape	preferred	interventions,	and	is	apparent	in	policy	documents	and	popular	commentary.		When	H5N1	was	found	to	have	spread	across	much	of	Asia,	and	later	to	countries	in	Africa	and	Europe,	the	virus	was	already	anchored	to	the	legacy	of	the	1918	pandemic	(Institute	of	Medicine	(US)	Forum	on	Microbial	Threats	2005,	10).	Echoing	these	concerns,	in	2007,	the	World	Health	Organization	labelled	the	H5N1	virus	among	“the	most	feared	security	threat[s]”	(World	Health	Organisation	2007,																																																									30	In	contrast	to	the	predominantly	negative	projections	stemming	from	the	1918	outbreak,	Houssin	draws	attention	to	the	comparative	advantages	of	the	present	day:	“Contrary	to	1918	we	are	not	in	a	situation	that	leaves	us	entirely	unarmed.	In	1918,	our	grandparents	did	not	even	know	it	was	a	virus,	they	had	no	capacity	for	identification,	and	they	had	no	way	to	fight	or	prevent	this	phenomenon.	We	are	not	in	the	same	situation.	Today	we	have	a	network	of	surveillance	and	epidemiology	that,	even	if	it	is	not	perfect,	has	a	certain	capacity	to	react.	We	know	it	is	a	virus.	We	even	know	it	intimately.	We	know	its	genome	from	A	to	Z.	We	are	able	to	produce	and	transmit	information	rapidly”	(2006,	36).	31	See,	for	example,	the	debates	regarding	the	publication	of	the	two	scientific	papers	(Herfst	et	al.	2012;	Imai	et	al.	2012)	mentioned	in	the	first	chapter	describing	the	molecular	changes	required	for	H5N1	to	mutate	so	as	to	be	able	to	transmit	between	mammals	via	respiratory	droplets	(Doherty	and	Thomas	2012).		
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45).	An	impending	influenza	pandemic	leading	to	a	global	catastrophe	was	almost	assumed:			 Virtually	every	expert	on	influenza	believes	another	pandemic	is	nearly		 inevitable,	that	it	will	kill	millions	of	people,	and	that	it	could	kill	tens	of		 millions	–	and	a	virus	like	1918,	or	H5N1,	might	kill	a	hundred	million	or		 more	–	and	that	it	could	cause	economic	and	social	disruption	on	a		 massive	scale.	This	disruption	itself	could	kill	as	well	(Barry	2005,	5).		Similar	concerns	permeated	public	discussion	and	the	media.	Writing	in	2005,	United	States’	Senators	Barack	Obama	and	Richard	Lugar	penned	an	editorial	arguing	that	avian	influenza	“could	cause	millions	of	deaths,	destabilize	southeast	Asia	(its	likely	place	of	origin),	and	threaten	the	security	of	governments	around	the	world”	(Obama	and	Lugar	2005).	These	fears	were	shared	in	the	United	Kingdom,	with	some	officials	deeming	H5N1	“as	serious	a	threat	as	terrorism”	(Lean	2005).	Writing	in	Military	Medicine,	Feldman	and	colleagues	(2007)	multiplied	the	security	threat	of	old	and	new	pandemics,	arguing	that	co-infection	of	HIV	and	AIDS	and	H5N1	could	result	in	military	and	political	instability	in	Africa.	Science	journalist	Laurie	Garrett	argued	for	ever	more	securitization	as	a	way	of	preparing	to	meet	the	threat	of	a	future	influenza	pandemic	(2005).			Beyond	potential	morbidity	and	mortality	rates,	significant	economic	costs	were	associated	with	the	virus	(Herring	and	Lockerbie	2010).	When	H5N1	was	first	diagnosed,	Asia’s	poultry	industry	was	growing	rapidly	to	meet	demand	for	increasingly	urbanized	populations	in	Asia	and	further	abroad:	between	1994	and	2004	the	number	of	birds	raised	for	consumption	in	Asia	rose	from	4	billion	to	16	billion	(Liverani	et	al.	2013;	Nikiforuk	2005).	As	outbreaks	of	H5N1	in	poultry	were	diagnosed	across	parts	of	Asia	and	beyond,	disease	control	efforts	were	undertaken	at	a	great	economic	cost.	In	Viet	Nam,	for	example,	in	2003-2004	approximately	45	million	birds	were	culled,	with	losses	estimated	at	US	$118	million	(Rushton	et	al.	2005).	Estimates	suggest	that	agricultural	growth	in	Thailand	halved	as	a	result	of	H5N1	in	poultry	in	2003-2004	(FAO	2004).	The	cost	of	H5N1	in	Hong	Kong	in	1997	is	estimated	at	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	(FAO	2004).	Approximately	150	million	poultry	have	been	culled	since	2003,	causing	a	loss	of	$470	million	(Pongcharoensuk	et	al.	2012).	Early	estimates	and	projections	suggested	that	H5N1	could	lead	to	a	decrease	in	demand	for	poultry	products	that	could	ultimately	cost	southeast	Asian	countries	upwards	of	US$	280	billion	(E.	Bloom,	Wit,	and	Jose	2005).	The	costs	associated	with	controlling	avian	influenza	in	poultry	do	not	impact	all	sectors	equally	(Coker,	Hunter,	et	al.	2011).	Along	with	agriculture,	other	sectors,	such	as	tourism,	can	also	suffer.	While	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	costs	of	H5N1	to	small-scale	producers,	some	contend	that	these	producers,	and	those	reliant	on	poultry	for	their	livelihoods,	shoulder	the	majority	of	losses	stemming	from	H5N1	in	birds	(Verbiest	and	Castillo	2004).	In	brief,	H5N1	has	been	presented	as	an	extraordinary	threat	to	the	global	bird	trade,	and	to	the	wider	economies	of	many	countries	(Cooper	and	Coxe	2005).				
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Older	concerns	about	the	potential	of	infectious	diseases	to	be	weaponized	and	deployed	in	an	act	of	bioterrorism	resurfaced	(Washer	2010).	H5N1	was	fodder	for	some	public	health	and	national	security	officials	in	the	United	States	who	argued	that	preventing	a	bioterrorist	attack	would	require	further	incorporation	of	the	“agencies	and	institutions	of	the	life	sciences	and	public	health	into	the	national	security	establishment”	(Lakoff	and	Collier	2008).	The	threat	of	a	rogue	state	or	terrorist	organization	deliberately	spreading	an	infectious	disease	agent	continues	to	sway	research	and	policy	on	avian	influenza,	as	seen	recently	in	the	controversy	surrounding	two	studies	in	which	the	H5N1	virus	was	made	more	transmissible	among	ferrets	(To	et	al.	2012).	In	short,	avian	influenza	was	“one	of	the	most	prominent	international	health	issues	to	have	become	securitized	over	the	past	decade”	(Elbe	2010a,	478).			Securitization	can	function	as	an	“accenting	device”	(Snow	and	Benford	1992),	elevating	an	issue	to	be	a	top	political	priority,	forcing	unwilling	governments	to	take	action	(Buzan,	Waever,	and	de	Wilde	1998),	and	can	lead	to	the	re-assignment	of	policies	and	re-allocation	of	resources	(Aldis	2008).	The	securitization	frame	thus	leads	particular	forms	of	evidence	and	research	methodologies	to	be	favoured	and	funded,	in	effect	conferring	“legitimacy	upon	particular	aspects	of	reality	while	marginalizing	other	aspects”	(Lawrence	2000,	93).	Particular	response	pathways	can	follow	and	are	manifest,	in	relation	to	avian	influenza,	in	some	of	the	more	prominent	interventions	to	contain	and	control	the	spread	and	impact	of	the	virus.		
Public	health	narrative:	response	pathways		The	public	health	narrative	for	avian	influenza	-	and	influenza	more	generally	–	favours	and	promotes	‘proven’	preventative	and	therapeutic	interventions,	identified	as	such	by	epidemiological	modelling	data.	As	data	are	often	limited,	especially	at	the	outset	of	a	novel	disease	event,	these	models	combine	historical	and	contemporary	data	to	simulate	different	control	strategies	for	potential	disease	events,	to	ultimately	evaluate	their	efficacy	and	identify	the	“interventions	most	likely	to	impede	the	spread	of	influenza”	(M.	Davis,	Stephenson,	and	Flowers	2011,	5).	Put	another	way,	these	models	rely	on	“heroic	assumptions	–	such	as	diseases	spreading	in	concentric	circles,	the	relative	insignificance	of	borders	of	countries	and	districts,	and	the	easy	prevention	of	people	from	moving”	(I	Scoones	2010,	151)	–	in	making	predictions	about	how	a	disease	event	will	transpire	and	spread,	and	in	predicting	the	ease	and	outcome	of	using	a	particular	intervention.			Influenza	pandemics,	however,	are	unpredictable	events.	In	this	uncertainty,	policy	makers	are	drawn	to	models	to	determine	interventions	because	they	offer	a	degree	of	statistically	assessed	certainty	(Leach	and	Scoones	2013),	allowing	them,	“when	confronted	with	an	existential	threat…	to	justify	expending	scarce	resources	in	purchasing	statistically	validated,	proven	means”	(Kamradt-Scott	2012,	S121)	to	
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protect	public	health.	Leach	and	Scoones32	highlight	how	two	models	of	H5N1	in	Thailand	(Ferguson	et	al.	2005;	Longini	et	al.	2005)	“fed	perfectly	into	the	‘outbreak’	narrative	gripping	policymakers”	(2013,	11),	and	were	used	as	the	base	of	evidence	for	global	bodies	and	national	governments.	These	papers	conclude	that	to	quell	the	spread	of	influenza,	should	it	mutate	to	transmit	between	humans	more	efficiently,	requires	the	rapid	dispersion	of	antivirals	as	prophylaxis,	to	either	everybody	in	a	five	kilometre	radius	of	a	confirmed	case	(Ferguson	et	al.	2005),	or	to	all	those	ill,	as	well	as	their	social	contacts	(Longini	et	al.	2005).33	The	success	of	mass	prophylaxis	is	understood	to	hinge	on	prompt	detection	of	new	cases	as	well	as	the	imposition	of	strict	quarantine	and	other	social	distancing	measures.	This	set	of	interventions	–	surveillance,	antiviral	therapeutics,	and	social	distancing	-	combined	with	vaccine	development	and	other	non-pharmaceutical	measures	have	long	been	affixed	to	the	public	health	narrative	of	influenza,	and	were	favoured	in	public	health	strategies	for	avian	influenza.			Surveillance34	has	been	an	essential	feature	of	pandemic	planning	since	1952,	when	the	Global	Influenza	Surveillance	Network	(GISN)	was	established	with	the	aim	of	connecting	National	Influenza	Centres	(NIC)	located	around	the	world	with	WHO	Collaborating	Centres,	known	as	WHO	reference	labs.35	In	brief,	these	labs	identify	and	categorize	influenza	strains	sent	from	NICs,	ultimately	to	monitor	antigenic	changes	in	influenza	viruses	and	to	develop	vaccines	(WHO	2013).	Today,	surveillance	involves	a	range	of	state	and	non-state	actors	focused	on	detecting	novel	and	recurring	disease	events.36	Detection,	however,	is	not	verification.	Ministries	of	Health	are	primarily	responsible	for	verifying	cases,	and	for	passing	on	viral	samples	to	the	WHO	for	laboratory	confirmation:	processes	that	necessarily	precede	an	intervention,	especially	one	on	the	scale	advocated	by	Ferguson	and	colleagues	(2005).	While	surveillance	is	essential	to	detect	novel	disease	threats,	and	in	developing	preventative	and	therapeutic	pharmaceuticals,	it	suffers	from																																																									32	In	their	discussion	of	the	differing	assumptions	of	each	model,	Leach	and	Scoones	highlight	the	importance	of	considering	the	factors	influencing	the	social	life	of	models.	This	includes	hierarchies	within	and	between	disciplines	that	may	influence	what	data	are	privileged,	and	“scientists’	social	values	and	positions	in	shaping	their	particular	readings	of	the	world”	(2013,	15).	For	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	sociology	of	modeling	see:	(Mansnerus	2013;	Mattila	2005).				33	The	number	of	treatments	deemed	necessary	to	disperse	in	order	to	contain	the	hypothetical	virus	differs	between	the	two	papers:	whereas	Ferguson	and	colleagues	(2005)	suggest	that	1	to	2	million	drug	will	be	required,	Longini	and	colleagues	(2005)	suggest	that	between	100,000	and	1	million	courses	would	be	necessary.		34	Surveillance	systems	extend	beyond	state	and	global	institutions,	to	include	private	companies,	such	as	Google,	who	undertakes	global	syndromic	electronic	surveillance	of	online	search	terms	to	determine	where	disease	events	occur.	Google	describes	their	surveillance	programme:	“We’ve	found	that	certain	search	terms	are	good	indicators	of	flu	activity.	Google	Flu	Trends	uses	aggregated	Google	search	data	to	estimate	current	flu	activity	around	the	world	in	near	real-time.”	See:	http://www.google.org/flutrends/about/how.html	Accessed:	October	19,	2013.	35	From	40	NICs	in	1952,	the	GISN	has	now	grown	to	comprise	135	centres	in	105	countries,	with	six	WHO	reference	labs	in	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	Japan,	China	and	Australia.	36	For	more	information	on	current,	dominant	surveillance	strategies	for	influenza	viruses	see	WHO	2013.	
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bureaucratic	processes.	Despite	the			International	Health	Regulations’37	power	to	pressure	countries	to	share	information	and	samples	from	outbreaks,	surveillance	is	easily	disrupted	by	an	unwillingness	to	report	or	share	data.38			Vaccines	have	been	a	primary	feature	of	the	public	health	narrative	since	the	1950s,	when	developing	a	“safe	and	effective”	vaccine	was	upheld	as	one	of	the	“single	most	important	public	health	tool	for	decreasing	the	morbidity,	mortality,	and	economic	effects”	of	a	potential	influenza	pandemic	(Poland	2006).	Should	human-to-human	transmission	of	H5N1	increase,	vaccines,	“even	if	of	low	efficacy”,	are	promoted	as	an	intervention	that	“could	significantly	reduce	attack	rates”	(Ferguson	et	al.	2006,	448).	Despite	“promising	preclinical	and	clinical	data”	(Pica	and	Palese	2013),	a	universal	influenza	vaccine	remains	aspirational;	virus-specific	vaccines,	or	combination	vaccines,	are	what,	at	present,	are	possible.			Human	vaccines	for	avian	influenza	viruses,	including	H5N1,	have	proven	far	more	difficult	to	develop	than	seasonal	varieties	(Subbarao	and	Joseph	2007).	One	problem	is	that	H5N1	viruses	are	“lethal	to	the	embryonated	egg”	where	they	are	grown,	meaning	that	the	usual	process	of	generating	antigen	using	eggs	is	not	possible.	Thus	with	H5N1,	attenuated	strains	are	developed	through	reverse	genetics,	processes	“which	typically	yield	less	than	half	of	the	antigen	of	that	achieved	with	interpandemic	strains”	(Manzoli	et	al.	2009,	482).	Because	most	populations	are	immunologically	naïve	to	the	virus,	two	doses	of	vaccine	are	considered	necessary	to	elicit	adequate	immunity	(Baz	et	al.	2013).	Two	doses	become	difficult	to	administer	effectively,	as	it	can	take	up	to	6	months	to	develop	an	effective	vaccine	(Ferguson	et	al.	2006).	Some	suggest	manufacturing	capabilities	cannot	exceed	500	million	doses	within	twelve	months	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010),	at	which	time	any	vaccine	would	likely	be	too	late.	In	short,	H5N1	vaccine	development	remains	difficult	because	genetic	and	antigenic	factors	of	different	H5N1	subtypes	are	not	fully	understood,	and	because	manufacturing	capacity	is	limited	(Luke	and	Subbarao	2014).		With	efficient	vaccines	difficult	to	produce,	antiviral	therapeutics	–	and	specifically	
Oseltamavir,	generically	called	Tamiflu	-	were	promoted	by	institutions	informed	by	the	public	health	narrative	as	a	“second,	more	reliable”	(Kamradt-Scott	2012,	S116)	measure	for	treating	those	infected	with	H5N1.	In	part	determined	by	demographic,	clinical,	and	biological	factors,	when	administered	promptly	with	the	onset	of	symptoms,	Oseltamavir	is	upheld	as	the	most	effective	antiviral	for	treating	H5N1	infection	(Chan	et	al.	2012).39	There	are	concerns,	however,	that	an	over-reliance	on	one	antiviral	for	H5N1	infection	could	result	in	drug-resistant	variants	of	avian	
																																																								37	See:	http://www.who.int/ihr/en/.	Accessed,	October	22,	2014.	38	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	in	Chapters	1	and	4	about	the	former	Indonesian	Health	Minister	Supari	refusing	to	share	virus	samples.	For	more	on	this,	see:	(Elbe	2010b).	39	In	2006,	Indonesia	established	a	policy	objective	to	vaccinate	0.5-1%	of	its	population	with	
Oseltamavir	(Pongcharoensuk	et	al.	2012).	
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influenza	(Govorkova	et	al.	2013);	combination	therapies	may	offer	more	efficacious	therapy	(Dunning	et	al.	2014),	but	this	too	requires	more	research.			Exactly	which	clade	will	produce	an	influenza	pandemic	is	of	course	unknown,	making	it	difficult	to	predict	and	manufacture	vaccines	to	adequately	prevent	infection,	or	an	antiviral	for	treatment.	Pursuing	these	strategies,	however,	remain	a	top	priority,	with	vaccines	and	antivirals	seen	as	“the	two	most	important	medical	interventions	for	reducing	illness	and	deaths”	from	influenza	(International	Monetary	Fund	2006,	12).	With	multilateral	bodies	such	as	the	WHO,	the	World	Bank,	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund	“fixated”	(Kamradt-Scott	2012,	S117)	on	the	efficacy	of	vaccines	and	antivirals,	national	governments	were	encouraged	to	prioritize	these	strategies	in	developing	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	plans	(WHO	2005).	Combined	with	the	limitations	of	manufacturing	capacity,	costs	of	production,	and	barriers	to	distribution,	the	preference	for	vaccines	and	antivirals	inevitably	led	to	stockpiling	by	national	governments,	as	well	as	individuals.40	Limited	access	to	vaccine	and	antivirals	raised	ethical	and	moral	questions	about	the	way	in	which	these	finite	interventions	are	dispersed	-	To	whom?	And	in	what	order?	-	in	part	challenging	the	very	notion	that	public	health	is	for	all.			A	less	dominant	response	stemming	from	the	public	health	narrative	focuses	on	non-pharmaceutical	options	like	public	education	and	the	promotion	of	social	distancing	should	a	pandemic	occur.	Public	education	is	a	preventative	strategy	that	aims	to	increase	the	scientific	literacy	of	populations	deemed	to	have	inadequate	knowledge	about	aetiology,	and	preventative	and	therapeutic	measures.	These	strategies	derive	from	the	idea	that	recall	of	some	degree	of	scientific	knowledge	about	a	disease	translates	to	behaviour	change.	In	2006	UNICEF	became	the	UN	agency	responsible	for	altering	people’s	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface	to	prevent	the	emergence	of	a	pandemic	influenza.	Their	behaviour	change	communication	strategy	comprised	of	four	key	messages:	report	sick	or	dead	birds,	cook	poultry	thoroughly,	separate	birds	by	species	and	by	origin,	and	wash	hands	after	any	contact	with	poultry	or	related	by-products.			Though	public	education	campaigns	do	not	command	the	same	attention	or	resources	as	‘proven’	technological	solutions	such	as	vaccines	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010),	they	are	nonetheless	considered	integral	components	of	long-term	preventative	public	health	programming	for	avian	influenza,	especially	where	the	virus	is	endemic	in	poultry.	Yet,	public	education	about	avian	influenza	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	behaviour	change	(Neupane	et	al.	2012),	and	can	have	challenges	in	implementation	(Alders	and	Bagnol	2007).	This	can	be	because	structural	and	social	factors	impede	individuals	from	altering	their	behaviours.	As	UNICEF	recognizes,	“perceptions	of	risk,	poverty,	difficult	living	conditions,	poor	access	to	resources	and	deep-rooted	cultural	practices”	can	“prevent	people	from	
																																																								40	Doses	of	Tamiflu	were	selling	through	the	online	retailer	eBay	far	above	its	original	cost.	
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practicing	safe	behaviours.”41	As	will	be	discussed	in	relation	to	marginalized	disease	narratives,	there	are	also	inherent	limitations	in	seeing	a	population	as	deficient	of	knowledge,	rather	than	as	possessing	certain	unique,	alternative	forms	of	knowledge	arising	from	experience.		Efforts	to	change	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface	draw	attention	to	the	role	that	individuals	play	in	aiding	or	hindering	efforts	to	prevent	or	contain	certain	global	disease	threats.	These	efforts	are	sometimes	cast	in	the	public	health	narrative	in	terms	of	global	public	goods	(GPG).	Global	public	goods	are	defined	as:	“A	good	which	it	is	rational,	from	the	perspective	of	a	group	of	nations	collectively,	to	produce	for	universal	consumption,	and	for	which	it	is	irrational	to	exclude	an	individual	nation	from	consuming,	irrespective	of	whether	that	nation	contributes	to	its	financing”	(Woodward	and	Smith	2003,	9).	Applied	to	avian	influenza,	this	means	that	prevention	and	containment	of	the	disease	benefits	everyone,	irrespective	of	whether	an	individual,	a	community,	or	a	country	actively	and	equally	contributes	to	its	attainment	(R	Smith	and	MacKellar	2007).	Given	that	certain	types	of	behaviours	are	implicated	in	increasing	the	risk	of	avian	influenza	transmission	(Janes	et	al.	2012),	attention	to	global	public	goods	means	that	individuals’	behaviours	cannot	be	considered	solely	their	own	-	what	they	do	has	implications	for	others.			Another	preventative	non-pharmaceutical	intervention	promoted	by	the	public	health	narrative	is	social	distancing,	a	strategy	that	aims	to	keep	people	from	congregating	in	large	numbers.	Manifest	in	the	closure	of	schools,	public	transport,	and	other	settings	where	people	gather,	keeping	people	apart	and	isolated	in	some	US	cities	during	the	1918-1919	pandemic	was	found	to	cut	the	death	rate	by	up	to	half	(Markel	et	al.	2007;	Hatchett,	Mecher,	and	Lipsitch	2007).	These	are	convincing	data	for	policy	makers	who	understand	the	difficulties	in	procuring	and	dispersing	pharmaceutical	options	should	a	pandemic	occur.			Social	distancing,	however,	is	difficult	to	monitor	and	enforce,	and	can	require	active	quarantining	of	infected	individuals	and	others,	as	not	all	people	willingly	oblige	to	the	measure.	The	current	Ebola	epidemic	in	west	Africa	illustrates	that	enforcing	social	distancing	can	require	physical	force	to	make	sure	that	suspected	infected	individuals	are	kept	isolated.42	Thus,	this	may	not	be	a	sustainable	preventative	measure.	Serious	questions	about	the	imperatives	of	human	rights	considerations	versus	those	of	the	global	public	good	arise.	Should	a	generalized	influenza	pandemic	emerge,	social	distancing	would	likely	prove	difficult	to	maintain,	as	not	all	people	will	have	the	resources	to	remain	isolated	for	extended	periods,	and	governments	may	be	unable	to	enforce	such	measures	for	long	periods.																																																										41	See	UNICEF	Communication	Strategies	for	Avian	Influenza:	http://www.unicef.org/avianflu/index_42666.html	Accessed	February	26,	2015.	42	A	video	of	fully-suited	public	health	workers	wrestling	to	constrain	a	suspected	Ebola	infected	individual	to	ensure	he	is	isolated	from	others	is	available	at:	http://www.channel4.com/news/fugitive-ebola-patient-wrestled-into-ambulance-video	Accessed	February	28,	2015.	
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	A	final	response	stemming	from	the	public	health	narrative	articulates	the	need	for	general	strengthening	of	health	systems,	a	long-term	strategy	that	improves	the	ability	to	achieve	and	maintain	certain	global	public	goods	such	as	the	prevention	and	containment	of	certain	communicable	diseases	such	as	avian	influenza.	This	health	systems	approach	focuses	on	building	the	capacity	of	local	health	structures,	particularly	in	places	where	avian	influenza	is	endemic,	so	that	they	are	able	to	diagnose	and	respond	to	localized	disease	events.	This	ambitious	focus	appeals	to	the	notion	of	protecting	public	goods,	in	that	it	argues	for	collective	action	to	promote	health	systems	around	the	world	as	a	means	of	preventing	global	communicable	disease	transmission	(R	Smith	and	MacKellar	2007).	Yet	supporting	health	systems	suffers	from	the	constraints	of	funding	and	political	cycles:	few	governments	are	able	or	willing	to	fund	the	development	of	another	country’s	health	system	over	the	long-term,	especially	when	the	benefits	that	may	accrue	from	such	action	amount	to	the	intangible	absence	of	infection.			As	outlined	above,	the	public	health	narrative	is	the	dominant	outbreak	narrative,	and	is	premised	on	a	construction	of	risk	that	frames	avian	influenza	as	an	existential	threat	to	global	public	health,	the	economy,	and	security.	Focussed	on	mitigating	human	morbidity	and	mortality,	the	public	health	narrative	has	commanded	attention	and	resources.	Predominant	pathways	of	response	are	seen	in	the	various	programmes	and	interventions	which	spawn	from	the	public	health	narrative,	ranging	from	surveillance,	vaccines,	and	therapeutics,	to	non-pharmaceutical	options	such	as	behaviour	change,	social	distancing,	and	developing	health	systems.	While	all	of	these	interventions	form	part	of	a	comprehensive	response	to	avian	influenza,	each	can	be	hampered	in	implementation	because	of	technological,	structural,	and	social	considerations.	Moreover,	as	discussed	below	in	relation	to	biosecurity	and	One	Health,	the	pathways	of	response	are	changing.	As	the	next	section	discusses,	other	narratives	compete	to	shape	priorities	and	direct	policy	for	avian	influenza,	the	most	significant	being	the	animal	health	narrative.			
The	animal	health	narrative	The	emergence	of	H5N1	elevated	the	role	of	veterinarians	in	zoonoses	control,	and	in	turn	fostered	a	dispute	between	the	public	health	and	animal	health	communities	regarding	appropriate	constructions	of	risk	of	avian	influenza,	leading	to	questions	about	how	the	disease	should	be	framed:	Who,	and	what	are	at	risk?;	And	what	are	the	best	responses?	Two	organizations	institutionally	represent	and	promote	the	animal	health	narrative:	the	World	Organization	for	Animal	Health	(OIE)	and	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	(FAO)	of	the	United	Nations.	While	the	human	public	health	narrative	positions	public	health	experts	as	central	to	response	efforts	for	H5N1,	the	animal	health	narrative	also	asserts	an	authority	over	the	disease,	largely	drawn	from	the	fact	that	avian	influenza	is	foremost	a	disease	in	birds.	In	the	absence	of	human-to-human	transmission	of	avian	influenza,	the	animal	health	narrative	contends	that	the	main	threat	posed	by	H5N1	continues	to	be	in	relation	
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to	animals,	and	by	extension	the	livelihoods	of	those	dependent	on	poultry	production	and	marketing.			Keck’s	study	of	these	disciplinary	disputes	about	avian	influenza	is	illustrative	of	a	general	tension	in	how	they	view	risk:	“As	an	animal	disease,	it	could	be	addressed	either	by	veterinarians	or	by	physicians,	depending	on	whether	the	virus	was	considered	from	the	perspective	of	its	consequences	for	animals	or	its	impact	on	humans”	(Keck	2008,	198).	These	different	“rationalities	of	risk”	–	or	risk	constructions	-	have	material	consequences	for	determining	the	optimal	allocation	of	power	and	resources	to	respond	to	the	disease.	In	contrast	to	the	public	health	narrative,	which	in	emphasizing	the	potentiality	of	an	inter-human	spread	has	favoured	precautionary	and	preparatory	activities	such	as	the	stockpiling	of	therapeutics	and	vaccines,	the	animal	health	narrative	suggests	that	prevention	of	disease	at	its	source	–	animals	–	is	of	upmost	importance.	Veterinarians,	in	Keck’s	estimation,	have	been	agitated	over	the	diversion	of	resources	towards	these	precautionary	activities,	asserting	that	“actual	problems	require	more	attention	than	virtual	catastrophes”	(2008,	213).			The	animal	health	narrative	advocates	for	controlling	H5N1	promptly	at	the	source	by	using	standard	veterinary	interventions,	such	as	culling,	or	stamping	out,	poultry	diagnosed	or	suspected	to	be	infected	with	the	virus,	vaccination	of	birds,	and	routine	surveillance.	When	it	became	clear	that	H5N1	was	endemic	in	many	country’s	poultry	stocks,	the	animal	health	narrative	evolved	away	from	an	emergency	mode,	towards	more	sustainable	long-term	programming,	manifest	in	novel	surveillance	strategies	and	the	promotion	of	biosecurity.	In	all	of	these	measures,	the	animal	health	narrative	recognizes	the	importance	of	limiting	the	impact	of	disease	and	interventions	on	those	whose	livelihoods	or	nutrition	derive	from	poultry.	Despite	these	goals,	from	the	outset	the	aim	was	to	establish	disease-free	areas,	leading	to	eradication	of	H5N1	from	endemic	countries.	“Control	and	eradication	is	feasible”,	the	FAO	and	OIE	assert,	because			 The	tools,	methodologies	and	approaches…	have	been	successfully	used	by	many	countries	to	control	and	eradicate	HPAI	infections	in	Europe	(Italy	and	the	Netherlands)	and	North	America	(Mexico,	USA	and	Canada)	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2005,	10).		Employing	the	interventions	outlined	above	and	discussed	below,	in	2005,	the	OIE	and	FAO	“expected	that	in	1-6	years	time”	most	Indonesian	islands,	except	Java,	“will	be	free”	of	H5N1	(2005,	9).	Today,	H5N1	remains	endemic	in	poultry	stocks	across	the	archipelago.		These	measures	are	employed	from	a	normative,	professional	perspective	that	any	intervention	leading	to	the	prevention	of	spread	of	disease	between	birds	will	reduce	the	incidence	of	H5N1	infection	in	bird	populations,	which	will,	in	turn,	decrease	the	likelihood	for	human	exposure	and	infection,	and	thus	the	potential	for	a	pandemic.	In	this	way,	standard	veterinary	measures	are	seen	as	complimentary,	
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rather	than	in	opposition	to	public	health	priorities.	And	while	they	have	been	critiqued	as	too	focused	on	disease	eradication	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010),	and	for	failing	to	adequately	address	questions	about	what	to	do	in	contexts	of	endemicity,	the	responses	discussed	below	come	from	careful	positioning	and	politicking	among	animal	health	officials	who	have	ensured	that	avian	influenza	is	seen	as	more	than	a	public	health	concern.	
	
Animal	health	narrative:	response	pathways	After	initial	jostling	for	resources	in	2003	and	2004,	the	OIE	and	the	FAO	began	to	work	collectively	when	it	became	clear	there	were	plenty	of	resources	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010).	This	required	the	demarcation	of	professional	roles	between	the	two	organizations.	In	brief,	the	OIE’s	task	line	includes	technical	advice	for	establishing	interventions,	analysing	and	disseminating	information,	support	and	capacity	building	for	laboratory	services	and	national	veterinary	services,	and	promoting	the	safety	of	trade	in	animal	products	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2007).	The	FAO’s	role	has	been	more	applied,	broadly	dedicated	to	supporting	the	implementation	of	programming	in	conjunction	with	government	structures	and	through	regional	and	country-based-offices,	and	focused	on	bio-security,	agricultural	development,	and	livelihoods.			Both	the	OIE	and	the	FAO	have	a	long	history	of	working	to	control	and	eradicate	animal	diseases.	With	H5N1	it	was	recognized	that	disease	events	in	animals,	and	control	at	source	programming,	take	place	amidst	diverse	contexts,	and	with	potential	negative	implications	for	those	losing	animals	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2005).	Although	the	animal	health	narrative	is	animal-focused,	the	FAO	in	particular	recognizes	that	in	each	country,	along	with	biological	and	epidemiological	considerations,	there	may	be	unique	economic,	political,	and	social	factors	influencing,	and	influenced	by,	disease	events	in	animals	(FAO	2004).	To	address	these	realities,	early	on,	the	FAO	established	a	Socio-economic	Working	Group	to	examine	the	“human	dimensions”	of	avian	influenza	–	and	intervention	programmes	–	in	terms	of	their	impact	on	households	and	livelihoods,	food	security,	and	markets.43	To	this	end,	they	produced	an	extensive	list	of	reports	outlining	short-	and	long-term	agendas.	Central	to	these	reports	was	recognizing	that	any	intervention	hinged	on	a	number	of	factors,	including:	the	importance	of	context-specific	messaging	and	programming,	the	need	to	work	with	public	and	private	interests,	the	potential	for	economic	shocks	across	every	sector	of	the	poultry	industry,	and	the	role	that	incentives,	such	as	compensation,	play	in	fostering	trust	and	in	facilitating	surveillance	activities,	and	thus	the	implementation	of	control	measures	(Rushton,	Morgan,	McLeod	2006).	Those	advocating	for	greater	consideration	of	socio-economic	factors,	however,	often	found	themselves	at	loggerheads	with	veterinarians	(Scoones	and	Forster	2010).	And	while	socio-																																																								43	For	more	information	on	the	Socio-economic	working	group,	along	with	their	numerous	publications,	see:	http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/seworkinggroup.html.	Accessed:	February	22,	2015.	
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economic	concerns	were	widely	recognized	in	policy	documentation	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2005),	early	on	the	priority	underscoring	the	animal	health	narrative	was	control	at	source	using	established	veterinary	measures,	with	eradication	the	“ultimate	goal	of	all	efforts”	(FAO	2004,	11).			Culling,	or	stamping	out,	poultry	aims	to	reduce	environmental	viral	loads	and	the	potential	for	disease	transmission	(Perry,	Isa,	and	Tarazona	2009,	36),	and	is	the	central	focus	of	programming	initially	promoted	by	the	animal	health	narrative	(FAO	2004;	FAO/OIE/WHO	2005;	FAO/OIE/WHO	2007).	Avian	influenza	was	eradicated	from	Hong	Kong	poultry	stocks	in	1997	through	aggressive	and	comprehensive	culling	(Mounts	et	al.	1999;	Sims	et	al.	2009).	Informed	by	this	experience,	and	under	the	guidance	of	the	FAO	and	the	OIE,	highly-affected	countries	in	Asia	(China,	Thailand,	Cambodia,	Vietnam,	Indonesia)	adopted	culling	as	a	primary	control	method	(Empres	2004).	To	date,	hundreds	of	millions	of	birds	are	estimated	to	have	been	killed	as	part	of	culling	programmes	(FAO	2013b).	With	culling,	the	boundaries	of	implementation	can	vary,	from	killing	all	poultry	in	a	household	where	H5N1	has	been	identified,	to	killing	all	birds	within	a	particular	radius	of	where	H5N1	is	diagnosed	or	suspected	(Otte	et	al.	2008).	Over	time	ring	culling	–	killing	all	birds	located	in	a	fixed	3	kilometre	ring,	for	example	–	gave	way	to	more	localized,	focal	culling	of	particular	flocks,	as	the	latter	method	had	considerably	less	economic	and	social	impacts	(FAO	2013b).			Culling	has	been	met	with	resistance	by	some	who	raise	and	sell	poultry,	in	part	because	compensation	-	although	long	considered	an	essential	component	of	culling	strategies,	(Rushton	et	al.	2005)	–	is	often	limited	or	non-existent,	with	many	countries	either	unwilling	or	unable	to	compensate	people	who	lose	their	birds	(Sims	2013).	There	are	many	instances	where	poultry	owners	are	paid	no	compensation,	or	compensated	below	market	value	for	their	slaughtered	animals	(Naysmith	2013b;	Simmons	2006;	Catley,	Alders,	and	Wood	2012;	Azhar	et	al.	2010).	Compensation	does	not	ensure	compliance,	but	a	failure	to	compensate	such	loss	may	impinge	upon	public	trust	of	veterinary	officials,	leading	some	to	actively	withdraw	from	disease	control	programming	(Johansen	and	Penrith	2009).	Moreover,	if	people	are	worried	about	losing	their	birds	and	not	being	paid,	they	may	hide	their	flock,	or	sell	it	through	informal	channels,	potentially	outside	of	the	realm	of	existing	surveillance	structures.	With	national	veterinary	services	largely	responsible	for	culling	and	surveillance	activities,	any	such	loss	of	trust	may	impede	the	efficacy	and	implementation	of	animal	health	programming	more	generally.	Importantly,	in	contexts	of	endemicity,	culling	may	have	only	a	short-term	impact	on	disease	presence,	as	restocking	of	poultry	post-cull	can	result	in	the	reintroduction	of	the	virus.			Culling	can	also	have	a	negative	impact	on	incomes,	food	security,	and	nutrition	(Rushton	et	al.	2005;	McLeod	2010;	Sonaiya	2007).	This	is	especially	the	case	in	a	country	like	Indonesia,	where	the	population	derive	the	majority	of	their	meat	protein	from	chicken	(USAID	2013),	and	where	compensation	for	culled	birds	is	uncommon.	Here	nutritional	and	economic	shocks	can	amplify	the	stark	dual	
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realities	of	food	insecurity	and	poverty.	Estimates	suggest	around	20	million	Indonesians	are	undernourished	-	roughly	8.6	percent	of	the	population	(FAO	2012).	Almost	53	percent	of	Indonesians	fail	to	consume	the	international	threshold	of	2000	calories	per	day	(WFP	2015).	Malnutrition	is	particularly	acute	among	children:	roughly	37	percent	of	children	under	5	years	of	age	are	considered	stunted	(WFP	2015).	While	there	has	been	a	significant	decrease	in	the	number	of	Indonesians	that	are	generally	food	insecure,	malnutrition	and	under-nutrition	remain	considerable	problems	that	can	be	amplified	and	extended	when	birds	die	from	disease	or	through	culling	campaigns.	On	the	whole,	stamping	out	H5N1	in	endemically	infected	countries	became	recognized	as	largely	inefficient,	detrimental	to	livelihoods,	and	ultimately	unsustainable	(Capua	and	Cattoli	2013).	Indeed,	in	recognition	of	the	financial	costs	associated	with	culling	and	under	pressure	from	large	and	small	scale	poultry	producers	who	were	concerned	about	their	livelihoods,	Indonesia’s	policy	makers	became	more	favourable	towards	poultry	vaccination	(Pongcharoensuk	et	al.	2012).		Prior	to	H5N1,	vaccines	were	not	widely	used	for	highly	pathogenic	avian	influenza	viruses.44	With	increasing	outbreaks	of	H5N1	affecting	parts	of	Asia,	some	countries	implemented	large-scale	poultry	vaccination	without	prior	experience	on	a	similar	scale,	and	with	no	articulated	exit	strategy.	From	2002-2010,	over	113	billion	doses	of	avian	influenza	virus	were	administered	in	birds	worldwide;	the	vast	majority	of	these	vaccines	were	for	H5N1	and	used	in	Egypt,	Indonesia,	Vietnam	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(Swayne	et	al.	2011).	Together	these	countries	are	home	to	tens	of	billions	of	poultry,	many	of	them	reared	in	backyards.	From	the	outset	these	programmes	suffered	from	inadequate	management,	poor	quality	vaccines,	and	a	number	of	political,	economic,	and	social	considerations	(Alders	et	al.	2007;	Swayne,	Spackman,	and	Pantin-Jackwood	2014;	FAO	2013b).		The	efficacy	of	poultry	vaccines	is	primarily	determined	in	laboratory	conditions.	In	reality,	“the	antigenic	variability	and	diversity”	of	viruses	in	endemic	countries	challenges	the	level	of	protection	offered	by	vaccines,	making	“generalizations	on	vaccine	efficacy	problematic”	(Hinrichs,	Otte,	and	Rushton	2010,	3).	There	is	no	one	optimal	vaccine	for	H5N1.	In	many	vaccine	programmes	in	endemic	countries,	myriad	suboptimal	vaccines	were	administered	by	individuals	and	private	actors,	often	away	from	the	gaze	of	central	government	and	national	veterinary	services.	This	matters	primarily	because	the	misapplication	of	vaccines	of	sub-optimal	quality	may	hide	clinical	symptoms	without	actually	reducing	transmission	(Desvaux	et	al.	2013);	monitoring	for	the	presence	of	H5N1	in	poultry	is	more	difficult	if	they	are	asymptomatically	infected.	Importantly,	mass	vaccination	for	H5N1	does	not	indicate	adequate	protection	(serologically	measured),	and	vaccines	do	not	necessarily	offer	the	same	level	of	immunity	in	all	target	hosts:	ducks,	for	example,	can	require	larger	doses	of	vaccine	to	induce	immune	responses	than	other	species	(Desvaux	et	al.	2013).	Some	vaccines	and	species	require	two	to	four	doses	per	bird,																																																									44	In	Pakistan	in	the	mid-1990s,	a	vaccine	was	used	for	a	highly	pathogenic	avian	influenza	virus,	in	this	case	H7N3.	
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each	separated	by	three-week	intervals,	to	trigger	immune	responses	capable	of	conferring	long-term	immunity	(Capua	and	Cattoli	2013).	And	many	vaccines	require	a	cold-chain	(FAO	2011).	This	kind	of	vaccine	schedule	is	expensive	and	can	prove	difficult	to	implement	and	monitor,	especially	in	backyard	environments,	and	contexts	where	billions	of	birds	are	reared	and	bred	to	be	slaughtered	within	a	few	months	(Hinrichs,	Otte,	and	Rushton	2010).			In	Indonesia,	administering	vaccine	in	commercial	settings,	where	birds	are	caged	and	controlled,	proved	to	be	quite	different	from	rolling	out	the	campaign	in	backyards	and	villages,	where	birds	roam	freely	(R.	Thornton	2007).	Although	vaccination,	in	contrast	to	culling,	was	seen	as	an	intervention	“likely	to	gain	much	greater	community	support”	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2007,	17),	vaccines	are	considered	by	some	small-hold	farmers	in	Indonesia	to	be	the	source	of	disease	(Naysmith	2010).	And	when	vaccine	teams	in	Indonesia	were	identified	to	have	inadvertently	spread	the	virus	between	locations,	some	populations	actively	resisted	vaccination	for	their	flocks	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a;	Normile	2007;	FAO	2011).	Though	a	mass	vaccination	campaign	was	proposed	in	2004,	with	300	million	doses	to	be	provided	free	to	small	hold	farmers	across	Indonesia,	financial	constraints	and	limited	supplies	restricted	government-led	vaccination	strategies	to	12	provinces;	commercial	producers	implement	vaccination	programmes	independently.	Studies	testing	the	efficacy	of	vaccines	in	Indonesian	poultry	find	different	species	developing	varied	levels	of	immunity	(Sawitri	Siregar	et	al.	2007).	A	combination	vaccine	for	H5N1	and	Newcastle	disease	was	recently	found	to	reduce	disease	events	in	semi-commercial	and	backyard	birds	in	Indonesia	(Bett	et	al.	2015).	While	such	advances	offer	promise,	ultimately	there	are	still	many	technical	and	logistical	difficulties	in	implementing	H5N1	vaccination	effectively	(Swayne,	Spackman,	and	Pantin-Jackwood	2014).		In	most	countries	mass	vaccination	programmes	have	given	way	to	more	targeted	interventions	(FAO	2013b).	And	while	routine	vaccination	is	recommended	for	some	poultry	sectors	in	endemic	countries	(Domenech	et	al.	2009),	“if	reliance	is	placed	on	vaccination	alone…	it	seems	inevitable	that	not	only	will	the	virus	spread	to	free	areas	but	will	become	or	remain	endemic”	(Capua	and	Cattoli	2013,	119).	Learning	from	experience,	it	has	become	clear	that	vaccine	for	H5N1	is	best	utilized	in	conjunction	with	other	systems	and	interventions,	such	as	surveillance	strategies	and	the	implementation	of	biosecurity	measures.		As	in	humans,	surveillance	of	disease	events	in	animals	is	essential	to	H5N1	control	programming,	and	consists	of	many	different	elements	(I	Scoones	2010;	FAO	2013b).	Despite	being	central	to	monitoring	the	evolution	of	viruses,	containing	disease	events,	and	in	the	development	of	effective	pharmaceuticals,	general	“surveillance	of	human	diseases	that	originate	in	animals	remain	in	the	nineteenth	century”	(Nature	2009,	889).	Surveillance	of	H5N1	in	animals	is	evolving,	and	can	broadly	be	demarcated	as	either	active	or	passive.	In	brief,	active	surveillance	entails	routine	searching	for	disease	in	communities,	along	the	market	chain,	and	in	live	bird	markets,	and	requires	constant	financial	and	logistical	inputs.	Passive	
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surveillance,	by	contrast,	is	more	decentralized,	and	relies	largely	on	voluntary	reporting	from	community	members	who	are	supported	by	animal	health	officials,	and	who	may	receive	some	form	of	compensation	for	reporting.	While	active	surveillance	remains	essential	to	monitor	virus	evolution,	along	with	the	success	of	control	measures,	as	the	endemic	nature	of	H5N1	in	countries	like	Indonesia	became	understood,	active	surveillance	gave	way	to	more	passive	surveillance	systems	that	relied	largely	on	the	participation	of	poultry	rearing	communities	(FAO	2013b).			Veterinarians	started	using	participatory	methods	in	the	1980s,	and	they	have	since	become	popularized	in	animal	disease	control	programming	(Catley,	Alders,	and	Wood	2012).	When	H5N1	was	identified	in	Indonesia,	an	early	priority	was	establishing	disease	presence	and	distribution	across	the	country’s	poultry	stocks.	The	enormity	of	the	task	was	apparent	and,	early	on,	it	was	recognized	that	community	participation	could	assist	more	traditional,	vet-led	surveillance	systems	that	had	neither	the	resource	nor	capacity	to	undertake	this	work	alone.	Participatory	Disease	Surveillance	and	Response	(PDSR)	was	introduced	in	Java	in	2006,	and	focused	near	exclusively	on	small-hold,	backyard	farming	communities.	PDSR	is	considered	both	an	active	and	passive	form	of	surveillance,	in	that	it	relies	on	community	members	sharing	information	about	disease	events	in	poultry,	and	centres	on	training	district-level	animal	health	officials	to	conduct	rapid	surveillance,	containment,	and	prevention	activities	when	disease	events	are	confirmed,	along	with	raising	community	awareness	(Azhar	et	al.	2010).45	By	2011	PDSR	was	operating	in	76	percent	of	all	districts,	in	29	out	of	33	provinces	(FAO	2011).	At	its	height,	the	PDSR	programme	consumed	almost	100	percent	of	the	FAO’s	H5N1	response	budget	in	Indonesia,	though	that	number	dropped	to	less	than	50	percent.	Of	the	25,525	villages	where	PDSR	activities	were	undertaken,	approximately	11	percent	were	identified	or	suspected	as	having	infected	birds	(Perry,	Isa,	and	Tarazona	2009).	The	PDSR	programme	in	Indonesia	also	consisted	of	a	wider	educational	component,	and	roughly	150,000	meetings	and	consultations	were	held	with	communities	and	their	leaders,	households,	and	people	working	in	the	poultry	trade	(Perry,	Isa,	and	Tarazona	2009;	Azhar	et	al.	2010;	Halton	et	al.	2013).	The	success	of	PDSR	is	largely	found	in	the	bolstered	surveillance	systems	at	the	district	level,	in	building	relationships	between	communities	and	government	officials,	and	in	the	training	of	thousands	of	animal	health	workers	to	detect	and	respond	to	disease	events	(Halton	et	al.	2013).	Much	like	other	animal	health	programming,	however,	the	success	of	PDSR	can	hinge	largely	on	whether	people	want	to	partake	in	programming.		PDSR	represents	an	attempt	to	address	the	highly	localized,	context	specific	determinants	of	disease	emergence,	and	in	this,	there	is	recognition	that	people	can	be	active	agents	in	the	process	of	disease	surveillance	and	control.	And	while	active	surveillance	makes	up	a	large	part	of	PDSR,	the	programme	is	largely	determined	by																																																									45	Though	surveillance	and	response	activities	were	originally	conceptualized	as	distinct	(reflected	in	separate	teams	for	each	task),	these	two	activities	were	merged	in	late-2007.	
	 57	
the	willingness	of	community	members	to	report	disease	events	and	accept	resulting	interventions.	Although	it	has	long	been	recognized	that	compensation	can	help	determine	participation	(Rushton	et	al.	2005),	such	incentives	are	largely	absent	in	Indonesia.	The	integration	of	PDSR	into	provincial	Animal	Health	Services	will	further	strengthen	the	capacity	to	detect	and	respond	to	zoonotic	diseases.	Sustainability	of	these	programmes,	however,	will	be	in	part	determined	by	whether	those	who	raise	birds	see	benefit	from	participating.	PDSR	characterizes	an	evolution	in	the	animal	health	narrative	of	H5N1	towards	a	more	contextualized	understanding	of	disease	and	its	impacts,	a	transition	that	is	also	underscored	by	the	promotion	of	biosecurity.					Biosecurity	is	defined	broadly	as	“the	product	of	all	the	actions	taken	to	prevent	the	introduction	of	disease	agents	into	a	specific	area	and	to	safeguard	the	health	of	living	organisms	from	hazards”	(FAO	2013b,	50).	In	practice,	biosecurity	promotes	the	goals	of	both	public	health	and	animal	health	narratives.	Three	broad	priorities	underscore	biosecurity:	segregation,	cleaning,	and	disinfection.	Segregation	implies	creating	and	maintaining	barriers	to	keep	infected	animals	from	uninfected	sites;	cleaning	refers	to	cleaning	all	materials	–	potential	vectors	–	entering	uninfected	sites;	and,	finally,	applying	disinfectant	on	these	cleaned	materials.	Exclusion	and	containment	of	pathogens	are	primary.	So	too	is	the	promotion	of	hygiene,	as	routine	cleaning	and	daily	disposal	of	market	waste	are	associated	with	less	environmental	contamination	in	markets	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	To	meet	these	ends,	biosecurity	measures	are	primarily	preventative.	They	work	in	combination,	and	in	practice	can	include:	creating	barriers	between	commercial	flocks	and	wild	and	domestic	birds,	routine	cleaning	and	disinfection,	appropriate	waste	removal	policies,	public	education	campaigns,	behaviour	change	programming,	market	restructuring,	the	implementation	of	rest	days,	and	market	closure	strategies.	The	appropriate	mix	of	measures	is	recognized	as	necessarily	contextually	determined.			Biosecurity	marks	a	shift	away	from	heavy	prioritization	on	culling	and	vaccine	-	more	traditional	veterinary	measures	-	towards	long-term	thinking	about	the	dynamic	processes	of	disease	maintenance	and	transmission	in	endemic	countries,	and	in	particular	sites.	In	this,	it	is	recognized	that	the	virus	is	mostly	spread	along	the	market	chain	by	the	actions	of	people;	human	behaviours	can	both	facilitate	and	hamper	interventions.	It	is	readily	acknowledged	that	biosecurity	needs	to	be	difficult	to	avoid	and	easy	to	comply	with	(FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008).	Economic	incentives	are	identified	as	potentially	necessary	to	ensure	compliance,	and	thus	the	efficacy	of	programming.		Over	the	long	term	the	range	of	measures	promoted	under	the	banner	of	biosecurity	aim	to	restructure	and	update	–	modernize	-	poultry	marketing	systems,	particularly	in	developing	countries.	Attention	to	biosecurity	leads	to	the	identification	of	particular	locations	and	livelihoods	as	facilitating	or	maintaining	disease.	Whereas	industrial	producers	in	many	countries	are	seen	as	capable	of	implementing	adequate	biosecurity	independently,	and	largely	left	alone	to	do	so,	backyard	farmers	and	live	bird	markets	are	identified	as	high-risk,	and	in	need	of	
	 58	
modernization	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010).	And	while	biosecurity	is	considered	necessary	across	different	sectors	in	the	wider	poultry	trade,	attention	and	resources	have	primarily	focused	on	the	promotion	of	biosecurity	among	small-hold	farmers	and	traders,	and	particularly	in	LBMs.	As	the	focus	of	this	research	is	LBMs,	biosecurity	measures	are	largely	discussed	in	relation	to	these	markets.46			Market-restructuring	initiatives,	as	well	as	temporary	and	permanent	market	closures	are	central	features	to	the	promotion	of	biosecurity	in	LBMs.	When	appropriately	designed	and	implemented,	market	restructuring	activities	can	reduce	and	help	to	eliminate	environmental	contamination	over	the	long-term	(WHO	2006;	FAO	2013a).	Restructuring	can	entail	large	market	renovations,	building	cages	to	keep	poultry	separated	by	flock	and	by	species,	as	well	isolated	from	people,	providing	potable	water	and	soap,	creating	sloped	drainage	to	remove	effluent,	as	well	as	behaviour	change	initiatives.	Participatory	consultation	with	PWP	was	found	to	improve	biosecurity	following	restructuring	project	in	2	Indonesian	LBMs;	some	PWP	in	these	markets	were	dissatisfied	because	they	recorded	lower	sales	than	before	the	restructuring	(Samaan	et	al.	2012).	Market	restructuring	in	Jakarta	found	PWP	there	also	not	entirely	satisfied	with	the	alterations	in	their	markets	(and	market	chains)	because	of	associated	economic	loss	(Forster	2012).	Although	restructuring	can	reduce	risks	on	a	long-term	basis	(FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008),	it	is	a	massive	and	expensive	undertaking	in	a	country	with	thousands	of	LBMs	like	Vietnam,	China,	and	Indonesia.		Temporary	and	permanent	market	closure	are	increasingly	utilized	biosecurity	measures	(FAO	2013a).	Government	closures	of	LBMs	in	China	during	recent	outbreaks	of	H7N9	are	credited	with	limiting	disease	spread	and	human	cases	(H.	Yu	et	al.	2013).	Such	tactics	were	also	associated	with	eliminating	H5N1	from	LBMs	in	Hong	Kong	following	the	first	round	of	disease	events	there	in	1997	(Sims	et	al.	2003).	In	other	cases,	the	benefits	of	this	tactic	are	less	clear.	Indonesian	officials	temporarily	closed	a	market	in	Bali	in	2012	after	fighting	cocks	tested	positive	for	H5N1.	Although	this	market	closure	was	intended	to	last	three	weeks,	it	was	not	effectively	enforced	and	the	trade	in	live	animals	continued	largely	unabated	(Naysmith	2013b).	The	trade	in	live	birds	does	not	necessarily	stop	simply	because	a	formal	LBM	is	closed;	market	closure	may	in	fact	push	poultry	marketing	into	informal	channels	that	are	more	difficult	to	monitor	for	disease	than	currently	operating	LBMs	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013).	Moreover,	market	closures	in	places	like	Indonesia,	where	most	meat	protein	is	from	chickens,	may	negatively	impact	access	to	meat	and	the	consumption	of	protein,	and	thus	further	exacerbate	existing	food	insecurity	and	malnutrition	(WFP	2015).		If	temporary	market	closures	are	employed	they	should	be	used	only	as	a	short-term	solution,	in	concert	with	the	disinfecting	of	the	market,	the	provision	of	sufficient	compensation	for	affected	PWP,	and	when	alternative	venues	are	available	to	market	poultry	and	meet	demand	(FAO	2013a).	Permanent	market	closure																																																									46	For	more	on	biosecurity	see:	FAO	2008;	FAO	2013;	Sims	2013;	Capua	and	Cattoli	2014.	
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should	only	be	considered	as	part	of	a	long-term	strategy.	In	either	case,	it	may	be	necessary	to	ensure	customers	are	able	to	access	the	birds	they	want,	especially	during	holidays,	otherwise	alternative	markets	may	emerge.	Any	such	closure	will	likely	require	constant	enforcement	by	officials	–	a	form	of	centralized	authority	more	characteristic	of	the	political	landscape	in	China	and	Hong	Kong	than	that	of	decentralized	Indonesia.	Further	research	is	required	to	understand	how	market	closures	impact	PWP,	and	to	determine	whether	an	effective	means	can	be	found	of	preventing	market	closures	from	leading	to	a	total	reconfiguration	of	the	poultry	trade	in	a	way	that	can	amplify	the	spread	of	disease	or	limit	access	to	food.		Importantly,	when	markets	are	closed,	access	to	disease	sentinels	may	be	lost,	making	monitoring	for	novel	pathogens	and	disease	spread	more	difficult.	Market	closure,	however,	may	not	be	necessary.	A	recent	modelling	paper	suggests	that	interventions	in	certain	centralized	markets	-	“hubs”	–	can	have	a	significant	impact.			 The	implementation	of	thorough,	daily	disinfection	of	the	market		 environment	as	well	as	of	traders’	vehicles	and	equipment	in	only	a	small		 number	of	hubs	can	disconnect	the	network	dramatically,	preventing		 disease	spread	(Fournié	et	al.	2013,	1).		These	interventions	may	be	less	detrimental	to	PWP	than	market	closure.	Targeting	particular	hub	markets	may	also	be	more	cost-effective	and	sustainable,	considering	that	Indonesia,	for	example,	has	more	than	13,000	LBMs.47	Other	interventions	include	the	implementation	of	rest	days	at	the	market,	strict	movement	of	poultry,	and	routine	use	of	disinfectant	(FAO	2013a;	Fournié	et	al.	2011).	In	the	absence	of	coercion	and	strict	enforcement,	the	likelihood	of	success	for	any	biosecurity	measure	is	greatly	increased	when	target	populations	see	a	benefit	in	their	active	participation.	Participation,	however,	does	not	guarantee	that	an	intervention	will	be	wholly	successful,	as	Samaan	and	colleagues	(2012)	found.	On	the	whole	biosecurity	broadens	and	extends	the	animal	health	narrative,	promoting	long-term	programming	along	with	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	disease	processes.			A	major	theme	that	arises	from	the	application	of	dominant	interventions	stemming	from	the	animal	health	narrative	is	that	the	particularities	of	the	virus	and	the	environment,	as	well	as	human	behaviours,	can	interrupt	their	efficacy	in	practice.	While	initial	programming	focused	on	more	emergency-like	methods	of	immediate	containment	and	eradication,	as	the	embedded	nature	of	H5N1	in	places	like	Indonesia	became	apparent,	programming	became	more	progressive,	linked	to	a	long	view	of	disease	control	that	combined	elements	of	the	public	health	and	animal	health	narratives,	and	culminated	in	the	One	Health	approach.																																																									47	Supported	by	the	FAO	and	the	Indonesian	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	a	cleaning	and	disinfectant	programme	was	implemented	at	43	poultry	collection	yards	and	14	LBMs	in	Jakarta	in	2011.	More	on	this	programme	is	available	at:	http://www.fao.org/avianflu/En/news/jakarta_market.html	Accessed	April	13,	2015.	
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The	One	World,	One	Health	narrative	The	One	World,	One	Health	approach	evolved	from	the	One	Medicine	concept	coined	by	Schwabe	(1984),	which	posited	a	shared	paradigm	between	human	and	veterinary	medicine	as	a	result	of	commonalities	in	animal	and	human	physiology	and	pathophysiology	(Zinsstag	et	al.	2011;	Frank	2008).	Other	initiatives,	such	as	the	Veterinary	Public	Health	(VPH)	approach	of	the	FAO	and	the	WHO,	offered	insights	from	one	discipline	to	the	other	but	fell	short	of	a	truly	holistic	perspective	on	the	interactions	of	human,	animal	and	environmental	health	(Zinsstag	et	al.	2011).	For	many,	this	came	in	2004,	when	a	symposium	in	New	York	City	on	emerging	infectious	diseases	produced	a	list	of	priorities	and	recommendations	termed	the	‘Manhattan	Principles’48	for	responding	to	infectious	diseases	from	a	broader	perspective	(FAO/OIE/WHO/UNSIC/UNICEF/The	World	Bank	2008,	51).	These	principles	became	the	basis	for	the	One	World,	One	Health	agenda,	defined	as	the	“collaborative	efforts	of	multiple	disciplines	working	locally,	nationally	and	globally	to	attain	optimal	health	for	people,	animals	and	our	environment”	(The	American	Veterinary	Medical	Association	2008,	13).			Endorsed	at	the	International	Ministerial	Conference	on	Avian	and	Pandemic	
Influenza	in	New	Delhi49	in	2007,	the	initiative	has	since	been	upheld	as	the	way	forward	for	interdisciplinary	collaborations	to	control	zoonosis,	and	is	now	formally	endorsed	by	a	range	of	government	bodies	and	global	institutions,	including	the	US	Centers	for	Disease	Control,	the	World	Bank,	the	European	Commission,	as	well	as	the	WHO,	the	FAO,	and	the	OIE	–	the	three	primary	multilateral	bodies	charged	with	global	policy	development	for	avian	influenza	and	other	zoonotic	pathogens.	Scoones	and	Forster	suggest	that	the	One	Health	narrative	provided	a	“last	chance	to	rekindle	support	and	interest”	for	collective	efforts	to	control	H5N1,	partly	by	providing	a	platform	for	animal	health	to	be	“on	par	with	the	major	players	in	the	global	scheme	of	things”	(2010,	28).		As	an	agenda	for	research	and	policy	development	for	EID,	One	Health	has	a	compelling	narrative,	encapsulated	in	the	name	itself:	the	concept	of	One	World,	One	Health	conveys	both	the	“global	and	inter-species	sharing	of	health	concerns	and	interests”	alongside	a	call	for	expertise	to	be	pooled	from	diverse	disciplinary	perspectives	(Craddock	and	Hinchliffe	2015,	1).	Both	these	qualities	significantly	differentiate	the	One	Health	narrative	from	the	more	siloed	disciplinary	perspectives	and	priorities	of	the	human	public	health	and	animal	health	narratives.	The	authors	of	the	Manhattan	Principles	were	aware	of	the	novelty	and	boldness	of	their	proposal,	concluding	their	guiding	priorities	by	declaring:	“Solving	today’s	threats	and	tomorrow’s	problems	cannot	be	accomplished	with	yesterday’s	approaches.	We	are	in	an	era	of	‘One	World,	One	Health’	and	we	must	devise	adaptive,	forward	looking	and	multidisciplinary	solutions	to	the	challenges	that																																																									48	See:	http://www.oneworldonehealth.org/.	Accessed,	February	26,	2015.	49	See:	http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=33862.	Accessed,	February	28,	2015.	
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undoubtedly	lie	ahead”	(FAO/OIE/WHO/UNSIC/UNICEF/The	World	Bank	2008,	52).		As	could	be	expected,	the	implementation	of	a	novel,	integrated	approach	is	more	challenging	than	the	declaration	of	it	(Zinsstag	et	al.	2011).50	Although	the	pooling	of	disciplinary	insights	to	solve	shared	interspecies	concerns	is	novel,	the	One	Health	narrative	does	not	depart	markedly	from	the	approach	and	responses	favoured	by	the	other	dominant	narratives.	In	reinforcing	the	notion	that	controlling	and	eradicating	H5N1	through	emergency-type	globally	coordinated	responses	is	a	global	public	good,	it	aligns	itself	with	the	top-down	normative	standards	of	both	the	public	health	and	animal	health	narratives.	A	central	goal	stated	in	the	One	Health	strategic	framework	reads:	“To	diminish	the	threat	and	minimize	the	global	impact	of	epidemics	and	pandemics	due	to	highly	infectious	and	pathogenic	disease	of	humans	and	animals,	underpinned	by	enhanced	disease	intelligence,	surveillance	and	emergency	response	systems	at	national,	regional	and	international	levels,	and	by	supporting	them	through	strong	and	stable	public	and	animal	health	services	and	effective	communication	strategies”	(FAO/OIE/WHO/UNSIC/UNICEF/The	World	Bank	2008,	5).	While	enhanced	surveillance	and	emergency	responses	may	be	necessary,	they	are	insufficient	in	and	of	themselves.	For	this	reason,	some	have	cautioned	that	One	Health	must	go	further	to	avoid	being	“a	new	technical	super-discipline,	where	two	outbreak	narratives	are	combined	more	forcefully	and	with	more	resources”.	In	other	words,	“Old	wine	must	not	be	placed	in	new	bottles”	(I	Scoones	2010,	157).			One	of	the	most	promising	potential	consequences	of	the	One	Health	agenda	is	the	bringing	together	of	multiple	disciplines	to	respond	to	EID.	As	the	Joint	Strategic	framework	on	One	Health	states,	“the	complex	interactions	of	biological,	ecological,	environmental	and	socio-economic	factors	that	act	at	the	animal-human-ecosystems	interface	require	multidisciplinary	and	multisectoral	approaches”	(FAO/OIE/WHO/UNSIC/UNICEF/The	World	Bank	2008,	33).		For	this,	the	One	Health	agenda	–	also	called	a	“movement”	-	aims	to	build	a	“better	sectoral	balance”	to	address	zoonotic	health	threats,	particularly	between	public	health	and	animal	health,	but	also	“to	increase	the	participation”	from	ecologists,	environmental	and	wildlife	health	professionals,	and	“social	scientists	and	development	actors.”	The	“common	theme	is	collaboration	between	sectors.”51	The	One	Health	agenda	in	action,	however,	primarily	amounts	to	collaboration	between	physicians,	veterinarians	and	ecologists.52	Although	the	One	Health	movement	“has	gained	
																																																								50	Zinsstag	et	al	(2011)	note,	in	particular,	the	persistence	of	siloed	thinking	about	health	issues,	particularly	in	the	public	health	sector.	They	cite	the	example	of	a	H1N1	outbreak	in	Canada	where	coordination	between	the	animal	health	and	public	health	authorities	remained	elusory.		51	See	the	One	Health	Global	Network	Webportal,	What	is	One	Health?:	http://www.onehealthglobal.net/what-is-one-health/.	Accessed	March	12,	2015.	52	See	the	US	Centers	for	Disease	Control	One	Health	homepage:	http://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/.	Accessed	March	12,	2015.	
	 62	
significant	momentum”	in	the	past	few	years,	and	is	now	“moving	fast”,53	Scoones’	earlier	observation,	that	there	is	a	need	for	greater	inclusion	of	alternative	forms	of	expertise	in	the	One	Health	agenda,	especially	those	that	“extend	beyond	formal,	accredited	sources	to	encompass	local	experiential	knowledge”	(2010,	158),	holds	true	today.				Notwithstanding	overtures	about	including	social	science	methodologies	and	methods	in	One	Health	approaches,	in	practice	this	is	largely	tokenistic	inclusion,	designed	more	to	maintain	the	appearance	of	a	multidisciplinary	approach	than	to	truly	engage	with	the	methods	and	findings	of	social	science	research	(Janes	et	al.	2012;	Craddock	and	Hinchliffe	2015).	Indeed,	despite	the	One	Health	agenda’s	call	for	interdisciplinary	collaboration,	some	suggest	that	“the	approach	and	the	programme	has	tended	to	offer	few	opportunities	for	serious	social	scientific	contributions	or	engagement”	(Craddock	and	Hinchliffe	2015,	1).	In	some	formulations,	the	main	value-added	of	social	scientists	has	been	to	facilitate	“the	ability	of	society	to	understand	and	accept	scientific	evidence	and	guidance	for	one	health”	(Zinsstag	et	al.	2012).	This	speaks	to	social	scientists	playing	a	bridging	role	between	those	who	generate	scientific	facts	and	the	public	rather	than	legitimate	generators	of	scientific	facts	themselves.			While	“significant	human	behaviours”	are	at	the	centre	of	“propagation,	prevention	and	transmission”	of	infectious	diseases	there	is	a	paucity	of	social	science	research	regarding	efficacious	approaches	to	understanding	human	behaviours	and	decision	making	processes	(Lapinski,	Funk,	and	Moccia	2015,	53).	Social	sciences	offer	methodologies	and	methods	to	understand,	for	example,	“epidemiologically	notable	behaviours”	in	context	–	a	necessary	step	towards	designing	effective	interventions	(Janes	et	al.	2012).	Alongside	appreciating	all	that	the	human	and	animal	health	narratives	bring	to	avian	influenza	programming,	as	discussed	above,	their	limitations	also	become	apparent.	Much	remains	to	be	understood	about	the	experience	of	those	living	and	working	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Understanding	the	predominance	of	these	dominant	narratives	in	framing	avian	influenza	and	designing	responses	gives	rise	to	important	questions	regarding	what	perspectives	are	“missing,	obscured,	hidden	or	blocked?”	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010,	39).	What	can	alternative	narratives	about	epidemic	disease	in	general	and	H5N1	specifically	reveal?	This	is	the	subject	for	discussion	at	the	outset	of	the	next	chapter.					
																																																								53	See	the	One	Health	Global	Network	Webportal,	What	is	One	Health?:	http://www.onehealthglobal.net/what-is-one-health/.	Accessed	March	12,	2015.	
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Chapter	4:	Alternative	epidemic	narratives			
Introduction	This	chapter	introduces	a	number	of	epidemic	narratives	that	reflect	alternative	accounts	of	disease	and	distinct	pathways	of	response	to	those	of	the	dominant	narratives	described	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	alternative	narratives	outlined	underscore	the	impacts	of	disease	events	and	interventions	on	livelihoods,	on	the	wider	contextual	influences	on	individual-level	risks,	on	the	variation	in	interpretations	and	responses	among	national	and	local	level	governments,	and	on	the	experiences	of	people	living	or	working	in	contexts	where	disease	may	be	part	of	the	daily	reality.	This	chapter	argues	that	alternative	narratives	offer	competing	and	complementary	frames	that,	taken	into	consideration,	have	the	potential	to	inform	more	equitable	and	efficacious	pathways	of	response.			
Introducing	alternative	narratives	There	are	myriad	ways	in	which	to	interpret	and	define	a	disease	event	in	animals	and	in	people.	Understanding	the	predominance	of	the	dominant	narratives	in	framing	avian	influenza	and	designing	responses	gives	rise	to	important	questions	regarding	forms	of	knowledge	and	alternative	narratives	that	are	overshadowed,	side-lined,	or	missed.	What	accounts	are	not	encapsulated	in	these	mainstream	formulations?	And	what	can	these	alternative	narratives	reveal?		In	discussing	alternative	narratives,	several	caveats	are	required.	Alternative	narratives	are	not	necessarily	framed	in	direct	opposition	to	dominant	narratives,	but	rather,	are	often	articulated	within	the	core	organizations	and	structures	that	promote	the	dominant	narratives.	As	discussed	below	in	relation	to	the	livelihoods	narrative,	for	example,	some	at	the	FAO	recognized	early	on	that	avian	influenza	can	negatively	impact	the	lives	of	those	who	raise	poultry,	and	thus	advocated	for	greater	consideration	of	livelihoods	when	designing	responses.	Nonetheless,	there	is	a	difference	between	advocacy	and	action,	and	when	alternative	perspectives	are	discussed	within	the	dominant	narratives,	it	is	often	as	“a	polite	add-on,	before	proceeding	to	the	main	argument”	(I	Scoones	and	Forster	2010,	39).	Additionally,	that	some	alternative	narratives	are	voiced	by	subaltern,	or	marginalized	communities	that	are	most	directly	affected	by	disease	does	not	mean	that	they	should	be	taken	to	wholly,	or	more	authentically	represent	a	disease.	As	Leach	and	Dry	(2010)	contend,	we	should	not	simply	replace	dominant	narratives	with	those	that	are	alternative	or	marginalized.			Individual	narratives	provide	only	a	partial	account	of	disease.	Despite	this	partiality,	alternative	narratives	require	consideration	because	they	offer	competing	and	complementary	frames	on	disease	that	can	inform	more	just,	equitable,	and	efficacious	pathways	of	response	(Leach	and	Dry	2010).	Attention	to	a	multiplicity	
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of	narratives	highlights	different	“rationalities	of	risk”	(Keck	2008)	surrounding	disease	-	that	is,	the	manner	in	which	the	risk	is	constructed	by	a	particular	group.	Forster,	for	example,	has	noted	the	“significant	disconnect	between	the	global	construction	of	risk	associated	with	H5N1	and	the	Indonesian	one”	(2010,	158),	an	observation	that	this	thesis	takes	forward	by	examining,	in	part,	constructions	of	risk	among	people	who	work	with	poultry	in	LBMs	in	Indonesia.	These	rationalities	of	risk	shape	what	is	seen	as	a	threat,	who	is	seen	as	affected,	and	how	pathways	of	response	are	generated.	Importantly,	if	response	pathways	are	pursued	without	considering	such	alternative	narratives,	they	may	be	at	odds	with	local	people’s	perceptions	and	priorities,	which	may	in	turn	affect	their	willingness	to	engage,	support	or	participate	in	disease	programming	(Leach	and	Dry	2010).			Though	the	discussion	that	follows	does	not	claim	to	be	a	comprehensive	account	of	alternative	epidemic	narratives	about	zoonotic	diseases,	or	avian	influenza	specifically,	it	draws	on	experiences	across	disease	control	programming	to	briefly	outline	more	prominent	alternative	narratives,	which	focus	on	livelihoods,	risk	environments,	governance,	and	local	realities.		
Livelihoods	and	poverty	narrative	One	alternative	narrative	focuses	on	livelihoods54	and	underscores	the	disproportionately	negative	impact	that	both	disease	and	disease	control	programming	can	inflict	upon	poorer	populations	who	raise,	sell,	and	eat	animals	that	can	harbour	zoonotic	pathogens.	Culling,	for	example,	can	eliminate	poultry	or	pig	farmers’	source	of	income	and	food	security.	As	a	result,	interventions	may	face	resistance	from	local	populations.	They	may	also	find	that,	as	Farmer	has	observed,	“those	least	likely	to	comply	are	usually	those	least	able	to	comply”	(2004),	in	that	interventions	focused	on	behaviour	change	may	face	challenges	if	people	perceive	significant	disincentives	to	alter	their	practices.			The	relationship	between	dominant	and	alternative	narratives	is	complex	in	relation	to	the	livelihoods	narrative.	As	discussed	above,	aspects	of	the	livelihoods	narrative	are	taken	up	by	some	core	global	organizations.	Indeed,	from	early	on,	the	FAO	and	others	identified	livelihoods	protection	and	promotion	–	largely	through	compensation	schemes	-	as	necessary	components	of	avian	influenza	programming	(Rushton	et	al.	2005;	FAO	2004).	Livelihood	considerations	remain	seen	as	a	priority	to	the	FAO	and	other	policy	bodies	(FAO	2013b),	as	well	as	in	the	One	Health	agenda.	Yet	in	practice,	and	seen	in	several	country’s	responses	to	influenza	–	both	H5N1	and	H1N1	–	livelihoods	are	largely	neglected	in	interventions	premised	on	dominant	disease-focused	narratives.	For	example,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3	with	reference	to	the	animal	health	narrative,	culling	hundreds	of	millions	of	birds																																																									54	Though	some	scholars	have	interpreted	“livelihoods”	in	broad	terms,	referring	not	only	to	“the	satisfaction	of	material	needs”	but	also	“the	satisfaction	of	emotional,	spiritual	and	intellectual	needs”	(Bebbington	2000),	for	the	purposes	of	this	discussion,	“livelihoods”	are	interpreted	as	“the	means	that	a	household	uses	to	achieve	that	well-being	and	sustain	it”	(Messer	and	Townsley	2003,	8).		
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as	part	of	H5N1	programming	in	endemic	countries	has	had	negative	impacts	on	the	livelihoods	of	low-income	populations.		The	consequences	of	marginalizing	poor	people’s	livelihoods	can	also	be	seen	in	government-led	interventions	in	Egypt	for	H1N1	–	the	‘Swine	Flu’.	Blame	and	disease	attribution	are	common	communal	responses	to	disease	events,	and	those	painted	as	responsible	are	often	marginalized	minorities	lacking	power	or	political	representation	(Washer	2010).	In	Egypt,	in	response	to	H1N1	the	government	invoked	a	common	outbreak	narrative,	replete	with	blame	and	accusation,	when	justifying	and	enacting	interventions	(Tadros	2010).	Despite	all	cases	of	swine	flu	reportedly	imported	by	those	arriving	from	elsewhere,	the	Egyptian	government	was	quick	to	identify	the	pigs	raised	by	Zabaleen,	a	primarily	Coptic	Christian	minority	of	garbage	collectors,	as	the	source	of	disease,	and	ordered	the	pigs	to	be	culled.	Because	of	their	profession	and	their	beliefs,	the	Zabaleen	had	long	suffered	from	discrimination	and	stigmatization.	Culling	was	pursued,	not	because	the	pigs	were	the	source	of	disease,	but	because	of	sectarian	preferences	of	the	Muslim	majority,	and	because	it	enabled	the	government	to	exhibit	strength	and	solidify	political	support.	Zabaleen	who	resisted	were	physically	forced	to	relinquish	their	pigs.	With	limited	compensation	and	no	consideration	for	how	the	pigs’	value	extends	beyond	the	cost	of	their	meat,	the	livelihoods	of	the	Zabaleen	were	effectively	“taken	away”	(Tadros	2010).	The	government	culled	the	pigs	in	the	name	of	public	health.	However,	as	garbage	was	left	to	rot	across	Egyptian	cities,	the	culling	programme	effectively	created	a	major	health	hazard.			This	example	illustrates	how	response	pathways	stemming	from	an	outbreak	narrative	can	negatively	impact	livelihoods,	and	simultaneously,	depending	on	a	range	of	factors	across	different	countries,	provide	an	element	of	cover	for	officials	to	target	particular	populations.	Embedding	a	livelihoods	narrative	means	undertaking	a	more	long-term	developmental	agenda,	one	that	recognizes	the	wider,	structural	factors	that	predate	and	facilitate	disease	outbreaks,	rather	than	short-term	disease-focused	emergency	responses.	The	example	of	the	Zabaleen	in	Egypt	also	alludes	to	the	importance	of	another	alternative	narrative	that	is	discussed	below	and	focuses	broadly	on	the	governance	of	infectious	diseases.			
Risk	environment	narrative	Another	alternative	narrative	focuses	on	understanding	the	wider	risk	environment	(Barnett	and	Blaikie	1992;	Rhodes	2002)	in	which	zoonotic	diseases	emerge	and	proliferate.	Attention	to	risk	environments	expands	the	lens	of	focus	from	“simple	linear	causal	relationships	between	risk	drivers	and	disease	emergence	and/or	spread”	(Liverani	et	al.	2013,	875),	to	understanding	the	complex,	and	often	unique,	sociobiological	factors	that	contribute	to	the	presence	or	absence	of	zoonotic	risk	in	diverse	contexts.			A	risk	environment	can	be	defined	as	the	“space,	whether	social	or	physical,	in	which	a	variety	of	factors	exogenous	to	the	individual	interact	to	increase”	or	
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decrease	health	risks	(Rhodes	et	al.	2005,	1026).	The	narrative	provides	a	“simple	heuristic	for	researching	multiple	environmental	factors	that	produce	health	risk”	(Rhodes	and	Simic	2005,	222),	departing	from	the	outbreak	narratives’	overemphasis	on	“individuals’	cognitive	decisions	and	immediacy	of	interpersonal	relations”	(Rhodes	et	al.	2005,	1027).	In	this,	individual	behaviours	are	understood	to	be	variably	risky	as	opposed	to	definitively	or	intrinsically	risky,	depending	on	a	range	of	contributing	factors	that	amplify	or	diminish	risk,	and	which	are	largely	outside	of	a	single	person’s	control.	This	distinction	is	explored	in	relation	to	HIV/AIDS:			 …sexual	intercourse	(of	whatever	variety)	is	not	intrinsically	a	‘risky’	(in		 the	popular	sense)	behaviour	beyond	the	obvious	risk	of	conception.		 However,	when	a	deadly	disease	appears	and	the	social	and	economic		 environment	is	such	as	to	facilitate	rapid	and/or	frequent	partner	change,		 then	that	environment	may	be	described	as	a	risk	environment	and	the	act		 of	sexual	intercourse	becomes	a	risk	behaviour	(Barnett	and	Whiteside	1999,		 207).			Like	HIV,	avian	influenza	is	an	infectious	disease	where	the	risk	of	infection	is	in	part	determined	by	environmental	influences.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	LBMs	are	considered	particularly	risky	environments	(Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012),	and	are	associated	with	multiple	human	infections	with	H5N1	resulting	in	death	(M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011).	While	LBMs	are	often	presented	as	uniformly,	intrinsically,	and	definitively	risky	environments	for	public	and	animal	health	(Webster	2004),	live	bird	markets	are	better	understood	as	variably	risky	environments	where,	alongside	biological	considerations,	a	range	of	contributing	factors	may	amplify	or	diminish	zoonotic	risk.	For	example,	a	man	slaughtering	a	chicken	in	a	live	bird	market	in	Indonesia	is	identified	as	engaging	in	a	risk	behaviour	in	an	environment	with	zoonotic	risk.	Yet	an	individual’s	risk	in	a	LBM	is	determined	not	only	by	their	behaviours,	but	by	a	range	of	factors	that	make	this	particular	behaviour	risky	–	beginning	with	the	prevalence	of	disease	in	poultry,	the	physical	layout	of	the	market,	the	structure	of	live	bird	trade	in	Indonesia,	as	well	as	the	length	of	time	they	spend	in	“the	particular	environments	in	which	risk	is	produced”	(Rhodes	and	Simic	2005,	220).			The	risk	environment	narrative	thus	usefully	highlights	the	range	of	factors	contributing	to	disease	risk,	directing	attention	to	wider	structural	issues	that	might	be	neglected	in	more	restricted	analyses.	Liverani	and	colleagues,	for	example,	highlight	the	importance	of	examining	the	complex	dynamics	of	livestock	production	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	risk	environments.			Attention	to	the	complex	interactions	between	seemingly	disparate	factors,	“from	viral	genome	sequencing	to	animal	keeping”	(2013,	875),	reorients	analysis	towards	interrogating	the	many	“social	situations,	structures	and	places"	(Rhodes	et	al.	2005,	1027)	in	which	disease	risks	are	produced.	In	doing	so,	the	risk	environment	narrative	ultimately	merges	the	epidemiological	identification	of	risk	environments	
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with	social	science	explanation	and	contextualization	of	these	places	and	processes	(Rhodes	and	Simic	2005).				In	emphasizing	broader	contextual	factors,	this	narrative	also	highlights	the	importance	of	considering	the	influence	of	the	global	political	economy	and	governance	structures	on	conceptualizations	of,	and	responses	to,	disease	risk.	The	following	alternative	narrative	on	governance	takes	up	this	emphasis	in	greater	specificity.			
Governance	narratives	In	dominant	narratives	for	avian	influenza,	and	outbreak	narratives	more	generally,	there	is	an	assumption	that	global	institutions,	regional	organizations,	and	national	governments	are	‘on	board’	with	the	priorities	and	pathways	of	response	that	such	narratives	promote.	Policy	documents	present	the	notion	that	“there	is	a	global	consensus	on	what	to	do	and	that	this	can	then	be	implemented	through	an	international	architecture,	based	on	the	principles	of	cooperation	and	respect”	(Scoones	and	Forster	2010:	43).	The	pathways	of	response	associated	with	dominant	narratives	for	avian	influenza,	such	as	surveillance,	rapid	response,	and	vaccine	development	all	rely	on	this	presumed	consensus.	And	while	H5N1	has	catalysed	unprecedented	coordination	in	addressing	emerging	health	threats	across	multiple	UN	and	developmental	agencies,	the	appearance	of	consensus	can	mask	underlying	tensions	and	constraints	in	addressing	diseases	across	different	countries	and	different	regions.	In	south	east	Asia,	for	example,	despite	substantial	gains	in	coordination	between	countries,	there	remain	significant	challenges	to	enacting	effective	surveillance	systems	across	transnational	borders	(Coker	et	al	2011).	Attention	to	diverse	narratives	surrounding	the	governance	of	disease,	both	challenges	assumptions	of	consensus	in	policy,	and	highlights	more	practical	limitations	for	some	governments	to	implement	particular	pathways	of	response.		At	times,	national	governments	may	lack	the	willingness	to	partake	in	coordinated	activities	in	cooperation	with	international	bodies,	and	in	pursuit	of	a	purported	global	public	good.	Surveillance,	for	example,	hinges	on	active	reporting	of	novel	outbreaks	by	national	governments.	Some	governments,	however,	fearing	economic	backlash,	suppress	news	of	novel	disease	events	when	first	diagnosed;	a	prime	example	seen	in	the	Chinese	government’s	initial	foot-dragging	in	reporting	human	infections	with	SARS	in	2002/2003	to	the	WHO	(G.	Bloom	2010).	Other	governments	vocally	challenge	the	notion	that	dominant	pathways	of	response,	advocated	by	global	institutions,	lead	towards	a	so-called	‘global	public	good’,	and	thus	actively	disengage	from	such	coordination.	Here,	Indonesia’s	disengagement	from	sharing	avian	influenza	viruses	provides	an	example.			In	2006,	former	Indonesian	Health	Minister	Siti	Fadilah	Supari	observed	that	global	demand	for	therapeutics	for	H5N1	had	surpassed	their	supply.	In	February	2007,	she	triggered	a	virus-sharing	dispute	when	she	announced	that	Indonesia	would	stop	sending	H5N1	virus	samples	through	the	Global	Influenza	Surveillance	
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Network,	and	on	to	WHO	reference	laboratories.	In	her	book,	It’s	Time	for	the	World	
to	Change	(2008)	Supari	outlines	the	process	that	led	to	this	decision:	Indonesia	was	unable	to	secure	advance	purchase	agreements	from	pharmaceutical	manufacturers	for	an	H5N1	vaccine	under-development,	despite	the	fact	that	the	genetic	material	used	to	develop	the	vaccine	originally	came	from	Indonesia;	the	Indonesian	virus	sample	that	she	referred	to	had	been	passed	on	to	an	Australian	pharmaceutical	company	via	the	WHO	reference	labs.	Moreover,	the	cost	of	the	vaccine,	Supari	argued,	was	prohibitive,	and	part	of	a	system	that	was	exploitative	and	reinforced	inequalities	between	high-	and	low-income	countries	(Coker,	Hunter,	et	al.	2011).	Supari’s	actions	and	calls	for	recalibrating	the	GISN	to	enable	greater	access	to	pharmaceuticals	was	met	with	condemnation	from	some	(Holbrooke	and	Garrett	2008),	yet	found	support	from	other	governments,	including	India,	Brazil,	and	Iran.	Following	months	of	negotiations,	and	a	World	Health	Assembly	resolution	promoting	more	“transparent,	fair	and	equitable”	use	of	genetic	materials	and	the	benefits	that	come	from	their	use	(WHO	2007),	in	2008,	the	Indonesian	government	agreed	to	start	sharing	H5N1	virus	sequencing,	but	not	actual	viral	samples.55	While	Supari’s	actions	reinforce	the	fragile	nature	of	assumptions	of	global	consensus,	underscoring	how	dominant	pathways	of	response	ultimately	hinge	on	national	governments’	willingness	to	participate,	there	are	also	instances	when	governments	lack	the	ability	to	implement	programming	aligned	with	the	dominant	narratives	advocated	for	by	the	core	global	organizations.		The	ability	of	national	governments	to	enact	interventions	and	prevent	infections	depends	largely	on	available	resources	and	the	form	of	political	system.	The	quality	and	capacity	of	health	systems	differs	greatly	across	and	within	countries.	The	recent	Ebola	epidemic	in	west	Africa,	for	example,	has	been	partly	attributed	to	the	limited	capacity	of	health	systems	in	that	region	to	quickly	and	comprehensively	respond	to	early	outbreaks	(Bausch	and	Schwarz	2014).	Early	on,	limits	to	the	capacity	of	national	governments’	health	and	veterinary	services	for	responding	to	H5N1	were	identified	(FAO/OIE/WHO	2005).	Health	systems	in	many	south	east	Asian	countries,	however,	still	suffer	from	significant	shortages	of	health	workers	and	resources,	and	are	thus	at	“risk	of	being	unable	to	adequately	respond	to	emerging	threats	from	new	and	re-emerging	diseases	or	surges	in	demand	that	might	accompany	these	diseases”	(Coker,	Hunter,	et	al.	2011,	606).	Attention	to	governance	refocuses	the	need	for	long-term	structural	changes	in	some	countries’	health	systems,	while	illustrating	that,	even	if	officials	prioritize	a	particular	intervention,	they	may	not	have	the	necessary	funding	or	capacity	to	do	so.	As	discussed	above,	compensation	for	those	who	lose	animals	in	culling	initiatives,	for	example,	proved	too	expensive	and	difficult	to	implement	in	Indonesia.		Additionally,	not	all	governments	have	the	same	ability	to	enforce	particular	interventions.	The	means	and	methods	of	a	government	largely	depend	on	the	form	of	the	political	system.	In	looking	at	national	responses	for	cholera,	smallpox,	and	syphilis	in	Europe	between	1830-1930,	Baldwin	argues,	“It	was	not	the	nature	of	the																																																									55	For	more	on	the	virus-sharing	dispute	see	(Elbe	2010a;	Kamradt-Scott	and	McInnes	2012).	
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disease	which	specified	how	it	would	be	prevented	and	limited,	but	the	kind	of	political	regime	under	epidemic	attack	(1999,	13).	While	this	may	gloss	over	important	distinctions	between	diseases	–	smallpox	has	no	human	hosts,	for	instance,	whereas	avian	influenza	is	considered	endemic	in	Indonesian	poultry	and	has	myriad	potential	vectors	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a)	–	the	implications	of	different	forms	of	governance	for	disease	control	can	be	clearly	seen	in	relation	to	avian	influenza.	The	closure	of	live	bird	markets	-	and	preventing	informal	trade	networks	outside	of	formal	surveillance	structures	-	for	example,	is	much	easier	to	enforce	in	China	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013)	than	in	other	countries	where	avian	influenza	is	endemic	(Naysmith	2013b;	Fournié	et	al.	2013).	A	historical	look	at	Indonesia’s	different	political	systems	underscores	how	divergent	systems	have	different	abilities	to	respond	and	implement	infectious	disease	programming.			Under	Suharto	(1967-1998),	when	Indonesia	was	a	centralized,	autocratic	state,	officials	tasked	with	implementing	disease-control	programmes	employed	both	soft	and	hard	coercive	tactics	to	eradicate	smallpox	(Naysmith	2013a).	When	the	Indonesian	government	implemented	the	Smallpox	Eradication	Program	(SEP)	between	1966-1974,	the	central	government	mobilized	the	army,	local	defence	forces	–	Hansip	-	and	the	police	to	track	unvaccinated	persons,	enforce	quarantines	and	vaccination,	and	ensure	that	all	outbreaks	were	reported.56	Similar	strong-armed	tactics	were	employed	by	Suharto’s	government	in	other	public	health	initiatives	such	as	population-control	programming	(Hull	2005).	While	these	tactics	were	not	the	only	factor	leading	to	the	SEP’s	success	–	the	fact	that	there	were	no	non-human	vectors	meant	that	it	was	possible	to	eradicate	the	virus	if	surveillance	and	vaccination	activities	were	efficient	(Henderson	2009)	–	the	strong	arm	strategies	of	the	government	certainly	facilitated	and	hastened	along	the	aims	of	the	SEP	in	Indonesia.	A	focus	on	governance	in	contemporary	Indonesia	shows	constraints	in	employing	similar	methods	in	disease	control	programming	today.			Indonesia’s	rapid	and	systemic	political	decentralization	after	the	fall	of	Suharto	in	1998	ushered	in	a	drastically	different	form	of	government.	With	guidance	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	and	the	World	Bank,	health	in	post-Suharto	Indonesia	came	under	the	purview	of	provincial	and	district	level	health	authorities	working	within	a	multiparty	democracy	for	the	first	time.	These	officials	were	made	responsible	for	setting	priorities	and	allocating	funding	for	health-related	programming.	While	decentralization	was	intended	to	promote	local	ownership	and	the	prioritization	of	context-specific	needs,	there	were	some	negative	unintended	consequences.	When	health	officials	were	encouraged	to	look	inwards	at	localized	concerns,	the	coordination	of	health	related	activities	across	different	political																																																									56	These	data	derive	from	the	World	Health	Organization’s	archives	in	Geneva	and	the	United	States’	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	collected	when	I	was	a	visiting	research	associate	in	the	Department	of	History	at	Columbia	University	in	summer	2011.	Here	I	participated	in	the	Hertog	Global	Strategy	Initiative,	a	summer	programme	then	focused	on	the	history	of	pandemic	threats	and	related	policies.	I	report	these	findings	in	an	unpublished	manuscript	on	the	history	of	the	Smallpox	Eradication	Program	in	Indonesia	titled:	Modernizing	disease	and	the	politics	of	the	intensified	
smallpox	eradication	program	in	New	Order	Indonesia,	1966-1974.	
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jurisdictions	was	weakened	(S.	Kristiansen	and	Santoso	2006).	Some	district	level-officials	did	not	prioritize	or	fund	health	concerns,	“as	reflected	by	the	near	collapse”	of	infectious	disease	surveillance	systems	in	some	parts	of	the	country.57	Decentralization	also	diluted	the	central	government’s	responsibility	for	veterinary	services	(Forster	2012),	making	the	control	of	zoonotic	diseases	such	as	avian	influenza	more	difficult.			Indonesia’s	current	system	has	been	contrasted	with	avian	influenza	control	programmes	in	other	countries	that	bear	a	more	authoritarian	form	of	government.	Peter	Roeder,	an	FAO	animal	health	officer,	remarked,	“Indonesia	lacks	the	strong	central	government	and	established	veterinary	capabilities	that	enabled	top-down	bird	flu	control	programmes	to	work	in	Thailand,	which	relied	on	aggressive	culling,	and	Viet	Nam,	which	introduced	massive	vaccination”	(Normile	2007,	31).	Beyond	culling	and	vaccination,	movement	control	is	another	measure	where	success	is	derived	in	part	from	the	system	of	government	in	place.	Movement	controls	aim	to	limit	the	introduction	and	spread	of	avian	influenza	viruses	to	previously	disease-free	areas.	In	Indonesia	this	is	difficult,	as	the	extensive	trade	in	poultry	sees	myriad	birds	routinely	transported	over	the	boundaries	of	Indonesia’s	34	provinces	and	465	districts.	Here,	controlling	the	spread	of	disease	in	birds	is	weakened	if	local	officials	do	not	prioritize	the	need	to	monitor	and	control	avian	influenza	in	poultry,	or	seek	to	coordinate	with	neighbouring	counterparts.			In	short,	governance	narratives	about	avian	influenza	direct	attention	to	the	opportunities	and	constraints	for	disease	control	derived	from	a	country’s	governance	system	and	political	actors	and	institutions.	Indonesia’s	non-authoritarian,	decentralized	political	structure	makes	it	difficult	to	coordinate	responses	and	poses	additional	challenges	to	ensuring	population	compliance	with	government	interventions.	The	oft-cited	culling	and	compensation	example	is	but	one	case	showing	how	undesirable	interventions	can	be	met	by	some	populations	with	derision	and	active	disengagement	from	programming	(Naysmith	2013b).	These	challenges,	coupled	with	the	nature	of	avian	influenza	as	a	virus	with	multiple	potential	vectors,	means	that	efforts	to	control	the	spread	of	H5N1	hinges	in	large	measure	on	the	extent	to	which	PWP	–	including	small-hold	farmers,	traders,	and	market	workers,	among	others	-	are	concerned	about	the	disease	in	question,	and	whether	they	are	willing	to	partake	in	interventions.	Indeed,	Indonesia’s	adoption	of	a	widespread	poultry	vaccination	policy	was	determined,	in	part,	by	the	influence	of	poultry	producers,	who	worried	that	widespread	culling	would	decimate	their	business	and	pressured	the	government	accordingly	(Pongcharoensuk	et	al.	2012).	Government	officials	and	others	implementing	avian	influenza	control	programming	must	consider	the	processes	and	incentives	that	both	help	inform	people’s	understanding	of	disease	and	which	shape	their	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface.																																																										57	See:	http://www.ino.searo.who.int/en/Section3.htm.	Accessed	March	25,	2015.	
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Local	realities	narrative	Infectious	diseases	are	inherently	social	as	well	as	biological	phenomena	(Basch	1993;	Cline	1995).	The	dominant	narratives	for	avian	influenza,	however,	remain	focused	on	the	“pathogen	itself	–	its	molecular	machinery,	processes	of	reassortment	and	mutation,	and	how	these	factors	indicate	risk	for	human-to-human	transmission”	(Janes	et	al.	2012,	1884)	–	and	largely	neglect	the	social	and	cultural	dimensions	of	the	disease	including	factors	that	influence	human	behaviours.	Absent	from	the	“apocalyptic	scenario”	attached	to	outbreak	narratives	about	H5N1	has	been	a	“rigorous	analysis	of	the	local	contexts	in	which	flus	arise	and	in	which	the	effects	of	a	pandemic	would	most	strongly	be	felt”	(Kleinman	et	al.	2008a,	1).	An	important,	and	often	overlooked,	alternative	narrative	focuses	on	local	realities,	with	particular	attention	on	the	perspectives,	experiences,	and	behaviours	of	local	populations	who	are	disproportionately	affected	by	diseases,	particularly	those	who	live	and	work	at	the	human-animal	interface.			Such	local	realities	have	long	been	recognized	as	central	for	understanding	disease	events,	and	in	developing	public	health	interventions	(Trostle	2005;	Inhorn	and	Janes	2007;	Nichter	2008).	Yet	many	crucial	social	factors	about	avian	influenza	are	not	fully	understood	(Janes	et	al.	2012).	It	is	important	to	consider	the	local	realities	of	people	living	in	close	proximity	to	poultry	as	a	way	of	aligning	disease	control	interventions	more	closely	with	their	priorities	and	perceptions.	As	Scoones	and	Forster	remind	us,	“Everyone	agrees	that	local	perspectives	matter,	but	without	effective	articulation	with	locally	embedded	understandings	of	risks,	diseases,	animals	and	epidemics,	externally	derived	interventions	often	fail”	(2010,	216).			Consideration	of	local	realities	replaces	dominant	narratives’	assumption	of	“cultural	shortcomings”	(Kleinman	et	al	2008b,	1),	allowing	for	the	possibility	that	interventions	can	draw	on	local	populations’	beneficial	indigenous	or	experiential	knowledge	in	relation	to	diseases,	including	potential	treatments	and	prevention	strategies.	Rather	than	viewing	people’s	behaviour	as	the	result	of	a	lack	of	knowledge,	a	local	realities	narrative	pays	attention	to	what	people	do	know	about	disease,	and	what	factors	motivate	their	behaviour.	In	their	case	study	of	an	Ebola	control	programme,	Hewlett	and	Hewlett	(2008)	show	how	a	narrative	focused	on	local	realities	can	provide	valuable,	complementary	solutions	to	the	pathways	of	response	indicated	by	dominant	narratives.	Observing	that	local	people	“had	an	existing	cultural	model	to	explain	the	nature,	transmission	and	prevention	of	epidemic	illness”,	they	sought	to	integrate	this	knowledge	into	responses	(Leach	and	Hewlett	2010,	58).	For	instance,	the	Acholi,	in	Uganda,	have	an	illness	concept	called	
gemo,	which,	once	identified,	lead	to	the	implementation	of	a	local	protocol	in	response	to	disease	events,	with	practices	comprising	a	“broad	spectrum	approach	to	epidemic	control”	(Leach	and	Hewlett	2010,	58),	including:	isolating	patients	at	least	100m	away	from	others,	using	survivors	of	the	epidemic	to	provide	care	for	patients,	marking	affected	houses,	limiting	general	movement	between	households	and	villages,	and	keeping	patients	who	are	no	longer	symptomatic	in	isolation	for	one	lunar	cycle.	While	these	responses	mirror	–	and	complement	–	dominant	response	pathways,	they	differ	in	that	they	are	drawn	from	the	practical	and	
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everyday	experiences	of	people	living	closely	with	disease,	rather	than	the	methods	and	methodologies	associated	with	the	human	and	animal	health	narratives.	Of	course	not	all	local	realities,	and	the	diverse	perspectives	and	responses	that	stem	from	them,	will	reinforce	dominant	response	pathways.	Nonetheless,	attention	to	diversity	of	places	and	perspectives,	of	local	knowledge	and	behaviours,	may	actually	prove	central	to	the	efficacy	of	programming,	and	in	identifying	disease	emergence	(I	Scoones	2010).		Another	facet	of	the	local	realities	narrative	is	the	observation	that	local	people	have	long	lived	with	outbreaks	of	disease	and	may,	in	fact,	experience	them	less	as	crisis	events	than	as	“something	to	be	accommodated	when	possible	and	occasionally	suffered	when	not”	(Leach	and	Dry	2010,	5).	In	parts	of	Indonesia,	for	example,	some	of	those	who	raise	and	sell	birds	consider	disease	events	in	poultry	normalized,	even	seasonal,	and	reject	the	notion	that	avian	influenza	can	infect	humans	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008).	Such	insights	highlight	how	local	constructions	of	disease	can	differ	significantly	from	more	dominant,	global	perspectives.	In	Cambodia,	while	responses	to	H5N1	are	“driven	by	the	perceived	risk	of	an	influenza	pandemic	and	its	associated	costs	to	Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	Countries”(Coker	et	al	2011:	328),	those	who	raise	and	sell	poultry	perceive	little	risk	from	the	virus.	Attention	to	local	realities	reinforces	the	notion	that	the	concept	of	risk	in	relation	to	avian	influenza	is	not	uniform,	but	rather	subjective,	and	understood	in	different	terms	in	different	places.	Indeed,	in	looking	at	diverse	“risk	rationalities”	(Keck	2008)	of	avian	influenza,	a	perceived	“mismatch	between	local	and	expert	understandings	of	disease,	its	dynamics	and	consequences”	(Scoones	and	Forster	2010,	211)	is	apparent.				A	final	element	of	the	local	realities	narrative	is	the	insight	it	provides	into	the	rationale	for	certain	human	behaviours	that	can	facilitate	the	spread	and	evolution	of	zoonotic	pathogens.	Eating	wild	animals	–	bush	meat	-	such	as	simians,	rodents,	and	bats	are	but	one	example	of	human	behaviours	that	can	lead	to	zoonotic	transmission	(Wolfe	et	al.	2005).	These	kind	of	“epidemiologically	notable	behaviours”	are	in	part	socially	mediated,	with	particular	actions	driven	by	cultural	norms	or	societal	expectations	(Janes	et	al.	2012).	Despite	their	importance	in	disease	emergence	and	spread,	the	social	factors	influencing	human	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface	remain	poorly	understood.	Focusing	on	diverse	local	realities	helps	to	identify	and	explain	human	behaviours	related	to	zoonotic	transmission,	in	turn	providing	useful	data	for	more	efficacious	and	ethical	responses.			The	inclusion	of	local	realities	is	particularly	important	for	avian	influenza	because	the	virus	is	considered	endemic	in	poultry	stocks	in	countries	including	Indonesia,	Egypt,	and	Viet	Nam	and	eradicating	the	virus	has	proven	difficult.	As	discussed	above	in	relation	to	the	governance	narrative,	strong-armed	tactics	may	help	facilitate	interventions	in	the	short-term	but	they	may	not	be	possible	over	the	long-term	in	all	countries.	In	some	endemic	settings	effective	programming	may	hinge	on	
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the	participation	of	affected	communities,	in	turn	underscoring	a	need	for	greater	consideration	of	diverse	local	realities.		
Conclusion	This	chapter	outlines	a	range	of	interpretations	and	perspectives	contained	in	alternative	disease	narratives,	including	consideration	of	the	importance	of	livelihoods	in	shaping	people’s	priorities,	the	relevance	of	considering	the	wider	contextual	environment	in	which	particular	forms	of	risk	are	experienced	and	constructed,	the	imperatives	and	constraints	that	exist	for	government	responses	at	the	local,	provincial	and	national	level,	and	the	insights	into	disease	and	containment	and	control	programmes	that	become	available	when	local	realities	are	taken	seriously.	An	overarching	message	derived	from	these	alternative	narratives	is	that	“there	is	always	more	than	one	way	to	tell	a	story,	or	‘frame’	a	particular	issue”	(Leach	and	Dry	2010,	5).	One	of	the	most	important	distinctions	between	these	different	ways	of	framing	avian	influenza	is	how	the	risk	associated	with	the	disease	is	constructed:	as	a	threat	to	global	health	and	security	in	the	human	public	health	and	outbreak	narrative,	as	a	chronic	issue	to	be	managed	by	improved	animal	husbandry	in	the	animal	health	narrative,	as	a	challenge	situated	at	the	nexus	of	animal	and	public	health	in	the	One	Health	narrative,	or	as	a	persistent	though	largely	un-troubling	issue	best	managed	through	long-established	informal	protocols	derived	in	part	from	practical	experience	among	local	populations.	Tensions	can	emerge	between	constructions	of	risk	that	represent	avian	influenza	as	a	threat	in	need	of	rapid,	intensive	responses	and	those	that	downplay	such	emergency	imperatives,	suggesting	instead	that	routinized	local	practices	are	sufficient	to	manage	the	problem.	In	such	cases,	those	practicing	indigenous	control	measures	or	resisting	large-scale	interventions	may	be	viewed	as	lacking	in	accurate	knowledge	about	the	disease.	The	following	chapter	examines	different	approaches	to	conceptualizing	the	notion	of	risk	in	relation	to	avian	influenza,	and	concludes	by	outlining	the	conceptual	commitments	of	this	study.			
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Chapter	5:	Conceptualizing	constructions	of	risk	at	the	human-animal	
interface		
Introduction	As	detailed	in	the	previous	two	chapters,	there	are	vastly	different	ways	that	avian	influenza	can	be	framed,	and	responded	to,	by	different	global,	national	and	local	actors	and	institutions.	Of	interest	in	this	thesis	are	alternative	disease	narratives	focusing	on	the	local	realities	of	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface,	and	in	particular	those	who	work	with	poultry	on	a	daily	basis	in	LBMs.	As	highlighted	in	the	introduction	of	this	thesis,	this	is	both	because	PWP	are	in	routine	contact	with	animals	and	environments	that	can	harbour	and	transmit	disease,	and	are	thus	considered	a	potential	“bridge	population”	for	transmitting	viruses	across	species,	and	for	spreading	the	virus	between	humans	(Gray	and	Kayali	2009;	Gray,	Trampel,	and	Roth	2007),	and	because	interventions	and	responses	for	avian	influenza	often	focus	on	live	bird	markets	and	those	who	work	in	them	(Neupane	et	al.	2012;	Samaan	et	al.	2012).			People	who	live	and	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	have	revealed	significant	divergences	in	constructions	of	the	risk	posed	by	H5N1	to	humans	between	these	local	communities	and	those	presented	in	much	of	the	scientific	literature	and	international	policy	documents	(Forster	2010;	Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008).	For	example,	Forster	and	Scoones	report	an	Indonesian	study	showing	that	97%	of	respondents	were	aware	of	avian	influenza	but	only	15%	regarded	it	as	a	direct	threat	to	themselves	and	their	families	(2008,	158).	Reflecting	on	this	disparity,	one	informant	stated,	“The	awareness	among	at	risk	groups	is	quite	high	but	the	perception	of	the	risk	is	low,	and	changes	in	behaviour	and	practices	are	less	than	optimal”	(Ian	Scoones	and	Forster	2008,	156).	These	divergent	constructions	of	risk	range	from	people	thinking	that	avian	influenza	does	not	pose	a	threat	to	humans	because	it	does	not	exist,	or	because	it	cannot	infect	humans,	to	viewing	outbreaks	as	a	normalized,	seasonal	event	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008;	Forster	2010;	Naysmith	2010;	Naysmith	2013b).			Presented	with	these	findings,	the	question	then	becomes:	How	do	we	conceptualize	assessments	of	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	to	humans	that	depart	significantly	from	those	represented	by	the	dominant	outbreak	narratives?	This	chapter	outlines	several	competing	theories	of	risk	perceptions,	highlighting	how	each	conceptualizes	assessments	of	risk	that	depart	from	those	primarily	presented	in	dominant	narratives	and	how	each	is	operationalized	in	contemporary	research	on	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.	Discussion	then	turns	to	outline	the	conceptual	framework	employed	in	this	study,	which	draws	together	several	concepts	and	theories	of	risk	perception	to	form	a	series	of	empirical	questions	that	guide	this	research.			
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Objectivist	conceptualizations	of	risk		One	of	the	dominant	theories	of	risk	perception	draws	on	the	objectivist-realist	interpretation	of	risk,	which	conceptualizes	risk	as	the	domain	of	the	expert	scientist,	to	be	communicated	to	members	of	the	passive	public	(Irwin	1995;	Irwin	and	Wynne	1996).	Studies	emerging	from	this	tradition	focus	on	individual	cognitive	processes	and	levels	of	knowledge,	whereby	individuals	are	thought	to	assess	“the	probability	of	risks	and	the	magnitude	of	specific	consequences”	in	ways	that	may	or	may	not	align	with	techno-scientific	analyses	(Kasperson	et	al.	1988).	Risk	assessment,	in	this	formulation,	refers	to	“a	structured,	systematic	process	to	determine	the	likelihood	of	the	occurrence	of	an	event	and	the	likely	magnitude	of	the	consequences	following	exposure	to	a	hazard”	(The	Council	of	Canadian	Academies	2011).	Of	crucial	importance	is	the	relationship	between	having	the	
correct	knowledge	about	the	risk	in	question	and	forming	appropriate	–	meaning	in	line	with	technical	-	risk	perceptions.	Yet	members	of	the	public	are	seen	primarily	as	“irrational	individuals”	who	are	prone	to	either	underestimate	their	risk	from	habitual	behaviours,	such	as	smoking	or	not	wearing	a	seat	belt,	for	example,	or	develop	an	“exaggerated	fear	of	hazards	which	experts	consider	to	be	relatively	safe”,	such	as	nuclear	power	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	6).		As	a	result,	when	people	conceptualize	risk	in	ways	that	deviate	from	scientific	data,	the	objectivist	interpretation	suggests	they	do	so	because	they	lack	sufficient	awareness	or	information	(Wynne	1991;	Wynne	2006).	For	instance,	PWP	who	do	not	recall	or	confirm	biomedical	knowledge	about	H5N1	are	presented	as	“confused”	and	in	need	of	education	(Fielding	and	Lam	2007).	This	interpretation	is	often	termed	the	knowledge	deficit	perspective,	whereby	“public	dissent	from	expert	pronouncements	therefore	must	be	due	to	public	rejection	or	ignorance	of	the	risk	science”	(Wynne	2008,	23).			The	knowledge	deficit	interpretation	of	divergent	risk	perceptions	is	typically	operationalized	in	knowledge,	attitudes,	and	practices,	or	behaviours,	surveys	(KAP	or	KAPB)58	(WHO	2008;	Medecins	du	Monde	2011;	Green	2001;	Manderson	and	Aaby	1992;	Launiala	2009;	Nichter	2008).59	In	KAP	surveys	of	avian	influenza,																																																									58	KAP	surveys	were	designed	in	the	1950s	to	measure	whether	particular	populations	were	hostile	to	family	planning	programmes,	and,	more	generally,	to	identify	local	knowledge,	attitudes,	and	practices	regarding	fertility	(Cleland	1973).	As	international	aid	for	public	health	increased	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	KAP	surveys	became	a	standardized	tool	to	measure	what	people	know,	believe,	and	do	in	relation	to	particular	health	concerns.	Since	that	time,	KAP	surveys	have	been	employed	to	gather	such	data	and	inform	interventions	for	infectious	diseases	(Nichter	2008),	including	HIV/AIDS	(Launiala	2009),	tuberculosis		(WHO	2008),	and	avian	influenza	(American	Red	Cross	in	Indonesia	2009).	59	KAP	surveys	are	popular,	in	part,	because	enumerators	and	other	field-staff	can	be	trained	quickly,	so	that	the	surveys	can	be	implemented	relatively	rapidly,	and	because	they	provide	quantifiable	data	that	are	easily	generalized	to	a	wider	population	and	utilized	for	cross-cultural	comparison	(Bhattacharyya	1997).	It	is	generally	assumed	that	what	people	know	and	perceive	influences	what	they	do,	and	KAP	surveys	are	primarily	used	to	identify	gaps	in	people’s	knowledge,	their	perceptions	of	risk,	and	other	influences	on	behaviour	(Nichter	2008).	For	policy	makers	focused	on	infectious-disease	control,	data	from	KAP	surveys	are	used	to	identify	priorities,	such	as	building	
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knowledge	is	narrowly	defined	as	biomedical	knowledge	focusing	mostly	on	symptoms,	risks,	and	preventative	behaviours,	with	respondents	questioned	on	their	ability	to	recall	biomedical	understandings	of	H5N1.60	Similarly,	risk	perceptions	of	disease	are	elicited	primarily	in	order	to	establish	whether	a	target	population’s	assessment	of	risk	align	with	scientific	data.			Ensuring	that	PWP’s	risk	perceptions	align	with	scientific	data	is	seen	as	important	because	KAP	measures,	though	technically	not	predictive,	are	used	alongside	other	data	about	intentions,	self-efficacy,	and	subjective	norms,	to	inform	models	predicting	potential	health	behaviours	(C.-M.	Liao	and	You	2014;	Leppin	and	Aro	2009).	Such	models	include	the	Theory	of	Reasoned	Action	(Fishbein	and	Ajzen	1975),	Social	Cognitive	Theory	(Bandura	1977),	the	Theory	of	Planned	Behaviour	(Ajzen	1991),	and	the	Health	Belief	Model	(Janz	and	Becker	1984).	This	latter	model	is	particularly	popular	in	conceptualizing	and	predicting	health-related	behaviours,	and	includes	a	measure	of	“perceived	susceptibility”	to	establish	an	individual’s	own	risk	assessment	for	a	particular	health	issue.	As	Neupane	and	colleagues	report,	“most	evidence	accumulated	within	the	context	of	SARS,	H5N1	and	the	H1N1	outbreak	in	2009	is	consistent	with	these	models’	assumptions	about	the	relevance	of	risk	perceptions	and	beliefs	in	the	efficacy	of	protective	behaviours”	(2012,	2).	Conceptualizing	the	importance	of	risk	perceptions	in	this	way	naturally	leads	to	the	recommendation	that	“improving	the	KAPs	of	poultry	workers	could	provide	an	effective	means	of	preventing	AIV	infection	in	humans”	(Q.	Yu	et	al.	2012,	315).			Yet	in	conceptualizing	risk	perceptions	as	either	“correct”	and	“rational”	(i.e.	aligned	with	more	technical	risk	assessments)	or	“incorrect”	and	“irrational”	(i.e.	informed	by	misperceptions	or	misinformation)	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	8),	the	objectivist-realist	interpretation	of	risk	assumes	a	“shared,	even	single,	rationality	of	risk	avoidance”,	wherein	“rational	behaviour”	is	synonymous	with	“risk	avoidance”	(Rhodes	2002).	It	further	promotes	a	narrow	definition	of	risk	that	is	denuded	of	context	and	based	exclusively	on	scientific	principles	and	norms,	ignoring	the	extent	to	which	perceptions	of	risk	can	be	shaped	by	a	diverse	range	of	subjective	contextual,	emotional,	and	social	influences	(Q.	Liao	et	al.	2014;	Plough	and	Krimsky	1987;	Fischhoff,	Watson,	and	Hope	1984).	As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	below,	alternative	paradigms	for	conceptualizing	risk	indicate	that	other	characteristics,	in	addition	to	levels	of	knowledge,	are	significant	in	shaping	public	perceptions	of	risk.	Thus,	different	characteristics	of	risk,	such	as	whether	the	risk	is	engaged	in	voluntarily	or	involuntarily	(Shepperd	et	al.	2002),	whether	a	risk	evokes	dread,	whether	a	risk	is	seen	to	bring	benefits	or	not,	create	significant	differences	in	individual	responses	(Fischhoff,	Watson,	and	Hope	1984).			
																																																																																																																																																																					epidemiological	literacy	among	target	populations	or	altering	high-risk	behaviours,	and	inform	interventions,	as	well	as	to	analyse	the	impact	and	efficacy	of	such	interventions.		60	As	an	example	of	how	knowledge	is	defined,	a	recent	study	derived	their	questions	about	AI	knowledge	from	a	WHO	fact	sheet	(Neupane	et	al	2012).	
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Rhodes	argues	that	viewing	risk	perceptions	primarily	as	the	product	of	individual	cognitive	processes	assumes	an	“overly	calculative	and	context	free	vision	of	risk	decision-making,	neglecting	to	capture	how	risks	and	their	perceptions	are	context	dependent”	(2002,	86).	In	short,	by	conceptualizing	divergent	risk	perceptions	primarily	as	the	result	of	deficits	of	knowledge,	to	be	resolved	by	interventions	to	boost	scientific	literacy,	the	realist-objectivist	conceptualization	of	risk	perceptions	does	not	fully	capture	underlying	rationales	for	individuals’	assessments	of	risks	in	a	given	situation.			
Experiential	risk	rationalities	Not	surprisingly,	“it	has	been	difficult	to	find	common	ground	between	the	social	world	of	risk	perceptions	guided	by	human	experience	and	the	scientists’	rational	ideal	of	decision-making	based	on	probabilistic	thinking”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	5).	An	alternative	theory	of	risk	perceptions	comes	from	the	constructivist	tradition	of	Cultural	Theory,	which	conceptualizes	risk	perceptions	as	a	socially	and	contextually	constructed	phenomena	(Wildavsky	and	Dake	1990).	Responding	to	some	of	the	limitations	of	the	objectivist	perspective	described	above,	this	approach	highlights	the	way	subjective	lay	assessments	contribute	to	a	form	of	“experiential	risk	rationality”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	8).	This	concept	emphasizes	the	importance	of	considering	the	range	of	empirical	observations	that	lay	people	marshal	to	evaluate	a	risk	event,	highlighting	how	“ideas	about	the	world	come	directly	out	of	human	experience”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	9).	Rather	than	ignore	or	downplay	the	role	that	subjective	judgements	play	in	assessing	risk,	as	can	be	the	case	in	the	objectivist	perspective	(Fischhoff	et	al	1984),	the	constructivist	tradition	explicitly	highlights	the	way	these	“direct	experiences”	shape	the	way	risk	is	constructed(Kasperson	et	al.	1988).			This	concept	of	experiential	risk	rationality	therefore	draws	attention	to	the	processes	of	deliberation	used	by	lay	populations	to	question	the	source	and	veracity	of	scientific	data,	particularly	when	technical	data	deviate	from	their	experiences	and	observations.	Conceptualized	in	this	manner,	constructions	of	risk	that	deviate	from	technologically	-	and	scientifically	-	informed	constructions	of	risk	do	not	necessarily	reflect	a	lack	of	scientific	literacy	or	ignorance,	but	rather	a	considered	and	socially	contingent	system	for	interpreting	scientifically	defined	risk	against	a	history	of	past	experience	coupled	with	contemporary	observations	(Fischer	2000).	Importantly,	this	concept	does	not	pit	lay	constructions	of	risk	against	expert	interpretations	but	suggests	that	each	can	“be	logical	and	coherent	on	their	own	terms”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	8).	In	this	sense,	different	constructions	of	risk	reflect	diverse	disease	narratives,	showcasing	differences	“in	how	the	problem	is	articulated,	in	the	factors	relevant	to	the	analysis,	and	in	who	the	experts	are”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	8).		The	concepts	and	values	underpinning	experiential	risk	rationality	have	a	long	historical	tradition.	Scholars	over	centuries	and	across	many	disciplines	have	sought	ways	to	conceptualize	how	certain	individuals	and	communities	come	to	know	or	
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understand	certain	phenomena	in	their	own	environment	(Kant	2007;	Lévi-Strauss	1966;	Geertz	1983;	Butchvarov	1970),	and	there	are	multiple	terms	that	frame	these	epistemological	discussions	(Corburn	2005).	One	such	term	is	local	
knowledge.	This	term	is	used	to	refer	to	an	“organized	body	of	thought	based	on	immediacy	of	experience”	and	also	“practical,	collective	and	strongly	rooted	in	a	particular	place”	(Geertz	1983,	167).	Others	define	local	knowledge	as:			 knowledge	that	does	not	owe	its	origins,	testing,	degree	of	verification,		 truth,	status	or	currency	to	distinctive...	professional	techniques,	but	rather		 to	common	sense,	casual	empiricism,	or	thoughtful	speculation	and		 analysis	(Lindblom	and	Cohen	1979,	12).		In	drawing	on	the	tradition	of	local	knowledge	to	situate	experiential	risk	rationality,	this	study	acknowledges	that	this	term	is	not	without	critique	or	alternatives.	The	local	in	local	knowledge	has	been	interpreted	as	justifying	romantic,	essentializing	notions	of	others	(Agrawal	1995).	Local	knowledge	may	also	reinforce	moralistic,	nationalistic,	and	ethnocentric	beliefs,	or	be	appropriated	to	infringe	on	minority	rights	(Corburn	2005).	Alternative	terms	for	what	is	broadly	understood	to	be	local	knowledge	include	indigenous	knowledge,	folk	knowledge,	and	traditional	knowledge	(Agrawal	1995;	Chambers	1997;	Grenier	1998;	Irwin	1995).61	Although	general	commonalities	exist,	these	concepts	can	have	slightly	different	meanings.	Indigenous	knowledge,	for	example,	can	be	defined	as	“the	unique,	traditional,	local	knowledge	existing	within	and	developed	around	the	specific	conditions	of	women	and	men	indigenous	to	a	particular	geographic	area”	(Grenier	1998).	Indigenous	knowledge,	in	part,	is	also	described	as	knowledge	and	skills	passed	down	orally	between	generations	to	provide	necessary	survival	strategies.62	While	each	of	these	terms	differs	slightly	in	its	approach	to	understanding	the	way	in	which	knowledge	is	“made”,	there	is	“enough	overlap	among	the	different	definitions...	to	ensure	a	shared	intersubjective	understanding”	(Corburn	2005,	48–49)	in	the	term	local	knowledge.			While	local	knowledge	is	characterized	to	a	degree	by	a	form	of	“casual	empiricism”	(Lindblom	and	Cohen	1979),	of	sorting	through	observations	and	experiences,	in	recent	years,	scholars	have	pointed	to	more	active	constructions	of	local	knowledge,	emphasizing	how	individuals	and	communities	actively	inquire	and	develop	new	forms	of	knowledge.	The	notions	of	“street	science”	(Corburn	2005)	or	“citizen	science”	(Irwin	1995;	Fischer	2000)	emphasize	the	quasi-experimental	attitude	that	members	of	the	public	bring	to	their	inquiries	of	uncertainty	and	risk,	highlighting	how	lay	populations	undertake	data	collection,	analyse	and	interpret	findings,	and																																																									61	Existing	Veterinary	Knowledge	(EVK)	is	another	term	that	is	used	to	refer	to	local	knowledge	that	is	specifically	related	to	animal	health	and	animal	rearing.	I	do	not	use	EVK	in	this	study,	because	this	thesis	goes	beyond	looking	specifically	at	what	people	know	about	animals	and	their	health.	62	See,	for	example	Ellen	and	Harris’	Concepts	of	indigenous	environmental	knowledge	in	scientific	and	
development	studies	literature:	A	critical	assessment	(1996):	lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Rainforest/SML_files/Occpap/indigknow.occpap_1.html#Section3	Accessed:	November	13,	2013.	
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seek	collaboration	with	scientific	institutions	and	personnel	to	ensure	that	their	knowledge	and	insight	have	bearing	on	public	policy.	Importantly,	one	of	the	priorities	that	animate	street	science,	for	example,	is	the	anxiety	of	individuals	and	communities	about	scientific	developments	and	innovations	(Corburn	2005).63			Previous	work	on	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia	has	situated	its	analysis	of	divergent	constructions	of	risk	primarily	in	these	experiential	risk	rationalities,	exploring	the	extent	to	which	people	who	live	and	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	are	engaged	in	reasoned	assessments	of	a	range	of	risks	in	their	lives	based	on	their	own	empirical	observations	and	experiences.	In	doing	so,	this	body	of	work	draws	attention	to	the	“different	forms	of	practical	logic”	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008,	37)	that	motivate	different	perspectives	on	the	degree	of	risk	posed	by	H5N1	to	humans.	For	example,	Padmawati	and	Nichter	describe	the	widespread	belief	that	poultry	farm	workers	and	market	workers	are	“weather	vanes”	for	the	presence	of	illness	in	the	community:	“Given	that	no	butcher	or	poultry	worker	had	been	reported	ill	with	avian	flu,	several	people	voiced	the	opinion	that	the	risk	of	the	disease	to	humans	was	exaggerated.	Others	were	of	the	opinion	that	H5N1	was	a	disease	of	birds	and	not	humans,	just	like	Newcastle	disease”	(2008,	37).	Forster	(2012)	reports	a	similar	perception	among	his	informants:	“A	woman	buying	slaughtered	and	butchered	meat	for	her	household’s	consumption	said:	“I	see	the	market	workers	and	if	they	look	healthy	I	do	not	worry.	If	the	chicken	was	dangerous,	they	would	get	ill	first”	(2012,	105).	These	accounts	are	important	for	the	extent	to	which	they	offer	insights	into	the	specific	reasoning	processes	involved	in	determining	whether	avian	influenza	is	of	risk	to	humans.			Guided	by	the	experiential	risk	rationality	conceptualization,	key	questions	for	the	present	study	emerge:	How	do	people	who	work	and	live	with	poultry	construct	the	risk	associated	with	H5N1	for	humans?	Put	another	way,	what	kind	of	evidence	are	PWP	employing	in	order	to	make	their	assessments	about	the	relative	health	risks	posed	by	H5N1?		
	
Heuristics	and	biases	Attention	to	the	role	of	empirically-derived	observations	and	experiences	highlights	a	complimentary	notion	from	the	field	of	cognitive	psychology,	which	suggests	that	risk	perceptions	are	primarily	derived	from	lay	assessments	that	draw	on	heuristics	and	perceptual	biases.	Individuals	rely	on	these	cognitive	shortcuts,	the	theory	suggests,	to	help	simplify	the	vast	amount	of	information	they	are	called	upon	to	assimilate	(Kahneman,	Slovic,	and	Tversky	1982).	Put	another	way,	“people	answer	a	hard	question	by	substituting	an	easier	one”	(Kahneman	and	Frederick	2002).	Most	important	among	these	heuristics	is	the	availability	heuristic,	employed	by																																																									63	Corburn’s	study	(2005),	in	part,	looks	at	how	knowledge	from	low-income	urban	communities	in	Brooklyn,	New	York,	is	used,	and	combined	with	scientific	–	technical	–	knowledge,	to	inform	policies	that	address	local	environmental	risks.	In	this	work,	Corburn	argues	for	a	revaluation	of	local	knowledge	to	complement	scientific	data,	a	process	which	ultimately	“democratizes	the	inquiry	and	decision-making	process”,	and	which	he	labels	street	science.	
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people	to	“assess	the	magnitude	of	risks	by	asking	whether	examples	can	readily	come	to	mind.	If	people	can	easily	think	of	such	examples,	they	are	far	more	likely	to	be	frightened	than	if	they	cannot”	(Sunstein	2005,	14).				Three	factors	affect	the	availability	of	information	about	a	particular	risk.	The	first	is	familiarity,	whether	the	risk	in	question	is	commonly	known	or	obscure.	A	familiar	risk,	such	as	terrorism,	is	cognitively	available	to	many	people.	The	second	factor	is	salience,	or	whether	an	example	of	the	risk	in	question	is	prominent	or	not.	To	illustrate	salience,	some	use	the	example	of	seeing	a	house	burning	versus	reading	about	a	fire	in	the	local	paper	(Kahneman,	Slovic,	and	Tversky	1982).	Third,	a	recently	experienced	event	is	more	cognitively	available	than	one	that	occurred	many	years	ago,	meaning	that	time	and	space	play	important	roles	in	availability.	In	short,	an	individual’s	assessment	of	risk	is	shaped	by	their	awareness	of	the	risk	in	question,	by	how	dramatic	or	striking	the	risk,	and	by	how	recently	the	risk	event	occurred.	Theorists	note	that	in	many	circumstances,	the	use	of	the	availability	heuristic	is	“hardly	irrational”,	indeed,	“What	has	happened	before	seems,	much	of	the	time,	to	be	the	best	available	guide	to	what	will	happen	again”	(Sunstein	2005,	15).				The	availability	heuristic	also	provides	a	way	of	theorizing	about	differences	in	the	construction	and	perception	of	risk	across	diverse	populations,	by	suggesting	that	such	divergences	reflect	how	different	groups	in	society	have	come	into	contact	with	different	observations	about	a	particular	phenomenon.	Savadori	and	colleagues,	for	instance,	found	that	differences	in	risk	perceptions	between	the	north	and	the	south	of	Italy	were	premised	primarily	on	hazard	familiarity	(1998).	Thus,	in	contrast	to	the	notion	of	a	“shared,	even	single,	rationality	of	risk	avoidance”	(Rhodes	2002:	87),	the	availability	heuristic	aligns	with	Keck’s	plural	notion	of	“rationalities	of	risk”	(2008),	in	that	the	availability	of	different	observations	and	experiences	result	in	different	constructions	of	the	risk	posed	by	the	same	pathology.			Applied	to	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza,	the	availability	heuristic	posits	that	those	who	perceive	the	risk	of	human	infection	with	the	virus	as	plausible,	striking,	and	salient	will	develop	corresponding	constructions	of	risk	about	the	disease	in	which	it	is	viewed	as	posing	a	significant	threat	to	humans.	Different	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	will	develop	in	cases	where	individuals	draw	on	different	experiential	contexts.	As	will	be	explored	further	in	this	thesis,	such	is	the	case	among	PWP,	who	live	and	work	in	environments	where	few	opportunities	exist	to	observe	human	infections	with	H5N1,	in	potential	contrast	to	the	opportunities	to	witness	animal	diseases,	and	the	consequences	of	disease	and	related	interventions.		The	availability	heuristic	is	alluded	to	in	other	studies	of	risk	perceptions	about	avian	influenza,	though	not	by	name.	For	instance,	Padmawati	and	Nichter	(2008)	observe	that	informants	“changed	their	poultry-related	behaviour	when	front-page	headlines	about	avian	flu	appeared,	and	then	resumed	their	previous	behaviour	
	 81	
when	news	waned”	(2008,	41).	This	anecdote	is	meant	to	convey	the	mutability	of	risk	perceptions	and	behaviours	among	some	respondents,	as	well	as	indicate	the	difficulties	in	achieving	long-term	behaviour	changed	related	to	the	handling	of	birds.	Yet	viewed	through	the	lens	of	the	availability	heuristic,	these	perceptions	and	behaviours	can	be	viewed	as	a	rational	assessment	of	the	human	risks	from	H5N1.		Attention	to	the	implications	of	the	availability	heuristic	raises	key	questions	in	this	research:	First,	what	does	attention	to	the	familiarity,	salience	or	timing	of	particular	risks	highlight	about	the	risk	perceptions	of	those	who	work	at	the	human-animal	interface?	And	second,	what	other	risks,	other	than	the	risk	to	humans	–	such	as	those	perceived	to	stem	from	animal	disease,	from	impacts	to	economic	livelihoods,	or	from	political	pressures	-	are	familiar,	salient,	or	recently	experienced	in	PWP’s	lives?		
Conceptualizing	multiple	risks	While	conceptualizing	risk	perceptions	as	contextually	constructed	phenomena	highlights	the	range	of	social	and	cultural	influences	on	a	given	risk,	existing	risk	perception	theories	still	exhibit	a	tendency	to	focus	on	a	single	risk	as	the	object	of	study.	In	practice,	of	course,	an	individual	is	called	upon	to	consider	and	assess	a	wide	scope	of	risks	in	their	daily	lives.	The	exception	to	this	singular	focus	is	the	claim	in	the	Cultural	Theory	of	risk	that	“selective	attention	to	risk,	and	preferences	among	different	types	of	risk	taking	(or	avoiding),	correspond	to	cultural	biases	–	that	is,	to	worldviews	or	ideologies	entailing	deeply	held	values	and	beliefs	defending	different	patterns	of	social	relations”	(Douglas	1978).	Yet	in	rooting	individuals’	analyses	of	different	forms	of	risk	in	cultural	worldviews	rather	than	in	practical	empirical	assessments,	this	theory	may	elevate	the	importance	of	ideological	motivations	while	side-lining	exploration	of	what	leads	certain	risks	to	be	elevated	above	others.	This	thesis	takes	forward	Cultural	Theory’s	attention	to	multiple	risks	while	also	drawing	on	the	notion	of	experiential	risk	rationality	to	explore	the	manner	in	which	different,	competing	risks	are	assessed	in	reference	to	empirical	observations	and	experiences.		Existing	studies	on	avian	influenza	have	mainly	presented	evidence	of	the	existence	of	multiple,	competing	risks,	though	a	few	have	gone	further,	offering	initial	conceptualizations	of	the	relationship	between	different	forms	of	risk.	Padmawati	and	Nichter,	for	instance,	suggest	that	local	authorities	facing	a	range	of	threats	construct	“risk	hierarchies”	based	on	various	pressures	and	incentives	to	act	(2008),	though	no	further	elaboration	on	these	hierarchies	is	provided.	The	notion	of	a	risk	hierarchy	is	echoed	in	Forster’s	(2012)	work	on	the	political	economy	of	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.	Having	observed	that	Indonesians	generally	do	not	perceive	avian	influenza	as	a	significant	risk	or	threat,	he	suggests	that	this	can	explained,	in	part,	by	the	myriad	geological,	political	and	humanitarian	disasters	that	befall	Indonesians.	These	dangers,	he	contests,	are	of	such	a	magnitude	and	severity	that	the	risks	of	avian	influenza	pale	in	comparison:	“In	these	circumstances,	it	is	
	 82	
understandable	that	an	invisible	virus	that	has	resulted	in	only	the	low	hundreds	of	deaths	over	nearly	ten	years	does	not	cause	significant	concern	amongst	the	Indonesian	population”	(2012,	84).	To	some	extent,	this	explanation	hinges	on	the	notion	that	“people	worry	most	about	the	risks	that	seem	most	directly	to	threaten	their	well	being	at	the	moment”	(Holdren	1983,	36).	“What	is	wrong”,	Holdren	continues,	”with	the	simple	idea	–	paralleling	Maslow’s	stages	of	wants	–	that	worries	about	more	subtle	and	complex	threats	will	materialize	if,	and	only	if,	the	most	direct	and	obvious	threats	are	taken	care	of?”	(1983,	36).	This	notion	both	highlights	the	multitude	of	competing	risks	that	Indonesians	are	called	upon	to	assess	in	their	daily	lives,	and	offers	the	idea	of	a	risk	hierarchy	to	help	conceptualize	the	relationship	between	different	types	of	risk.			The	present	study	expands	on	existing	conceptualizations	of	multiple	simultaneous	risk	assessments,	focusing	on	how	practices	of	experiential	rationality	are	invoked	to	assess	the	different	types	of	risks	in	a	given	society	and	for	a	given	individual.	In	doing	so,	two	questions	emerge.	First:	How	do	PWP	construct	the	risks	other	than	those	presented	by	H5N1	to	humans,	such	as	the	risks	that	animals	will	become	sick	or	die,	the	risks	that	a	disease	or	a	disease	intervention	will	threaten	economic	livelihoods,	or	the	risks	that	a	disease	or	a	disease	intervention	will	put	political	pressures	on	local	populations	to	adhere	to	external	authorities?	The	second	question	emerging	from	this	strand	of	risk	perception	research	points	to	the	importance	of	conceptualizing	assessments	of	different	types	of	risk,	asking:	What	is	the	relationship	between	competing	types	of	risks?	Is	a	hierarchy	of	risks	an	accurate	depiction	of	this	connection?			
Pathways	of	response	A	final	element	of	the	conceptual	approach	in	this	study	is	the	notion,	discussed	in	Chapters	3	and	4,	that	the	differing	rationalities	of	risk	evident	in	diverse	disease	narratives	play	a	role	in	shaping	how	pathways	of	response	are	generated	(Leach	and	Dry	2010).	These	pathways	of	response	can	be	enacted	at	the	international,	national,	regional,	community,	or	individual	level,	whereby	particular	interventions,	policies,	methodologies,	research	agendas,	or	–	at	the	individual	level	–	personal	behaviours	–	are	judged	appropriate.	Behaviours	can	therefore	be	revealing	as	manifestations	of	specific	constructions	of	risk.			Research	from	the	objectivist	tradition	–	such	as	KAP	studies	and	models	about	health	beliefs	-	have	conceptualized	the	relationship	between	risk	perceptions	and	behaviours	largely	as	linear	and	predictive.	As	Liao	and	Yu	summarize,	“Generally,	non-regulatory	approaches	to	changing	behaviours	against	influenza	across	individuals	and	populations	have	focused	on	using	information-based	interventions	to	persuade	people	of	the	risks	they	face	and	the	potential	benefits	of	change”	(2014,	190).			There	is	some	evidence	to	support	the	association	between	risk	perceptions	and	behaviour.	Brewer	and	colleagues	suggest	that	“hazard-specific	risk	perception	is	a	
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predictor	of	the	vaccination	behaviour	against	infectious	disease”	(Brewer	et	al.	2007).	Similarly,	Barr	and	colleagues	found	higher	levels	of	risk	perceptions	about	influenza	to	be	associated	with	greater	willingness	to	comply	with	recommended	public	health	behaviours	(2008),	while	Rubin	and	colleagues	indicated	that	believing	there	is	a	high	risk	of	catching	H1N1	and	that	catching	it	would	have	severe	consequences	was	associated	with	behaviour	change	(Rubin	et	al.	2009).	A	study	in	Viet	Nam	suggested	that	respondents	in	communities	affected	by	avian	influenza	who	had	a	higher	perceived	risk	of	infection	were	more	likely	to	seek	health-care	(Manabe	et	al.	2012).	Yet	not	all	studies	report	such	definitive	results.	Fielding	and	colleagues	suggest	that	“sickness	anxieties	did	not	predict	buying	or	touching	habits”	among	customers	of	live	chicken	markets	in	Hong	Kong	(2005,	682).	Furthermore,	they	found	that	increasing	people’s	anxiety	about	disease	produced	only	“transient,	inconsistent,	and	therefore	often	ineffective	results	as	a	means	of	reducing	long-term	high-risk	behaviour”	(2005,	681),	and	posited	that	this	may	be	because	respondents	felt	both	a	sense	of	control	of,	and	familiarity	with,	the	risk	in	question.			Despite	the	challenges	of	establishing	a	definitive	relationship	between	risk	perceptions	and	particular	practices,	it	is	nonetheless	important	to	expand	the	focus	of	analysis	beyond	what	people	say	about	risks,	to	consider	what	they	do	in	reference	to	them.	Furthermore,	simply	indicating	associations	between	perceptions	of	risk	and	behaviours	does	not	provide	insight	into	the	rationale	for	particular	behaviours.	As	Plough	and	Krimsky	contend,	these	insights	only	become	available	“when	people’s	cognitive	behaviour	is	observed	when	they	are	threatened	by	a	real	risk	event.	It	is	only	then	that	the	full	panoply	of	factors	come	into	play	that	create	a	complete	picture	of	a	public	response”	(1987,	8).	In	other	words,	risk	cannot	be	studied	independently	of	the	context	where	constructions	of	risk	are	generated	and	behaviours	are	performed.	Observing	PWP’s	behaviours	in	live	bird	markets,	therefore,	enables	an	exploration	of	the	extent	to	which	“perceptions	of	relative	risks	can	powerfully	determine	pathways	of	response”	(G.	Bloom	2010,	87).	Building	on	existing	studies	that	indicate	how	human	behaviours	contribute	to	the	spread	of	disease	(Janes	et	al.	2012),	this	study	explores	the	implications	for	varying	constructions	of	risk	on	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Such	behaviours	can	be	considered	to	contribute	to	or	detract	from	seeing	efforts	to	contain	avian	influenza	as	a	global	public	good,	in	turn	raising	important	ethical	questions	about	the	extent	to	which	PWP’s	behaviours	can	be	considered	purely	personal	or	private.	Thus,	this	thesis	explores	the	question	of	how	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	are	invoked	in	determining	their	societal	obligations	to	modify	their	own	behaviours	in	LBMs.		Guided	by	this	approach,	this	study	asks:	“To	what	extent	are	PWP’s	different	constructions	of	risk	–	about	human	health,	animal	health,	economic	impacts,	and	political	pressures	–	animating	their	behaviours?		
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Summarizing	the	conceptual	approach	and	guiding	questions	for	this	study	In	sum,	the	above	discussion	establishes	the	comparative	advantages	of	viewing	risk	perceptions	from	a	constructivist	perspective,	suggesting	that	risk	is	a	socially	and	culturally	constructed	notion,	unique	to	particular	contexts.	This	approach	enables	an	examination	of	the	plural	notion	of	the	various	“rationalities	of	risk”	that	are	constructed	by	particular	individuals	at	particular	times,	rather	than	the	idea	of	a	singular,	rationally	assessed	perception	of	risk	that	exists	independently	of	the	wider	perceptions,	meanings	and	interpretations	of	individuals	and	communities.	Drawing	on	the	conceptualization	of	risk	perceptions	as	“experiential	risk	rationalities”,	this	study	examines	the	extent	to	which	these	perceptions	emerge	from	the	range	of	empirical	observations	and	experiences	that	are	available	to	study	respondents	at	a	specific	point	in	time.	The	cognitive	psychological	view	that	risk	perceptions	are	developed	partly	as	a	result	of	heuristics	is	taken	up	by	focusing	on	the	availability,	salience	and	timing	of	experiences	with	risk.	In	an	attempt	to	conceptualize	the	relationship	between	the	range	of	risks	that	an	individual	is	called	upon	to	consider	in	their	lives,	this	study	focuses	attention	on	the	notion	that	risk	perceptions	of	a	particular	risk	are	only	one	of	a	multitude	of	risks	under	assessment.	Lastly,	as	noted	in	Chapter	4,	these	rationalities	of	risk	play	a	role	in	shaping	what	is	seen	as	a	threat,	who	is	seen	as	affected,	and	how	pathways	of	response	are	generated.	This	latter	emphasis	on	the	implications	for	various	constructions	of	risk	on	responses	at	the	national,	regional,	community	and	individual	level	find	expression	in	this	study	through	an	in-depth	examination	of	the	human	behaviours	reported	and	observed	at	the	human-animal	interface.		In	light	of	these	conceptual	commitments,	the	empirical	questions	being	investigated	in	this	study	include:		 1. How	do	people	who	work	and	live	with	poultry	construct	the	risk	associated	with	H5N1	for	humans?		2. What	kind	of	evidence	are	PWP	employing	in	order	to	make	their	assessments	about	the	risks	posed	by	H5N1?	3. What	insights	into	risk	perceptions	are	provided	by	attention	to	the	familiarity,	salience	or	timing	of	particular	risks	for	particular	individuals	or	communities?		4. What	other	risks	–	other	than	the	risk	to	humans	–	such	as	those	perceived	to	stem	from	animal	disease,	from	impacts	to	economic	livelihoods,	or	from	political	pressures	-	are	familiar,	salient,	or	experienced	recently	in	PWP’s	lives?		5. How	do	PWP	construct	the	risks	other	than	those	presented	by	H5N1	to	humans,	such	as	the	risks	that	ones’	animals	will	become	sick	or	die,	the	risks	that	a	disease	or	a	disease	intervention	will	threaten	economic	livelihoods,	or	the	risks	that	a	disease	or	a	disease	intervention	will	put	political	pressures	on	local	populations	to	adhere	to	external	authorities?	6. What	is	the	relationship	between	competing	types	of	risks?	Is	a	“hierarchy	of	risks”	an	accurate	depiction	of	this	connection?	
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7. To	what	extent	are	PWP’s	different	constructions	of	risk	–	about	human	health,	animal	health,	economic	impacts,	and	political	pressures	–	animating	their	behaviours?			In	answering	these	questions,	this	thesis	argues	that	PWP	draw	on	various	facets	of	experiential	risk	rationality	to	construct	perceptions	of	H5N1	risk	to	humans,	to	animals,	to	their	livelihoods,	and	to	their	political/institutional	relationships.	These	constructions	of	risk	largely	do	not	shift	or	modify	in	relation	to	each	other;	an	adjustment	in	the	construction	of	risk	posed	by	H5N1	to	humans	does	not	necessarily	have	a	corollary	effect	on	the	construction	of	risk	around	economic	livelihoods.	Rather,	informed	by	empirical	observations	and	experiences,	PWP	conceptualize	each	type	of	risk	based	on	its	own	merits	and	according	to	available	evidence.	These	constructions	of	risk,	in	turn,	are	seen	to	influence	their	behaviours	in	live	bird	markets,	leading	to	a	prioritization	of	those	practices	and	habits	that	have	beneficial	implications	for	PWP’s	economic	livelihoods.	So	long	as	PWP	perceive	avian	influenza	to	be	a	problem	largely	confined	to	animal	health,	they	have	little	incentive	to	adjust	their	behaviours	in	significant	ways.	Indeed,	interventions	designed	to	bring	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	into	alignment	with	those	of	the	international	community	and	in	so	doing,	bring	PWP’s	behaviours	into	agreement	with	prescribed	best	practices	for	H5N1	disease	control	and	containment,	may	be	in	conflict	with	the	dearth	of	observable	evidence	to	support	constructions	of	risk	that	frame	H5N1	as	a	significant	threat	to	humans.			The	following	chapter	outlines	the	overarching	methodological	approach	used	to	explore	these	questions,	and	sets	out	how	the	conceptual	commitments	established	in	this	chapter	were	operationalized	in	the	data	collection	and	analysis	phase	of	this	study.		
	 86	
Chapter	6:	Methodology	and	methods	
Introduction	This	chapter	introduces	and	situates	the	methodological	approach	that	I	employ	in	this	project,	along	with	the	qualitative	research	tools	utilized	during	fieldwork.	In	particular,	I	illustrate	why	I	use	a	focused	ethnographic	approach	to	broadly	explore	how	respondents	construct	and	respond	to	the	risks	presented	by	H5N1	in	the	context	of	everyday	life.	From	here,	I	qualify	field-site	selection,	discuss	participant	recruitment	and	data	saturation,	and	argue	that	findings	from	this	study	can	be	cautiously	generalized.		
Methodological	approach	How	avian	influenza	A	H5N1	is	perceived	and	assessed	by	those	living	at	the	human-animal	interface,	and	with	what	tangible	consequences	for	behaviour	is	the	central	focus	of	this	study.	To	examine	these	issues	this	qualitative	research	is	informed	by	anthropological	traditions,	and	guided	in	particular	by	a	focused	ethnographic	
approach.			Malinowski	defined	ethnography	as	an	approach	designed	“to	grasp	the	native	point	of	view,	his	reaction	to	his	life,	to	realize	his	vision	of	his	world”	(1961,	25).	Indeed,	an	ethnographic	approach	looks	to	gain	a	vantage	point	on	everyday	life	(Jenkins	2008),	and	appreciates	that	“everything	can	be	significant	because	the	most	potentially	mundane	and	everyday	activities	can	be	as	revealing	as	the	spectacular	ceremonies	and	rituals	(which	often	seem	like	the	mainstay	of	anthropology	to	lay	perceptions)”	(Spencer	2011,	47;	Toren	1996).	Applied	to	research	on	health	and	disease,	an	ethnographic	approach	enables	an	“empirically	based	grasp	of	the	context	specific	nature	of	social	processes”	(Lambert	and	McKevitt	2002,	211)	that	can	lead	to	ill	health	and	disease	events.			Criticism	of	traditional	ethnography	sometimes	centres	on	how	difference	is	represented.	“There	is	a	preference	amongst	many	Ivy	League	anthropology	departments”,	cautions	Robins,	“to	send	their	students	to	Third	World	countries	for	close	encounters	with	distant	and	exotic	Others...	[These]	Studies	of	exotic	Third	World	Others	often	reproduce	a	fetishization	of	difference	and	a	proliferation	of	relatively	esoteric	studies	devoid	of	any	taint	of	policy	or	development	application”	(1996,	17).	I	strive	to	avoid	this	fetishizing	tendency,	in	part,	by	focusing	on	the	everyday,	habitual	routines	of	respondents	at	the	human-animal	interface.			In	this	study	I	am	guided	by	a	focused	ethnographic	methodology.	I	chose	this	approach	for	two	reasons.	First,	focused	ethnographies	are	designed	to	inform	policy	with	tangible	recommendations	derived	from	primary	ethnographic	data.	Second,	a	focused	ethnographic	approach	balances	the	competing	demand	for	increasing	in-depth	qualitative	inquiry	into	the	human-animal	interface	with	the	ethical	imperative	of	limiting	exposure	to	pathogens.		
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	Focused	illness	ethnographies	started	to	be	used	more	frequently	in	international	health	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	to	provide	specific	data	about	a	particular	disease	to	public	health	professionals	tasked	with	developing	interventions	(Gove	and	Pelto	1994).	This	demand	for	anthropological	insight	in	public	health	was	partially	due	to			 recognition	by	planners	and	policy	makers	that	program	success	requires		 an	understanding	of	human	behaviour	and	knowledge	of	what	will		 motivate	people	to	do	what	programs	prescribe.	Conversely,	there	is	[also]		 a	demand	to	understand	why	programs	aren’t	working	and	what	is		 required	to	‘fix’	them	(Herman	and	Bentley	1992,	1369).		While	focused	ethnographies	draw	heavily	from	the	methods	used	in	traditional	ethnographies,	such	as	participant	observation,	some	distinct	features	separate	these	two	approaches.	The	field	of	investigation	in	traditional	ethnographies	is,	to	a	degree,	open	and	determined	over	the	course	of	fieldwork,	which	is	undertaken	by	an	individual	and	typically	characterized	by	extended,	immersive	time	in	the	community	or	place	of	focus.	As	illustrated	in	Table	2,	focused	ethnographies	are	characterized	as	having	a	specific,	closed	field	of	investigation	that	is	intensively	examined	with	multiple	methods,	and	may	include	more	than	one	researcher	undertaking	the	research.			Whereas	the	aim	of	most	traditional	ethnographies	remains	largely	undefined	until	the	fieldwork	process,	focused	ethnographies	identify	and	look	at	a	particular	population	or	phenomenon	from	the	outset.	Additionally,	while	traditional	ethnographies	are	not	policy	oriented,	focused	ethnographies	are	“problem	focused”	with	an	ultimate	aim	of	informing	the	development	of	policy	(Higginbottom,	Pillay,	and	Boadu	2013).	Focused	ethnographies	are	also	usually	limited	by	time,	with	fieldwork	consisting	of	episodic	stints.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	focused	ethnographies	are	sometimes	criticized	as	too	thin	on	time	in	the	field,	and	thus	characterized	as	superficial	ethnographies	that	do	not	yield	sufficiently	in-depth	data	(Nichter	2008).	Although	I	took	a	focused	ethnographic	approach	to	broadly	examine	H5N1	in	context,	fieldwork	for	this	study	was	undertaken	over	multiple	visits	to	each	of	the	three	field	sites	and	not	limited	by	time	or	hastened	along	by	a	need	to	immediately	inform	interventions.	Moreover,	I	chose	a	focused	ethnographic	approach	precisely	because	it	does	not	rely	on	extended	periods	of	fieldwork	stretching	out	continuously	over	months	or	years.										
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Table	2:	Comparing	focused	ethnographies	to	traditional	ethnographies64		
Focused	ethnography	 Traditional	ethnography	Specific	issue/aspect	purposively	studied	 Entire	social	field	studied	Closed	field	of	investigation,	determined	by	research	questions		 Open	field	of	investigation,	determined	over	the	course	of	research	Background	knowledge	usually	informs	research		 Researcher	gains	knowledge	from	participatory	engagement	Informants	are	key	participants,	determined	by	their	knowledge	and	experience	 Participants	are	often	those	with	whom	the	researcher	has	developed	a	close	relationship	Intermittent	and	purposeful	field	visits	based	on	particular	timeframes	or	to	coincide	with	an	event	 Immersion	during	long-term,	experience-based	fieldwork	Intensive	focus	on	data	analysis,	often	employing	electronic	devices	such	as	voice	recorder	and	still-	or	video-cameras	
Focus	on	developing	narrative	
May	utilize	multiple	researchers	with	knowledge	of	the	research	goals		 Research	undertaken	and	analysed	by	individual	researcher			Contact	with	infected	poultry	and	fomites,	and	passive	exposure	in	contaminated	environments	like	live	bird	markets	are	associated	with	H5N1	infection	in	humans	(M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013).	As	the	majority	of	this	research	took	place	in	live	bird	markets,	and	at	the	human-animal	interface,	limiting	the	potential	for	either	myself	or	my	research	assistants	to	be	exposed	to	H5N1	or	other	pathogens	during	fieldwork	was	top	priority.	A	traditional	ethnographic	approach	may	have	amplified	risk	of	disease	exposure	simply	because	the	extended	time	spent	in	select	field	sites.	By	utilizing	a	focused	ethnographic	approach,	I	was	able	to	broadly	examine	a	particular	disease	in	context	while	mitigating	risk	to	my	assistants	and	myself.	The	unique	ethical	and	practical	considerations	of	studying	emerging	infectious	diseases	with	ethnographic	methods	are	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.			The	above	observation,	that	ethnography	of	the	everyday	can	be	more	revealing	than	ethnography	of	spectacular	cultural	ceremonies	and	rituals,	presents	a	complex	challenge	in	this	research.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	H5N1	in	Indonesia	is	relatively	exceptional,	in	that	Indonesia	has	reported	the	highest	number	of	human	deaths	resulting	from	infection	with	H5N1,	with	a	crude	fatality	rate	exceeding	80	percent	(Patel	et	al.	2014).	This	coexists	with	the	anthropological	reality	of	Indonesians	working	in	live	bird	markets	–	the	everyday.	In	recognition	of	this	challenge,	this	study	took	a	blended	approach,	combining	the	inward	looking	perspective	of	focused	ethnography	with	three	illustrative	case	studies,	the	latter	enabling	an	outward-looking	perspective,	“aiming	to	delineate	the	nature	of	phenomena	through																																																									64	Adapted	from	(Higginbottom,	Pillay,	and	Boadu	2013,	4).	
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detailed	investigation	of	individual	cases	and	their	contexts”	(Cohen	and	Court	2003).65	Through	this	approach,	the	everyday	realities	shaping	constructions	of	risk	among	PWP	are	explored.		
Research	tools	This	research	is	broadly	concerned	with	examining	how	PWP	construct	the	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza,	and	exploring	what	implications	these	constructions	of	risk	have	for	behaviours	in	live	bird	markets.	The	study	sites	where	this	research	took	place	are	dynamic.	Capturing	the	complexity	and	richness	of	the	human	experience	in	these	environments	requires	combining	multiple	qualitative	methods.	If,	for	example,	only	interviews	were	employed,	data	collection	would	be	“mediated	by	the	invariably	biased	retrospections	of	interview	respondents”	(Holstein	and	Gubrium	2003,	28).	Becker	and	Geer	argue	that	participant	observation	provides	a	more	direct	way	of	accessing	data	(1957).	Participant	observation	alone,	however,	would	not	describe	why	people	behave	in	a	particular	manner.	To	better	validate	and	interpret	findings,	this	research	thus	combines	three	methods	of	data	collection:	semi-structured	interviews,	participant	observation,	and	photography.			
Semi-structured	interviews		Qualitative	studies	that	employ	structured	interviews	pose	a	sequence	of	predetermined	questions	in	a	linear	fashion	to	informants.	Semi-structured	interviews,	on	the	other	hand,	are	organized	around	thematic	priorities	or	an	interview	guide	yet	leave	respondents	a	fair	degree	of	freedom	to	determine	the	tenor	of	conversation,	what	is	said,	how	much	is	revealed,	and	the	length	of	the	interview.	While	the	general	theme	of	an	interview	can	circulate	around	a	particular	phenomenon,	or	a	series	of	related	issues,	the	length	of	semi-structured	interviews	in	this	research	was	not	fixed,	but	open-ended	and	determined	primarily	by	the	respondents’	desire	to	talk.	The	flexible	nature	of	semi-structured	interviews	allows	new	ideas	and	perspectives	to	be	brought	to	light	over	the	course	of	research	–	an	iterative	research	method	that	allows	researchers	to	probe	respondents	for	more	detail	and	tailor	thematic	priorities	for	different	contexts,	and	to	take	account	of	new	information	that	becomes	available.	The	practical	and	ethical	considerations	of	undertaking	these	interviews	–	such	as	the	use	of	recording	equipment	during	the	first	rounds	of	semi-structured	interviews	in	each	site	–	is	discussed	in	detail	in	the	next	chapter.		Beside	Padmawati	and	Nichter	(2008),	there	are	only	a	few	qualitative	studies	examining	lay	perceptions	of	risk	and	H5N1	aetiology	among	people	at	the	human-animal	interface	(Q.	Y.	Liao	et	al.	2009;	Kuo,	Huang,	and	Liu	2011).	These	studies,	however,	are	rarely	iterative,	and	often	rely	on	“pre-specified	criteria”	to	develop	questions	“used	to	initiate	data	collection”	(Q.	Y.	Liao	et	al.	2009,	575),	with	data	derived	from	one-off	visits	with	no	follow-up	research.	Rather	than	a	fully																																																									65	Max	Gluckman,	a	social	anthropologist	at	the	University	of	Manchester,	popularized	the	use	of	case	studies	in	anthropological	research	as	a	means	for	inferring	a	degree	of	generalizability.	This	case-study	approach	is	a	defining	feature	of	the	“Manchester	School”	of	anthropology.	
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structured	interview	guide,	in	the	current	study,	semi-structured	interviews	were	used	because	of	the	nature	of	the	interview	environment	and	the	research	aims.			Most	interviews	were	held	during	business	hours,	and	I	thus	needed	to	be	flexible	to	allow	for	interruptions	and	to	facilitate	the	continuation	of	business	as	usual.	Furthermore,	given	the	public	space	in	which	most	conversations	occurred,	one-on-one	interviews	sometimes	became	spontaneous	focus-group	discussions,	with	multiple	other	workers	and	customers	from	the	market	joining	in	and	adding	their	views.	This	required	a	flexible	method	that	could	accommodate	the	expansion	and	contraction	of	participants.	Additionally,	the	interview	guide	was	designed	to	provide	informants	with	the	opportunity	to	speak	openly	about	their	experience	and	share	their	knowledge,	without	restricting	them	with	overly	structured	set	categories.	In	this	way,	informants	could	dictate	the	topic	of	conversation	rather	than	be	immediately	prompted	into	a	conversation	specifically	about	avian	influenza.	Both	my	assistants	and	I	actively	wrote	notes	during	the	course	of	conversations,	as	timing	permitted,	and	elaborated	upon	each	interview	afterwards.	Each	day	we	conferred	about	what	each	of	us	had	heard,	observed,	and	noticed,	and	then	digitally	transcribed	each	interview	and	fieldnote.	Further	discussion	about	the	use	of	recording	equipment	during	interviews	is	in	Chapter	7.		Guiding	research	questions	for	this	study’s	semi-structured	interviews	were	adopted	from	Padmawati’s	and	Nichter’s	(2008)	focused	ethnography	of	the	poultry	trade	in	Yogyakarta.	These	questions	concentrate	on	what	people	know	about	avian	influenza,	popular	perceptions	of	illness,	and	on	behaviours	that	can	contribute	to	disease	spread	or	containment.	My	research	assistants	helped	ensure	that	these	questions	would	resonate	with	informants	in	each	of	my	three	field	sites;	these	questions	were	revised	iteratively	as	research	progressed.	Appendix	1	contains	a	list	of	questions	used	to	inform	semi-structured	interviews.		
Participant	observation	Participant	observation	has	been	defined	as	a	method	in	which	“the	observer	participates	in	the	daily	life	of	the	people	under	study,	either	openly	in	the	role	of	researcher	or	covertly	in	some	disguised	role,	observing	things	that	happen,	listening	to	what	is	said,	and	questioning	people,	over	some	length	of	time”	(Becker	and	Geer	1957,	28).	It	is	advocated	as	a	means	to	document	the	practices	and	assumptions	underlying	behaviour,	intended	to	complement	or	contrast	with	interview	data	(DeWalt	and	DeWalt	2002).	“Many	events”,	argue	Becker	and	Geer,	“occur	in	the	life	of	a	social	group	and	the	experience	of	an	individual	so	regularly	and	uninterruptedly,	or	so	quietly	and	unnoticed,	that	people	are	hardly	aware	of	them,	and	do	not	think	to	comment	on	them	to	an	interviewer”	(1957,	30).	In	this	way,	participant	observation	can	act	as	“a	yardstick	against	which	to	measure	the	completeness	of	data	gathered	in	other	ways”	(Becker	and	Geer	1957,	28).		Despite	these	advantages,	participant	observation	has	been	criticized	as	a	sort	of	fiction	by	some	(Geissler	2013;	Geertz	1973).	Recognizing	that	one	is	never	truly	immersed	in	a	respondent’s	environment,	that	one	is	always	recognized	as	foreign	
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and	different,	and	that	this	difference	may	shape	the	research	encounter,	I	observe	and	note	as	much	about	the	daily	routine	of	market	life	as	possible.	Some	scholars	undertaking	participant	observation	have	tried	to	become	more	immersed	by	actually	participating	in	a	shared	activity	through	imitative	participation	or	productive	participation	(Mosse	2001;	Knox	2009).	While	these	approaches	carry	certain	benefits	for	gaining	entry	in	different	contexts	and	can	yield	novel	insights,	I	concluded	that	imitative	or	productive	participation	would	be	inappropriate	for	several	reasons.	First,	had	I	offered	my	services	in	the	slaughter	and	sale	of	poultry,	I	surely	would	have	been	less	skilled	than	my	respondents	and	thus	functioned	largely	to	slow	them	down	in	their	business.	Second,	given	the	potential	zoonotic	risk	of	working	intimately	with	poultry	in	LBMs,	active	participation	could	have	proven	ethically	problematic	for	my	assistants	and	myself.	Ultimately,	by	remaining	outside	of	the	environment	as	a	mere	observer,	I	was	able	to	document	normal	everyday	practices	of	the	market	while	mitigating	the	potential	for	exposure	for	my	research	assistants	or	myself.	
Photography	Alongside	semi-structured	interviews	and	participant	observation,	I	utilize	still	photography	as	a	data	collection	method:	photography	ranked	as	the	third	priority	among	these	three	methods.	In	this	thesis	still	imagery	functions	as	a	complementary	empirical	tool	to	draw	out	an	extended	narrative	of	everyday	behaviour	in	live	bird	markets	–	a	tool	to	capture	the	“seemingly	unremarkable	signs	of	everyday	life”	(Spencer	2011,	47).	In	utilizing	photography,	I	recognize	the	ethically	contentious	and	politicized	nature	of	photographic	imagery;	I	address	these	ethical	considerations	more	thoroughly	in	the	next	chapter.			The	primary	aim	of	using	photographic	images	in	this	study	is	to	document	everyday	behaviours.	Photographs	add	complexity	to	our	understanding	of	the	notion	of	zoonotic	risk,	and	help	question	the	degree	of	exceptionality	attributed	to	an	individual’s	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface.	In	this	way	I	use	photographs	to	further	establish	what	is,	in	practice,	normalized	behaviour,	habitually	repeated	in	the	live	bird	markets	where	this	research	was	conducted.	Leading	from	this,	a	secondary	aim	in	using	photographic	images	is	triangulation.	Taken	with	words	and	observations,	photographs	convey	a	reality	of	place.	As	Sontag	contends:			 		 Photographs	furnish	evidence.	Something	we	hear	about,	but	doubt,	seems		 proven	when	we’re	shown	a	photograph	of	it.	In	one	version	of	its	utility,	the		 camera	record	incriminates...	The	picture	may	distort;	but	there	is	always	a		 presumption	that	something	exists,	or	did	exist,	which	is	like	what’s	in	the		 picture	(1977,	5).		It	is	important	to	recognize	that	the	realities	shown	in	the	selected	images	are	subjective:	technical	standards	are	always	selected	and	imposed	by	the	photographer	on	the	subject.	Photographs	do	not	show	universalized	truth	or	falsehood,	nor	do	they	constitute	an	“epistemological	end-game	to	the	debates	about	
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reality”	(R.	Brown	2011,	201).	They	show	a	reality,	selected	by	the	photographer	and	open	for	interpretation	-	a	reality	that	is	concentrated	on	a	particular	moment,	conferring	on	the	captured	“event	a	kind	of	immortality”	(Sontag	1977,	11).	In	this	way,	photographic	data	are	not	immune	from	criticism	but	recognized	as	inherently	subjective,	in	the	same	way	as	other	qualitative	and	quantitative	data.			While	I	had	intended	to	utilize	photography	as	complementary,	yet	subordinate,	to	interviews	and	observation,	having	a	camera	often	facilitated	access,	opening	conversations	far	more	frequently	than	it	closed	them.	On	separate	occasions	Sari	and	Sammy	both	informed	me	that	simply	having	a	camera	facilitated	research,	in	that	the	presence	of	a	camera	led	people	to	ask	about	us	before	we	had	the	opportunity	to	introduce	ourselves	and	speak	with	them.	There	were	no	more	than	a	handful	of	instances	where	somebody	asked	not	to	have	their	image	captured.	Such	requests	were	not	overtly	hostile	but	polite	engagements	that	would	often	include	a	longer	conversation.	Of	course,	every	time	these	requests	were	made	they	were	acknowledged	and	conceded.	Had	there	been	more	concentrated	and	systemic	resistance	to	my	taking	of	photographs,	I	would	have	unquestionably	stopped.	Ethics	and	discussion	always	took	precedence,	as	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	In	each	site,	we	began	by	verbally	introducing	ourselves	to	people	in	the	poultry	trade	and	continued	with	a	request	to	speak	with	them	about	their	work	and	their	experience,	and,	only	thereafter	followed	by	a	request	to	use	the	camera.	When	I	asked	people	whether	I	could	take	photographs	of	them,	their	work	environment	and	their	birds,	I’d	often	gesture	to	my	camera	to	make	certain	my	request	was	understood.	To	this	question,	the	vast	majority	of	people	answered	boleh,	essentially,	“yes,	you	may”.	
Field	site	selection	Fieldwork	was	centred	among	people	in	the	poultry	trade	in	live	bird	markets	in	three	distinct	urban	centres	on	Sumatra	and	Java:	Bireuen,	in	Aceh	province,	Bandar	Lampung,	in	Lampung	province,	and	Serang,	in	Banten	province	(Map	1).			These	three	LBMs	were	selected	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	they	were	located	within	provinces	that	had	been	assigned	particular	risk	profiles	in	relation	to	cases	in	birds	and	humans.	Comparing	and	contrasting	between	these	sites	allowed	me	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	these	risk	profiles	led	to	different	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza.	Second,	these	sites	were	physically	located	in	different	provinces	across	Sumatra	and	Java	and	thus	represented	different	contexts	and	histories,	as	well	positions	within	the	Indonesian	state.	While	I	recognize	that	similarity	of	place	does	not	necessarily	confer	similarity	of	experience	or	perceptions,	ensuring	that	each	site	was	physically	disparate	opened	up	space	to	determine	whether	there	were	unique	contextual	realities	influencing	respondents.						
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Map	1:	Map	of	field	site	locations	in	Indonesia	
	Data	courtesy	of	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey		Specific	market	selection	for	this	research	is	guided	by	the	selection	criteria	informing	the	research	design	of	three	KAP	surveys	implemented	by	the	American	Red	Cross	and	Palang	Merah	Indonesia	(PMI),	and	conducted	in	households,	live	bird	markets,	and	schools	in	October	and	November	2009.	Site	selection	criteria	for	these	three	surveys	were	as	follows:			 The	first	stage	[of	the	survey	design]	was	a	stratification	of	the	districts		 where	PMI	implements	its	avian	influenza	program	into	three	‘severity’		 zones:	Red,	Orange	and	Yellow.	These	zones...	were	based	on	the	number		 of	avian	and	human	avian	influenza	cases	that	had	been	reported	by	PMI		 Branches	(Districts)	in	Java	and	Sumatra	since	2005,	with	the	Red	zone		 having	the	most	combined	cases,	the	Yellow	zone	having	the	least,	and		 the	Orange	zone	representing	the	intermediate	(American	Red	Cross	in		 Indonesia	2009,	2).		After	demarcating	these	risk	profiles,	the	ARC	and	PMI	clustered	households,	markets,	and	schools				 by	severity	zone	and	at	two	levels.	The	first	level	was	the	selection	of	four	 		 districts	within	each	severity	zone	using	probability	proportional	to	size.		 The	second	was	the	random	selection	of	five	villages	per	district.	These		 villages	were	then	used	for	random	sampling	of	households	as	well	as		access			 to	schools	and	wet	market.	The	nearest	wet	market	and	primary	school	to		 the	village	was	selected	(American	Red	Cross	in	Indonesia	2009,	3).		Informed	with	this	criteria	I	selected	one	market	in	each	of	these	colour-coded	zones:	Pasar	Bireuen	in	Bireuen,	Aceh,	from	a	Yellow	zone;	Pasar	Tugu	in	Bandar	
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Lampung,	Lampung,	from	an	Orange	zone;	and	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang,	Banten,	from	a	Red	zone.	In	selecting	these	field	sites	I	wanted	to	ensure	that	each	market	was	located	in	a	different	province	and	some	distance	away	from	the	others.66	Selecting	three	markets	in	distinct	areas	across	Sumatra	and	Java	opened	up	the	possibility	for	capturing	whether	local	contexts	and	histories	influence	respondents’	constructions	of	risk.	Previous	studies	on	risk	perceptions	and	H5N1	have	adopted	a	cross-national	design,	focusing	on	comparing	and	contrasting	results	from	several	countries	in	Asia	(Q.	Y.	Liao	et	al.	2009).	While	this	provides	a	regional	snapshot	of	community	beliefs	and	priorities,	it	obscures	the	extent	to	which	variation	can	exist	within	one	country,	and	may	homogenize	diverse	risk	environments.	For	instance,	Java	is	the	centre	of	Indonesian	poultry	production.	Had	I	chosen	three	sites	on	Java,	I	might	have	missed	the	diversity	of	experience	within	Sumatra.	Aceh,	for	example,	sought	independence	from	Jakarta	and	fought	a	decades-long	insurgency	with	the	central	government	that	ended	in	2004.	The	district	of	Bireuen	experienced	some	of	the	most	intense	violence	during	this	time	(Aspinall	2009).	Banten,	on	the	other	hand,	is	geographically	proximate	to	Jakarta	and	was	peacefully	established	as	a	province	in	2000.	These	differing	histories	and	experiences	may	impinge	on	people’s	perceptions	of	state	authority	in	Jakarta,	and	by	extension,	the	national	government’s	health	and	disease	control	programming.			Additionally,	each	of	these	locations	has	had	different	encounters	with	multilateral	and	bilateral	organizations.	Between	2005	and	2010,	millions	of	dollars	in	aid	money	and	hundreds,	if	not	thousands,	of	foreign	workers	descended	upon	Aceh	for	post-conflict,	post-tsunami	reconstruction	and	development	work.	By	contrast,	Lampung	and	Banten	provinces	have	had	no	large-scale	disaster	in	recent	years,	and	the	international	community’s	presence	there	has	been	limited	to	smaller,	localized	aid	programmes.		Finally,	I	wanted	to	contribute	new	knowledge	and	therefore,	in	selecting	field	sites,	I	avoided	Indonesian	provinces	and	cities	that	were	the	focus	of	other	studies,	such	as	Bali	(Simmons	2006;	Santhia	et	al.	2009),	Yogyakarta	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008),	West	Java	(Forster	2012),	North	Sumatra	(McLeod	2010),	or	Makassar	(Samaan	et	al.	2012).	I	know	of	no	other	qualitative	study	undertaken	in	any	of	the	three	sites	where	this	research	was	undertaken.	
Repeated	visits	Many	of	the	studies	investigating	lay	perceptions	of	risk	and	H5N1	aetiology	employ	a	cross-sectional	design	characterized	by	one-off	visits	to	field	sites	to	collect	data	(Q.	Y.	Liao	et	al.	2009;	deZwart	et	al.	2007;	Fielding,	Lam,	Ho,	Lam,	Heley,	et	al.	2005;	I.	Kristiansen,	Halvorsen,	and	Gyrd-Hansen	2007;	Abbate	et	al.	2006;	Barennes	et	al.	2007;	Fasina	et	al.	2009;	Gupta	et	al.	2006;	Leslie	et	al.	2008).	Employing	a	cross-sectional	research	design	makes	it	difficult	to	say	whether	observations	are																																																									66	Selecting	research	sites	in	different	provinces	does	not	of	course	exclude	the	possibility	that	there	are	economic	or	social	links	(broadly	understood)	between	these	provinces.	This	became	clear,	for	example,	when	speaking	to	poultry	traders	in	Banten	about	how	they	sometimes	source	birds	from	Lampung.	
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reflective	of	normal,	everyday	behaviour	or	motivated	by	some	form	of	exceptional	circumstances.	People’s	knowledge	and	behaviour	with	regards	to	avian	influenza	can	change	with	time	and	new	information	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008;	Figuie	and	Fournier	2008).	In	order	to	explore	the	dynamism	of	perceptions	of	risk	and	behaviours,	I	undertook	repeated	visits	to	each	field	site.	Though	this	study	is	not	strictly	longitudinal,	as	the	intervals	between	my	visits	varied	between	the	three	sites,	this	left	open	the	possibility	of	observing	changes	in	respondents’	attitudes	and	behaviours	brought	about	by	events	or	experiences	going	on	around	them.			The	possibility	remained	that	a	disease	event	in	poultry	or	in	people	would	occur	in	one	of	the	study	sites	during	the	course	of	fieldwork.	A	further	advantage	of	this	method	of	repeated	visits	was	that,	in	the	event	of	such	an	outbreak,	I	would	have	been	able	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	disease	events	shape	or	alter	local	perceptions	and	priorities.	The	fact	that	no	such	outbreak	occurred	during	my	fieldwork	provided	a	different	sort	of	insight,	one	derived	from	observing	a	market	community	in	a	state	of	relative	normality,	without	the	potential	tumult	or	anxiety	that	an	outbreak	in	poultry	or	a	human	case	of	H5N1	may	provoke.		
Participant	recruitment,	purposive	sampling,	theoretical	saturation,	and	
generalizability	of	findings		Primary	respondents	in	this	research	are	people	who	work	with	animals	in	live	bird	markets.	It	is	important	to	preface	what	follows	by	noting	that	most	people	who	sell	poultry	also	slaughter	poultry;	labels	such	as	slaughterer	or	seller	do	not	fully	capture	the	multiple	tasks	which	these	populations	perform	as	part	of	their	daily	work	routine	in	LBMs.	While	many	people	working	in	the	markets	self	identify	as	
penjual	ayam	–	chicken	seller	–	or	penjual	bebek	–	duck	seller	–	I	refer	to	these	populations	primarily	as	people	involved	in	the	poultry	trade.	To	reiterate,	I	opt	for	more	specific	titles,	such	as	slaughterer	or	farmer	or	trader	where	appropriate,	but	employ	the	acronym	PWP	to	refer,	in	general,	to	people	who	work	with	poultry.		This	research	hinged	on	gaining	access	and	being	accepted	by	PWP.	During	the	first	visit	to	each	field	site	the	priority	was	to	become	gradually	acquainted	with	the	research	environment	and	potential	informants.	Typically	this	process	entailed	walking	the	entirety	of	the	market	to	become	familiar	with	the	physical	layout,	paying	particular	attention	to	where	poultry	sellers	clustered.	While	my	assistants	and	I	did	not	focus	on	conducting	interviews	during	these	early	visits,	people	were	curious	about	why	a	bule	–	foreigner67	–	was	in	the	market,	and	we	were	routinely	approached	and	asked	about	the	rationale	for	our	being	there.	These	encounters	were	never	hostile	and	naturally	led	to	more	formalized	introductions.	When	people																																																									67	Bule	is	a	slang	term	referring	to	visibly	identifiable	foreigners	but	mostly	reserved	for	white	foreigners.	Translated	literally,	bule	means	albino	and	is	thus	considered	somewhat	derogatory.	I	have	been	called	a	bule	across	the	archipelago;	children	have	called	me	a	bule	and	pointed	at	me	as	I	walk	by	schools,	and	adults	working	in	the	markets	continued	to	call	me	a	bule	each	time	I	returned.	It	is	worth	stating	that	throughout	fieldwork	I	never	once	saw	another	bule	in	any	of	the	markets	where	this	research	was	undertaken.	This,	of	course,	does	not	mean	that	there	were	not	other	foreigners	in	the	market.		
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enquired	about	our	presence,	we	responded	that	we	were	students	researching	the	poultry	trade,	looking	primarily	at	the	economy	of	pasar	traditional	–	traditional	markets	–	across	different	provinces	in	Indonesia.	In	these	introductions	we	did	not	talk	about	disease	because	we	did	not	want	to	prompt	or	stigmatize	respondents.	We	wanted	to	give	respondents	the	space	to	discuss	avian	influenza,	or	any	other	disease,	on	their	own	terms,	in	this	way	allowing	them	to	inform	us	of	what	was	salient	in	their	lives,	and	their	primary	concerns.	Following	these	initial	introductions	my	assistants	and	I	retreated	to	one	of	the	many	small	warungs	–	small	shops	selling	food	and	drink	-	to	discuss	observations	and	impressions.	This	routine	continued	for	a	few	days,	with	each	visit	gradually	extending	to	more	in-depth	conversations	with	PWP	as	they	came	to	recognize	and	welcome	us	to	the	market	each	morning.			There	were	only	a	few	people	that	we	approached	who	did	not	want	to	speak	with	us.	I	recall	one	trader	in	particular	who,	after	delivering	birds	to	the	market,	said	he	was	too	tired	to	speak	and	instead	sat	beside	us,	smoking	and	drinking	coffee,	as	we	conversed	with	his	colleague,	another	trader	who	had	just	arrived	with	dozens	of	birds	attached	to	his	motorbike.	Any	suggestion	as	to	why	other	individuals	did	not	want	to	converse	would	be	mere	speculation:	some	may	have	feared	stigma	or	previously	had	a	negative	experience	when	speaking	to	another	bule;	they	may	simply	have	been	shy.	We	always	respected	people’s	requests	to	be	left	alone	and	never	asked	these	individuals	to	clarify	why	they	did	not	want	to	speak	with	us.		Key	respondents	in	the	markets	were	selected	according	to	purposive	sampling	guidelines:	this	means	loosely	identifying	participants	“according	to	predetermined	criteria	relevant	to	a	particular	research	objective”	(Guest,	Bunce,	and	Johnson	2006,	61).	In	this	research	the	criterion	for	participant	recruitment	was	that	informants	work	in	the	poultry	trade	in	LBMs,	including	traders	and	farmers	who	deliver	birds	to	other	sellers	but	are	not	necessarily	permanently	established	in	the	markets,	with	respondents	primarily	those	who	take	care	of,	slaughter,	and	sell	poultry	in	LBMs.			This	study	focused	on	those	who	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	in	LBMs	for	several	reasons.	First,	these	kind	of	poultry	workers	are	considered	a	bridge	population	for	disease	transmission,	and	may	be	among	the	first	to	become	infected	should	H5N1	become	more	transmissible	to	humans	(J.	H.	Kim	et	al.	2011;	Bridges	et	al.	2002).	Second,	as	live	bird	markets	are	identified	as	environments	that	can	both	maintain	and	disseminate	zoonotic	pathogens	(Webster	2004;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013)	these	markets,	and	those	who	work	in	them,	have	become	a	primary	focus	of	avian	influenza	control	initiatives	in	Indonesia	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Samaan	et	al.	2011;	Santhia	et	al.	2009;	Indriani	et	al.	2010)	and	elsewhere	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Amonsin	et	al.	2008;	Abdelwhab	et	al.	2010).	And	third,	despite	a	concerted	focus	on	live	bird	markets,	there	are	few	existing	qualitative	studies	specifically	focusing	on	people	working	at	this	human-animal	interface.	As	a	result,	in	this	study	I	did	not,	for	example,	explore	constructions	of	risk	or	associated	practices	among	those	who	primarily	rear	poultry,	either	in	large	commercial	
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poultry	production	facilities,	or	in	small	backyard	farms.	There	are,	of	course,	important	questions	relating	to	these	populations	and	their	place	in	the	poultry	supply	chain,	and	in	turn	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.	For	instance,	more	research	is	needed	on	the	role	of	the	commercial	poultry	industry	in	the	maintenance	and	spread	of	H5N1	in	Indonesia.	Forster	and	Charnoz	(2013)	discuss	the	disproportionate	attention	that	backyard	poultry	producers	have	received	in	relation	to	avian	influenza	maintenance	and	spread,	in	contrast	to	commercial	producers,	and	suggest	that	this	may	be	due	to	a	number	of	factors.	One,	commercial	poultry	producers	are	seen	as	capable	of	controlling	avian	influenza	internally;	two	commercial	producers	are	closely	intertwined	with	the	political	elite	in	Indonesia,	and	have	thus	been	able	to	largely	evade	scrutiny	from	the	national	government	and	by	extension	international	organizations;	and	three,	the	prioritization	of	a	“Pro-“Poor”	agenda	among	some	international	organizations68	may	have	had	the	effect	of	disproportionately	focusing	attention	on	backyard	poultry	producers	as	both	the	source	of	H5N1	and	as	those	most	in	need	of	assistance.				The	locational	focus	of	this	research	was	LBMs,	and	here	I	purposively	sampled	people	who	were,	out	of	their	own	discretion,	at	the	slaughtering	areas,	the	selling	tables,	and	the	wider	space	in	which	birds	are	traded,	housed,	slaughtered	and	sold	in	the	markets.	While	PWP	are	the	primary	respondents,	for	supplementary	data,	I	also	interviewed	various	government	officials,	those	working	with	NGOs,	and	representatives	from	global	bodies	such	as	the	FAO	and	the	OIE;	the	criterion	for	these	respondents	was	defined	as	those	working	for	an	organization	or	government	agency	with	a	focus	on	avian	influenza,	as	the	disease	relates	to	poultry	and	to	people.	In	each	site	we	interviewed	district-	and	provincial-level	officials,	as	well	as	employees	of	Palang	Merah	Indonesia	who	are,	or	were,	responsible	for	the	agency’s	avian	influenza	programme.	Meeting	with	PMI	officials	in	all	three	provinces	was	facilitated	by	a	former	head	of	avian	influenza	programming,	Dr.	Hambal.	Roger	Montgomery,	visiting	research	fellow	at	the	Asia	Research	Center	at	the	LSE,	connected	me	with	federal	government	officials	in	Jakarta,	among	whom	I	spoke	with	people	working	for	the	Indonesian	National	Committee	for	Avian	Influenza	Control	and	Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	(KOMNAS)	and	FAO	officials	in	December	2010	and	May	2011.	In	June	and	July	2012	I	interviewed	officials	responsible	for	global	programming	for	avian	influenza	and	other	zoonotic	diseases	at	the	OIE	in	Paris	and	the	FAO	in	Rome.	These	supplementary	discussions	were	often	one-off	interviews,	although	there	were	occasions	when	I	met	repeatedly	with	district-level	officials.	And	while	I	reference	interviews	with	government	employees	and	people	working	in	non-governmental	and	multilateral	agencies,	I	utilize	these	data	primarily	to	illustrate	divergence	of	opinion,	or	to	reinforce	findings.69	To	be	clear,	the	primary	respondents	in	this	study	are	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface	in	live	bird	markets	in	Indonesia.																																																									68	The	Pro-Poor	agenda	underpins	aspects	of	the	FAO’s	programming	for	avian	influenza.	For	more	on	this	see:	http://www.fao.org/AG/againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/hpai.html	69	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	how	these	and	other	policy	makers	interpret	and	respond	to	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia	see	Forster	(2012).	
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	Although	studies	suggest	that	women	and	children	are	the	primary	caretakers	of	poultry	raised	at	home	in	Indonesia	(American	Red	Cross	in	Indonesia	2009;	Forster	2012),	this	research	found	that	the	vast	majority	of	people	actively	engaged	in	the	poultry	trade	in	live	bird	markets	are	men.	In	Bireuen,	Aceh,	there	are	two	female	sellers	who	work	with	their	husbands.	In	Lampung,	roughly	half	of	the	sellers	are	women.	In	Serang	there	are	no	female	sellers.	Throughout	fieldwork	in	all	three	sites	I	never	met	a	single	female	who	transported	birds	to	and	from	markets.	The	majority	of	restaurateurs	interviewed	were	also	are	men.	Conversely,	and	in	line	with	other	studies	from	Indonesia	(Sumiarto	and	Arifin	2008a),	the	bulk	of	the	customers	shopping	for	poultry	for	household	consumption	in	the	LBMs	where	this	research	was	undertaken	are	women.	Table	3	describes	the	research	participants	in	each	field	site.	The	age	of	poultry	traders	interviewed	ranged	between	16	and	74,	with	most	traders	roughly	between	20-60	years	of	age.		Table	3:	Description	of	research	participants	
Description	of	
respondent	
Bireuen,	
Aceh	 Bandar	Lampung,	Lampung	 Serang,	Banten	 Total	Seller/slaughterer	 23	 25	 23	 71	Poultry	trader	or	agent	(agen/mugee)	 13	 5	 4	 22	Farmer/raiser	of	birds	or	fighting	cocks		 5	 3	 17	 25	Customers	 10	 12	 14	 36	Government	official:	animal	health	and	human	health	 12	 8	 7	 27	NGO	 3	 2	 5	 10	Other	market	workers:	cleaners	and	non-poultry	seller	
8	 5	 4	 17	
Total	 74	 60	 74	 208		The	size	of	a	purposive	sample	is	determined	inductively,	with	qualitative	fieldwork	continuing	until	theoretical	saturation	has	been	met.	Theoretical	saturation	implies	that	no	new	themes	or	information	arise	in	discussion	with	respondents.	Indeed,	Guest	and	colleagues	state	that	saturation	is	the	“gold	standard”	for	determining	sample	size	in	qualitative	health-related	research	(2006,	60).	To	conclude	that	theoretical	saturation	has	been	met,	fieldwork	and	preliminary	data	analysis	run	concurrently	(Wray,	Markovic,	and	Manderson	2007).	In	this	way	researchers	can	determine	when	they	no	longer	have	to	recruit	new	informants.	Theoretical	saturation	in	this	research	was	achieved	during	the	second	visit	to	each	field	site.	
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Nonetheless,	three	rounds	of	fieldwork	were	undertaken	in	order	to	look	for	change	over	time.	Other	reasons	for	three	visits	to	each	site	include	the	desire	to	capture	the	perspectives	of	informal	poultry	traders	who	come	to	the	market	to	sell	birds	during	holidays;	the	last	round	of	fieldwork	in	Serang	and	Lampung	coincided	with	Ramadan,	a	time	of	year	when	some	informal	sellers	come	to	the	markets	to	benefit	from	the	increased	demand	for	poultry.			There	are	divergent	opinions	on	the	actual	sample	size	normally	required	to	meet	theoretical	saturation.	For	ethnographic	research	Bernard	(2000)	believes	that	studies	require	thirty	to	sixty	informants.	Morse	(1995)	is	slightly	less	conservative,	recommending	roughly	thirty	to	fifty	respondents.	Bertraux	(1981)	contends	that	the	sample	size	for	qualitative	research	can	be	no	less	than	fifteen	informants.	While	this	research	was	not	strictly	ethnographic,	the	sample	size	from	each	field	site	roughly	falls	in	with	the	numerical	bounds	established	by	Bernard	(2000),	Morse	(1995),	and	Bertraux	(1981).			Achieving	theoretical	saturation	in	qualitative	research	raises	the	question	of	whether	findings	are	generalizable	to	PWP	in	other	Indonesian	LBMs.	This	research	readily	acknowledges	that	respondents’	constructions	of	risk	and	behaviours	may	be	dynamic	and	constantly	evolving	with	new	information	and	experiences;	indeed,	in	the	time	that	has	passed	since	this	research	was	undertaken,	respondents	may	have	altered	their	beliefs	and	behaviours.	Moreover,	those	interviewed	can	not	represent	the	views	of	all	people	working	in	the	poultry	trade,	as	employees	from	larger	commercial	poultry	companies,	for	example,	are	not	represented.	Nonetheless,	as	Krueger	(1995)	argues,	cautious	generalization	to	similar	demographic	groups	can	be	asserted	after	multiple	interviews	with	target	populations	have	failed	to	produce	new	information.	Thus	data	from	this	study	can	be	read	as	cautiously	generalizable	to	people	working	in	the	poultry	trade	in	live	bird	markets	in	Indonesia,	and	particularly	men	who	work	in	LBMs.	
Conclusion	This	chapter	outlines	how	this	study	is	methodologically	informed	by	a	focused	ethnographic	approach,	and	describes	the	methods	used	in	this	research.	Additionally,	this	chapter	justifies	the	selection	of	the	field	sites	and	the	recruitment	of	participants,	and	illustrates	how	data	from	this	study	can	be	cautiously	generalized.	The	next	chapter	elaborates	and	reflects	on	the	practical	and	ethical	considerations	of	doing	this	study.		
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Chapter	7:	Ethical	and	practical	considerations	of	doing	this	research		
Introduction	This	chapter	addresses	the	wider	ethical	and	practical	implications	of	this	study,	as	well	as	the	everyday	practice	of	undertaking	fieldwork,	and	staying	safe	throughout	the	research	process.	Ethical	approval	was	granted	by	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	and	ethical	considerations	informed	each	step,	from	research	design,	to	the	training	of	research	assistants,	and	data	collection	and	analysis.	This	chapter	outlines	and	addresses	how	standard	ethical	considerations	feature	in	this	research,	including:	Informed	consent	and	voluntary	participation;	Confidentiality	and	anonymity;	Reciprocity	in	research:	Compensation	and	gifting;	and,	Positionality.	The	discussion	on	positionality	focuses	first	on	how	my	identity	shaped	fieldwork,	and	second	on	how	my	research	assistants’	identity	shaped	the	research	process.	Thereafter	I	examine	the	ethical	dimensions	of	employing	photographic	methods.	Finally,	I	conclude	this	chapter	in	discussing	some	practical	and	ethical	issues	for	qualitative	social	science	research	on	emerging	infectious	diseases.		
Informed	consent	and	voluntary	participation	Prior	to	engaging	in	conversation	about	the	poultry	trade	all	key	respondents	were	informed	about	this	research	and	asked	directly	whether	we	could	speak	with	them	about	their	work.	Consent	was	discussed	orally	rather	than	in	writing,	as	we	did	not	want	to	interrupt	people’s	business,	or	to	stigmatize	any	illiterate	PWP.	Oral	consent	was	sought	prior	to	interviews	with	government	officials	and	representatives	of	NGOs	and	multilateral	agencies.	As	illustrated	in	the	discussion	on	photographic	methods,	oral	consent	was	also	obtained	prior	to	capturing	pictures	of	the	environment	or	of	individuals.		When	introducing	this	research	to	respondents	we	made	it	clear	that	their	participation	was	voluntary,	that	they	did	not	have	to	speak	with	us,	and	that,	if	they	chose	to	engage	in	conversation,	they	could	exit	at	any	time.	While	very	few	people	refused	to	speak	with	us,	many	informants	pulled	away	from	our	conversation	to	serve	customers;	my	assistants	and	I	tried	to	remain	cognizant	of	our	impact	on	people’s	business	and	sought	to	politely	withdraw	when	customers	approached.	Informants	were	encouraged	to	ask	questions	about	this	research	and	we	were	forthcoming	about	the	study	when	queried.	
Confidentiality	and	anonymity		Informants	were	made	aware	that	our	conversations	would	be	kept	private,	in	that	I	would	make	no	reference	to	specific	individuals	when	presenting	these	data.	I	should	state	that	at	no	time	in	fieldwork	did	respondents	from	the	poultry	trade	ask	me	to	avoid	using	their	names	or	identities;	there	were	a	few	times	when	informants	from	the	government	or	NGOs	asked	to	remain	anonymous.	As	discussed	above,	from	the	outset	of	research,	I	decided	to	refer	to	people	in	the	poultry	trade	by	pseudonyms	or	more	generically	as	sellers,	farmers,	respondents	or	informants	–	
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or	simply	PWP.	When	referencing	key	informants	from	government,	NGOs,	or	multilateral	agencies,	I	refer	to	these	individuals	as	officials	or	employees	rather	than	using	their	names.	In	short,	I	avoided	attributing	conversations	to	particular	individuals	so	that	informants	felt	comfortable	in	openly	discussing	their	experiences	without	fear	of	reprisal,	stigma,	or	economic	loss.		All	data	derived	from	this	research	are	kept	secure	and	private.	I	discussed	the	sensitive	nature	of	these	data	with	research	assistants	and	have	been	assured	that	all	fieldnotes	deriving	from	this	research	remain	private,	shared	only	between	them	and	myself.	As	discussed	below,	when	a	digital	recorder	was	used,	those	research	assistants	employed	to	transcribe	or	translate	interviews	have	been	asked	to	delete	the	audio	files	following	the	completion	of	this	work.	Research	assistants	only	have	access	to	their	fieldnotes;	I	alone	have	access	to	the	comprehensive	data	set.		
Reciprocity	in	research:	Compensation	and	gifting	The	provision	of	compensation	and	incentives	–	monetary	payments	or	otherwise	–	to	respondents	by	researchers	has	long	been	criticised.	Fine	and	Sandstrom	(1988)	argue	that	gifting	leads	to	the	commodification	of	the	relationship	between	researcher	and	respondent,	and	generates	a	sense	of	expectation,	by	which	researchers	are	accepted	within	a	community	because	of	the	gifts	they	provide.	Weinreb	and	colleagues,	however,	argue	that	the	“researcher-respondent	relationship	is	essentially	instrumental”	and	that,	as	a	result,	“researchers	need	to	give	more	formal	attention	to	the	notion	of	reciprocity	as	a	methodological	issue”	(1998,	2).	Along	these	lines,	researchers	need	to	be	aware	of	the	demands	they	place	upon	respondents	and	what	respondents	deserve	in	return.			In	this	research	I	was	cognizant	that	interviewing	people	actively	working	in	the	poultry	trade	might	distract	them	from	their	work,	and	potentially	impact	their	business	and	livelihood.	With	this	in	mind,	we	limited	interviews	during	the	busy	early-morning	hours	of	work	in	the	market	when	the	majority	of	birds	are	slaughtered	and	the	majority	of	customers	purchase	poultry;	during	these	hours	we	focused	on	participant	observation,	as	outlined	in	Chapter	6.	The	majority	of	interviews	were	held	later	in	the	morning	and	early	afternoon	when	PWP	had	more	time.	Nonetheless,	we	were	always	mindful	when	customers	approached,	and	were	quick	to	retreat	from	conversation	to	ensure	that	we	did	not	interrupt	business.		As	an	in-kind	contribution	to	respondents,	I	often	paid	for	coffees	and	small	snacks.	Less	frequently	I	bought	informants	meals,	but	this	happened	only	a	few	times,	when	we	met	away	from	the	central	market	and	from	other	informants.	I	did	not	view	this	as	compensation	so	much	as	reciprocity;	many	informants	readily,	and	pre-emptively,	bought	my	assistants	and	me	food	and	drink	in	all	three	of	the	fieldsites.	Cigarettes	were	offered	and	shared	between	my	research	assistants	and	respondents;	again,	this	was	more	bi-directional	reciprocity	than	simple	gifting.	Although	a	third	party	prepared	the	food	and	drink,	sharing	and	interacting	in	this	way	may	present	an	elevated	risk	for	disease	exposure.	When	I	talked	about	this	with	Sari	and	Sammy,	they	responded	that,	much	like	a	handshake	in	some	
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circumstances,	these	kinds	of	interactions	were	typical	and	considered	polite,	even	necessary,	and	thus	it	may	have	been	perceived	as	rude	to	have	abstained	or	not	reciprocated.					Some	believe	that	gifting	as	a	material	exchange	from	researcher	to	respondent	initiates	a	“process	of	social	bonding”	(Ahlheim,	Börger,	and	Frör	2013).	However,	I	deemed	it	inappropriate	to	provide	a	financial	incentive	for	informants,	in	part	because	our	interactions	were	frequently	fluid	and	informal.	For	instance,	we	would	often	be	speaking	with	a	particular	informant	for	a	few	minutes	in	the	morning,	and	then	be	drawn	into	a	different	conversation	with	their	neighbour,	before	engaging	in	a	discussion	among	several	informants	in	which	people	would	join	spontaneously	before	they	returned	to	work.	Determining	who	to	pay	in	these	contexts	would	have	proven	difficult,	and	might	have	artificially	attracted	informants	who	would	not	otherwise	have	spoken	with	us,	or	those	who	are	not	PWP.	Essentially,	I	wanted	to	leave	open	the	space	for	potential	informants	to	join	in	as	well	as	opt	out	from	conversation,	and	did	not	want	to	create	an	expectation	of	payment	for	each	and	every	conversation,	regardless	of	its	length.			While	I	never	gave	any	denomination	of	money	to	informants,	the	gesture	of	gifting	or	providing	monetary	incentives	to	informants	came	up	through	the	course	of	fieldwork.	Of	the	few	informants	who	did	ask	for	uang	kecil	–	small	money	–	most	made	the	request	in	a	half-embarrassed,	joking	manner.	Although	usually	coupled	with	a	laugh	or	a	smile,	these	requests	may	very	well	have	been	an	exhibition	of	genuine	need;	I	do	not	know.	When	such	requests	were	made,	we	responded	that	we	were	students	and	could	not	pay	for	interviews.	Indeed,	on	several	occasions,	other	informants	would	overhear	their	colleague	asking	for	money	and	pre-empt	our	response,	telling	the	enquiring	individual	that	we	were	students	and	could	not	pay	to	speak	with	them.	I	do	not	believe	that	our	response	to	such	requests	ever	halted	conversation	or	limited	access.			The	only	time	that	I	gave	money	to	people	during	fieldwork	was	when	they	were	begging	or	performing	(mostly	singing).	The	majority	of	people	who	begged	or	sang	were	elderly.	Many	were	blind	or	physically	challenged,	and	most	were	accompanied	by	a	younger	male	escort,	usually	a	relative,	who	helped	them	navigate	between	stalls,	through	the	tight	corridors	that	interweave	the	markets.	When	confronted	by	requests	for	money,	I	followed	the	lead	of	PWP,	the	majority	of	whom	gave	small	change,	usually	a	few	coins,	to	these	people;	the	amount	given	ranged	between	five	hundred	and	a	few	thousand	IDR	(less	than	20	pence	in	GBP).	I	always	kept	small	change	with	me	for	this	purpose.	
Positionality	Throughout	fieldwork	and	during	data	analysis	I	have	attempted	to	remain	mindful	of	the	ways	in	which	my	identity	–	race,	gender,	class,	nationality,	and	other	personal	characteristics	–	may	have	affected	relationships	with	respondents	and	perspectives	on	data.	I	have	also	asked	each	of	my	research	assistants	to	reflect	on	
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how	their	identity	affected	the	research	process.	Their	reflections	follow	the	discussion	below	on	my	positionality.			As	a	relatively	tall,	white,	upper-middle	class	male,	I	did	not	go	unnoticed	during	fieldwork.	This	visible	difference	–	my	obvious	foreignness	–	allowed	me	to	ask	questions	that	might	have	been	considered	naïve,	should	an	Indonesian	have	asked,	such	as:	“what	does	halal	mean?”.	And,	“how	do	you	ensure	that	a	bird	is	killed	according	to	halal	standards?”.	Both	Sari	and	Sammy	knew	the	answer	to	each	of	these	questions,	yet	I	routinely	informed	them	to	ask	questions	about	common	practices	to	ensure	that	there	was	not	divergence	of	opinion.	To	ensure	that	my	assistants	were	not	embarrassed	to	ask	these	sorts	of	questions,	I	told	them	both	to	claim	that	I,	as	a	foreigner,	was	not	knowledgeable	and	curious	about	seemingly	commonly	understood	notions	or	behaviours.	In	this	way,	I	was	able	to	leverage	my	foreignness	to	understand	the	subtleties	of	daily	practice.			Conversely,	at	times	the	fact	that	I	was	visibly	foreign	led	some	people	to	try	and	stage	activities	for	my	benefit,	such	as	cockfighting.	As	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	section	on	photography,	when	this	occurred,	I	politely	attempted	to	divert	effort	away	from	these	theatrical	acts,	stating	that	I	had	already	seen	many	cockfights.	Such	interactions	were	never	hostile	and,	so	far	as	I	could	judge,	everyone	was	quick	to	revert	to	a	state	of	normal	business.			The	vast	majority	of	respondents	from	the	poultry	trade	were	men.	The	fact	that	I	too	was	a	male	helped	more	than	hindered	access	with	key	informants.	This	was	most	evident	in	Aceh,	where	a	separation	of	the	sexes	is	more	clearly	demarcated	than	in	the	other	provinces.	Had	I	been	a	woman,	I	believe	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	speak	as	openly	with	the	majority	of	informants;	I	say	this	having	heard	from	some	foreign	female	researchers	that	they	had	difficulty	negotiating	access	in	Aceh.	Of	course,	my	sex	may	have	also	limited	my	access	to	particular	groups,	as	both	of	the	women	working	in	the	market	in	Aceh	opted	not	to	speak	with	me,	referring	Sammy	and	me	instead	to	their	husbands.	That	being	said,	we	frequently	spoke	to	female	customers	in	Aceh.	In	the	other	two	fieldsites	I	do	not	think	that	my	gender	greatly	altered	my	research	relationships,	as	I	openly	spoke	with	women	in	the	poultry	trade	in	Lampung,	and	with	female	customers	in	Serang;	it	is,	however,	quite	possible	that	these	discussions	were	facilitated	primarily	because	Sari,	the	assistant	who	worked	with	me	there,	is	a	woman.			Language	afforded	an	opportunity	to	observe	how	respondents	perceived	my	presence.	Both	Bahasa	Indonesia	and	Bahasa	Aceh	utilize	personal	pronouns	that	distinguish	individuals	by	age,	and	as	a	sign	of	respect.	In	Bahasa	Indonesia,	for	example,	an	older	man	would	be	referred	to	as	Pak,	a	second	person	pronoun	that	also	means	father.	In	most	of	Indonesia	a	man	of	near	equivalent	age	or	status,	or	somebody	very	familiar,	would	be	referred	to	as	Mas,	a	slang	equivalent	of	brother	
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or	young	man.70	In	Aceh,	the	equivalent	of	Mas	is	Bang	or	Bung.	During	the	early	stages	of	fieldwork	I	would	frequently	be	greeted	as	Pak	as	a	sign	of	respect,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	many	of	those	speaking	with	me	were	clearly	older.	I	too	would	most	frequently	utilize	the	more	formal	Pak	to	greet	respondents,	even	if	they	appeared	to	be	younger.	Over	time,	however,	most	people	referred	to	me	as	Mas	or	
Bung,	indicating	both	familiarity	and	a	recognition	that	I	was	similar	in	age	to	many	of	the	PWP.	When	this	occurred	I	too	would	revert	to	less	formal	titles.		Every	Indonesian	citizen,	regardless	of	their	adherence	or	practice,	is	identified	on	government-issued	documentation	as	a	member	of	one	of	five	recognized	religious	communities.	These	are:	Islam,	Buddhism,	Confucianism,	Catholicism,	and	Protestantism.71	Atheism	is	not	recognized.	While	tolerance	for	religious	diversity	and	expression	are	enshrined	politically,	in	practice	only	particular	expressions	appear	to	be	protected.	Religious	intolerance	in	Indonesia	is	rife	and	increasing	(Human	Rights	Watch	2013),	with	frequent	violent	clashes	between	groups	having	divergent	beliefs	(Sidel	2006).	This	is	the	context	in	which	I,	an	atheist,	undertook	fieldwork.			As	a	white	foreigner	it	was	assumed	that	I	was	a	Christian,	and	in	each	fieldsite	I	was	routinely	asked	if	I	was	Protestant	or	Catholic.	Prior	to	beginning	fieldwork,	and	following	discussions	with	Indonesian	colleagues,	I	decided	to	respond	honestly	when	asked	about	my	personal	religious	affiliation,	answering	tidak	ada	agama	–	I	have	no	religion	–	each	time	I	was	queried.	I	asked	Sammy	and	Sari	to	observe	whether	my	response	altered	or	closed-off	discussion;	they	never	concluded	that	it	did,	and	I	never	felt	as	though	people	were	offended	by	my	response.	Rather,	answering	honestly	frequently	led	to	further	discussion	about	religion,	and	in	particular,	about	the	existence	of	Muslims	in	Canada,	my	home	country.	When	I	affirmed	that	there	were	indeed	Muslims	in	Canada	people	appeared	pleasantly	surprised.			Along	with	questions	about	religious	belief,	I	was	routinely	asked	in	a	hetero-normative	manner	about	my	marital	status.	When	I	confirmed	that	I	was	married	the	inevitable	follow-up	question	was	whether	I	had	children.72	To	this	second	question	I	always	answered	belum	–	not	yet.	This	answer	often	spurred	a	third	line	of	questioning	about	how	long	I	had	been	married	and,	after	they	found	out	that	I	had	been	married	for	a	few	years,	why	I	did	not	have	children.	I	found	most	people	extremely	frank	about	procreation,	with	both	men	and	women	enquiring	whether	or	not	my	partner	and	I	were	actually	physically	and	biologically	able	to	have																																																									70	Mas	derives	from	Javanese	but	has	entered	into	common	usage	in	Bahasa	Indonesia.	In	Aceh,	the	equivalent	of	Mas	is	Bang	or	Bung;	in	Bali	the	equivalent	is	Bli.	For	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	the	politicized	history	of	these	terms	see	Anderson	(1990).		71	Along	with	these	five	recognized	religions,	across	the	archipelago,	myriad	local	belief	systems	known	as	agama	asli	–	literally	original	religion	–	exist.		72	In	each	fieldsite	many	men	suggested	in	a	half-heartedly	joking	manner	that	I	marry	a	local	woman	as	well,	assuring	me	that	it	was	permissible	to	have	more	than	one	wife.		
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children.	The	fact	that	I	was	married	frequently	opened	a	larger	discussion	with	respondents	about	our	respective	families.			Taken	as	a	whole,	I	do	not	feel	that	my	foreignness,	in	its	many	manifestations,	negatively	altered	fieldwork.	Conversely,	in	many	settings	being	a	male	foreigner	opened	opportunities	to	explore	the	subtleties	of	behaviour	and	culture	among	PWP	that	might	be	closed	for	questioning	by	Indonesians	or	women.	Nonetheless,	there	may	of	course	have	been	situations	where	I	could	not	judge	accurately	how	my	presence	altered	the	research	environment.			Norman	(2009)	observes	that	field	assistants	are	often	visible	in	the	research	process	only	to	the	extent	that	they	are	thanked	in	the	acknowledgement	section	of	a	dissertation	or	an	article.	Following	the	completion	of	fieldwork	in	August	2012	I	asked	both	my	research	assistants,	Sammy	and	Sari,	to	reflect	on	their	experiences	in	doing	this	research,	focusing	in	particular	on	how	their	background	and	identity	may	have	affected	this	process.	I	did	not	specify	a	word	or	page	limit,	allowing	them	both	to	reflect	on	the	process	of	fieldwork	as	they	saw	fit.	I	have	edited	their	reflections	into	a	collective	discussion	and	attribute	direct	quotes	to	each	speaker	when	appropriate:	Sammy	and	Sari	have	both	read	and	approved	what	is	presented	below.	By	asking	them	to	reflect	on	how	their	identities	may	have	shaped	the	fieldwork	process,	I	aim	to	make	visible	these	essential	companions	in	my	doctoral	research.	
Reflecting	on	research:	Sammy	and	Sari	looking	back	on	fieldwork	One	reason	why	I	chose	to	work	with	both	Sammy	and	Sari	is	because	they	were	curious	about	the	practice	of	qualitative	research,	and	in	particular	qualitative	health	research.	When	I	met	Sammy,	he	was	in	the	first	year	of	his	undergraduate	degree,	reading	Social	Psychology.	When	Sari	and	I	met,	she	had	recently	completed	an	undergraduate	degree	in	Anthropology.	While	they	were	both	familiar	with	ethical	considerations	relating	to	qualitative	research,	prior	to	beginning	this	research	both	Sammy	and	Sari,	at	different	times,	participated	in	a	research-training	course	I	prepared	to	ensure	that	safety	and	ethical	considerations	remained	paramount	throughout	our	work	together.	Concerted	time	was	spent	identifying	how	personal	characteristics	or	beliefs	may	affect	fieldwork.	In	particular,	we	discussed	at	length	how	gender,	age,	ethnic	or	national	identity,	religion	or	personal	philosophy,	political	orientation,	and	language	could	affect	the	research	process.73	These	discussions	continued	through	the	process	of	fieldwork,	and	their	reflections	below	are	written	with	reference	to	how	their	identity	shaped	the	research	process.	Below	I	summarize	and	reflect	on	their	afterthoughts,	beginning	with	Sammy,	as	he	and	I	undertook	fieldwork	together	in	Aceh	before	I	started	work	with	Sari	in	Banten	and	Lampung.		Sammy	discussed	primarily	how	“being	Acehnese”	facilitated	research	in	Bireuen.	He	noted	that	having	the	ability	to	speak	Bahasa	Aceh	was	incredibly	important	and,																																																									73	In	retrospect	I	acknowledge	that	I	did	not	address	how	sexual	identity	may	also	affect	fieldwork.	
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as	he	wrote,	“in	my	own	humble	opinion	made	research	more	flexible,	comfortable,	and	acceptable”	for	respondents,	allowing	us	to	“access	information”	that	might	have	been	difficult	to	access	if,	for	example,	“I	were	a	Batak	from	North	Sumatra	or	Javanese”.	For	Indonesians,	Sammy	contended,	“unless	I	was	an	anthropologist	that	lived	in	the	fieldsite	for	many	years	(or	spent	the	rest	of	my	life	in	the	field,	or	married	an	indigenous	woman)”	it	would	be	difficult	to	be	accepted	by	respondents	in	Aceh.			Indeed,	throughout	fieldwork	in	Bireuen	I	routinely	witnessed	Sammy	being	publicly	questioned	on	his	ancestry,	his	place	of	birth,	and	his	ability	to	speak	
Bahasa	Aceh.	This	vetting	would	often	continue	for	several	minutes,	as	Sammy	relayed	the	district	and	the	village	where	he	grew	up,	the	place	where	he	now	lives,	and	the	work	that	we	were	undertaking	together.	These	interactions	were	always	cordial	and	frequently	ended	with	Sammy	turning	to	me	and	stating:	“It’s	fine,	they	just	wanted	to	know	where	I	was	from.”	In	this	way,	Sammy	writes,	“being	Acehnese”	was	incredibly	important	for	building	“trust”	with	people	in	the	poultry	trade	in	Bireuen.	Establishing	credibility,	in	this	way,	did	not	figure	as	prominently	in	the	other	two	fieldsites.		Sammy	is	“from	a	middle-class	family	from	a	rural	village	in	Aceh”	and	grew	up	“keeping	chicken	in	the	house.”	Despite	being	university	educated,	Sammy	contends:	“I	am	from	the	same	class	as	the	people	in	the	market...	[and	thus]	it	wasn’t	hard	for	me	to	communicate”	with	them.	Although	people	would	ask	about	Sammy’s	education	and	the	fact	that	he	spoke	English,	he	does	not	believe	that	his	education	hampered	access.	Conversely,	he	believes	people	more	readily	accepted	our	presence	in	the	market	because	we	said	we	were	students.	Moreover,	“smoking	and	drinking	coffee	in	the	same	place	as	respondents	everyday	in	the	market”	worked	to	dilute	any	sense	that	he	was	of	a	different	class	than	respondents,	and	“actually	led	to	greater	acceptance,	trust,	and	openness”	with	people	in	the	poultry	trade.			“Being	Acehnese”	was	important,	Sammy	contends,	but	so	too	was	being	a	male.	In	Aceh,	“there	is	an	unwritten	rule	that	in	an	Acehnese	family,	the	husband	has	an	obligation	to	provide	for	the	family...	[while]	an	Acehnese	wife	has	an	obligation	to	be	a	good	mother	for	their	children...	[and	is	not	obliged]	to	work	outside”	of	the	house.	As	stated	in	Chapter	5,	men	make	up	the	vast	majority	of	people	in	the	poultry	trade	in	Aceh.	And,	as	Sammy	states,	the	fact	that	he	was	a	male	most	certainly	affected	our	relationship	with	people	in	the	market:			 If	I	were	a	woman,	there	would	be	some	secrets	or	issues	that	they	[male		 respondents]	wouldn’t	want	to	talk	about	with	us...	There	are	some	topics		 [that	come	up]	in	conversation	that	are	taboo	to	talk	about	between	men		 and	women.	So,	in	this	context,	we	would	have	had	trouble	gaining	access		 [if	I	had	been	a	woman].		There	were	two	female	sellers	in	Bireuen.	Neither	would	speak	to	us	beyond	basic	
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they	worked.	Although	many	female	customers	spoke	with	us,	Sammy	believes	that	the	female	sellers	avoided	conversing	because	we	were	both	men	and	they	were	in	the	presence	of	their	husbands.	Ultimately,	Sammy’s	sex	and	Acehnese	identity,	among	many	other	personal	qualities,	facilitated	research	in	Bireuen,	Aceh.			Sari	grew	up	in	urban	Indonesia,	first	in	Yogyakarta	and	later	in	Jakarta.	She	reflects	on	how	she	too	grew	up	with	birds	in	the	house:			 As	a	Javanese	girl,	my	dad	raised	many	live	birds	at	home.	We	had		 songbirds,	ayam	kampung,	ayam	Bangkok,	and	sometimes	we	had	ducks.	I		 remember	when	I	was	a	child	my	dad	raised	many	fighting	cocks	and	on		 Sunday	morning	many	of	his	friends	came	into	our	backyard	for	matches.		 I	don’t	know	whether	my	dad	gambled	money	on	those	matches	but	I		 remember	my	dad	was	very	qualified	at	raising	fighting	cocks.	He	also		loved		 to	raise	ayam	kampung	because	he	liked	to	eat	their	eggs.	Sometimes	he			 would	kill	one	and	ask	my	mom	to	cook	the	bird.	But	only	my	dad	and		I	ate		 the	chicken;	my	mom	and	brother	and	sister	did	not	eat	it	because	they	said		 “it	was	hard	to	eat	our	pet”.		When	Sari	was	growing	up	she	also	frequently	went	to	live	bird	market	with	her	mother	to	buy	poultry	for	the	household.	Recalling	these	experiences	many	years	later,	and	with	knowledge	about	avian	influenza,	Sari	reflects	on	her	childhood	experience	around	birds	and	in	markets,	with	what	I	emphasized	about	staying	safe	in	the	field	during	research	training	and	throughout	fieldwork:			 Sometimes	I	felt	confused	about	risk	and	my	presence	in	the	market.		 Sometimes	I	felt	nervous	and	worried	about	becoming	sick	if	I	touched		 birds	or	feathers	or	faeces.	But	on	the	other	hand,	reflecting	on	my		 personal	experience,	I	never	had	any	problems	when	I	lived	among	many		 birds	at	home	when	I	was	younger.	In	this	process,	I	reflected	on		 Indonesian	people’s	perspectives	about	avian	influenza...				 I	tried	to	recall	my	childhood	memories:	Why	was	there	no	flu	burung		when	I	was	a	child?...	Why	did	my	mom	not	feel	scared	or	awkward	about	touching	chickens	when	we	went	to	the	traditional	market	near	our	house?...	The	scientific	facts	that	Scott	talks	about	contradict	with	my	values,	from	my	personal	experience....	because	I	feel	safe	even	though	I	have	touched	chickens	without	wearing	gloves...	My	close	experience	with	live	birds	since	I	was	a	child	make	me	think	like	many	chicken	sellers	who	do	not	believe	that	avian	influenza	is	a	problem.		Sari	and	I	discussed	these	issues	over	the	course	of	research,	particularly	the	issue	of	the	relative	risk	of	human	infection,	and	reflected	on	how	PWP	do	not	appear	to	be	disproportionately	infected	with	H5N1,	and	nor	do	they	routinely	show	signs	of	past	infection	in	seroprevalence	studies	(Toner	and	Adalja	2012;	M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013).	These	discussions	served	to	reiterate	that,	while	there	are	a	range	of	factors	that	may	influence	the	likelihood	of	human	infection,	many	of	which	are	
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outside	of	our	control,	such	as	the	particular	clade	(Toner	et	al.	2013;	Bridges	et	al.	2002),	safety	in	the	field	should	remain	a	high	priority	as	the	majority	of	reported	human	infections	are	associated	with	disease	exposure	from	contact	with	sick	or	dead	poultry,	or	more	passive	transmission	in	contaminated	environments	(M.	D.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	Patel	et	al.	2014).	Furthermore,	for	me,	Sari’s	reflections	also	underscored	the	normalized	nature	of	human	interaction	with	poultry	in	Indonesia		Just	as	Sammy’s	Acehnese	identity	was	important	for	gaining	access	to	people	in	the	poultry	trade	in	Aceh,	Sari	contends	that	my	foreignness	afforded	us	greater	access	to	those	working	in	the	poultry	trade	in	both	Serang	and	Bandar	Lampung.	Indeed,	although	she	was	initially	concerned	that	it	would	be	“very	hard”	to	speak	with	sellers	and	customers,	Sari	states	that	my	“status	as	a	bule	gave	us	the	opportunity	to	open	discussion”	with	respondents;	because	of	this	she	came	to	see	me	as	“the	can	opener.”		The	situation	of	“a	female	researcher	working	with	a	foreign	male	researcher”	in	a	predominantly	male	environment	posed	unique	challenges,	and	led	Sari	to	“sometimes	feel	uncomfortable”	during	fieldwork.	This	was	because	“many	people	thought	that	I	had	a	private	and	personal	relationship	with	Scott”,	and	despite	the	fact	that	“we	both	always	clarified	our	relationship,	sometimes	people	still	do	not	believe	us.”	In	particular,	Sari	writes:	“when	we	went	to	cockfighting	matches	I	was	the	only	female”	there	and	because	of	this				 sometimes	they	teased	me...	but	I	didn’t	pay	much	attention	to	this	and		 just	continued	my	job.	Cockfighting	in	Indonesia	has	a	strong	relationship		 with	masculinity	–	it	is	a	man’s	game	–	and	maybe	that’s	why	they	also		 feel	uncomfortable	with	my	presence	at	the	match.			I	tried	to	remain	aware	of	these	negative	interactions	during	fieldwork	and	when	respondents	would	make	assumptions	about	Sari	-	or	our	relationship	-	we	would	always	reflect	on	these	interactions	at	the	end	of	the	day,	as	I	wanted	to	ensure	that	these	insinuations	did	not	negatively	impact	her	wellbeing.	Our	discussions	together	always	concluded	in	laughter,	with	reference	to	the	absurdity	of	such	commentary.				While	Sari	recalled	how	being	a	woman	made	some	aspects	of	fieldwork	more	difficult,	I	noted	throughout	research	in	Lampung	that	Sari’s	gender	was	advantageous,	in	that	it	allowed	us	to	speak	more	openly	with	the	relatively	large	number	of	female	sellers	working	in	Pasar	Tugu.	Whether	or	not	we	would	have	had	the	same	access,	for	example,	in	Lampung	if	Sari	was	male	I	do	not	know.	I	do	know,	however,	that	Sari’s	training	in	anthropology,	her	self-effacing	confidence,	and	her	reflexivity,	greatly	facilitated	research	in	Lampung	and	Banten.	
Working	with	interpreters	in	the	field	The	markets	where	the	majority	of	fieldwork	took	place	are	not	known,	well-trodden	environments	extensively	chronicled	by	researchers	focusing	on	the	human-animal	interface.	On	the	contrary,	I	know	of	no	comparable	qualitative	
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studies.	The	extensive	and	intensive	nature	of	this	research	would	not	have	been	possible	without	Sammy	and	Sari,	who	assisted	to	interpret	conversations	and	cultural	norms,	to	negotiate	access,	and	to	ensure	that	guiding	research	questions	were	appropriate.			Language	has	long	mediated	political	authority	in	the	Indonesian	archipelago.	
Bahasa	Indonesia	was	not	widely	used	prior	to	Japanese	occupation	during	the	Second	World	War	and	only	gained	prominence	as	the	“language	of	the	state”	during	the	“Revolution	of	1945-49	[when]	it	was	the	language	of	resistance	to	the	returning	Dutch	and	the	language	of	hope	for	the	future”	(B.	Anderson	1990,	139).	Since	that	time	Bahasa	Indonesia	has	functioned	as	part	of	the	unification	project,	institutionalized	by	bureaucrats	in	Jakarta	and	taught	across	the	country	to	cultivate	a	national	identity.	This	national	project,	although	largely	successful,	in	that	Bahasa	
Indonesia	can	now	be	heard	across	the	archipelago,	was	seen	by	some	as	supplanting	local	linguistic	identities	and	therefore	resisted.			While	I	acquired	a	working	knowledge	of	Bahasa	Indonesia,	I	recognized	from	my	first	visit	to	Bireuen	that	many	informants	preferred	to	speak	Bahasa	Aceh,	and	therefore	wanted	to	make	certain	I	was	working	with	an	Acehnese	interlocutor.	In	the	other	two	fieldsites	language	was	less	politicized	and	respondents	primarily	spoke	Bahasa	Indonesia	during	interviews.	Nevertheless,	employing	Sari	to	translate	in	Banten	and	Lampung	made	possible	more	in-depth	discussion	than	I	alone	would	have	been	capable	of	facilitating.		When	appropriate,	I	asked	Sammy	and	Sari	to	provide	simultaneous	translation	of	the	conversations	with	respondents.	This	occurred	more	often	during	the	first	round	of	fieldwork,	when	I	wanted	to	maintain	oversight	to	make	certain	that	they	were	not	asking	leading	questions.	During	the	early	stages	of	research	my	command	of	Bahasa	Indonesia	was	also	less	developed.	Over	time,	as	I	became	more	comfortable	in	Bahasa	Indonesia	and	as	Sammy	and	Sari	grew	more	confident	and	knowledgeable	about	the	research	aims,	I	did	not	request	simultaneous	translation	unless	I	was	unclear	about	the	content	of	the	discussion,	as	I	wanted	to	avoid	interrupting	the	flow	of	conversation.	In	such	cases,	I	would	actively	listen	and	participate	in	the	discussion,	while	also	taking	note	of	verbal	cues	and	observing	the	surroundings.			In	employing	translators	there	is	always	the	possibility	for	miscommunication	and	misrepresentation.	Two	prominent	concerns	arise:	One,	are	my	assistants	representing	key	research	questions	adequately	and	not	posing	leading	questions	to	informants?	And	two,	are	my	assistants	representing	the	views	of	respondents	accurately	back	to	me?	To	avoid	the	former,	I	revisited	the	aims	of	research	and	research	themes	and	questions	with	Sammy	and	Sari	prior	to	each	round	of	fieldwork.	To	mitigate	both	of	these	concerns,	during	the	first	round	of	fieldwork	in	Aceh,	I	used	a	digital	recorder	to	enable	literal	translation.	This	allowed	me	to	see	if	Sammy	was	staying	on-track	and	whether	he	was	accurately	representing	respondents.	I	did	not	record	interviews	in	subsequent	field	visits	because	I	was	
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confident	in	the	translation	I	was	receiving	and	also	became	better	able	to	understand	what	was	being	said.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	we	returned	to	each	site	three	times	and	spoke	with	the	majority	of	respondents	on	multiple	occasions	diluted	the	possibility	that	Sammy	and	Sari	simply	got	it	wrong	in	their	translation.	In	this	way,	the	research	design	crosschecked	what	I	was	told	and	helped	ensure	reliability	of	findings.			
Ethical	considerations	and	photography	In	the	photographic	process	a	camera	can	become	a	“tool	of	power,”	which	has	the	ability	to	turn	“people	into	objects	that	can	be	symbolically	possessed”	(Sontag	1977).	Writing	before	the	advent	of	digital	cameras,	Sontag	in	On	Photography	(1977)	was	unable	to	signal	to	the	wider	dispersion	of	these	tools.	Along	with	taking	images,	I	was	also	the	subject	of	many	photographs,	all	captured	on	camera-phones.	It	was	not	uncommon	for	people	in	the	market	–	mostly	customers	–	to	take	my	photo,	sometimes,	but	by	no	means	always,	after	asking	my	permission.	Sometimes	I	was	asked	to	stand	next	to	their	children;	sometimes	customers	would	pose	with	me,	handing	their	phones	to	a	poultry	trader	to	capture	our	image.	Poultry	traders	also	frequently	took	my	picture.	In	this	way,	the	research	process	became	bi-directional,	with	key	informants	readily	engaged	in	capturing	part	of	this	fieldwork.		While	I	was	asked	to	pose	both	for	and	with	others,	the	pictures	that	are	presented	in	this	dissertation	were	not	staged.	I	never	asked	people	to	behave	in	a	particular	way,	stand	in	particular	places,	or	undertake	certain	actions.	That	is	not	to	say	that	people	did	not	ask	me	to	take	a	picture	when	they	themselves	were	posing	for	the	camera,	or	attempting	to	create	a	scene	they	deemed	worthy	of	capturing.	For	example,	men	in	all	three	fieldsites	tried	to	pit	two	fighting	cocks	against	each	other	for	my	supposed	benefit.	Each	time	this	occurred	I	tried	politely	to	let	them	know	that	this	was	not	necessary	and	that	I	did	not	want	it	to	occur,	as	I	did	not	want	to	be	responsible	for	animals	fighting	or	being	injured,	even	if	this	practice	was	commonplace.74	Moreover,	the	photographic	component	of	my	research	was	guided	by	the	principles	of	documentary	photography,	which	may	be	best	understood	as	“a	praxis	and	phronesis	for	visualising	the	object	of	the	social	sciences;	a	reflexive	process	of	thoughtful	and	ethical	social	interaction	whose	value	combines	history,	observation	and	aesthetics	in	a	discourse	over	time”	(R.	Brown	2011,	198).	Essential	to	this	process	is	capturing	images	that	are	not	staged,	and	do	no	harm.				More	specific	ethical	issues	arose	due	to	the	nature	of	this	research.	Many	of	the	images	presented	show	people	touching	dead	birds,	working	or	shopping	in	what	are	considered	to	be	high-risk	environments,	or	undertaking	behaviours	that	may	expose	people	to	disease.	I	know	from	showing	select	photographs	both	privately	and	in	public	venues75	among	people	working	in	public	and	animal	health,	including																																																									74	I	have	captured	hundreds	of	photos	of	cocks	fighting.	These	scenes,	however,	were	not	staged	for	my	benefit,	but	were	occurring	when	I	arrived.	I	always	asked	to	take	photographs	and	was	always	granted	permission.	75	I	have	presented	some	form	of	this	qualitative	research	alongside	select	photographs	to	academic	audiences	at:	the	History	Department,	Columbia	University	(May	2011);	The	Saw	Swee	Hock	School	
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those	working	specifically	on	avian	influenza,	that	some	people	recoil	from	images	of	animals	bleeding	and	dying,	some	react	to	the	explicit	and	visceral	presentation	of	environments	considered	high-risk,	and	most	have	never	seen	or	visited	live	bird	markets.	In	presenting	these	images,	important	practical	and	ethical	implications	of	including	pictures	come	to	light,	as	showing	such	pictures	in	these	instances	may	misrepresent	the	context	in	which	these	photos	were	originally	taken,	and	may	have	inadvertently	served	to	stigmatize	informants.	This	experience	has	led	me	to	consider	what	it	means	to	take	a	picture	that	is	representative	of	normal	behaviour,	and	then	transport	said	picture	into	a	context	where	it	can	easily	be	viewed	as	disgusting,	risky,	dirty,	dangerous,	odd,	bizarre,	exotic,	and,	perhaps,	as	rationale	for	an	intervention.		Photography	has	long	portrayed	unfamiliar	locales	and	cultures	as	inherently	primitive,	dirty,	and	un-evolved	(Solomon-Godeau	1991).	In	this	way,	the	act	of	taking	photographs	has	worked	to	infantilize	and	exoticize	others,	effectively	presenting	them	as	in	need	of	assistance	–	a	material	process	that	has	been	used	to	justify	colonial	intervention	in	so-called	pre-modern	societies.	As	Spencer	writes,			 		 There	are	many	examples	of	static,	stereotyped	images	of	indigenous		 people...	rendered	voiceless	and	devoid	of	active	subject	status	in	the		 process	of	representation,	passively	posed	for	the	eye	of	the	camera.		 Examples	of	this	imperialist	cataloguing	are	abundant	and	reflect	thinking		 in	the	social	sciences	which	still	laboured	under	the	sign	of	the	colonial		 project	(2011,	48).		I	am	aware	that	the	inclusion	of	certain	pictures	in	this	dissertation	and	subsequent	publications	may	be	appropriated	to	justify	and	reinforce	preconceived	stereotypes	about	particular	individuals	or	communities	said	to	give	rise	to	disease.	To	make	it	clear,	photographs	from	this	research	are	not	shown	with	any	intention	to	shock	or	to	either	valorise	or	stigmatize	behaviour	exhibited.	Rather,	particular	photographs	are	employed	to	illustrate	the	everyday,	what	I	came	to	see	and	understand	as	normal	behaviour	–	what	Brown	calls	the	“rhythms	of	everyday	life”	(2011).	In	future	exhibitions	of	this	work,	I	intend	to	have	comprehensive	written	descriptions	accompanying	the	images,	serving	to	explicate	the	behaviours	captured	in	the	images	and	make	the	rationality	of	certain	activities	clear.	Of	the	many	limitations	inherent	in	still	photography,	the	most	glaring	is	that	pictures	cannot	explain	why	people	undertake	certain	behaviours.	By	pairing	images	and	words	I	aim	to	reduce	the	exoticizing	effect	of	such	photos,	and	instead	represent	the	reality	of	the	subjects	on	their	own	terms.		
																																																																																																																																																																					of	Public	Health	at	the	National	University	of	Singapore	(April	2012);	The	Centre	for	Global	Development,	Leeds	University	(September	2012);	The	Royal	Veterinary	College,	University	of	London	(December	2012).	
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Ethical	considerations	for	social	science	studies	of	emerging	infectious	diseases	
at	the	human-animal	interface	There	is	growing	consensus	that	understanding	and	effectively	responding	to	emerging	infectious	diseases	hinges	upon	greater	social	science	engagement	at	the	human-animal	interface	(Janes	et	al.	2012).	Yet	many	essential	elements	of	this	research	remain	undefined.	Over	the	course	of	this	fieldwork	it	became	apparent	that	there	are	distinct	ethical	considerations	for	researchers	employing	qualitative	methods	to	study	emerging	infectious	diseases.	The	following	discussion	aims	to	add	complexity	to	qualitative,	social	science	approaches	to	EID,	and	to	contribute	to	the	development	of	this	burgeoning	research	agenda	by	illustrating	the	need	for	balancing	ethical	considerations	alongside	methodological	rigor.		While	there	are	inherent	risks	in	all	fieldwork,	there	may	be	unique	risks	for	researchers	employing	ethnographically-oriented	methods	to	study	EID.	The	quality	of	such	social	science	research	is	largely	determined	by	how	far	each	research	team	adapts	to	social	and	cultural	norms	and	whether	respondents	accept	researchers.	Building	trusting	relationships	can	take	time.	Spending	extensive	time	and	interacting	in	particular	environments	like	live	bird	markets,	however,	may	pose	an	increased	risk	of	disease	exposure	to	researchers.	Although	transmission	routes	for	emerging	diseases	are	not	always	known,	some	of	the	most	common	routes	–	aerosol,	fomites,	skin	contact	-	are	highly	social	(Woolhouse,	Gowtage-Sequeria,	and	Evans	2006).	Questions	about	safety	during	the	fieldwork	process	arise	when	employing	qualitative	methodologies	and	methods.	Should	an	interviewer,	for	example,	try	to	limit	physical	contact	with	some	respondents	by	not	shaking	hands	or	sharing	food	and	drink,	if	such	behaviour	may	be	perceived	as	impolite?	Should	research	teams	avoid	certain	localities	identified	as	particularly	risky	environments?	Balancing	the	competing	demands	of	collecting	data,	ensuring	the	safety	of	all	researchers,	and	limiting	the	spread	of	disease	requires	careful	planning.	Each	disease	poses	unique	challenges	that	may	test	disciplinary	conventions,	and	researchers	may	have	to	adjust	their	methodological	approaches.	This	is	particularly	important	for	qualitative	studies	requiring	sustained	time	in	environments	associated	with	transmission	and	human	infections.				In	their	ethnographic	study	of	outbreaks	of	Ebola	in	Gabon,	Uganda	and	the	Congo,	Hewlett	and	Hewlett	(2008)	questioned	whether	wearing	personal	protective	equipment	(PPE),	such	as	a	mask,	boots,	apron,	and	gloves,	during	fieldwork	protected	them	sufficiently.	They	also	struggled	with	the	interpersonal	implications	of	employing	PPE	and	biohazard	suits	to	shield	them	from	exposure	–	a	compromise	between	safety	and	ethical	data	collection.	Such	dilemmas,	they	assert,	occurred	daily:	“Where	to	stay,	how	to	protect	ourselves	from	the	virus	while	at	the	same	time	trying	to	develop	rapport	and	trust	with	families	and	communities”(2008,	69).	Researching	a	disease,	such	as	Ebola,	that	is	readily	transmitted,	has	a	high	case	fatality	rate,	and	is	widely	feared	by	at-risk	communities,	raises	different	safety	and	ethical	issues	for	researchers	than	a	disease	that	has	limited	human-to-human	transmission,	a	longer	incubation	period,	and	is	not	widely	perceived	as	a	risk.	Here,	H5N1	is	instructive.	
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	Despite	high-mortality	rates	and	global	concern	about	an	impending	influenza	pandemic,	this	study	and	others	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Naysmith	2013b)	show	that	communities	living	and	working	closely	with	poultry	in	H5N1-endemic	countries	rarely	wear	masks	and	gloves.	Exploring	lay	knowledge	and	risk	perceptions,	and	observing	behaviour	among	these	high-risk	groups	is	critical	for	understanding	the	social	and	economic	drivers	of	exposure	and	transmission	(Janes	et	al.	2012).	In	such	an	environment,	however,	PPE-use	or	the	avoidance	of	contact	with	respondents	may	take	on	new	meaning,	as	it	may	appear	to	presuppose	environmental	contamination,	in	turn	acting	to	stigmatize	respondents,	jeopardize	access,	and	potentially	endanger	the	research	agenda.		In	this	study,	safety	was	paramount,	and	in	laying	out	the	research	agenda	I	addressed	these	concerns	as	well	as	some	of	the	areas	of	scientific	uncertainty	surrounding	avian	influenza,	as	set	out	in	Chapter	2.	Though	the	relative	risks	of	contracting	avian	influenza	from	an	animal	host	in	LBMs	is	low,	the	high	case	fatality	rate	and	the	impossibility	of	knowing	precisely	where,	or	if,	H5N1	virus	resided	in	any	particular	LBM,	meant	that	there	existed	real	tensions	between	pursuing	practices	that	were	linked	to	decreasing	one’s	personal	risk	and	those	practices	that	were	associated	with	being	accepted,	even	trusted.	One	such	tension	that	arose	was	whether	to	shake	hands	with	PWP.	From	an	epidemiological	perspective,	shaking	hands	with	people	who	slaughter	and	sell	birds	may	lead	to	viral	exposure.	From	a	cultural	perspective,	not	shaking	hands	with	informants	may	be	viewed	as	impolite	or	arrogant.	After	Sammy	and	Sari	and	I	had	discussed	this	dual	reality	together	on	separate	occasions,	we	made	the	decision	that	we	would	never	refuse	an	informant’s	hand	that	was	first	offered	to	us,	but	we	would	not	pre-emptively	offer	our	own	hand.	In	practice	this	meant	that	we	routinely	shook	people’s	hands.	At	some	point	after	this	contact	we	would	attempt	to	apply	hand	sanitizer	discreetly,	away	from	public	gaze.		Reflecting	on	fieldwork,	Sari	discussed	how	my	preoccupation	with	staying	safe	in	the	field	by	avoiding	unnecessary	contact	with	people	or	places	in	LBMs	was	difficult	to	balance	against	cultural	expectations.	She	stated:			 I	tried,	as	Scott	requested,	to	reduce	the	possibility	to	shake	hands	with		 people	in	the	markets.	But	this	is	not	common	in	Indonesian	culture.	I		mean,		 maybe	it’s	okay	for	Scott	[to	avoid	shaking	people’s	hands]	because	people		 will	understand	that	he	is	from	another	culture,	but	for	me,	as	an		 Indonesian,	I	may	be	called	sombong	(arrogant).	If	I	think	about	it,	I	would		 probably	think	that	somebody	is	sombong	if	they	avoided	shaking	my	hand.		Sari’s	comments	indicate	a	concern	that	goes	deeper	than	fear	of	being	seen	to	take	precautionary	measures	such	as	sterilizing	one’s	hands	following	an	interview.	For	Sari,	taking	these	actions,	even	if	respondents	did	not	witness	them,	was	seen	as	culturally	duplicitous	–	to	a	certain	degree	a	betrayal	of	her	experience	and	what	she	knows	about	her	culture.	On	one	level,	in	this	research,	we	engage	with	respondents	
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and	yearn	for	acceptability;	and	then,	immediately	following	these	interactions	we	seek	to	purify	ourselves	of	this	engagement,	driven	by	the	fact	that	the	simple	act	of	meeting	and	greeting	informants	is	a	potential	risk	factor	for	exposure.				Alongside	avoiding	personal	contact	with	people	in	the	poultry	trade,	I	instructed	Sammy	and	Sari	to	eschew	touching	surfaces	that	could	have	come	in	contact	with	poultry,	or	poultry	by-products,	such	as	cutting	boards,	seller’s	tables,	or	cages.	Yet	when	working	alongside	poultry	traders	in	live	bird	markets	one	never	knows	where	a	bird	has	been.	H5N1	has	been	found	to	travel	between	villages	on	car	tires	and	footwear	(Normile	2007)	and	thus,	upon	returning	from	fieldwork	every	day,	we	commenced	a	daily	cleansing	that	would	start	by	scrubbing	our	footwear,	feet,	and	hands	with	soap	and	water	outside	of	our	lodgings.	We	would	then	launder	all	of	our	clothes	and	thereafter	retire	to	our	respective	rooms	to	shower.			Along	with	these	practical	precautionary	measures,	I	routinely	met	with	my	assistants	to	ensure	they	were	feeling	healthy	and	rested.	While	I	remained	vigilant	about	safety	throughout	fieldwork,	the	methods	that	I	tried	to	enforce	by	no	means	eliminated	all	risk.	Indeed,	like	Sari,	I	continually	found	myself	caught	between	a	desire	to	be	respectful	and	accepted	among	respondents	and	a	concern	to	remain	safe	in	the	field.			Remaining	safe	during	qualitative	research	on	EID	requires	a	certain	degree	of	familiarity	with	biomedical	data.	It	is	not	enough	to	know	about	therapeutic	interventions.	Knowledge	of	disease	transmission	and	spread	are	integral.	So	too	are	recognizing	behaviours	that	are	associated	with	exposure	and	transmission,	understanding	diagnostic	methods,	and	knowing	how	and	where	to	seek	medical	assistance.76	With	increased	interest	and	funding	for	research	on	EID,	the	number	of	social	scientists	engaging	in	this	kind	of	qualitative	research	will	surely	grow,	contributing	valuable	disciplinary	perspectives	to	our	understanding	of	the	human-animal	interface.	With	these	studies	come	unique	ethical	and	practical	considerations	that	need	further	attention	for	each	context	and	for	each	disease	before	research	begins.	These	issues	are	revisited	in	the	conclusion	of	this	thesis.	
Conclusion	This	chapter	has	outlined	the	unique	ethical	and	practical	considerations	that	I	considered	throughout	each	stage	of	this	study.	In	particular,	it	outlines	how	I	keep	informants’	identities	private	and	confidential,	how	my	positionality	influenced	fieldwork,	and	how	the	identity	of	my	assistants	influenced	the	research	process.	Although	I	recognize	that	I	am	unable	to	eliminate	all	bias,	by	acknowledging	how	my	identity	-	and	that	of	my	assistants	–	influenced	the	research	environment,	data	collection,	and	analysis,	I	aim	to	relay	findings	as	they	are	portrayed	and	experienced	by	people	in	the	poultry	trade	in	Indonesia.	Finally,	after	discussing	the																																																									76	Throughout	research	I	kept	a	list	of	“Avian	influenza	referral	hospitals”	in	Indonesia.	These	are	available	at:	http://www.who.or.id/avian/information_advice_avian-referral_hospitals.php	Last	accessed:	August	18,	2012.	
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unique	ethical	implications	associated	with	using	photography,	this	chapter	concluded	with	a	novel	discussion	of	the	ethical	and	practical	considerations	of	employing	qualitative	methods	in	studying	the	human-animal	interface.	The	next	chapter	elaborates	on	the	wider	context	in	each	field	site,	and	in	this	way,	expands	on	the	description	of	each	LBM	in	which	research	was	undertaken.	
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Chapter	8:	The	research	context	
Introduction	This	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	the	research	environment,	and	describes	both	the	physical	space,	as	well	as	the	dynamic	structures	and	networks	underpinning	the	wider	poultry	trade	in	each	of	the	three	LBMs	in	which	this	research	was	undertaken.	In	contextualizing	the	trade,	slaughter,	and	sale	of	birds	in	these	LBMs,	this	chapter	illustrates	how	different	forms	of	risk	may	be	produced	and	experienced	through	everyday	activities.	In	part,	this	chapter	underscores	that	disease	risk	in	poultry	and	people	is	not	definitive,	but	variable,	and	contingent	upon	a	range	of	factors	that	can	amplify	and	diminish	such	risk.	The	trade	in	live	birds,	for	example,	is	identified	as	a	“major	pathway	for	disease	spread”	in	H5N1	endemic	countries,	and	live	bird	markets	can	act	as	hubs	for	traders	to	sell	their	birds	(Fournié	et	al.	2013,	1).	When	poultry	traders	transit	between	communities,	farms,	and	different	markets,	they	can	introduce	H5N1	viruses	in	the	poultry	that	they	are	selling	or	on	their	equipment,	and	this	sort	of	trade	has	been	associated	with	disease	introduction	in	LBMs	(Wan	et	al.	2011;	Indriani	et	al.	2010),	and	disease	events	in	poultry	(Sims	2007;	Fournié	et	al.	2013)	and	in	people	(Soares	Magalhães	et	al.	2012).	Environmental	contamination	in	Indonesian	LBMs	is	most	common	in	markets	that	sell	ducks	and	have	slaughtering	on-site	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	Although	the	actual	risk	that	each	market	in	this	study	poses	to	poultry	and	people	could	not	be	ascertained,	a	somewhat	partial	view	of	these	relative	risks	in	each	market	can	be	inferred	from	observations	and	existing	studies	that	identify	the	factors	associated	with	environmental	contamination	and	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people.	In	this	chapter	it	becomes	clear	that	the	potential	for	environmental	contamination	and	disease	exposure	for	both	poultry	and	people	in	each	field	site	are	myriad.	Yet,	as	this	chapter	outlines	and	concludes,	the	potential	for	virus	introduction	and	maintenance	is	not	equal	across	every	market.		Ultimately	this	chapter	situates	the	research	context,	providing	background	for	data	that	are	presented	and	analysed	in	the	remainder	of	this	thesis.	Before	examining	each	fieldsite	in	turn,	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	briefly	outlines	general	human	health	considerations	in	Indonesia,	paying	particular	attention	to	communicable	and	non-communicable	diseases.	Thereafter,	this	chapter	looks	at	each	research	environment,	first	in	Aceh,	and	then	moves	to	Lampung,	and	finally	concludes	with	Serang.		
General	human	health	considerations	in	Indonesia	With	roughly	249,886,000	people	living	in	the	archipelago,	Indonesia	is	the	fourth	most	populated	country	in	the	world.	The	government	dedicates	approximately	3.1	percent	of	the	country’s	gross	domestic	product	on	health.77	Although	the	contemporary	decentralized	nature	of	health	service	provision	in	Indonesia	has																																																									77	See:	http://www.who.int/countries/idn/en/	Accessed	May	12,	2015	
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negatively	impacted	more	marginalized	Indonesians	(S.	Kristiansen	and	Santoso	2006),	there	have	been	marked	gains	in	human	health	indicators	in	Indonesia	in	the	past	half-century	(WFP	2015;	Statistics	Indonesia	2012).	In	the	1970’s,	for	example,	life	expectancy	was	43	for	adults.78	Now,	life	expectancy	at	birth	for	men	is	69	years;	for	women	it	is	73	years	(Statistics	Indonesia	2012).79	The	number	of	children	considered	“fully	vaccinated”	in	Indonesia	increased	from	59	percent	in	2007	to	66	percent	in	2012	(Statistics	Indonesia	2012),	and	under-five	mortality	continues	to	drop.80	Despite	such	gains,	however,	significant	human	health	complications	and	considerations	persist.			After	years	of	steady	decline,	the	maternal	mortality	rate	has	increased	in	the	past	decade	(Statistics	Indonesia	2012).	Communicable	diseases	remain	prevalent	in	some	parts	of	the	country,	in	particular	lymphatic	filariasis,	malaria,	dengue,	tuberculosis,	typhoid,	diphtheria,	and	rabies	(Kandun	2006).	Poliomyelitis	was	reintroduced	in	2005.	Roughly	640,000	Indonesian	adults	aged	15	and	up	are	living	with	HIV;	approximately	34,000	people	die	from	AIDS	each	year.81	With	estimates	suggesting	680,000	people	are	infected	with	tuberculosis,	Indonesia	is	considered	a	high	TB	burden	country	by	the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO	2009).82	Alongside	communicable	diseases,	over	half	of	Indonesians	do	not	meet	their	daily	caloric	needs	-	roughly	37	percent	of	children	are	stunted	(WFP	2015).	Food	insecurity	and	malnutrition	persist	across	the	archipelago	(FAO	2012;	WFP	2015).	Non-communicable	diseases	in	Indonesia	are	increasing,	as	are	obesity	rates.	Diabetes	and	cardiovascular	diseases	too	are	on	the	rise,	and	account	for	most	adult	deaths.83	Moreover,	the	majority	of	Indonesian	men	smoke:	cardiovascular	diseases	and	cancers	are	likely	to	increase.84	As	one	of	Forster’s	respondents	states	in	reference	to	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia,	H5N1	is	“just	a	little	rattle	in	the	deep	Indonesian	machine”	(2012,	25).	In	other	words,	H5N1	may	not	be	among	the	most	pressing	health	concerns	amidst	the	myriad	other	human	health	considerations	afflicting	Indonesians.	Having	outlined	in	brief	the	general	context	of	human	health	in	Indonesia,	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	looks	at	each	of	the	three	field	sites	in	context.		
Pasar	Bireuen,	Bireuen,	Aceh	Aceh	is	a	province	on	the	northern	tip	of	Sumatra	-	the	western-most	part	of	the	Indonesian	archipelago	–	and	is	governed	as	a	daerah	istimewa,	or	special	territory,	with	significant	autonomy	from	the	central	government	in	Jakarta.	This	political																																																									78	See:	http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/world-bank-and-health-in-indonesia	Accessed	May	22,	2015.	79	See:	http://www.who.int/countries/idn/en/	Accessed	May	22,	2015.	80	See:	http://www.who.int/gho/countries/idn.pdf?ua=1	Accessed	June	13,	2015.	81	See:	http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/indonesia	Accessed	May	22,	2015	82	See:	https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=%2FWHO_HQ_Reports%2FG	2%2FPROD%2FEXT%2FTBCountryProfile&ISO2=ID&LAN=EN&outtype=html	Accessed	June	12,	2015.	83	See:	http://www.who.int/gho/countries/idn.pdf?ua=1	Accessed	June	13,	2015.	84	See:	See:	http://www.who.int/gho/countries/idn.pdf?ua=1	Accessed	June	13,	2015.	
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distinction	came	following	decades	of	civil	conflict	between	the	Free	Aceh	Movement	–	Gerakan	Aceh	Merdeka	(GAM)	–	and	the	national	government,	and	was	written	into	the	Helsinki	Memorandum	of	Understanding,	the	peace	accord	signed	on	15	August	2005	to	bring	an	end	to	the	conflict.85			The	epicentre	of	the	26	December	2004	Indian	Ocean	earthquake	was	off	the	coast	of	Aceh	and	the	resulting	tsunami	killed	roughly	180,000	Acehnese.	Following	this,	the	international	community	descended	on	the	province	to	provide	short-term	humanitarian	assistance,	as	well	as	longer	term	aid	in	the	form	of	a	five-year	multi-donor	development	programme.86	I	went	to	Aceh	for	the	first	time	in	October	2009.			In	Banda	Aceh	I	was	hosted	at	the	Aceh	Research	Training	Institute	(ARTI)	at	Syiah	
Kuala	University.87		Here,	I	was	often	asked	by	other	international	scholars:	“Is	there	
actually	bird	flu	in	Aceh?”.	In	2005	H5N1	was	confirmed	in	domestic	poultry	in	Aceh,	and	there	has	been	one	suspected	human	case	of	H5N1	in	the	province.88	The	live	bird	market	in	which	I	focused	research	in	Aceh	was	located	in	Bireuen,	a	district	located	roughly	100	miles	south	of	the	provincial	capital	Banda	Aceh	(Map	2).	Kota	Bireuen	–	Bireuen	city	-	is	the	economic	and	political	center	of	the	district	Bireuen.89	The	Trans	Sumatran	Highway	is	the	island’s	commercial	artery	and	it	runs	from	Aceh	to	Lampung	along	the	eastern	coast	of	Sumatra.	This	highway	bisects	Bireuen,	and	each	day	thousands	of	broiler	chickens	travel	north,	roughly	175	miles	from	Medan	into	Bireuen	via	this	route.	Road	density	and	highway	systems	like	this	have	been	found	associated	with	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people	in	Indonesia	(Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Loth	et	al.	2011).	And	while	disease	in	poultry	and	humans	in	Aceh	is	comparatively	limited	in	relation	to	the	other	two	fieldsites,	the	trade	in	poultry	on	the	Trans	Sumatran	Highway	offers	a	potentially	rapid	route	for	disease	spread	between	provinces	and	districts.	Located	less	than	one	mile	from	this	highway,	Pasar	Bireuen	is	the	largest	market	in	the	district	and	open	daily,	and	the	area	in	this	market	where	poultry	are	sold	and	slaughtered	was	my	primary	field	site	in	Aceh.	
	
	
																																																									85	For	more	on	the	conflict	in	Aceh	see:	(Drexler	2008;	Aspinall	2009).	86	These	funds	were	primarily	directed	at	rebuilding	public	infrastructure	and	private	housing,	facilitating	governance	structures	in	a	post-conflict,	post-disaster	environment,	providing	health	programming	for	traumatized	communities,	and	supporting	livelihoods	across	the	province.	See:	(Grayman	2013).	87	ARTI	provided	a	research	base	for	a	number	of	international	doctoral	scholars	from	Australia,	Germany,	UK,	Netherlands,	and	the	USA.	The	vast	majority	of	these	scholars	were	in	Aceh	to	examine	one	of	three	broad	topics:	1)	post-conflict	reconstruction;	2)	post-disaster	reconstruction;	and	3)	Islam.	I	alone	was	there	to	research	a	disease	that	was	not	widely	discussed	in	the	province,	and	certainly	not	a	priority	for	research.	88	See:	http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=170867	Accessed:	21	August	2013.	89	Bireuen	and	neighbouring	districts	were	particularly	affected	by	conflict	during	Aceh’s	civil	insurrection	(Aspinall	2009),	and	I	was	warned	by	other	researchers	to	remain	vigilant	throughout	fieldwork.	Nonetheless,	during	fieldwork	Sammy	and	I	did	not	have	any	problems.	
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Map	2:	Map	of	Bireuen,	Aceh,	and	Banda	Aceh	and	Medan	
	Data	courtesy	of	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey		
Pasar	Bireuen		
Pasar	Bireuen	occupies	many	city	blocks	in	the	center	of	Bireuen.	On	one	side	of	the	market	there	are	multi-story	buildings	with	formalized	shops	spilling	into	the	streets	and	selling	household	goods,	ornamental	birds,	bulk	rice,	agricultural	supplies,	and	clothing	(Image	2).	These	buildings	give	way	to	single-story	structures	where	noodles	are	made,	spices	are	ground,	and	vegetables,	eggs,	and	other	goods	are	sold.	Two-lane	streets	turn	to	alleyways	where	different	kinds	of	sellers	are	interspersed.	The	ground	goes	from	concrete	to	dirt	and	back	again.	By	walking	down	these	smaller	lanes,	away	from	the	multi-story	buildings,	one	reaches	a	central	square	where	fish,	red	meat,	and	poultry	are	sold.	This	area	is	the	central	location	of	interest	for	research	in	Aceh.	Although	relatively	isolated,	the	poultry	slaughter	and	selling	area	is	surrounded	by	other	shops	and	restaurants,	and	people	shopping	and	working	elsewhere	in	the	market	may	come	and	go	through	the	section	of	the	market	where	poultry	are	located.	While	the	primary	pathway	of	human	exposure	is	contact	with	infected	poultry,	disease	exposure	may	also	occur	passively	in	contaminated	environments	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013).	Environmental	contamination	in	LBMs	in	Indonesia	and	elsewhere	can	be	extensive,	posing	a	potential	risk	for	human	and	animal	health	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).		
Where	do	birds	at	Pasar	Bireuen	come	from?	
Pasar	Bireuen	is	the	largest	market	in	the	district,	drawing	the	majority	of	traders	and	a	variety	of	birds	to	meet	demand.	Most	of	the	birds	slaughtered	and	sold	here	are	broiler	chickens	–	ayam	potong	-	brought	into	Bireuen	from	Medan	as	day-old	chicks	or	more	mature	birds	nearly	ready	for	slaughter.	The	movement	of	birds	between	Medan	and	Bireuen	is	constant	-	a	continual	line	of	trade	connecting	multiple	communities	in	Aceh	with	commercial	farms	in	North	Sumatra.	One	PWP	
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who	buys	these	commercial	poultry	to	finish	and	sell	at	Pasar	Bireuen	explains	that	he	receives	birds	from	Medan	twice	a	week:	“on	Tuesday	there	will	be	1200	chicks	and	600	chicks	come	on	Friday.”90	This	PWP	also	sells	birds	to	other	people	in	his	community,	and	to	contacts	in	neighbouring	districts,	and	he	sometimes	sends	birds	over	district	boundaries	by	public	transport.	When	asked	how	many	people	trade	commercial	poultry	in	a	similar	manner	in	the	area	another	PWP	states	bluntly:	“there	are	so	many.”91				Local	government	officials	confirm	that	birds	arrive	in	Bireuen	from	Medan	a	few	times	each	week.92	One	of	the	drivers	of	the	trucks	that	transport	birds	between	these	locations	confirms	he	makes	the	trip	twice	a	week,	each	time	bringing	around	1900	birds	to	one	particular	collector	yard.93	The	owner	of	one	of	these	yards	says	that	chickens	stay	at	the	farm	for	up	to	three	days,	but	all	end	up	being	sold	to	between	five	and	fifteen	local	traders.	He	explains	that	transporting	birds	into	Aceh	has	become	easier	since	the	end	of	the	conflict.94	He	now	buys	from	one	supplier	with	whom	he	has	worked	for	five	years,	and	hires	upwards	of	twelve	local	men	to	assist	in	unloading,	caging,	and	caring	for	these	birds.95	When	the	birds	arrive	they	are	offloaded	promptly	and	either	housed	in	large,	wooden	buildings	to	await	the	next	move,	or	immediately	re-caged	in	local	poultry	traders’	containers	(Image	3).	Although	the	actual	risk	of	disease	spread	in	these	activities	was	not	determined	in	the	current	study,	transporting	birds	between	farms	and	communities	and	markets	has	been	associated	with	disease	dissemination,	with	both	the	birds	and	poultry	traders’	equipment	identified	as	potential	vectors	(Fournié	et	al.	2013).		Poultry	traders	who	buy	ayam	potong	from	this	collector	yard	are	based	in	Bireuen	and	surrounding	districts	and	they	buy	anywhere	between	a	few	dozen	to	several	hundred	chickens	a	couple	of	times	a	week;	some	drive	motorbikes	with	a	side-cart	stacked	with	cages	(Image	4).	From	these	collector	yards,	chickens	are	taken	to	backyard	cages	on	farms	in	various	villages	until	they	are	30-35	days	old	–	a	timeframe	where	profits	still	outweigh	input	costs	like	feed.	At	that	time	most	are	brought	to	LBMs	to	be	slaughtered	and	sold.	The	profit	on	each	commercial	chicken	can	be	as	low	as	1000	IDR	and	PWP	who	care	for	these	birds	before	they	are	sold	monitor	the	potential	for	profits	carefully.96	Brought	back	to	farms,	these	chickens	may	be	caged	with	birds	from	other	stocks,	as	long	as	they	are	around	the	same	size.	At	one	farm	in	Aceh,	I	observed	small	wild	birds	inside	these	cages	drinking	from	watering	cans	used	for	the	chickens;	this	inter-species	interaction	has	the	potential	for	disease	transmission	(Prosser	et	al.	2013),	as	does	mixing	chickens	from	different	stocks	(Bouma	et	al.	2009).	The	actual	risk	for	disease	transmission	in																																																									90	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	October	2010.	91	Interview	in	Aceh,	10	February	2010.	92	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	93	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	94	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.		95	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	96	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	October	2010.	
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poultry	in	these	two	examples,	however,	hinges	on	a	range	of	temporal	and	biological	factors	not	accounted	for	in	this	study.			Image	2:	Ornamental	birds	and	pigeons	sold	at	Pasar	Bieruen,	Aceh	
		Image	3:	Sorting	and	caging	poultry	at	trading	yard	in	Aceh	
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	Hundreds	of	broilers	arrive	at	Pasar	Bireuen	each	day,	and	here	they	may	come	in	contact	with	people,	as	well	as	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	brought	to	the	market	by	mugees97,	poultry	traders	who	use	motorbikes	to	buy	these	birds	from	rural	communities	and	bring	them	to	central	urban	markets	(Image	4,	5,	and	6).	Outlined	in	Chapter	2,	ducks	infected	with	H5N1	are	often	asymptomatic	yet	can	shed	relatively	high	levels	of	virus	for	extended	periods	of	time.	Although	the	exact	mechanisms	of	transmission	are	not	always	known,	ducks	are	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry	and	people	in	Indonesia	and	elsewhere	(Henning	et	al.	2010;	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012;	J.	K.	Kim	et	al.	2009;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Loth	et	al.	2011),	and	the	presence	of	ducks	in	Indonesian	LBMs	has	been	associated	with	environmental	contamination	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	Whereas	ducks	and	village	chickens	are	brought	daily	by	mugees,	geese	are	more	commonly	available	during	holidays	such	as	Ramadan.		One	mugee	who	has	worked	for	over	twenty	years	says	that	there	are	around	fifteen	
mugees	who	sell	birds	at	Pasar	Bireuen.	This	older	mugee	collects	village	chickens	and	ducks	from	five	villages	in	Bireuen	each	afternoon,	taking	the	birds	he	buys	to	his	house	each	night,	and	then	to	Pasar	Bireuen	the	following	morning;	the	profit	on	each	bird	he	buys	is	roughly	2000	IDR.98	Others	drive	to	neighbouring	districts	and	beyond	to	buy	birds.99	All	mugees	confirm	that	they	keep	the	birds	they	buy	from	multiple	sources	in	cages	at	their	home.	Housing	different	species	and	stocks	of	birds	together	in	this	way	for	extended	periods	can	facilitate	disease	transmission	between	animals	(Paul	et	al.	2011),	and	increase	the	likelihood	of	environmental	contamination	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).		While	most	mugees	focus	on	selling	at	Pasar	Bireuen,	some	come	to	the	market	to	buy	birds	from	other	mugees,	to	then	sell	across	the	province,	and	in	districts	where	the	price	of	poultry	is	higher	than	in	Bireuen.100	Mugees	rely	on	personal	contacts,	connecting	with	them	by	mobile	phones	to	determine	the	value	of	birds	in	other	areas.	One	mugee	says	that	if	a	bigger	bird,	such	as	a	goose,	sells	for	140,000	IDR	in	Bireuen,	he	will	be	able	to	fetch	150,000	IDR	in	Meulaboh,	a	city	located	on	the	western	coast	of	Sumatra,	across	the	Gayo	mountain	range.101	Individuals	seeking	incremental	profits	connect	this	extensive	trade	network.	While	such	trade	has	been	associated	with	disseminating	H5N1	in	poultry	between	geographically	distant	
																																																								97	Mugee	is	an	Acehnese	term	reserved	strictly	for	people	who	buy	and	sell	products	that	they	collect	from	local	communities,	as	one	PWP	describes:	“There	are	so	many	mugee:	There	are	mugee	eungkot	(fish),	there	are	mugee	peutek	[papaya],	and	there	are	mugee	mamplam	[mango)].	There	are	so	many	kind	of	mugee”	(Interview	in	Aceh,	1	April	2012).	When	I	refer	to	mugee,	I	am	referring	to	those	who	buy	and	sell	birds.	As	discussed	below,	mugees	in	Aceh	are	a	rough	equivalent	of	agen	in	Banten	and	Lampung.		98	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	99	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	March	2012.	100	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.		101	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	
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locations	(Sims	2007),	assessing	the	relative	risks	for	transmission	in	this	sort	of	trade	in	Aceh	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.			Image	4:	A	poultry	trader	travels	by	motorbike	to	pick	up	chickens	in	Aceh	
			Image	5:	A	mugee	arrives	at	the	market	with	a	few	birds	to	sell	in	Aceh	
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Image	6:	A	mugee	in	Aceh	leaves	the	market	at	the	end	of	the	day	
				Image	7:	A	village	chicken	tied	to	the	top	of	a	cage	with	different	bird	species	housed	below	
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Mugees	congregate	in	Pasar	Bireuen	close	to	where	birds	are	slaughtered	and	defeathered,	on	a	main	customer	thoroughfare	for	the	wider	market.	Most	wait	with	their	birds,	engaging	potential	customers.	While	some	customers	take	the	birds	that	they	buy	from	mugees	home	alive,	most	pay	to	have	them	slaughtered	at	the	market.	One	or	two	birds	are	often	tied	to	the	tops	of	cages	as	an	advertisement	(Image	7);	some	mugees	hold	birds	in	their	hands,	or	place	them	on	the	ground.	These	birds	were	often	observed	excreting	faeces,	a	physiological	process	with	the	potential	to	amplify	environmental	contamination	in	LBMs	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013).		
The	slaughter	and	sale	of	poultry	at	Pasar	Bireuen	In	the	course	of	the	fieldwork	in	Bireuen,	Pasar	Bireuen	underwent	restructuring.	During	the	first	round	of	fieldwork	in	Pasar	Bireuen	in	February	2010	the	poultry	slaughtering	area	abutted	fish	sellers	on	one	side,	and	red-meat	sellers	on	the	other	side;	the	PWP	who	sell	birds	and	their	by-products	–	as	distinct	from	the	slaughterers	-	were	separated	from	the	slaughter	area	by	the	fish	sellers.	The	slaughtering	area	occupied	roughly	one-third	of	the	rectangular	footprint,	and	the	market’s	water	source	was	a	well	located	in	this	area.	Throughout	each	day,	multiple	individuals,	both	those	working	with	poultry	and	other	market	workers,	drew	water	from	this	well,	and	in	this	process,	walked	through	piles	of	feathers,	faeces,	and	pools	of	blood.	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	feathers	(Yamamoto	et	al.	2008)	and	other	bird	by-products	(Nazir	et	al.	2011),	and	water	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007)	for	extended	periods,	and	thus	the	shared	water	source	located	in	the	centre	of	the	slaughtering	area	may	have	posed	a	risk	for	wider	disease	dissemination.		When	Sammy	and	I	returned	to	Pasar	Bireuen	for	the	second	round	of	fieldwork	in	October	2010	this	slaughtering	and	selling	area	had	been	closed,	and	an	elevated	rectangular	area	was	being	built	to	house	the	fish	sellers.	During	this	construction,	chicken	sellers	had	relocated	to	the	thoroughfare	next	to	the	old	building.	Here,	they	sold	in	a	row,	covered	under	blue	tarpaulins	and	atop	compacted	dirt	ground	that	turned	to	mud	when	it	rained	(Image	8);	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	mud	and	soil	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Sorn,	et	al.	2012;	Horm	et	al.	2013;	Nazir	et	al.	2011).	All	poultry-slaughtering	activities	had	moved	to	the	opposite	side	of	the	new	building	for	fish	sellers,	between	15	and	20	yards	away	from	the	PWP	who	sold	the	slaughtered	birds.	There	were	then	two	distinct	shop-fronts	where	birds	are	slaughtered	at	
Pasar	Bireuen.	This	is	where	the	slaughterers	and	fish	sellers	remained.	The	public	well	was	covered	and	the	market’s	water	source	had	been	situated	between	the	two	slaughtering	areas,	in	the	form	of	a	publically	accessible	open-air	tank	that	market	workers	and	customers	used	jointly.	Indeed,	I	frequently	observed	PWP	collecting	water	by	dipping	buckets	that	they	used	during	slaughter	into	this	public	water	source,	and	also	often	saw	customers	rinse	their	hands	in	this	tank.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2	and	above,	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	water	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007),	yet	whether	or	not	the	conditions	allowed	for	contamination	in	this	public	water	source	in	Aceh	is	not	known.		After	the	fish	sellers’	building	was	completed,	a	comparable	building	was	built	for	the	chicken	sellers	on	the	footprint	of	the	first	market	described.	This	new	structure	
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includes	space	for	vegetable	sellers,	who	occupy	roughly	one-quarter	of	this	new	structure,	and	red-meat	sellers,	who	occupy	about	one-eighth	of	the	space.	The	majority	of	this	new	building	is	taken	up	by	poultry	sellers	(Image	9).	Slaughtering	activities	remain	on	the	far	side	of	the	fish	market,	thus	ensuring	a	steady	flow	of	processed	poultry	from	the	slaughter	area	to	the	sellers	(Image	10).	The	diffuse	nature	of	this	workflow	may	facilitate	wider	environmental	contamination,	as	slaughtered,	prepared	birds	are	routinely	carried	across	a	main	thoroughfare	to	seller’s	tables.	Moreover,	the	workflow	in	the	slaughtering	and	selling	area	in	Aceh,	as	here	described,	is	unique.	The	majority	of	PWP	in	the	other	two	fieldsites	slaughter	and	defeather	the	birds	that	they	sell	in	roughly	the	same	location.	In	Aceh,	however,	there	are	areas	dedicated	to	slaughtering	and	cleaning	poultry;	slaughterers	here	receive	live	birds	and	send	prepared,	defeathered	carcasses	to	people	who	strictly	sell	birds	and	by-products	to	customers	in	a	different	area	of	the	market.	At	the	risk	of	oversimplifying	the	dynamism	and	complexity	of	poultry	marketing	in	Pasar	Bireuen,	it	is	worth	illustrating	the	slaughter	and	sale	process	in	a	linear	fashion.		Image	8:	A	PWP	in	Aceh	sells	in	the	temporary	market	during	reconstruction	
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		Image	9:	A	PWP	in	the	new	market,	located	close	to	vegetable	sellers	
			Each	morning	PWP	with	broiler	chickens	and	mugees	with	some	variety	of	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	arrive	at	Pasar	Bireuen	around	sunrise.	While	mugees	keep	their	birds	live,	those	who	sell	commercial	chickens	unload	most	of	their	animals	with	slaughterers	who	are	in	turn	paid	around	700	IDR	for	each	commercial	bird,	and	up	to	3000	IDR	per	village	chicken,	duck,	or	goose	that	they	kill	and	defeather.102	Village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	are	killed	on-demand.	Between	seven	and	ten	slaughterers	work	in	the	market,	each	earning	around	45,000	and	50,000	IDR	per	day	after	expenses.	These	slaughterers	kill	birds	in	batches	in	the	morning	and	then	on-demand	thereafter.	Hundreds	of	animals	are	killed	most	mornings,	and	even	more	during	religious	holidays.	All	birds	are	killed	in	a	halal	manner.	After	their	throats	are	slit,	the	birds	are	thrown	into	oil	drums	to	bleed-out	(Image	11).	From	here	they	are	taken	by	hand	and	placed	in	pots	of	boiling	water	to	loosen	their	feathers	(Image	12).	Thereafter	these	birds	are	placed	in	mechanical	metal	drums	with	pieces	of	rubber	hose	attached	to	the	inner	sidewalls	(Image	13).	Turned	on,	this	petrol-powered	machine	quickly	spins	the	birds,	so	that	they	bang	against	the	inner	walls	of	the	drum	in	a	process	that	removes	most	of	their	feathers.	During	this,	slaughterers	add	water	and	use	their	hands	to	facilitate	de-feathering;	this	can	result	in	water	and	effluent	spraying	outwards.	Although	there	are	a	few	of	these	machines	in	both	Serang	and	Lampung,	I	never	saw	them	in	use.	As	a	collective,	the	slaughterers	in	Aceh	who	use	these	machines	pay	5000	IDR	a	day	to	a	
																																																								102	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	
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third-party	owner	and	are	responsible	for	fuel	used,	as	well	as	cleaning	the	machines	at	the	end	of	each	day.			As	the	morning	progresses	feathers	and	other	by-products	of	the	slaughtering	process	spill	out	onto	the	public	thoroughfare.	At	the	end	of	each	day	these	by-products	are	piled	together	and	removed	by	market	cleaners.	Before	they	are	removed,	however,	most	days	a	young	man	searches	through	them	for	duck	and	geese	feathers	that	he	resells	to	people	in	Java;	this	behaviour	has	the	potential	for	disease	exposure,	as	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	bird	feathers	for	days	(Yamamoto	et	al.	2008),	as	well	as	the	potential	for	disease	spread	during	the	shipment	of	feathers	to	Java.		Image	10:	A	slaughterer	carries	carcasses	to	selling	tables	in	Aceh	
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Image	11:	A	PWP	waits	for	a	bird	to	die	before	defeathering	
		Image	12:	Chickens	quickly	boiled	to	loosen	their	feathers	
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Image	13:	Defeathering	chickens	in	Aceh	
		Image	14:	Slaughtered	birds	ready	to	be	sold,	carried	by	wheelbarrow	
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Image	15:	Customers	looking	at	chickens	for	sale	in	Aceh	
		When	birds	are	slaughtered	and	cleaned,	their	carcasses	-	innards	intact	-	are	returned	by	hand,	bucket,	or	wheelbarrow,	to	the	PWP	who	brought	these	birds	to	the	market,	or	their	affiliates	who	are	responsible	for	selling	to	customers	(Image	14).	If	an	infected	bird	has	been	slaughtered,	this	process	has	the	potential	to	facilitate	environmental	contamination.	Most	PWP	who	bring	broiler	chickens	to	the	market	work	in	a	partnership	with	another	individual	who	then	sells	the	meat	and	by-products	to	customers;	there	are	multiple	groups	of	siblings	working	together	in	Aceh,	and	while	these	individuals	and	groups	may	rely	on	slaughterers	to	prepare	their	birds,	they	work	largely	independently	to	market	their	birds	and	are	responsible	for	paying	daily	market	taxes	for	cleaning	and	water,	which	can	equate	to	nearly	5000	IDR,	and	for	any	birds	that	do	not	sell.			These	sellers	present	birds	to	customers	in	a	row,	on	tiled	countertops	(Image	15).	There	are	approximately	twenty	different	stations	where	sellers	market	prepared	birds	in	Pasar	Bireuen,	and	nearly	all	of	them	sell	ayam	potong.	Those	who	sell	ayam	
merah	–	layer	chickens	–	commonly	char	the	skin	of	these	red-feathered	birds	because,	as	one	customer	explains,	they	have	smaller	feathers	than	ayam	potong	that	can	only	be	fully	removed	with	a	light	burning103;	PWP	in	Lampung	and	Serang	do	not	char	ayam	merah	like	this.	Under	each	seller’s	table	there	is	an	area	where	PWP	store	equipment	like	cutting	boards,	knives,	and	aprons.	In	LBMs	in	other	parts	of	Indonesia,	H5N1	viruses	have	been	isolated	from	the	equipment	used	to	prepare																																																									103	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	March	2012.	
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and	market	poultry,	suggesting	that	H5N1	can	persist	on	this	kind	of	equipment	and	potentially	pose	a	risk	for	poultry	and	people	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).			At	the	end	of	each	day	unsold	birds	are	often	put	on	ice	and	stored	in	locked	chests	and	left	at	the	market	overnight,	to	be	presented	for	sale	again	the	following	morning.	If	an	infected	bird	is	stored	in	this	way,	this	practice	may	lead	to	further	environmental	contamination,	as	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	the	meat	of	slaughtered	birds	(Mase	et	al.	2005;	Nazir	et	al.	2011).	These	sellers	use	water	throughout	the	day	to	keep	a	veneer	of	moisture	on	birds,	and	to	rinse	clear	their	workspace.	Puddles	emerge	and	can	linger	for	days,	posing	a	potential	threat	if	virus	is	present,	as	H5N1	can	persist	for	extended	periods	in	water,	depending	on	temperature	and	salinity	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007).	The	market	begins	to	empty	around	mid-day,	and	soon	thereafter	market	cleaners	begin	to	clean	the	area	where	poultry	are	slaughtered	and	sold.			Taken	together	with	the	discussion	in	Chapter	2,	this	rough	description	provides	a	more	complete	picture	of	the	fieldsite	in	Aceh,	and	illustrates	that	in	the	daily	routine	in	Pasar	Bireuen,	there	may	be	myriad	opportunities	for	disease	exposure	and	environmental	contamination	should	infected	birds,	or	traders	with	contaminated	equipment,	enter	this	marketing	system.	The	next	section	focuses	on	the	research	context	in	Lampung.		
Pasar	Tugu,	Bandar	Lampung,	Lampung	Bandar	Lampung	in	the	provincial	capital	of	Lampung,	the	southernmost	province	in	Sumatra,	and	the	city	where	Pasar	Tugu	is	located	(Map	3).	The	population	of	Bandar	Lampung	is	roughly	880,000	(Badan	Pusat	Statistik	2010).	Close	to	western	Java,	Lampung	has	long	received	Javanese	migrants,	many	of	whom	were	relocated	from	Java	during	Suharto’s	transmigrasi	programme,	a	central	government	initiative	that	sought	to	disperse	Java’s	growing	populations	across	Sumatra	and	other	Indonesian	islands	(Hardjono	1988).	Lampung	is	also	the	point	of	entry	for	goods	from	Java,	and	the	point	of	departure	for	goods	from	across	Sumatra	that	are	sent	to	Java	-	a	busy	trade	route	on	which	many	poultry	travel	between	the	two	islands.	The	Trans	Sumatran	Highway	starts	on	the	southern	tip	of	Lampung	and	heads	north,	through	Bandar	Lampung	as	far	north	as	Banda	Aceh.	As	discussed	above,	this	kind	of	road	way	has	been	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry	in	Indonesia	and	elsewhere	(Loth	et	al.	2011;	Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012)		
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Map	3:	Bandar	Lampung,	Lampung	
	Data	courtesy	of	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey		Lampung	has	experienced	sporadic	outbreaks	of	H5N1	in	poultry	and	in	humans.	While	Lampung	has	had	minor	success	in	controlling	the	spread	of	the	virus	because	the	governor	actively	engaged	with	policies	and	lent	his	weight	to	their	enforcement	(Forster	2009),	it	is	ultimately	very	difficult	to	control	the	movement	of	birds	here,	as	the	province	is	a	transit	point	for	birds	going	north	in	Sumatra,	and	east	to	Java.	This	trade	has	the	potential	to	facilitate	viral	reintroduction	in	poultry.	As	one	government	official	charged	with	avian	influenza	control	in	Lampung	explains	rhetorically:	“Bandar	Lampung	is	still	at	risk	of	bird	flu.	Why	do	I	say	so?	Because	Bandar	Lampung	is	the	gateway	to	Sumatra,	it	becomes	the	filter,	the	area	that	is	closest	to	the	[avian	influenza-]	prone	area	[in	Java]	right?104		
Pasar	Tugu		The	main	building	at	Pasar	Tugu	is	set	back	around	20	yards	from	the	main	road	and	rises	four	stories	high.	Thoroughfares	run	down	either	side	of	this	building,	with	a	variety	of	sellers	established	on	both	sides	of	these	alleyways.	Those	not	covered	by	the	formalized	market	sell	under	tarpaulins.	The	centre	of	the	market	is	occupied	mostly	by	clothing	and	electronics	sellers.	Fresh-produce	sellers,	PWP,	dry-goods	dealers,	and	small	restaurants	are	setup	along	the	lanes	that	border	the	market.	Both	these	lanes	thin	towards	the	back	of	Pasar	Tugu,	and	lead	to	an	area	predominantly	occupied	by	fishmongers	and	red-meat	sellers.	While	some	of	the	larger	poultry	sellers	work	from	established	storefronts,	PWP	sell	carcasses	and	by-products	throughout	the	ground	floor,	interspersed	between	people	selling	clothes,	produce,	and	other	goods	(Image	16).	If	any	birds	are	infected,	or	PWP’s	equipment																																																									104	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	August	2012.	
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contaminated,	this	sort	of	intimacy	can	provide	an	opportunity	for	disease	exposure	and	environmental	contamination.	Unlike	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang	and	Pasar	Bireuen	in	Bireuen,	Pasar	Tugu	in	Bandar	Lampung	is	not	the	largest	LBM	in	the	city.	The	market	is,	however,	consistently	busy	throughout	the	morning,	and	only	begins	to	slow	by	the	early	afternoon.	As	in	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang,	the	vast	majority	of	business	in	Pasar	Tugu	is	relegated	to	the	ground	floor	of	the	market,	despite	ample	space	in	the	upper	floors	of	the	main	building.			The	top	floor	of	the	market	is	occupied	by	a	colony	of	bats.	A	thin	layer	of	guano	and	rainwater	covers	much	of	the	ground.	The	ceiling	rises	to	roughly	30	feet	in	the	larger	rooms.	On	the	day	Sari	and	went	to	this	floor,	and	as	indicated	in	Image	17,	thousands	of	bats	flew	above	us	and	the	rooms	were	filled	with	smoke	emanating	from	oil	drums	burning	a	mixture	of	rubber	and	wood	–	fires	lit	by	the	local	government	in	an	attempt	to	persuade	the	bats	to	“relocate”.105	Bats	harbour	various	zoonotic	diseases	including,	rabies,	coronaviruses	like	SARS,	henipaviruses	like	Hendra	and	Nipah	(Calisher	et	al.	2006),	as	well	as	influenza	viruses	(Tong	et	al.	2012).	Although	there	is	little	opportunity	for	poultry	and	people	to	come	in	direct	contact	with	bats	at	Pasar	Tugu,	environmental	contamination	can	be	particularly	high	where	bats	nest	and	feed	(Newman	et	al.	2011).	In	short	these	bats	may	pose	an	additional	risk	facilitating	environmental	contamination	at	Pasar	Tugu.	
Where	do	birds	and	their	by-products	at	Pasar	Tugu	come	from?	As	in	the	other	two	sites,	the	majority	of	birds	at	Pasar	Tugu	are	commercial	broiler	chickens	–	ayam	potong.	There	is	only	one	PWP	who	permanently	sells	slaughtered	and	live	ayam	kampung,	and	a	few	others	who	occasionally	sell	live	village	chickens;	ducks	and	geese	were	not	observed	in	Pasar	Tugu.	With	few	ducks	entering	the	market	the	potential	for	disease	introduction	and	environmental	contamination	is	likely	far	lower	in	Pasar	Tugu	than	in	the	other	two	sites	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	The	
ayam	potong	sold	in	the	market	are	bought	from	commercial	poultry	companies	collector	yards	located	around	Bandar	Lampung.	One	large	commercial	poultry	producer	occupies	a	property	not	far	from	Pasar	Tugu,	and	this	collection	yard	provides	the	majority	of	the	birds	sold	in	the	market,	although	there	are	some	other,	smaller	suppliers.106	Everyday	up	to	a	few	thousand	ayam	potong	are	sent	to	this	particular	collector	yard	from	one	of	52	“ranches”	contracted	to	raise	the	birds,	the	closest	of	which	is	approximately	45	minutes	drive	away.	If	this	company	lacks	sufficient	supply	they	import	birds	from	Java,	or	from	Palembang,	farther	north	in	Sumatra.107				When	birds	arrive	at	this	collection	yard	they	are	promptly	offloaded	from	the	truck	and	placed	on	the	ground	to	be	sorted	(Image	18).	Sometimes	birds	die	during	transport;	these	dead	birds	are	placed	to	one	side	and	discarded	(Image	19),	while	live	birds	are	briefly	examined	and	shuffled	between	cages	(Image	20),	or	housed	in																																																									105	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	106	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	107	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	
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one	of	two	larger	holding	pens.	Faeces	that	build	up	under	the	orange-colour	crates	are	washed	away	with	water,	an	action	that	has	the	opportunity	to	lead	to	environmental	contamination,	as	H5N1	can	persist	in	both	faeces	and	water	for	extended	periods	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013;	J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007).	From	around	midday	onwards	PWP	arrive	to	buy	chickens.	PWP	select	the	birds,	which	are	promptly	weighed	and	paid	for;	there	is	no	credit,	and	one	kilogram	costs	between	21,500-22,500	IDR,	depending	on	supply	and	the	time	of	year.108	Many	PWP	travel	by	motorbike	without	cages,	binding	birds	by	their	feet	to	attach	them	to	their	motorbikes	(Image	21).	This	sort	of	trade	–	small-scale	traders	moving	birds	between	urban	and	rural	communities,	and	farms	and	markets	-	has	been	associated	with	H5N1	maintenance	and	dissemination	in	poultry	(Fournié	et	al.	2013),	and	may	connect	pathways	for	disease	transmission	in	Lampung;	establishing	the	actual	risk	for	transmission	in	poultry	and	people	posed	by	this	kind	of	trade	in	each	site,	however,	was	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	study.		Image	16:	A	PWP	sells	poultry	across	from	a	clothing	seller	in	Lampung	
																																																															108	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	
	 136	
Image	17:	Bats	fly	in	the	top	story	of	Pasar	Tugu,	in	Lampung	
		Image	18:	Commercial	chickens	arrive	at	a	trading	yard	to	be	sorted	
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Image	19:	Birds	that	die	during	transit	are	set	aside	
		Image	20:	Chickens	sorted	at	a	poultry	yard	in	Lampung	to	be	resold	
							
	 138	
Image	21:	A	PWP	ties	chickens	he	bought	from	a	poultry	yard	to	his	motorbike	
			Not	all	birds	from	this	collection	yard	go	to	LBMs.	For	example,	a	retired	policeman	from	Java	who	buys	10-50	chickens	a	week	takes	them	to	his	village	outside	of	Bandar	Lampung	to	resell	to	local	restaurants.109	Moreover,	not	all	PWP	who	buy	birds	from	this	receiving	bay	hand-select	the	birds.	Many	of	the	smaller	sellers	at	
Pasar	Tugu	obtain	chickens	from	an	intermediary	agent,	or	“broker”,	who	buys	birds	and	then	passes	them	to	those	who	cannot	afford	the	initial	financial	outlay;	this	system	was	unique	to	Lampung.	As	an	incentive	to	the	broker	a	marginal	increase	is	attached	to	the	price	of	each	bird.	PWP	buy	birds	through	this	route	because	it	offers	them	an	opportunity	to	sell	birds	without	having	the	necessary	funds	to	purchase	them	live.	When	asked	about	his	business,	Pak	Mustafa	–	the	most	prominent	broker	in	Pasar	Tugu	-	replies	that	the	commercial	companies	“implement	a	cash	and	carry	system”,	where	chickens	must	be	paid	for	up	front,	“so	I	buy	those	chickens	and	then	they	[PWP	in	the	market]	pay	me	according	to	how	many	chickens	they	sell.”110	Two	older	female	PWP	explained	their	relationship	with	Pak	Mustafa:			 Sari:	So,	are	there	a	lot	of	brokers	like	Pak	Mustafa	in	this	market?	
	
	 Ibu	Lena:	No,	but	there	are	some	others.	But	most	[sellers	who	borrow		 money]	take	the	chickens	from	Pak	Mustafa	because	he’s	kind,	he’s		 pleasant...	yesterday	I	lacked	30,000	IDR	for	payment	[and	he	said]	‘it	can																																																									109	Interview	in	Lampung,	28	July	2012.	110	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	
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	 be	paid	tomorrow,	no	problem’.	[And	then]	that	time	I	lacked	12,000	IDR		 he	let	it	go,	he	said	‘keep	it	for	the	children’s	pocket	money’.			 Ibu	Ning:	Yesterday	I	should	have	paid	350,000	IDR	but	I	gave	Pak		 Mustafa	300,000	IDR	[and	he	said]	I	can	give	50,000	IDR	later.			 Ibu	Lena:	...Thankfully	there	is	Pak	Mustafa.	Here	[in	Pasar	Tugu]	almost		 80	percent	of	small	chicken	sellers	take	chickens	from	Pak	Mustafa.111		Over	the	course	of	research	in	Lampung	I	only	heard	of	one	negative	experience	between	a	PWP	and	a	broker.112	Essentially,	this	system	illustrates	that	not	all	PWP	in	Lampung	have	the	financial	capital	to	purchase	poultry	up-front,	with	most	relying	on	intermediary	brokers	to	facilitate	the	purchase	of	poultry,	and	the	sale	of	birds	to	repay	loans.	Additionally,	it	illustrates	that	the	majority	of	PWP	in	Pasar	
Tugu,	although	reliant	on	external	financial	assistance,	work	independently	to	sell	their	birds.	Unfortunately,	I	did	not	ask	Pak	Mustafa	how	much	profit	he	makes	on	each	bird,	as	I	considered	it	inappropriate	to	enquire	in	the	presence	of	sellers.	The	larger	sellers	in	Pasar	Tugu	buy	birds	that	are	close	in	age	to	be	slaughtered	directly	from	commercial	poultry	companies;	only	one	seller	in	this	market	raises	day-old	chicks	until	they	are	ready	for	slaughter.		There	is	one	seller	who	sells	ayam	kampung	every	day	in	Pasar	Tugu,	an	older	woman	who	brings	both	a	few	carcasses	and	live	village	chickens	to	the	market.	She	sources	the	birds	she	sells	from	an	agen	who	brings	birds	to	her	house	that	he	collects	from	villages	surrounding	Bandar	Lampung.113	There	are	other	sellers	who	bring	live	ayam	kampung	to	the	market,	but	they	do	not	sell	at	Pasar	Tugu	everyday.114	There	is	an	increase	in	PWP	selling	ayam	kampung	during	Ramadan,	when	the	demand	and	cost	for	these	birds	rises.	Throughout	three	rounds	of	fieldwork	I	did	not	see	any	ducks	or	geese	in	Pasar	Tugu;	these	birds	are,	however,	in	other	LBMs	in	Bandar	Lampung,	and	thus	these	markets	may	have	a	higher	likelihood	of	contamination	with	H5N1	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013;	J.	K.	Kim	et	al.	2009).	The	vast	majority	of	poultry	sold	in	Pasar	Tugu	are	ayam	potong	that	are	slaughtered	outside	of	the	market.	
The	slaughter	and	sale	of	poultry	at	Pasar	Tugu	Slaughtering	birds	that	are	infected	can	lead	to	environmental	contamination,	and	such	practices	have	been	associated	with	disease	presence	in	LBMs	in	Indonesia	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	Only	a	minority	of	PWP	slaughter	birds	in	Pasar	Tugu.	Those	that	slaughter	on	site	are	established	in	permanent	storefronts	that	they	rent	or	own	(Image	22).	One	PWP	explained	that	he	continued	to	slaughter	at	the	market	even	though	officials	from	Dinas	Peternekan	–	the	local	animal	health	department	–																																																									111	Interview	in	Lampung,	28	August	2012.	112	Interview	in	Lampung,	10	April	2012.	113	Interview	in	Lampung,	26	July	2012.	114	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	
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instituted	a	ban	on	slaughtering	in	Pasar	Tugu	in	2010.115	Throughout	fieldwork	I	did	not	observe	officials	enforcing	this	ban,	and	no	other	PWP	confirmed	that	slaughtering	was	not	allowed	on-site,	or	that	animal	health	officials	had	implemented	such	a	ban.	Indeed,	throughout	fieldwork	I	did	not	observe	any	public	veterinary	or	public	health	officials	interacting	with	PWP	in	Lampung.	The	only	government	workers	I	observed	in	the	market	were	those	collecting	daily	taxes.		The	majority	of	PWP	in	Pasar	Tugu	slaughter	the	birds	they	sell	at	their	house	each	morning,	and	many	with	the	help	of	their	family.116	These	PWP	carry	the	birds	they	sell	with	them	to	the	market	each	morning	in	buckets	or	bags.	Some	rent	out	more	established	space	with	a	small	wooden	table;	others	move	daily	and	fit	where	possible	between	other	sellers	to	market	their	birds	(Image	23).	The	space	to	market	poultry	in	Pasar	Tugu	is	further	squeezed	during	Ramadan.	The	demand	for	all	poultry	increases	during	Islamic	holidays,	with	a	concomitant	rise	in	both	the	cost	of	birds,	and	in	the	number	of	seasonal	PWP	who	market	poultry.	The	cost	of	other	key	commodities,	like	garlic,	onions,	and	chillies,	also	increases	around	Ramadan	(Osman	2013).	While	more	PWP	vie	for	customers,	permanent	sellers	in	all	three	fieldsites	report	that	they	sell	more	birds	and	make	more	money	over	Islamic	holidays:	they	sell	more	birds	because	more	people	buy	them,	and	make	more	money,	in	a	relative	sense,	because	they	are	able	to	charge	more	for	poultry	during	this	time.	A	representative	from	a	commercial	poultry	company	says	that	during	Ramadan	2012	the	price	of	their	birds	rose	from	21,500	IDR	to	22,500	IDR,	an	increase	attributed	to	shortages	of			Image	22:	A	PWP	prepares	chickens	to	sell	in	Lampung	
																																																									115	Interview	in	Lampung,	10	April	2012.	116	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	
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Image	23:	A	PWP	sells	chickens	in	the	middle	of	the	market	in	Lampung	
		Image	24:	Birds	kept	at	the	market	in	Lampung	
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Image	25:	Birds	kept	at	the	market	in	Lampung	
		stock.117	On	top	of	any	increase	that	commercial	producers	charge,	PWP	add	more.	One	respondent	in	Pasar	Tugu	confirms	that	during	Ramadan	the	cost	of	poultry	cn	rise	up	to	20	percent.118;	the	day	after	Ramadan	the	price	of	poultry	is	said	to	drop	across	each	LBM	studied.	Other	commodities	fluctuate	in	a	similar	manner.	Such	price	fluctuations	are	not	necessarily	due	to	a	shortage	of	stock,	however,	but	can	reflect	opportunism	among	sellers	(Osman	2013).		While	some	of	the	larger	sellers	in	Pasar	Tugu	slaughter	on-site,	and	have	storage	space	for	equipment,	live	birds,	and	unsold	carcasses	and	by-products	(Image	24	and	25),	the	majority	of	PWP	here	take	equipment	and	unsold	poultry	home	each	day.	These	birds	and	by-products	are	brought	back	the	following	morning	and	sold	at	a	lower	price.	If	H5N1	persists	in	some	parts	of	the	market,	or	at	the	house	of	a	PWP,	this	daily	transportation	–	between	home	and	market	-	may	act	as	a	mechanism	for	disease	transmission	and	exposure	to	the	wider	public,	as	many	PWP	rely	on	public	transit.	Although	not	the	largest	market	in	Bandar	Lampung,	hundreds,	if	not	thousands	of	chickens	enter	and	leave	Pasar	Tugu	each	day,	and	in	this	way,	this	LBM	is	comparable	to	those	in	both	Aceh	and	Banten,	the	latter	of	which	is	discussed	next.	
Pasar	Rau,	Serang,	Banten	Serang	is	the	capital	city	of	Banten,	the	westernmost	province	on	the	island	of	Java,	located	roughly	50	miles	from	the	national	capital	Jakarta	(Map	4).	The	population																																																									117	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	118	Interview	in	Lampung,	26	July	2012.	
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of	Serang	is	just	above	575,000	(Badan	Pusat	Statistik	2010).	As	Jakarta	grows	outwards,	increasingly	encroaching	westward	into	Banten,	populations	in	cities	like	Serang	become	further	incorporated	into	the	Ibu	Kota,	or	Mother	City.	This	amalgamation	will	continue	should	the	proposed	Sunda	Strait	Bridge	connecting	Sumatra	and	Java	move	forward.			Java	is	the	centre	of	poultry	production	in	Indonesia	(USAID	2013),	and	the	majority	of	outbreaks	of	H5N1	in	poultry	and	disease	events	in	people	are	reported	from	the	island.	Banten	has	recorded	the	second	highest	number	of	infections	in	humans	after	the	neighbouring	province	of	West	Java.	Here,	disease	events	in	people	have	been	significantly	associated	with	outbreaks	in	poultry	(Yupiana	et	al.	2010).	Most	human	infections	in	Banten	have	been	near	Tangerang,	a	commercial	distribution	centre	of	the	Javanese	poultry	industry	located	on	the	west	side	of	Jakarta.	There	have	also	been	repeated	outbreaks	in	poultry	across	districts	in	Banten	from	2003,	with	sellers	reporting	disease	events	in	poultry	through	to	August	2012,	when	this	research	concluded.	In	short,	Banten	is	relatively	the	worst	affected	of	the	three	field	sites,	with	more	cases	of	H5N1	reported	in	poultry	and	in	people.		Map	4:	Serang,	Banten	
	Data	courtesy	of	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey		
Pasar	Rau	
Pasar	Rau	is	the	commercial	centre	of	Serang	and	open,	in	some	capacity,	every	hour	of	every	day.	The	streets	surrounding	the	central	market	bustle	with	traders	and	vehicles.	Angkots	–	mini-buses	–	crawl	through	pedestrian	traffic	and	becaks	–	pedal-driven	rickshaws	–	stand	idle	on	the	side	of	the	road	as	drivers	vie	for	passengers.	A	mass	of	fresh	produce	for	sale	narrows	the	road	leading	to	the	market	to	a	single	
	 144	
lane,	and	small-scale	produce	sellers,	mostly	women,	sit	closest	to	the	road,	exposed	to	the	elements.	The	position	of	these	sellers	is	not	guaranteed	–	each	day	they	set-up	wherever	space	is	available.	Behind	these	sellers	runs	a	row	of	more	established	produce	stalls,	most	covered	by	blue	or	orange	tarpaulins	held	down	by	ties	to	bricks	or	incorporated	into	the	wooden	structures.	Walking	towards	the	back	of	
Pasar	Rau,	the	stands	of	produce	become	interspersed	with	dry-goods	sellers	and	small	restaurants.	Continuing	in	this	direction,	the	first	indications	of	live	poultry	become	apparent	in	the	presence	of	rectangular	metal	cages.	Towards	the	south-east	corner	of	the	market,	poultry	sellers	begin	to	outnumber	produce	vendors.	This	is	the	area	where	the	majority	of	fieldwork	in	Serang	took	place.		“There	are	so	many”,	responded	one	government	official	asked	about	the	number	of	people	who	buy	and	sell	poultry	in	Serang.119	Pasar	Rau	is	the	largest	market	in	Serang,	attracting	the	majority	of	traders	and	customers.	Drawing	in	the	majority	of	traders,	and	thus	live	birds,	Pasar	Rau	may	be	at	an	increased	risk	for	repeated	reintroduction	of	virus,	either	through	infected	birds	or	a	trader’s	equipment.	Although	hinging	on	a	range	of	factors,	such	repeated	contamination	can	lead	markets	to	act	as	viral	reservoirs	(Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Fournié	et	al.	2012),	and,	as	traders	frequently	move	between	different	farms,	villages,	and	markets,	potentially	a	source	for	infection	across	the	wider	poultry	sector.	
Where	do	birds	at	Pasar	Rau	come	from?	Of	the	three	markets,	Pasar	Rau	hosts	the	largest	number	of	birds	and	PWP.	The	majority	of	PWP	sell	broiler	chickens.	There	are	also	PWP	who	specialize	in	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese;	fighting	cocks	are	also	occasionally	for	sale	at	the	market.	Taken	together,	there	are	hundreds,	and	sometimes	thousands,	of	birds	brought	daily	to	Pasar	Rau.	Indonesian	markets	with	a	mix	of	bird	species	–	and	especially	ducks	-	are	associated	with	greater	environmental	contamination	than	markets	selling	fewer	species	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).		While	broiler	chickens	are	bred	and	sold	across	the	archipelago,	the	centre	of	this	industry	is	in	West	Java	(USAID	2013),	the	province	neighbouring	Banten.	Most	of	the	broilers	sold	at	Pasar	Rau	come	from	other	areas	in	Java.120	As	one	PWP	explains:			 ...The	central	production	[of	these	birds]	is	in	Tasikmalaya.	So,	from		 Tasikmalaya	birds	are	sent	to	Bogor,	and	then	to	Tangerang,	and	from		 Tangerang	the	chickens	will	be	spread	all	around	the	city	of	Serang.121		Commercial	poultry	production,	and	the	transportation	of	these	birds	across	Indonesia’s	road	networks,	are	associated	with	disease	events	in	animals	(Loth	et	al.	2011;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010).	When	broiler	chickens	arrive	in	Serang	these	birds	are	either	sent	to	PWP	who	raise	the	birds	until	they	are	ready	to	be	sold	to	consumers																																																									119	Interview	in	Banten,	19	March	2012.	120	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	121	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.		
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or,	if	the	birds	are	considered	adequately	sized	and	ready	for	sale,	delivered	directly	to	PWP	at	LBMs	(Image	26).	When	broiler	chickens	arrive	at	Pasar	Rau	they	often	come	in	orange-coloured	cages	on	the	back	of	trucks.	Many	PWP	have	on-site	storage	for	birds,	and	broilers	are	placed	into	bamboo	stalls	or	metal	enclosures.	Sometimes	broilers	are	placed	with	other	bird	stocks	and	species.	Faeces	often	remain	on	the	back	of	poultry	delivery	truck,	and	these	are	frequently	removed	with	water	prior	to	the	truck	leaving	the	market	after	delivering	the	birds	(Image	27).	These	kind	of	actions	can	contribute	to	environmental	contamination,	as	H5N1	can	persist	in	faeces	(Kurmi	et	al.	2013),	water	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007),	and	mud	and	dirt	(Nazir	et	al.	2011;	Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Sorn,	et	al.	2012)	for	days.			Birds	brought	to	Pasar	Rau	that	are	not	killed	immediately	may	remain	caged	alongside	birds	from	other	stocks	or	species	for	a	few	days.	Keeping	different	stocks	and	species	of	birds	on-site	in	LBMs	for	repeated	days	can	increase	the	potential	for	environmental	contamination	and	disease	transmission	in	poultry	should	a	susceptible	bird	be	stored	alongside	an	infected	bird	or	in	an	already	contaminated	environment	(Samaan	et	al.	2011;	Indriani	et	al.	2010;	Fournié	et	al.	2012).	Compared	with	the	other	two	sites,	the	caging	facilities	at	Pasar	Rau	are	relatively	unique,	in	that	the	majority	of	birds	are	kept	on-site	until	they	are	sold	or	slaughtered.		Image	26:	Delivering	broiler	chickens	to	Pasar	Rau,	in	Banten	
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Image	27:	Chicken	faeces	washed	from	the	back	of	the	truck	after	delivery	
		Village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	are	brought	to	Pasar	Rau	by	agen,	or	poultry	traders,	and	small-hold	farmers.	There	are	more	than	a	dozen	agen	who	work	independently	and	sell	in	Pasar	Rau,	all	of	whom	use	motorbikes	to	transport	poultry.	This	sort	of	trade	network	is	associated	with	disease	introduction	in	farms	and	markets	(Sims	2007;	M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2009;	Kung	et	al.	2007;	Magalhães,	Pfeiffer,	and	Otte	2010;	FAO	2011;	Roche	et	al.	2014;	Santhia	et	al.	2009).	When	asked	how	many	agen	he	buys	from,	one	seller	at	Pasar	Rau	responds	there	are	five	traders	who	bring	him	birds	daily.122	Agen	and	PWP	in	the	market	speak	daily	about	prices	and	availability	via	mobile	phones.	When	customer	demand	for	poultry	rises,	sellers	make	contact	with	agen	to	secure	more	stock.	While	agen	and	PWP	are	nominally	independent,	their	business	transactions	take	place	within	longstanding	relationships	built	on	trust	and	mutual	benefit.	Sellers	do	not	necessarily	pay	entirely	up	front	for	all	of	the	birds	they	take	from	agen,	as	one	seller	claims:	“...we	don’t	pay	right	away	when	they	deliver	the	birds	but	maybe	the	next	day	when	he’s	back	to	deliver	some	more.”123			Like	mugees	in	Aceh,	agen	buy	only	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese.	As	one	agen	explains:		
																																																								122	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.		123	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.		
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	 There’s	no	farm	for	ayam	kampung	[village	chickens]	I	just	go	looking	at		 houses	where	people	care	for	ayam	kampung.	I	take	one	if	they	have	any		 available.	Sometimes	I	don’t	get	any.124		Through	this	trade,	these	PWP	can	connect	physically	disparate	communities.	Agen	often	source	birds	in	districts	and	provinces	away	from	their	home	base	of	business,	and	while	most	of	the	birds	are	bought	in	rural	communities	and	sold	in	urban	LBMs,	these	markets	are	not	necessarily	the	end	point	for	these	birds.	Some	PWP	buy	village	chickens,	ducks,	geese,	and	fighting	cocks	in	Serang	to	sell	in	other	parts	of	Java	where	the	price	is	higher.	An	agen	states	how	cost	dictates	where	he	procures	poultry:			 ...the	price	is	definitely	cheaper	if	you	get	[birds]	right	from	the	village.		 But	you	have	to	count	the	cost	of	petrol	and	the	time	and	energy.	So,	I		 thought	it’s	easier	to	just	go	to	the	market.	Pick,	buy,	and	resell		[laughing].125			The	majority	of	agen	in	Pasar	Rau	buy	birds	at	Pasar	Kelodoran,	a	large,	urban	poultry-only	market	roughly	fifteen	kilometres	outside	Serang.	To	better	understand	the	source	of	birds	brought	to	Pasar	Rau,	my	assistant	Sari	and	I	undertook	repeated	visits	to	Pasar	Kelodoran.		Every	day	about	a	dozen	agen	connect	a	trade	network	between	sellers	and	small-hold	farmers	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	and	PWP	at	Pasar	Rau,	and	by	extension,	customers.	Pasar	Kelodoran,	as	one	seller	describes,	has	existed	“from	the	time	of	our	ancestors.	The	market	is	already	here	before	Banten	[the	province].	It’s	been	a	long	time.”126	The	market	occupies	much	of	both	sides	of	a	busy	two-lane	road	and	there	are	between	70	and	100	sellers	marketing	birds	here.	The	beaks	of	some	sellers’	birds,	which	are	bound	and	laid	flat	on	the	tarmac,	stretch	into	the	road	(Image	28).	Ayam	kampung	are	tied	together	and	ducks	sit	at	sellers’	feet	where,	on	display,	they	are	routinely	prodded	and	moved	(Image	29	and	30).	Small	pitch-black	“antique”	chickens,	with	dark	eyes	and	purple-black	legs	sell	for	200,000	IDR	each.	Pointing	at	one	dark	chicken	their	owner	says:	“it’s	all	black:	black	meat,	black	bones”,	and	then	goes	on	to	relay	that	customers	buy	the	dark	birds	to	drink	their	blood,	as	it	alleviates	asthma	and	other	(unstated)	illnesses.127	Consuming	uncooked	birds	and	their	by-products	in	this	way	may	be	a	risk	factor	for	human	H5N1	transmission	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011).	A	likely	higher	risk	for	disease	in	poultry,	and	by	extension	in	people,	is	the	high	number	of	ducks	that	are	marketed	at	Pasar	Kelodoran.	As	largely	silent	carriers	of	H5N1,	infected	ducks	can	shed	high	concentrations	of	virus	for	extended	periods	and	have	been	associated	with	disease	events	in	poultry	(Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012).	On	any	given	day,	there	are	hundreds	of	ducks	brought	to	this	rural	market																																																										124	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.	125	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	126	Interview	in	Banten,	30	July	2012.	127	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	
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Pasar	Kelodoran	is	also	a	central	hub	for	fighting	cocks	-	ayam	jago	or	ayam	Bangkok	
-	attracting	sellers	from	across	Banten	and	farther	afield.	Some	birds	are	said	to	come	from	as	far	away	as	Thailand,	although	most	are	from	across	Java.128	There	is	an	area	of	the	market	where	most	of	these	cocks	are	sold	and	here	Sari	and	I	watched	multiple,	simultaneous	bouts	in	which	men	pitted	their	birds	against	one	another	to	show-off	their	value,	set	up	future	matches,	and	sell	birds	(Image	31	and	32).	Here,	men	massaged	and	washed	their	birds	in	preparation	for	bouts,	and	some	plunged	their	birds’	throats	with	a	damp	feather	to	promote	breathing;	this	feather	was	shared	between	multiple	birds.	While	dependent	upon	a	range	of	factors,	H5N1	infected	chickens	in	Indonesia	may	shed	high	concentrations	of	virus	orally	(Wibawa	et	al.	2013),	and	thus	such	behaviours	have	the	potential	to	facilitate	disease	spread	between	birds,	and	potentially	expose	people.	Indeed,	a	high	density	of	fighting	cocks	has	been	associated	with	disease	events	in	birds	in	Thailand	(Tiensin	et	al.	2009),	and	some	fighting	cock	owners	in	Indonesia	have	been	the	focus	of	disease	control	initiatives	(Lowe	2010).129	In	the	current	study,	respondents	who	raise	and	fight	cocks	in	each	site	recalled	losing	birds	in	the	past,	however,	no	respondent	reported	these	disease	events,	and	nobody	claimed	involvement	in	official	disease	control	initiatives.				
Pasar	Kelodoran	is	a	receiving	bay	and	transition	point	for	myriad	birds.	When	a	bird	arrives	here	it	is	difficult	to	determine	where	it	hatched.	One	duck	and	goose	seller	describes	how	he	sources	birds	from	across	Banten	as	well	as	across	the	Sunda	Straight	in	Lampung	because	of	the	marginal	economic	gains	that	come	from	buying	birds	where	they	are	cheapest:	“the	price	is	more	competitive...	That’s	my	secret	[laughing],	buying	in	Lampung.”	When	asked	why	he	travels	by	motorbike,	he	states:			 I	prefer	going	by	motorbike	because	it’s	more	efficient.	By	car	the	process		 is	not	short;	we	must	fulfil	the	quota.	It	means	two	days	may	not	be		 enough	[to	fill	the	cars].	It	means	we	have	to	feed	the	geese	–	it’s	another		 cost.	Using	a		 motorbike	is	fast...	the	weight	cost	in	the	harbour	is	cheaper,		 we	only	pay	the	ticket.	With	a	car	there’s	a	‘weight-cost’,	not	to	mention		 gasoline	cost.130		This	same	seller	discussed	the	process	of	buying	geese	from	rural	communities	in	Banten:		
																																																								128	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	129	Cockfighting	is	a	male	pursuit	in	each	site.	PWP	who	engage	in	cockfighting	take	particularly	intimate	care	of	their	birds,	and	pride	in	showing	them	off	and	in	pitting	them	against	one	another,	even	if	only	in	practice.	Indeed,	cockfighting	in	Indonesia	is	“far	from	simply	cruel	and	brutal”.	The	tradition,	in	all	aspects,	“exhibits	an	intimate	relationship	between	men	and	their	birds”,	with	the	life	of	fighting	cocks	straddling	“luxury	and	brutality”	(Naysmith	2011).				130	Interview	in	Banten,	2	August	2012.	
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There	are	entok	sellers	in	every	RT	[rukun	tetangga	–	the	smallest	unit	of	community]...	I	usually	wait	at	the	markets	in	[different]	districts;	then	they	will	come	to	me.	Sometimes	it	can	be	done	by	phone.	‘Sir,	there’s	this	amount	of	geese.’	I	can	visit	their	house	to	get	geese.131		Many	sellers	confirm	that	“big”	buyers	come	from	the	Jakarta	area	–	“from	Subang	and	Cikampek”132	–	and	bring	multiple	vehicles	at	a	time	to	fill	with	poultry	before	returning	east.	“Customers	in	Pasar	Kelodoran	are	from	markets	in	Marunda,	Klender,	Jatinegara	–	they	all	buy	birds	from	here!”133,	one	PWP	explains.	These	three	latter	locations	are	neighborhoods	in	Jakarta;	Subang	and	Cikampek	are	cities	east	of	Jakarta,	in	West	Java.			While	some	PWP	raise	all	the	ducks	that	they	sell,	others	purchase	ducks	from	different	communities.	One	such	seller	with	35	years	experience	says	that	to	“maintain	the	ducks”	at	home,	is	too	expensive.	Rather	he	collects	ducks	“one	by	one”	from	different	villages,	and	then	travels	to	Pasar	Kelodoran	each	day	with	a	few	dozen	ducks	that	he	keeps	bound	in	rice-sacks	with	holes	cut	in	them	for	the	ducks’	heads.	As	we	spoke,	this	particular	seller	prepared	to	leave	the	market	by	mini-bus.	The	first	three	drivers	refused	the	seller,	saying	their	vehicles	were	too	full	to	carry	him	and	his	ducks.	Finally,	a	mini-bus	transporting	school-children	picked	him	up	(Image	35).	This	interaction	illustrates	the	diffuse	nature	of	the	poultry	trade	in	Indonesia,	and	in	turn	underscores	that	if	a	bird	is	infected	and	shedding	virus,	there	may	be	ample	opportunities	for	environmental	contamination	resulting	in	the	potential	for	poultry	and	human	exposure.		Along	with	agen,	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	are	brought	to	Pasar	Rau	by	individuals,	or	small	groups	of	men	attempting	to	sell	a	few	birds	from	multiple	stocks.	Some	of	these	PWP	are	frequently	at	the	market;	others	sell	birds	only	intermittently,	bringing	one	or	two	animals	at	a	time.	On	our	first	day	in	Pasar	Rau	in	May	2011	Sari	and	I	spoke	with	an	older	trader	who	had	four	ayam	kampung	bound	on	the	ground	at	his	feet	(Image	34);	we	spoke	with	him	each	time	we	visited	Serang.	He	began	selling	birds	at	Pasar	Rau	in	1980.	As	we	spoke	he	rubbed	his	birds’	throats	and	chests,	and	trailed	his	hand	down	their	backs,	closing	his	grip	on	their	tail	feathers	before	repeating	the	stroke.	He	has	only	ever	sold	ayam	kampung,	and	collects	birds	from	neighbours,	who	often	give	him	village	chickens	on	credit	that	he	repays	when	the	birds	sell:	“They	trust	me,”	he	states.	When	he	cannot	procure	birds	from	neighbours,	he	is	given	birds	from	other	sellers	-	“friends”	in	the	market	–	using	a	similar	credit	scheme.	While	he	usually	sells	around	10	to	15	birds	each	day,	when	we	spoke	this	first	time,	he	had	only	four	birds	because	he	did	not	have	“enough	money	to	increase	[his]	capital	to	raise	[his]	business.”134																																																											131	Interview	in	Banten,	2	August	2012.	132	Interview	in	Banten,	2	August	2012.	133	Interview	in	Banten,	2	August	2012.	134	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	
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Although	this	older	seller	relies	on	credit	and	the	goodwill	of	others,	the	majority	of	people	trading	and	selling	village	chickens,	in	and	around	Serang	work	independently.	Indeed,	“There	are	so	many”,	responded	one	government	official	asked	about	the	number	of	people	who	buy	and	sell	poultry	in	Serang.135	Such	extensive	and	intensive	trade	networks	have	been	associated	with	disease	spread	and	outbreaks	among	poultry	in	different	countries	(Fournié,	de	Glanville,	and	Pfeiffer	2012),	and	this	kind	of	trade	may	be	largely	responsible	for	disease	spread	and	maintenance	in	poultry	in	parts	of	Indonesia	(Santhia	et	al.	2009;	Loth	et	al.	2011;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010).			
Pasar	Rau	is	the	largest	market	in	Serang,	attracting	the	majority	of	traders	and	customers,	and	thus	live	birds.	While	the	majority	of	birds	sold	at	the	market	are	broiler	chickens,	there	are	a	variety	of	species	brought	daily	to	the	market.	These	birds	can	come	from	numerous	stocks	in	different	areas,	including	from	other	provinces	in	Java,	as	is	the	case	with	most	broiler	chickens,	communities	around	Banten,	and	from	further	afield,	including	a	boat	ride	away	in	Lampung.	By	the	time	these	birds	arrive	at	Pasar	Rau	they	may	have	come	in	contact	with	multiple	people	as	well	as	different	species	of	birds,	from	multiple	stocks,	for	varying	lengths	of	time.	As	the	central	market,	Pasar	Rau	may	be	at	an	increased	risk	for	repeated	reintroduction	of	virus,	either	through	infected	birds	or	traders’	equipment.	Indeed,	although	hinging	on	a	range	of	factors,	such	as	the	presence	of	ducks	and	other	species	(Indriani	et	al.	2010),	a	constant	flow	of	traders	and	birds	can	facilitate	markets	to	become	viral	reservoirs	(Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Fournié	et	al.	2012)	and,	as	traders	frequently	move	between	different	farms	and	markets,	markets	like	Pasar	
Rau	may	act	as	a	constant	source	for	infection	across	the	wider	poultry	sector.		Image	28:	Birds	presented	for	sale	at	Pasar	Kelodoran,	outside	Serang	
																																																									135	Interview	in	Banten,	19	March	2012.	
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	Image	29:	Ducks	for	sale	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	
		Image	30:	Customers	look	to	buy	ducks	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	
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Image	31:	Fighting	cocks	for	sale	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	
		Image	32:	Two	fighting	cocks	pitted	against	each	other	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	
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Image	33:	A	duck	seller	returns	home	with	unsold	ducks	via	public	transit	
		Image	34:	A	PWP	sells	a	few	village	chickens	at	Pasar	Rau	
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Image	35:	Birds	are	quickly	boiled	in	Pasar	Rau	
	
The	slaughter	and	sale	of	poultry	at	Pasar	Rau	While	there	is	a	separation	between	slaughterers	and	sellers	in	Aceh,	in	Serang	and	Lampung	the	vast	majority	of	PWP	who	sell	birds,	also	slaughter	them.	However,	unlike	Pasar	Tugu	in	Lampung,	where	most	birds	are	slaughtered	at	sellers’	houses	each	morning,	in	Pasar	Rau	birds	are	slaughtered	onsite	each	day.		Most	PWP	at	
Pasar	Rau	occupy	storefronts	that	were	made	after	“one	hundred	shops	were	burnt”136	in	a	fire	that	destroyed	the	market	in	2001.137	Most	poultry	sellers	at	Pasar	
Rau	built	these	structures	in	the	years	following	the	blaze	and	have	since	slaughtered	and	sold	birds	from	within	them.	In	each	area	where	birds	are	slaughtered	there	is	a	barrel	–	an	aluminium	pot	or	oil	drum	cut	in	half	–	of	water	on	a	slow	boil,	heated	by	either	wood	or	gas.	This	water	serves	to	loosen	the	feathers	of	slaughtered	poultry	killed	in	a	halal	manner;	limp	birds	are	stirred	in	this	water	for	about	30	seconds	before	they	are	pulled	out	and	hand-	plucked	(Image	35).	Water	is	continually	added	to	these	ever-depleting	boiling	pots,	and	at	the	end	of	the	day	what	remains	is	often	poured	onto	the	main	thoroughfare,	a	dirt	road,	resulting	in	pockets	of	mud	surrounding	poultry	slaughter	areas.	If	an	infected	bird	is	processed	in	this	way	wider	environmental	contamination	can	result,	as	H5N1	viruses	can	persist	in	water	and	mud	for	extended	periods	(J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007;	Nazir	et	al.	2011).																																																										136	Interview	in	Banten,	18	March	2012.	137	While	sellers	spoke	about	this	fire,	only	one	respondent	was	certain	what	year	it	had	occurred,	with	most	sellers	simply	responding	“sudah	lama”	–	roughly	translated	as,	‘already	a	long	time	ago’.	
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Cleaned	carcasses	rest	beside	live	birds	awaiting	slaughter.	A	bucket	of	tepid	water	is	used	to	rinse	these	birds	before	they	are	presented	for	sale.	Piles	of	red,	white,	brown,	and	black	feathers	accumulate	incrementally,	along	with	faeces	stripped	from	intestines,	and	brown	and	orange	nodule-ridden	duck	and	geese	bills.	Cages	are	located	close	to	where	birds	are	slaughtered	and	elevated	off	the	ground	to	allow	faeces	from	live	birds	to	pass	through.	These	cages	are	often	covered	by	blue	tarpaulins	to	protect	birds	from	theft	and	weather	(Image	37).	The	tops	of	some	of	these	cages	double	as	a	table	where	slaughtered	birds	are	laid	out,	cut-up,	and	bagged	for	customers.	The	cutting	surface	on	top	of	these	tables	is	not	always	sealed,	allowing	small	amounts	of	water	and	blood	to	drip	on	the	live	birds	caged	below;	as	virus	can	persist	in	such	runoff	(Indriani	et	al.	2010),	this	process	may	lead	to	environmental	contamination.	Some	of	the	larger	sellers	in	Serang	also	rent	small,	enclosed	buildings	where	they	store	poultry	(Image	36).	When	PWP	slaughter	in	batches,	these	poultry	holding-rooms	can	be	depleted.	Birds	kept	at	the	market	are	fed	rice	husks	in	small	trays,	and	drink	water	from	containers	that	hold	about	10	litres	and	have	self-refilling	base	trays;	birds	share	these	watering	trays,	an	activity	that	may	lead	to	disease	transmission	in	birds	if	an	infected	animal	efficiently	sheds	virus	into	the	water	(Forrest,	Kim,	and	Webster	2010).		Though	the	number	of	people	selling	poultry	in	Pasar	Rau	fluctuates	according	to	the	season,	the	time	of	year,	or	an	individual’s	ability	to	raise	capital,	conservative	estimates	from	interviews	and	observations	suggest	that	there	are	more	than	60	individuals	involved	full-time	in	some	aspect	of	the	poultry	trade	in	Pasar	Rau.	Many	of	these	workers	slaughter	and	prepare	birds	for	sale,	receiving	between	40,000-50,000	IDR	per	day,	depending	on	sales.	Each	month	PWP	responsible	for	each	independent	outfit	pay	between	330,000-350,000	IDR	in	rent;	this	covers	electricity,	security,	and	general	cleaning.	Water	is	delivered	by	hand	to	each	seller	for	1000	IDR	per	jerry-can,	with	most	sellers	using	15-20	jerry-cans	a	day.	Broiler	and	layer	chickens	are	bought	from	contract	farmers	and	commercial	producers	for	about	20,000	IDR	each,	and	are	sold	to	consumers	at	the	market	for	about	22,000-24,000	IDR.138	The	price	of	other	species	fluctuates	depending	on	their	size	and	age:	ayam	
kampung	sell	for	between	40,000-50,000	IDR;	ducks	that	are	not	producing	eggs	sell	for	around	30,000-40,000,	while	the	price	for	adult	ducks	and	geese	start	between	60,000-70,000	IDR	each.139	In	all	three	fieldsites	the	price	of	poultry	rises	during	holidays	when	demand	increases.	While	these	prices	are	comparable,	or	slightly	cheaper	than	the	cost	of	poultry	and	taxes	in	Aceh	and	in	Lampung,	what	is	important	here	is	recognizing	that	after	taxes	and	expenses	are	paid,	PWP	in	each	of	the	three	sites	make	only	a	marginal	profit	from	each	bird	sold.																																																															138	Interview	in	Banten,	18	March	2012.	139	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	
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Image	36:	Chickens	kept	overnight	at	Pasar	Rau	
			Image	37:	Chickens	kept	overnight	in	cages	at	Pasar	Rau	
	
Conclusion	This	chapter	discusses	the	general	context	in	each	fieldsite	to	situate	this	research	and	underscore	the	dynamic,	extensive,	and	often	diffuse	nature	of	the	poultry	trade	in	Indonesia.	While	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	the	actual	risk	posed	to	poultry	or	people	in	any	of	the	three	field	sites,	through	observations	and	the	use	of	existing	studies	it	is	possible	to	generally	outline	the	relative	risk	that	exists	in	each	location.	
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Factors	associated	with	disease	in	poultry	include	the	presence	of	ducks,	the	density	of	road	networks	and	transport	links,	and	the	presence	and	proximity	to	water	(Gilbert	and	Pfeiffer	2012).	In	Indonesia,	other	factors,	such	as	commercial	poultry	and	trade	in	and	out	of	communities	are	also	associated	with	disease	events	in	birds	(Loth	et	al.	2011;	Yupiana	et	al.	2010;	Santhia	et	al.	2009).	Moreover,	Indonesian	LBMs	associated	with	environmental	contamination	are	those	that	market	ducks	and	those	with	on-site	slaughtering	and	processing	facilities	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	These	criteria	–	broadly	understood	–	are	not	similarly	present	in	each	of	the	field	sites	where	this	research	was	undertaken.	For	example,	although	ducks	are	routinely	sold	and	slaughtered	in	the	markets	in	Banten	and	Aceh,	they	are	not	commonly	sold	in	the	market	in	Lampung.	Similarly,	slaughtering	on-site	is	routine	in	the	markets	in	Aceh	and	Banten,	whereas	most	birds	sold	in	Lampung	are	slaughtered	off-site.	Additionally,	water	is	not	as	ubiquitous	in	Lampung	as	it	is	in	the	other	two	sites,	where	pooled	water	and	mud	are	frequently	observed	around	the	slaughter	and	sale	areas.	Each	of	the	three	sites,	however,	are	located	near	major	road	networks	on	which	birds	are	routinely	transported,	and	each	LBM	in	question	is	made-up	of	different	PWP	buying	and	selling	birds	from	different	stocks.	This	form	of	dynamic	trade	is	associated	with	disease	introduction	and	maintenance	in	LBMs	(Fournié	et	al.	2013).	Establishing	the	potential	–	and	degree	–	of	environmental	contamination	in	these	three	markets,	however,	was	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	That	said,	observations	and	available	information	suggest	that	Serang,	the	largest	of	the	three	markets,	attracts	the	most	traders	and	birds,	including	ducks,	from	across	Java	and	beyond,	and	thus	Pasar	Rau	may	be	the	market	most	likely	to	act	as	a	reservoir	of	infection.			In	describing	the	market	environment	in	each	field	site,	this	chapter	broadly	outlines	the	myriad	ways	in	which	H5N1	may	persist	within	a	live	bird	market	environment,	should	an	infected	bird	be	introduced,	or	PWP	introduce	virus	via	their	equipment.	Risk	factors	associated	with	H5N1	in	humans	include	contact	with	sick	poultry	or	fomites,	or	indirect	transmission	in	contaminated	environments	such	as	LBMs	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	2013;	Patel	et	al.	2014).	Human	contact	with	poultry	and	potential	fomites	in	each	of	the	three	sites	are	numerous,	illustrating	that	while	there	may	be	countless	opportunities	for	disease	exposure	in	the	right	circumstances,	such	contact	does	not	necessarily	result	in	disease	transmission.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	situates	the	current	study,	providing	a	sense	of	the	relative	risks	in	each	location,	and	context	for	the	data	presented	in	the	remaining	chapters.		 	
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Chapter	9:	Constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	among	PWP	
	
Introduction	This	chapter	explores	the	way	that	PWP	construct	the	risks	about	H5N1	for	animals	and	humans,	respectively.	In	the	case	of	the	former,	data	suggest	that	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	for	animals	are	largely	premised	on	whether	they	believe	that	avian	influenza,	as	a	new	or	a	familiar	disease,	is	species-specific,	or	whether	it	can	infect	other	birds	or	humans.	As	the	majority	of	PWP	subscribe	to	the	notion	that	avian	influenza	can	only	infect	poultry,	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1	for	humans	are	considered	to	be	implausible.	As	a	result,	the	most	familiar	and	salient	risk	associated	with	H5N1	is	that	derived	from	the	potential	of	economic	loss	as	a	result	of	either	disease	outbreaks	or	disease	interventions.	As	will	be	shown,	these	assessments	are	formed	in	response	to	PWP’s	long	histories	of	working	with	poultry,	illustrating	how	constructions	of	risk	are	founded	on	PWP’s	experiential	risk	rationalities.		To	introduce	the	themes	that	arise	in	the	body	of	this	chapter,	the	first	section	situates	the	research	with	reference	to	one	particular	seller,	Pak	Tusni,	who	works	on	the	fringe	of	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang.	The	aim	of	this	introduction	is	to	confer	a	degree	of	normality	upon	the	key	themes	that	arise	throughout	this	chapter	and	to	illustrate	that	disease	or	death	among	birds	is	not	seen	or	responded	to	as	an	abnormal	event.	Thereafter,	this	chapter	is	organized	around	5	questions	stemming	from	the	conceptual	commitments	set	out	in	Chapter	5.	These	are:	How	do	PWP	conceptualize	the	risks	from	avian	influenza	associated	with	humans?	How	are	the	risks	of	H5N1	for	animals	constructed?	How	are	the	risks	other	than	those	presented	by	H5N1	to	human	health	or	animal	health	constructed?	What	factors	are	involved	in	shaping	PWP’s	assessments	of	risks?	To	what	extent	can	attention	to	the	familiarity,	salience	or	timing	of	particular	risks	provide	insights	into	PWP’s	constructions	of	these	risks?	
Pak	Tusni	Pak	Tusni	has	sold	birds	for	decades	and	is	one	of	the	older	poultry	traders	at	the	market.	His	stall	is	located	on	the	opposite	side	of	Pasar	Rau,	and	is	well	separated	from	those	of	other	PWP	at	the	market.	He	keeps	ducks,	geese,	and	village	chickens,	and	is	the	sole	seller	who	markets	only	live	birds,	finding	it	too	much	trouble	to	slaughter	birds	and	sell	their	carcasses	and	by-products.	Commercial	broilers	and	layers,	among	other	species,	are	slaughtered	and	sold	on	the	other	side	of	the	market.140	Ayam	kampung	and	ducks	are	kept	in	one	of	six	stacked	cages,	while	geese	are	corralled	in	an	open	pen	enclosed	by	a	bamboo	fence.	A	concrete	wall	at	the	back	of	the	pen	has	a	bench	where	Pak	Tusni	often	sits	and	smokes.	Pieces	of	coconut	pulp	are	scattered	across	the	cage	floors	and	small	water	trays	in	each	cage	are	refilled	from	a	larger	bucket	under	the	bench.																																																									140	There	are	independent	sellers	that	sell	only	live	birds	in	Pasar	Rau	but,	unlike	Pak	Tusni,	they	have	no	fixed	location	at	the	market.	
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	The	roughly	15-20	birds	a	day	that	Pak	Tusni	sells	come	from	surrounding	villages	and	markets,	and	are	delivered	to	this	corner	of	Pasar	Rau	by	four	or	five	independent	agen,	with	whom	he	communicates	daily	via	mobile	phone	to	secure	poultry	and	prices.	Sometimes	an	individual	arrives	at	Pak	Tusni’s	stall	with	one	or	two	birds	in	hand.	Once	bought,	these	birds	are	promptly	caged	with	the	other	animals:	in	this	environment	identifying	the	exact	origin	of	any	one	bird	is	difficult.	The	price	of	a	younger	ayam	kampung	can	be	as	low	as	25,000	IDR;	while	larger	village	chickens	can	command	up	to	60,000	IDR.	Duck	and	geese	are	more	expensive,	with	large	birds	selling	for	70,000-100,000	IDR.		At	the	end	of	each	day,	Pak	Tusni	returns	home	with	the	unsold	birds	and	cages	the	animals	close	to	his	ayam	jago	–	fighting	cocks.	He	has	raised	fighting	cocks	for	a	long	time.	Two	years	ago,	after	following	his	normal	daily	routine,	he	was	shocked	to	find	all	his	chickens	dead	in	the	morning.	A	similar	incident	also	occurred	one	month	prior	to	our	first	conversation	in	2011.	He	has	never	reported	birds	dying	to	officials,	and	has	received	no	information	about	poultry	disease,	let	alone	poultry	raising	or	marketing,	from	any	government	officials.	When	birds	die	he	throws	their	carcasses	into	the	river	near	his	house.			Poultry	in	Serang	have	a	long	history	of	infection	with	disease.	What	people	now	call	
flu	burung,	Pak	Tusni	says,	is	actually	an	older	chicken	affliction	known	commonly	as	lelentuk;	ducks	and	geese	have	stronger	immune	systems	and	are	not	at	risk	for	infection.	Although	the	disease	is	old,	the	number	of	chickens	dying	has	dramatically	increased	since	2001,	with	die-offs	occurring	during	the	transition	between	musim	
hujan	-	the	rainy	season	-	and	musim	panas	–	the	hot	season.	When	Pak	Tusni	lost	all	his	chickens	two	years	earlier,	he	feared	he	would	not	be	able	to	recoup	the	loss,	and	consulted	with	other	poultry	traders.	Rather	than	sympathy,	however,	the	other	traders	recalled	similar	experiences	to	Pak	Tusni’s,	saying:	“Yeah	same,	my	birds	also	got	sick.	They’re	dead	[laughing].”141		Pak	Tusni	continually	looks	for	sickness	in	his	chickens,	the	diagnostic	symptoms	being	a	red	anus	and	a	lack	of	appetite,	especially	around	the	rainy	season.	The	way	to	keep	birds	safe,	he	says,	is	to	feed	them	before	they	sleep.	If	birds	are	sick,	they	are	fed	finely	crushed	red	onions.	And,	when	possible,	he	gives	sick	birds	a	common	human	obat	flu	dan	batuk	–	flu	and	cough	medicine	–	called	Mixagrip,	which	is	widely	advertised	on	television.142	If	a	chicken	is	not	recovering	he	slaughters	the	bird	before	it	dies.	If	a	bird	dies	naturally	it	is	not	eaten,	as	this	would	be	haram.	Although	Pak	Tusni	recalls	how	the	media	have	discussed	flu	burung	infection	in	humans,	he	challenges	the	notion	that	sick	birds	can	infect	humans,	stating:	“I	have	
																																																								141	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	142	Mixagrip	is	advertised	widely	on	television	in	Indonesia.	For	example,	see	an	advertisement	for	this	flu	and	cough	medicine	here:	http://vimeo.com/6456707	(Accessed	June	12,	2013).	
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always	been	around	chickens	and	I	don’t	get	the	disease.	It’s	safe	[laughing].	It’s	just	the	news”.143			Pak	Tusni’s	comments	illustrate	a	number	of	salient	themes	for	this	chapter.	In	speaking	about	his	long	history	of	involvement	in	the	market	and	his	extensive	experience	dealing	with	poultry	diseases,	Pak	Tusni	demonstrates	how	his	construction	of	the	risk	around	poultry	disease	is	derived	from	his	own	established	basis	of	knowledge	-	from	observations	and	experience	-	rather	than	from	external	sources	of	information.	As	such,	he	views	avian	influenza	as	a	species-specific	disease,	posing	a	threat	to	chickens	but	not	ducks	or	geese.	When	faced	with	a	large	die-off	of	his	poultry,	he	did	not	seek	assistance,	information,	or	other	resources	from	government	officials,	preferring	to	deal	with	the	problem,	as	he	conceived	of	it,	by	disposing	of	the	dead	birds	in	the	river.	He	challenges	the	notion,	widely	reported	on	television,	that	humans	are	at	risk	of	infection,	citing	his	own	inductively-derived	conclusions,	suggesting	that	his	experiential	risk	rationality	is	a	far	more	plausible	source	of	understanding.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	examines	key	issues	raised	by	Pak	Tusni	in	more	detail.		
Constructions	of	risk	for	animals	In	general,	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1	for	animals	are	considered	to	be	familiar	risks,	though	as	will	be	discussed	below,	PWP	are	quick	to	draw	distinctions	between	affected	species	and	those	that	are	less	susceptible.	Data	show	that	across	the	three	sites	poultry	diseases,	as	a	general	topic,	are	not	novel	phenomena.	Every	respondent	acknowledged	that	they	had	heard	of	flu	burung.	When	flu	burung	is	discussed	it	is	most	often	represented	as	a	new	name	for	older	afflictions	that	have	long	affected	chickens.	Only	a	minority	of	PWP	think	that	flu	burung	is	a	novel	disease.	The	greatest	variation	in	responses	came	from	Aceh.	In	Bireuen	there	is	less	certainty	than	in	Serang	or	Bandar	Lampung	about	whether	or	not	the	disease	is	novel	or	familiar,	or	whether,	although	a	real	disease,	it	exists	only	outside	of	Aceh.		In	Serang	most	respondents	confirmed	that	flu	burung	is	a	new	name	for	older	diseases.	When	questioned	directly,	two	sellers	in	Pasar	Rau	explained	this	as	follows:			 Sari:	What	are	the	diseases	that	infect	your	birds?			 Seller	1:	People	around	here	usually	call	it	lelentuk.		 			 Seller	2:	Yes,	the	[infected]	chicken	will	look	sleepy	all	the	time	and	their		 		 heads	are	bowed.	But	the	familiar	name	is	flu	burung.		 		 Sari:	So	lelentuk	is	the	same	as	flu	burung?		 																																																									143	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	
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	 Seller	2:	Yeah,	they	are	the	same.144		Another	seller	at	Pasar	Rau	echoes	these	two	respondents	while	suggesting	another	name	for	the	affliction:		 		 Pak	Atang:	Well,	I	can	say	there	is	a	disease	similar	to	it.	It’s	called	tetelo		 in	Sundanese	[the	local	dialect].	Tetelo	is	caused	by	weather...	It’s	hard	to		 cure	but	you	can	still	eat	the	meat.	It	used	to	be	called	tetelo	but	now	flu		
	 burung.				 Sari:	So	they	are	the	same	disease?			 Pak	Atang:	Yes,	the	same.	Old	disease,	same	story,	only	different		 names.145		A	minority	of	sellers	–	mostly	older	men	with	decades	of	experience	-	also	spoke	about	disease	names	that	were	commonly	used	in	the	past	but	are	no	longer	in	fashion,	and	not	used	by	younger	sellers;	these	include:	muyung146,	dedeluk147,	and	
beluk148.	Lelentuk	and	tetelo	were	the	most	common	local	names	that	people	employed	for	what	is	now	being	called	flu	burung	in	Serang.	Flu	burung	is	also	used	interchangeably	to	refer	to	a	number	of	poultry	diseases	in	Bandar	Lampung	and	in	Aceh.		
	In	Lampung,	among	those	who	do	not	see	avian	influenza	as	a	distinct	disease,	flu	
burung	is	often	seen	as	a	new	name	for	tetelo,	an	older	affliction.	A	minority	of	sellers	at	Pasar	Tugu	say	that	older	generations	spoke	of	a	disease	called	koli149,	though	this	name	is	no	longer	in	use;	and	a	few	distinguish	between	flu	burung,	
ngorok,	and	ND,	or	Newcastle	Disease.	
	
Flu	burung	in	Aceh	is	widely	seen	as	another	name	for	an	affliction	called	ta’oen.	For	most	“ta’oen	in	Aceh	is	[considered]	the	same	as	avian	influenza	in	the	world.”150	When	compared	with	the	other	two	sites,	however,	PWP	in	Aceh	more	often	convey	a	degree	of	uncertainty	in	distinguishing	between	diseases.	As	one	seller	remarked:	“I	do	not	know	if	they	are	the	same...	ta’oen	has	been	for	a	long	time...	but	whether	it	is	bird	flu	is	not	known...”151.		These	insights	suggest	that	there	is	a	long	history	of	knowledge	about	poultry	diseases,	with	new	names	supplanting	those	employed	by	previous	generations.	As																																																									144	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	145	Interview	in	Banten,	16	May	2012.	146	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	147	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	148	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	149	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	150	Interview	in	Aceh,	3	February	2010.	151	Interview	in	Aceh,	2	February	2010.		
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noted	in	Chapter	2,	it	would	be	difficult	to	conclusively	distinguish	cases	of	bird	flu	from	other	diseases	affecting	poultry	without	laboratory	diagnostics.	In	practice,	PWP	generally	distinguish	between	types	of	poultry	diseases	as	species-specific	afflictions;	diseases	that	affect	ducks	are	not	seen	to	affect	chickens.	“There	are	different	diseases	between	ducks	and	chickens”152,	one	mugee	asserts	in	Bireuen.	Asked	if	avian	influenza	could	infect	ducks	or	chickens,	a	seller	in	Serang	states,	“No,	ducks	have	their	own	kind	of	diseases.	Duck	disease	is	called	Celeng.	It’s	called	
Celeng	because	the	neck	is	twisted	and	the	duck	walks	as	if	it	is	drunk”153.	Similarly,	another	seller	in	Serang	explains,	“Geese	don’t	suffer	from	avian	influenza”,	and	offered	the	following	as	further	proof:	“When	there	was	bird	flu,	the	price	of	geese	went	up	because	people	prefer	eating	geese	to	chicken”.154			PWP	generally	attribute	the	increased	susceptibility	of	chickens	to	flu	burung	to	their	weak	constitution,	with	some	pointing	to	ayam	potong,	broiler	chickens,	and	
ayam	kampung.	“It’s	just	broilers”,	says	one	slaughterer	in	Aceh,	“It	only	lives	for	30	days,	so	it’s	weak”155.	Pak	Sutoyo,	a	seller	of	fighting	cocks	in	Lampung,	also	differentiates	between	different	types	of	chickens	when	explaining	susceptibility	to	infection.	Ayam	kampung	are	most	vulnerable	to	avian	influenza	because	they	“don’t	eat	properly	in	the	wild”156.	As	birds	that	are	considered	particularly	vulnerable	to	infection,	ayam	kampung,	in	his	opinion,	can	act	as	disease	sentinels.	The	general	consensus	among	PWP	respondents	about	chickens,	rather	than	ducks	or	geese,	being	susceptible	to	avian	influenza,	means	that	for	the	remainder	of	this	thesis,	unless	stated	otherwise,	discussion	of	“poultry”	or	“birds”	refers	to	commercially-raised	or	backyard	chickens.		The	observations	and	distinctions	described	above	roughly	map	onto	research	studies,	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2,	demonstrating	that	H5N1	infection	in	chickens	is	particularly	severe,	resulting	in	high	morbidity	and	mortality	(Perkins	and	Swayne	2001).	Although	some	ducks	can	die	suddenly	from	disease	without	obvious	clinical	symptoms	(Theary	et	al.	2012),	in	general	ducks	are	more	often	asymptomatic	reservoirs	for	infection	that	can	disseminate	live	virus	(Hulse-Post	et	al.	2005).			Table	4	catalogues	select	disease	names	discussed	among	respondents.	Within	species,	there	is	significant	crossover	in	nomenclature	for	disease,	and	most	PWP	discuss	these	diseases	as	though	different	names	are	synonymous.			
																																																								152	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	153	Interview	in	Serang,	6	May	2011.	154	Interview	in	Serang,	2	August	2012.	155	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	October	2010.	156	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	
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Table	4:	Select	diseases	discussed	in	Banten,	Lampung,	and	Aceh	
Place											Disease	name	 Affected	
species	
Distinguishing	feature	Serang,	Banten		 	
	 Gempor157	 Duck	 Does	not	infect	chickens	
Celeng158	 Duck	 Does	not	infect	chickens	
Lelentuk159	 Chicken		 Most	commonly	used	interchangeably	with	flu	
burung,	but	translated	as	Newcastle	Disease	(ND)	
Tetelo160	 Chicken	 Used	interchangeably	with	flu	burung	
Muyung161	 Chicken	 Older	generations’	name	for	chicken	disease	
Dedeluk162	 Chicken	 Older	generations’	name	for	chicken	disease	
Beluk163	 Chicken	 Older	generations’	name	for	chicken	disease	Bandar	Lampung,	Lampung		 Koli164	 Chicken	 Older	generations’	name	for	chicken	disease	
Tetelo165	 Chicken	 Most	commonly	used	interchangeably	with	flu	
burung	
Ngorok166	 Chicken	 Some	see	as	old	name	for	disease;	some	see	as	distinct	disease	
ND	(Newcastle	
disease)167	 Chicken	 Distinct	disease	Bireuen,	Aceh		 Ngorok168	 Chicken	 Some	see	as	old	name	for	disease;	some	see	as	distinct	disease	
ND	(Newcastle	
disease)169	 Chicken	 Some	see	as	old	name	for	disease;	some	see	as	distinct	disease	
Ta’oen170	 Chicken	 Most	commonly	used	interchangeably	with	flu	
burung			A	minority	of	PWP	from	across	the	three	sites	distinguish	between	the	concept	of	flu	
burung	and	other	poultry	diseases.	When	respondents	differentiate	between	avian																																																									157	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	158	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	159	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.	160	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.	161	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	162	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	163	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	164	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	165	Interview	in	Lampung,	8	April	2012.	166	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	167	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	168	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	March	2012.	169	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	October	2010.	170	Interview	in	Aceh,	3	February	2010.	
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influenza	and	other	diseases,	they	most	often	cite	as	the	distinguishing	feature	of	avian	influenza	infection	the	speed	with	which	flu	burung	kills	chickens.	These	observations	are	supported	by	scientific	literature	suggesting	that	poultry	infected	with	avian	influenza	usually	die	within	3	or	4	days	(Bouma	et	al.	2009).	One	older	man	who	raises	ayam	kampung	and	brings	a	few	to	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang	each	day	to	sell	live,	identifies	flu	burung	as	a	fast-moving	disease	that	kills	birds	quickly	and	was	never	“found	before	the	year	2000.”171	A	respondent	in	Lampung	confirms	that	“if	there’s	a	bird	infected	[with	flu	burung]	it	moves	fast.”172	A	mugee	in	Aceh	states	that	avian	influenza	kills	birds	quickly	and	is	“definitely	different”	than	ta’oen;	“if	[a	bird	has]	‘ta’oen	it	will	not	die	at	once”.173			Bireuen,	Aceh	was	the	site	where	the	smallest	number	of	respondents	identified	flu	
burung	as	a	new	poultry	disease	infecting	chickens	in	their	district	and	in	their	province.	In	April	2012,	however,	one	poultry	trader	there	furnished	evidence	in	defence	of	the	notion	that	flu	burung	was	distinct.	It	was	nearing	the	end	of	the	selling	day	and	Sammy	and	I	remained	at	the	market	to	speak	with	mugees,	who	often	remain	at	the	market	later	than	those	who	strictly	slaughter	chickens	or	sell	their	meat.	Our	conversation	turned	to	poultry	diseases	and	Sammy	asked	if	flu	
burung	was	a	new	or	an	old	disease:	“It’s	a	new	disease,	since	two	years	ago”	the	
mugee	replied.174	Suddenly,	as	if	reminded	of	a	relevant	point,	the	mugee	turned	and	walked	towards	his	motorbike,	gesturing	at	us	to	follow.	There,	he	untied	a	white	plastic	sac	from	the	frame	of	the	motorbike	and	opened	up	the	bag	to	reveal	two	dead	chickens.	He	pushed	aside	the	top	bird	to	select	the	dead	chicken	at	the	bottom	of	the	sack,	which	he	claimed	died	from	flu	burung	–	avian	influenza	-	earlier	that	day.	This	mugee	stated	confidently	that	the	other	dead	chicken	in	the	bag	had	not	died	from	flu	burung,	but	was	more	likely	crushed	by	other	birds	while	contained	in	one	of	the	three	cages	attached	to	his	motorbike.	The	breast	of	the	diseased	bird	that	he	held	was	dark	red	in	colour	–	a	clear	sign,	according	to	him,	of	infection.	He	replaced	the	bird	in	the	bag	and	reattached	it	to	his	motorbike,	and	then	turned	to	shake	hands	with	both	of	us	before	departing.	This	interaction	suggests	that	constructions	of	risk	about	H5N1	for	poultry	are	in	part	premised	upon	the	normalcy	that	is	conferred	upon	poultry	deaths.	Although	I	was	not	able	to	confirm	the	cause	of	death	in	the	bird,	this	interaction	had	the	potential	for	disease	exposure.			The	respondents	in	Aceh	who	distinguish	flu	burung	as	novel	had	a	somewhat	standardized	way	to	describe	symptoms	of	avian	influenza	in	chickens.	During	three	separate	interviews175	–	each	on	different	dates	–	these	respondents	stated	that	when	a	chicken	is	infected	with	avian	influenza	they	die	suddenly,	falling	to	the	ground	from	a	tree	branch.	As	one	respondent	stated,	it	is	possible	to	discern																																																									171	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.		172	Interview	in	Aceh,	25	August	2012.		173	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	174	Interview	in	Aceh,	1	April	2012.	175	Interviews	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010,	6	February	2010,	1	April	2012.	
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whether	a	chicken	has	flu	burung	because	the	bird	will	be	“sitting	on	the	branch	of	a	tree	[and	then	it]	will	suddenly	fall	down	and	die.”176	This	specific	phraseology	was	notably	echoed	by	three	separate	respondents.	While	this	“falling	from	the	tree”	anecdote	was	not	brought	up	by	respondents	at	the	other	two	sites,	a	NGO	official	in	Serang	did	echo	these	Acehnese	respondents	when	he	stated	that	with	flu	burung,	“sometimes	birds	are	falling	from	the	trees.”177	The	similarity	in	these	responses	is	unlikely	to	be	mere	coincidence,	but	may	have	originated	in	a	past	public	health	message	that	resonated	with	a	minority	of	PWP	in	Bireuen.			Others	in	Aceh	think	that	flu	burung	is	a	new	poultry	disease,	but	one	that	does	not	exist	in	their	province.	This	opinion	was	expressed	by	a	minority	of	the	slaughterers	and	sellers	who	work	at	Pasar	Bireuen,	although	it	was	endorsed	by	only	one	mugee.	As	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	section	below,	this	minority	of	respondents	point	to	other	parts	of	Indonesia	–	namely	Medan	and	Java	–	as	the	locations	that	are	most	affected	by	avian	influenza.		In	short,	most	respondents	generally	consider	flu	burung	“just	the	same”	178	as	other	poultry	diseases	that	people	have	encountered	and	dealt	with	throughout	their	time	raising	and	marketing	chickens;	it	is	only	the	name	that	is	considered	to	be	novel.	As	one	slaughterer	in	Serang	said,	flu	burung	was	simply	what	“scholars	call	it	[laughing]	–	a	term	from	the	government.”179		
Lay	aetiology	of	avian	influenza	Having	outlined	PWP’s	beliefs	about	the	terminology	used	to	refer	to	poultry	diseases,	the	following	section	examines	the	lay	aetiology	of	avian	influenza	among	people	who	raise	and	sell	birds	as	a	way	of	investigating	how	PWP	construct	the	risks	of	H5N1	to	specific	animals.	Individuals	who	believe	that	avian	influenza	comes	from	animals	are	liable	to	behave	differently	than	individuals	who	do	not	believe	this	is	the	case.	This	distinction	becomes	important	in	Chapter	10,	which	focuses	on	how	constructions	of	risk	inform	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface.		Data	presented	in	this	section	show	that	the	majority	of	PWP	represent	poultry	diseases	as	seasonal	afflictions	that	have	long	infected	their	chicken	flocks.	Although	very	few	PWP	claim	to	know	how	to	prevent	disease	from	infecting	their	birds,	there	are	multiple	curative	treatments	for	birds	once	they	are	infected,	with	most	involving	the	boosting	of	birds’	immunity	to	sustain	them	through	the	time	when	disease	is	prevalent.		Across	the	three	sites,	it	is	notable	that	there	are	very	few	respondents	who	believe	
flu	burung	to	be	a	disease	transmitted	between	birds,	though	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	birds	are	not	susceptible	to	disease.	Only	in	Aceh	do	a	minority	of	respondents																																																									176	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	177	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	178	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	179	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	
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discuss	flu	burung	as	a	novel	disease	transmitted	between	pigs	and	birds.	The	majority	of	respondents	do	not	think	that	birds	can	transmit	disease,	but	suggest	a	theory	of	species-specific	infection	that	is	endorsed	across	the	three	sites.	This	theory,	which	holds	in	part	that	inter-species	transmission	of	disease	is	not	possible,	is	further	elaborated	on	and	reinforced	in	the	remainder	of	this	thesis.			Regardless	of	whether	respondents	think	flu	burung	is	the	relabeling	of	an	old	disease,	or	rather	a	new	disease,	when	asked	“where	does	avian	influenza	come	from?”	they	reply	near	unanimously	that	poultry	diseases	generally	accompany	meteorological	change.	Indeed,	some	version	of	“The	problem	is	the	weather”	paraphrases	a	common	refrain	among	respondents	when	they	speak	about	disease	in	their	birds.	This	generalized	story	of	the	natural	origin	of	poultry	disease	is	echoed,	in	some	form,	across	each	of	the	three	sites.			Thus,	when	asked,	“Where	does	avian	influenza	come	from?”	a	small	group	of	
mugees	in	Bireuen	confirm	that	the	disease	comes	with	the	wind:		 		 Informant	1:	We	don’t	know	about	that,	it	comes	by	itself.		 Informant	2:	It	comes	from	the	wind.		 Informant	1:	Yes,	the	wind.		 ...		 Sammy:	What	wind	is	that?		 Informant	2:	The	wind	comes	by	itself.		 Informant	1:	It	certainly	doesn’t	come	from	any	other	place.180		Another	Acehnese	informant	remarks	that	disease	events	occur	mostly	in	chickens	and	usually	during	pancaroba,	the	changing	of	seasons.181	This	understanding	is	corroborated	by	a	seller	in	Serang:	“When	there’s	a	transition	in	weather,	like	from	hot	to	rain,	or	the	other	way	around,	chickens	will	surely	get	sick.”182	A	seller	at	
Pasar	Tugu	in	Lampung	agrees:	“when	the	weather	becomes	windy,	it’s	definitely	easy	to	get	sick	chickens”;	he	goes	on	to	state,	“surely	there’s	something	natural	[about	these	diseases].	My	chickens	have	been	sick	many	times.”183	These	observations	align	in	part	with	technical	data	on	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people,	which	find	disease	events	more	common	during	winter	months	and	lower	temperatures	(Mathur	et	al.	2014;	Durand	et	al.	2015).		In	anticipation	of	disease	events,	one	of	the	larger	sellers	in	Lampung	claims	that	she	has	stopped	raising	birds	prior	to	the	changing	of	the	seasons	because	past	losses	during	these	times	were	too	great;	she	prefers	to	buy	from	others	who	take	on	the	attendant	risks	of	rearing	poultry	during	weather-pattern	variations.	Animal-health	officials	agree	that	the	incidence	of	flu	burung	and	other	diseases	in	poultry																																																									180	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	181	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	182	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.	183	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	
	 167	
rises	during	the	rainy	season.184	Forster	(2010)	and	Padmawati	and	Nichter	(2008)	report	similar	findings	from	research	in	other	parts	of	Indonesia.	That	PWP	make	arrangements	to	procure	poultry	in	anticipation	of	pancaroba	underscores	the	common	association	of	poultry-disease	events	with	changes	of	seasons.			Disparate	communities	from	across	Indonesia	also	associate	weather	and	seasonal	patterns	-	and	particularly	“wind”	and	the	rainy	season	-	with	other	communicable	and	non-communicable	diseases.	Utarini	and	colleagues	(2003)	find	some	respondents	in	Central	Java	attribute	malaria	to	seasonal	change.	In	southeast	Sulawesi,	people	attribute	the	disease	panas	dalam	–	literally,	“hot	inside”	–	to	wind	and	temperature	fluctuations	(Nolan	2013).	On	Java,	cardiovascular	disease	(heart	disease)	is	recognized	by	some	as	“sitting-wind	sickness”	or	“exposed	to	wind	sickness”	(Dewi,	Weinehall,	and	Ohman	2010).	In	discussing	chronic	illness,	elderly	Indonesians	in	North	Sulawesi	are	found	to	“develop	a	specific	aetiology	for	every	illness	episode	such	as	“wind	intrusion”	(masuk	angin)	(Van	Eeuwijk	2003,	335).	
Masuk	angin	is	also	associated	with	disease	symptoms	such	as	fever	around	Yogyakarta	(Ferzacca	1996),	as	well	as	among	Sasak	communities	on	Lombok	(Hay	2001).	Additionally,	masuk	angin	is	remarked	on	by	the	expatriate	community	in	Indonesia185,	Indonesian	scholars186	and	companies	that	market	medicine	for	masuk	
angin	nationally.187	In	short,	wind	and	seasonal	change	are	common	lay	explanations	for	many	diseases	in	Indonesia.			For	most	PWP	a	sense	of	inevitability	lingers	over	discussions	about	the	incidence	of	poultry	diseases,	since	these	are	widely	perceived	as	natural	phenomena	outside	the	realm	of	individual	agency.	While	the	majority	of	PWP	can	diagnose	a	sick	chicken,	they	do	not	profess	an	ability	to	prevent	infection	in	the	first	place.	Most	do,	however,	employ	techniques	to	mitigate	the	impact	of	disease	on	their	birds	around	seasonal	transitions,	although	these	actions	are	more	curative	than	preventative,	aimed	at	boosting	their	stock’s	immunity	before	anticipated	disease	events	and	controlling	infection	when	it	arrives.	For	these	PWP,	poultry	diseases	can	be	managed	but	not	prevented	outright.			Asked	if	there	are	any	ways	to	prevent	disease	from	infecting	his	flock,	an	older	seller	in	Pasar	Rau	states:	“I	do	nothing	because	when	the	disease	comes,	it	will	also	go	away	again.	I	don’t	know	the	way	to	prevent	disease”	in	poultry.188	PWP	in	Lampung189	and	in	Aceh190	also	state	that	they	do	not	know	how	to	prevent	birds	from	becoming	infected	by	disease.	Very	few	respondents	talk	about	administering	vaccines	to	protect	poultry	from	infection;	references	to	vaccination	are	made	more																																																									184	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	185	See:	http://www.expat.or.id/info/culturalhabits-idiosyncrasies.html	Accessed:	13	June	2013.	186	See:	http://www.theindoproject.org/site/featured/how-to-expel-wind-when-you-have-masuk-angin	Accessed:	15	July	2013.	187	See:	http://obatmasukangin.org/	Accessed:	15	July	2013.	188	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	189	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	190	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	
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often	by	those	who	raise	birds	for	extended	periods,	such	as	those	raising	fighting	cocks.191	That	so	few	respondents	speak	about	preventative	measures,	such	as	vaccines,	may	reflect	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	respondents	are	not	responsible	for	raising	birds	for	extended	periods,	as	would	be	the	case	with	backyard	and	commercial	poultry	producers.			Although	PWP	do	not	feel	capable	of	preventing	infection	in	their	flocks,	many	do	try	to	boost	their	birds’	immunity	so	as	to	stave	off	infection	more	effectively	in	anticipation	of	seasonal	change;	common	interventions	include	feeding	birds	red	onions,	turmeric,	ginger,192	and	brown	sugar.193	Some	respondents	give	birds	vitamins	–	such	as	Vita	Chicks	or	Koleridin	(Images	38	and	39)	-	diluted	in	water	to	boost	growth	and	immunity.194	When	poultry	present	as	infected	a	minority	of	PWP	administer	widely	available	human	medicine.195	Others	claim	that	the	“way	to	treat”	an	infected	bird	is	simply	to	slaughter	it.196		Despite	these	mixed	opinions	and	methods,	one	seller	in	Bandar	Lampung	encompasses	the	majority	opinion	when	questioned	on	the	origins	of	poultry	diseases:	“I’m	not	sure	if	I	know	but	I	think	it	comes	from	nature...	from	the	air,	like	people	say.”	When	Sari	asked	this	seller	if	he	employed	any	preventative	tools	to	protect	his	chickens,	the	seller	stated	bluntly:	“I	have	no	ideas	for	that,	it	is	just	fate”	if	chickens	become	infected.197	This	statement	reflects	a	wider	construction	of	risk	around	animal	disease	as	largely	outside	of	one’s	control,	and	thus	confers	a	sense	of	normalcy	upon	poultry	diseases.	To	a	degree,	this	comment	also	indicates	this	population’s	pious	world-view;	respondents	across	the	three	sites	often	and	openly	identify	themselves	as	devout	Muslims.	This	seller’s	statement	goes	beyond	fatalism	or	piety,	however,	suggesting	a	more	complex	theory	of	the	risks	of	transmission	that	will	be	taken	up	below	with	reference	to	data	from	across	each	fieldsite.		
	
																																																								191	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	192	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	193	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	194	Interview	in	Aceh,	3	February	2010.	195	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	196	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	197	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	
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Image	38:	Vitamins	and	antibiotics	for	chickens	administered	by	diluting	with	water		
		Image	39:	Medicine	for	chickens	administered	by	diluting	with	water	
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Animals	as	disease	vectors	As	highlighted	above,	most	PWP	implicate	seasonal	weather	patterns	in	disease	outbreaks:	the	weather,	rather	than	a	contagious	agent,	is	believed	to	trigger	disease	emergence	in	poultry.	In	this	way,	poultry	are	rarely	identified	as	vectors	for	disease	transmission.	In	each	of	the	three	fieldsites,	however,	there	are	a	very	few	respondents	who	do	identify	poultry	as	carrying	and	spreading	contagion	between	birds.	In	Serang,	one	older	seller	identifies	birds	as	vectors	for	disease	transmission,	stating	that	when	25	birds	of	his	died	from	flu	burung	he	threw	them	in	the	river,	because	he	did	not	want	to	infect	other	people’s	poultry.198	When	asked	how	birds	become	infected	with	ta’oen,	an	Acehnese	respondent	replies:			 The	[spread]	of	ta’oen	can	be	explained	as	follows:	We	take	any	live		 chicken	from	the	market	then	put	it	together	with	some	other	ones		 [chickens]	at	home;	tomorrow	we	see	the	other	ones	[chickens]	are	sick,		 including	our	neighbours’	[chickens].199		That	this	respondent	implies	that	“any	live	chicken”	could	spread	disease,	further	suggests	that	infection	in	poultry	is	normalized,	even	expected.	Pak	Sutoyo,	a	fruit	seller	who	keeps	fighting	cocks	on	the	edge	of	Pasar	Tugu	in	Lampung,	also	confirms	that	infected	poultry	can	spread	disease.		Pak	Sutoyo	has	a	small	storefront	on	one	of	the	busy	side	streets	connecting	Pasar	
Tugu	to	the	main	thoroughfares	where	Sari	and	I	disembarked	and	caught	angkots	–mini-buses	-	each	day.	Out	of	the	front	he	and	his	wife	sell	papaya	and	pineapple;	just	inside	he	keeps	a	few	fighting	cocks	caged	and	separated,	with	each	cage	housed	in	an	empty,	large,	live-fish	holding	pen.	Sari	and	I	noticed	the	birds	during	the	first	round	of	fieldwork	in	Bandar	Lampung	and	returned	to	speak	with	Pak	Sutoyo	during	each	subsequent	visit.	A	few	years	earlier,	over	a	period	of	3-4	days,	Pak	Sutoyo	lost	roughly	60	fighting	cocks	to	flu	burung	even	though	he	bought	and	administered	vaccine	from	a	poultry	specialty	shop,	at	the	suggestion	of	friends	who	also	raise	fighting	cocks.	“Only	one	or	two	were	[still]	alive,	the	rest	were	dead”,	he	explains.200	He	considers	flu	burung	a	new,	“fast	moving”	disease	that	has	affected	“almost	everyone”	in	Lampung,	“not	only	me.”			When	asked	to	account	for	the	origin	of	avian	influenza,	Pak	Sutoyo	points	to	commercially	farmed	birds:			 Pak	Sutoyo:	Avian	influenza	comes	from	[commercial]	chicken	farms	[in	rural	areas].	Ayam	Bangkok	and	ayam	kampung	have	no	dust.201	If	you	see	ayam	
kampung	or	ayam	Bangkok	flap	their	wings,	there’s	no	dust.																																																									198	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	199	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.		200	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	201	Regrettably,	Sari	and	I	failed	to	ask	Pak	Sutoyo	to	clarify	what	he	meant	when	he	stated	that	“dust”	spreads	avian	influenza.	We	were	unable	to	follow	up	with	Pak	Sutoyo	about	this	issue,	as	this	interview	took	place	during	the	last	round	of	fieldwork	in	Lampung	
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		 Sari:	So	why	is	there	avian	influenza	in	the	city?			 Pak	Sutoyo:	Because	in	the	distribution	process,	when	live	chickens	are		 sent	from	the	farm	to	the	city,	the	dust	on	the	chickens	spreads	the	avian		 influenza.		For	Pak	Sutoyo,	flu	burung	does	not	originate	from	ayam	kampung,	but	these	birds	are	considered	particularly	vulnerable	to	infection,	and	disease	sentinels;	they	are	also	vectors	for	transmission	between	different	bird	species.	As	Pak	Sutoyo	explains,	last	June	he	moved	his	fighting	cocks	from	his	home	outside	of	the	city	to	his	current	location	near	Pasar	Tugu	“because	no	one	has	ayam	kampung	[here].”	He	continues:	“Because	[flu	burung]	infects	very	quickly,	if	ayam	kampung	have	died	it’s	a	sign.”202	These	two	respondents	are	exceptional.	Although	birds	are	known	to	become	sick	and	die,	the	majority	of	respondents	do	not	identify	the	body	of	a	diseased	or	dead	bird	as	a	contagious	threat	to	other	poultry.		A	minority	of	PWP	in	Bireuen,	however,	claim	that	avian	influenza	is	a	real	and	novel	disease,	yet	not	present	in	Aceh	because	there	are	no	domesticated	pigs	in	the	province.	According	to	these	respondents,	avian	influenza	is	prevalent	in	Medan,	Jakarta,	and	Java	more	generally	because	in	these	places	“the	henhouse	is	close	to	the	pig	stall.”203	Indeed,	the	belief	that	avian	influenza	infection	in	chickens	is	associated	with	proximity	to	pigs	was	recalled	more	than	once	by	sellers	and	slaughterers	in	Bireuen.204	One	mugee	there	also	confirmed	that,			 There	is	no	[avian	influenza]	here	because	there	are	no	pigs	here.	There	is		 lots	of		avian	influenza	in	Java,	and	in	Medan	also.	The	disease	is	there		 because	there	are	pigs	there	–	when	there’s	birds	and	when	there’s	pigs		 [there	is	avian	influenza].205		Whether	or	not	these	respondents	also	believe	that	birds	transmit	disease	to	pigs	was	not	made	clear.	Their	opinions	do,	however,	suggest	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	virology;	this	may	indicate	that	public	health	messaging	did	reach	at-risk	populations	during	the	2009	H1N1	pandemic.	Regardless,	the	fact	that	these	PWP	view	the	occurrence	of	avian	influenza	as	contingent	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	pigs	highlights	how	those	who	do	not	keep	pigs	absolve	themselves	of	concern.	In	this	there	is	an	element	of	othering	and	stigmatization	-	embedded	within	these	Acehnese	respondents’	opinions;	a	disassociation	with	avian	influenza	that	does	not	exist	in	Serang	or	Bandar	Lampung.	
																																																								202	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	203	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	October	2010.	204	Interviews	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010,	31	March	2012,	31	October	2010.	205	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	
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Alternative	interpretations	of	the	origin	of	flu	burung	Notably	absent	within	discussions	of	lay	etiology	of	poultry	diseases	–	and	flu	
burung	specifically	-	are	understandings	of	a	more	malevolent,	or	conspiratorial	nature.	No	respondents	blame	foreign	countries	for	either	devising	or	knowingly	spreading	flu	burung	in	Indonesia.	Even	when	asked	specifically	about	whether	avian	influenza	comes	from	the	United	States,	a	few	slaughterers	in	Aceh	were	hesitant	to	speculate	on	what	they	did	not	know:	“Maybe	there	is	avian	influenza	in	America	but	we	have	no	information	about	this.”206	Respondents	may	very	well	have	been	hesitant	to	voice	such	beliefs	in	the	presence	of	a	foreigner.	However,	the	fact	that	there	was	never	any	suggestion	that	a	foreign	government	or	country	plotted	to	spread	this	disease	reinforces	the	idea	that	poultry	disease	events	are	normalized	and	flu	burung	is	treated	as	a	new	label	for	older	afflictions.			The	fact	that	PWP	do	not	openly	associate	foreign	plots	with	flu	burung	contrasts	with	the	opinion	of	a	few	local	and	national	officials.	In	Banten,	one	official	casually	posited	a	“missing	link”	about	the	origin	and	spread	of	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.	While	lacking	in	specificity,	he	said	that	not	long	after	Indonesian	authorities	started	exterminating	infected	chickens	to	prevent	the	spread	of	disease,	there	were	“a	lot	of	chickens	imported	from	America	[laughing].”207	This	official	did	not	elaborate	further	and	other	government	officials	present	during	this	interview	did	not	confirm	or	debunk	this	particular	official’s	rhetorical	“missing	link”.		Positing	foreign	government	interest	in	flu	burung	in	Indonesia	was	popular	with	Siti	Fadilah	Supari,	the	former	Minister	of	Health	and	vocal	Indonesian	government	spokesperson	on	all	issues	relating	to	avian	influenza	from	2004	to	2009.	In	her	book	Supari	hypothesizes	that	the	United	States	government	was	using	viral	samples	to	develop	biological	weapons	(2008,	19).208	That	political	elites	with	higher	levels	of	formal	education	are	more	likely	to	endorse	these	conspiratorial	explanations	for	avian	influenza	than	PWP	aligns	with	some	other	studies	of	conspiratorial	and	alternative	beliefs.	In	Steinberg’s	study	of	alternative	explanations	for	HIV	in	rural	South	Africa,	he	contrasts	the	conspiratorial	views	of	a	government	official	with	those	of	the	villagers	under	his	jurisdiction	(2008,	153).	Indeed,	individuals	with	political	power	have	been	at	the	forefront	of	numerous	conspiratorial	accusations	about	disease.	Kenyan	Nobel	Prize	winner	Wangari	Maathai	publically	declared	that	HIV	was	created	by	“evil	minded	scientists”	(The	Economist	2004).	President	Yahya	Jammeh	of	the	Gambia	has	made	bold	claims	of	possessing	a	cure	for	HIV	(Cassidy	and	Leach	2009).	Barack	Obama’s	former	pastor,	Reverend	Jeremiah	Wright,	infamously	delivered	a	sermon	accusing	the	US	government	of	deliberately	spreading	HIV	among	marginalized	groups	(Wright	2003).	And	in	South	Africa,	former	president	Thabo	Mbeki	and	his	health	minister	Manto	Tshabalala-Msimang	publically	obfuscated	the	link	between	HIV	and	AIDS	and	the	efficacy	of	ARVs	for	years	(Nattrass	2007).																																																									206	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	October	2010.	207	Interview	in	Banten,	19	March	2012.	208	See	(Elbe	2010a)	for	further	discussion	on	Indonesian	former	Health	Minister	Siti	Fadilah	Supari.	
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	Ultimately,	of	particular	interest	in	this	study	is	the	fact	that	when	PWP	voice	counter-explanations	for	the	origin	or	spread	of	flu	burung	in	Indonesia,	they	are	more	likely	to	point	the	finger	at	Indonesian	official	meddling	rather	than	conspiratorial	accounts	involving	external	governments	or	foreigners.	The	absence	of	widespread	conspiratorial	beliefs	about	avian	influenza	in	this	population	suggests	that	respondents	are	not,	in	general,	casting	about	for	alternative	explanations	for	this	phenomenon.	They	are	instead	relatively	secure	in	their	knowledge	about	how	disease	originates	–	and	how	it	does	not.	These	beliefs	are	discussed	in	more	detail	below.	
Factors	influencing	constructions	of	risk	Having	established	that	the	majority	of	PWP	believe	avian	influenza	to	be	a	seasonal	affliction,	largely	outside	of	one’s	control,	discussion	will	now	turn	to	various	factors	influencing	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	towards	animals.	These	largely	align	with	the	availability	heuristic,	in	that	they	demonstrate	the	importance	of	familiarity,	salience	and	timing	with	regards	to	shaping	the	way	that	the	risk	avian	influenza	poses	to	animals	is	conceived.			People	who	believe	that	avian	influenza	exists	and	is	a	disease	present	in	their	communities	–	most	of	whom	see	flu	burung	as	simply	a	new	name	for	an	older	affliction	-	can	be	broadly	separated	into	two	categories.	The	first	comprises	PWP	who	tend	to	play	a	role	in	the	poultry	trade	entailing	an	extended	interface	with	poultry	and	a	degree	of	care	for	live	birds.	The	second	is	composed	of	individuals	who	recall	relatively	recent	and	large-scale	disease	events	that	affected	their	poultry	and	their	business.	These	categories	are,	of	course,	not	mutually	exclusive,	and	illustrate	the	relevance	of	the	availability	heuristic	–	referring	to	the	familiarity,	salience	and	timing	of	experiences	with	risk	–	in	shaping	respondents’	understanding	of	disease	and	constructions	of	risk.		Those	who	said	that	avian	influenza	was	a	novel	poultry	disease	that	affected	Acehnese	birds	were	primarily	mugees	and	not	people	who	strictly	slaughter	birds	or	sell	their	carcasses	to	customers.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	8,	at	Pasar	Bireuen	birds	are	not	kept	overnight	in	cages	and	thus	people	there	who	are	largely	responsible	for	slaughtering	and	selling	are	not	necessarily	responsible	for	caring	for	birds	before	they	are	killed	and	sold.	Mugees,	on	the	other	hand,	buy	birds	from	multiple	sources	and	house	and	care	for	them	-	sometimes	for	extended	periods	-	before	taking	them	to	the	market.	Not	all	birds	are	sold	every	day;	mugees	care	for	birds	as	they	await	sale,	and	a	healthy	bird	brings	a	better	price.	While	many	slaughterers	and	sellers	in	Bireuen	raise	birds	and	claim	an	ability	to	identify	a	diseased	bird,	on	the	whole,	mugees	in	Aceh	have	more	experience	in	tending	to	poultry	for	extended	periods	and	are	likely	to	witness	more	death	in	poultry	than	people	who	strictly	slaughter	birds	and	sell	meat.			In	Serang,	by	contrast,	all	unsold	live	birds	are	kept	caged	overnight;	a	chicken	in	
Pasar	Rau	may	remain	caged	with	other	animals	for	multiple	days	awaiting	a	buyer.	
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Because	of	this,	respondents	who	work	strictly	in	the	market	in	Serang	tend	to	care	for	animals	for	extended	periods	and	are	responsible	for	feeding	them,	providing	water,	and	ensuring	that	their	cage	is	sheltered	from	the	elements	when	closing	at	the	end	of	each	day.	PWP	here	spend	more	time	with	birds	than	slaughterers	and	sellers	in	Aceh	and	are	thus	better	able	to	discriminate	between	healthy	and	sick	chickens.	This	became	clear	when	Sari	and	I	witnessed	one	PWP	in	Pasar	Rau	assess	the	value	of	twelve	chickens	brought	by	an	agen	from	Pasar	Kelodoran.	During	this	assessment	he	singled	out	one	particular	ayam	kampung,	placing	it	to	one	side	of	the	remaining	eleven	village	chickens;	Sari	inquired	about	this	specifically:		
	 Sari:	What’s	wrong	with	that	one,	why	is	it	separated?			 PWP:	It’s	sick.			 Sari:	Sick?			 PWP:	Yes,	it’s	likely	to	die	tomorrow	morning,	if	not	this	afternoon.			 Sari:	How	do	you	know?			 PWP:	Because	the	face	is	red,	and	it’s	very	quiet	-	so	inactive.			 Sari:	Oh	is	that	so?	What	else?			 PWP:	The	leg	of	this	one	is	cold;	I	see	chickens	often	enough	to	know	if			 anything	strange	is	going	on.209		What	role	a	person	plays	in	LBMs	-	and	whether	they	buy	chickens	knowing	that	they	need	to	sustain	them	for	multiple	days	–	influences	whether	or	not	respondents	think	avian	influenza	affects	their	poultry.	In	this	way,	respondents’	familiarity	with	disease	is	an	important	factor	shaping	their	constructions	of	risk	about	H5N1.	In	Bandar	Lampung,	in	contrast,	birds	are	only	rarely	kept	overnight	at	Pasar	Tugu	and	there	are	very	few	agens	bringing	village	chickens	and	other	birds	to	the	market	each	day.	What	then	explains	why	nearly	all	respondents	in	Lampung	identify	flu	
burung	as	a	disease	present	in	poultry	in	their	market?			Respondents	in	Lampung	readily	discuss	disease	events	labelled	as	outbreaks	of	flu	
burung.	One	respondent	there	confirmed	that	in	the	past	few	years,	“Yes,	my	chickens	got	that	flu	[burung]	too.	Most	of	them	are	dead”	because	of	avian	influenza.210	In	this	way,	the	salience	and	timing	of	personal	and	collective	experiences	with	disease	matters:	those	who	have	lost	birds	or	business	because	of	a	disease	event	are	more	willing	to	discuss	these	events.	In	environments	where	disease	events	are	rare,	the	amount	of	interface	PWP	have	with	birds	helps																																																									209	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	210	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012.	
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determine	whether	they	think	avian	influenza	exists	in	their	location.	And	thus,	poultry	agents	-	broadly	understood	to	include	mugees,	agens,	and	other	individuals	who	source	and	buy	birds	from	surrounding	communities	and	bring	them	to	markets	–	may	serve	as	valuable	conduits	for	information	about	poultry	health	and	disease	events	in	rural	communities.		So	far,	this	chapter	has	outlined	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	for	animals	related	to	poultry	diseases	in	general	and	avian	influenza	specifically.	Although	PWP	lack	consensus	with	regards	to	some	aspects	of	aetiology	and	pathogenesis,	by	and	large,	they	construct	avian	influenza	as	a	disease	that	primarily	affects	chickens	rather	than	ducks	or	geese.	The	novelty	of	flu	burung	is	more	the	name	than	the	condition,	the	symptoms,	or	its	effects.	Those	who	have	greater	knowledge	of	poultry	disease	are	often	those	who	have	more	sustained	contact	with	birds	–	usually	those	who	are	responsible	for	their	care	over	several	days.	Most	respondents	agree	that	avian	influenza	comes	with	seasonal	fluctuations	rather	than	from	a	contagious	pathogen.	This	has	implications	for	the	majority	of	respondents’	aetiological	conceptualizations	–	infected	birds	are	not	seen	to	pose	a	risk	to	non-infected	birds,	even	when	kept	in	close	proximity.			Having	highlighted	how	PWP	construct	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1	for	animals,	specifically	distinguishing	between	the	risk	of	morbidity	and	mortality	among	different	species	of	birds,	and	leading	to	an	emphasis	on	chickens	as	the	poultry	species	most	susceptible	to	avian	influenza,	discussion	will	now	turn	to	how	PWP	assess	the	risk	posed	by	H5N1	to	humans.			
The	construction	of	risks	for	humans	Whether	or	not	people	perceive	a	risk	to	themselves	from	an	infectious	disease	may	contribute	to	their	willingness	to	participate	in	health	programming	aimed	at	controlling	the	disease	in	question	(Nichter	2008).	Discussing	influenza-control	programmes,	Leppin	and	Aro	state:				 The	effectiveness	of	such	control	measures	depends	fundamentally	on	the		 public’s	willingness	to	cooperate,	which	again	is	likely	to	be	associated		 with	the	level	of	personal	risk	people	perceive	(2009,	7).		As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	people	who	work	at	the	human-animal	interface	may	be	at	an	elevated	risk	for	H5N1	exposure	and	infection	(Bridges	et	al.	2002;	J.	H.	Kim	et	al.	2011),	and	there	have	been	recurrent	interventions	in	different	markets	across	Indonesia	focused	on	informing	these	populations	of	the	attendant	risks	associated	with	their	work	(Samaan	et	al.	2012).	For	example,	in	the	two	years	prior	to	this	research,	the	American	Red	Cross	and	the	Indonesian	Red	Cross	worked	in	all	three	of	the	primary	fieldsites	where	this	research	was	undertaken,	implementing	a	communications	campaign	to	inform	PWP	and	the	general	public	of	the	risks	associated	with	being	in	close	contact	with	poultry.			
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As	outlined	in	the	sections	above,	most	respondents	construct	the	risk	from	disease	as	species-specific,	meaning	that	the	majority	of	PWP	do	not	think	H5N1	can	affect	ducks	or	geese,	to	say	nothing	of	seeing	themselves	as	having	elevated	risk	for	avian	influenza	infection.	Human	diseases	are	seen	to	pose	a	risk	to	humans	alone.	Poultry	diseases	infect	poultry,	with	only	a	minority	of	Acehnese	respondents	suggesting	the	possibility	of	interspecies	transmission	with	pigs.	For	those	who	believe	flu	burung	exists,	it	is	a	disease	that	infects	only	chickens,	not	ducks	or	geese.	Likewise,	tetelo	and	ta’oen	were	also	diseases	that	only	infect	chickens;	ducks	and	geese	have	different	diseases.	In	this	way,	the	majority	of	respondents	articulate	a	firmly	embedded	construction	of	the	risks	associated	with	different	diseases:	human	diseases	are	uniquely	human	and	the	possibility	of	zoonotic	transmission	does	not	figure	in	conversation.	Underlying	hints	of	a	pious	fatalism	are	also	embedded	within	this	theory	of	species-specific	infection.			“No	it	is	impossible”	for	humans	to	become	infected	with	poultry	diseases,	reports	an	older	seller	with	a	few	ayam	kampung	at	his	feet:	“[There	are]	different	diseases	for	humans	and	animals.	I	don’t	know	exactly,	but	from	my	experience	selling	chicken	I’ve	never	[been]	infected	by	diseases.	Insha’	Allah.”211	It	is	notable	that	this	seller	was	one	of	the	few	who	believed	that	chicken	carry	disease	in	their	bodies	and	are	vectors	for	transmission	to	other	chicken.	When	asked	if	any	poultry	diseases	could	infect	humans,	a	seller	in	Lampung	confirms	that	there	are	“different”	diseases	for	birds	and	humans.212	As	one	small-hold	farmer	who		sells	birds	at	Pasar	Bireuen	crudely	states,	somewhat	jokingly:	“[laughing]	There	is	avian	influenza	for	the	animals	and	AIDS	to	the	people.”213			Even	among	those	who	say	avian	influenza	is	a	novel	disease	present	in	their	province,	the	likelihood	of	a	poultry	disease	infecting	humans	seems	farfetched,	a	perception	of	risk	cultivated	by	media	or	the	government;	PWP	in	all	three	sites	drew	similar	conclusions.	Thus	a	respondent	in	Serang	cites	the	empirical	basis	for	his	beliefs,	explaining	that	he	has	always	been	“around	chickens	and	he	doesn’t	get	the	disease	[avian	influenza].	It’s	safe	[laughing].	It’s	just	the	news.”214	Asked	if	avian	influenza	also	poses	a	risk	to	humans,	a	seller	in	Lampung	replies:	“No	it	doesn’t.	[But]	the	media	has	talked	about	this	for	a	long	time,	[and]	it	made	customers	worry.”215	Another	PWP	in	Serang	responds	that	he	has	sold	chickens	for	much	of	his	life	and	“has	never	been	attacked	by	these	diseases.	I	am	healthy,	just	like	now	[laughing].	No	it’s	impossible	[to	become	infected	with	poultry	diseases].	Even	sick	chickens	we	usually	eat.”216	Most	respondents	agree	that	flu	burung	“is	not	contagious	to	humans.	It’s	just	the	media	that	says	so.”217																																																											211	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.		212	Interview	in	Lampung,	8	April	2012.	213	Interview	in	Aceh,	3	February	2010.	214	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	215	Interview	in	Lampung,	26	July	2012.	216	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.		217	Interview	in	Banten,	17	May	2012.	
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Sellers	note	that	customers	were	afraid	when	avian	influenza	was	widely	discussed	in	the	press	-	broadly	around	the	years	2006-2009	-	and	therefore	they	avoided	buying	birds.218	Asked	to	account	for	why	customers	were	concerned	about	avian	influenza	when	people	working	in	the	markets	were	not,	a	PWP	in	Lampung	responds:	“I	guess	the	power	of	word	of	mouth	is	so	strong...	People	were	afraid	because	of	the	mass	of	information	on	the	television.”219	Of	course,	what	was	reported	in	the	press	was	the	incidence	of	human	cases,	meaning	that	as	customers	were	faced	with	regular	reminders	of	current	human	cases,	they	modified	their	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours,	albeit	on	a	temporary	basis.	This	highlights	the	availability	heuristic	in	effect,	as	perceptions	of	the	risk	as	familiar	(being	reported	widely),	salient	(being	dramatic)	and	timely	(being	recent)	informed	constructions	of	risk	among	customers.	Yet	for	PWP,	these	media	reports	were	insufficient	to	convince	them	that	humans	were	at	risk	for	infection,	suggesting	that	both	familiarity	and	salience	are	highly	subjective	criteria,	leading	to	heterogeneous	assessments	and	conclusions.		While	most	confirm	that	humans	are	not	at	risk,	there	are	a	few	respondents	who	are	uncertain	about	human	susceptibility	to	H5N1	infection.	Asked	if	flu	burung	can	infect	humans,	a	duck	seller	at	Pasar	Kelodoran,	the	market	just	outside	Serang	replies:	“I	don’t	really	know	about	it.”220	A	seller	in	Lampung	also	conveys	uncertainty:		 			 I’m	not	sure,	the	news	on	TV	was	never	good.	I	can’t	say	whether	it	is		 infecting	humans	or	not	because	I’m	not	infected.	Well,	I	hope	I	will	not	be		 infected...	Bottom	line,	if	we	are	honest,	God	will	protect	us,	and	we	have		 to	thank	God	for	what	we	have.221		This	seller	expresses	pious	fatalism	coupled	with	uncertainty	about	human	susceptibility	to	disease.	Indeed,	a	common	refrain	among	the	minority	who	echoed	some	concern	about	the	risks	of	human	avian-influenza	infection	was	that	this	issue	was	ultimately	not	in	their	control,	and	insha’	Allah	-	God	willing	–	they	will	not	be	infected.			Along	with	those	who	remain	unsure,	there	were	also	a	notable	few	respondents	who	felt	that	humans	could	be	infected	with	flu	burung.	A	fishmonger	working	across	the	aisle	from	the	area	where	most	poultry	is	sold	in	Aceh	says:	“I	am	very	worried”	about	avian	influenza	because	“our	health	is	everything	for	us.”	When	asked	whether	all	people	in	the	market	are	equally	at	risk	of	becoming	infected,	the	fish	seller	confirms	that	people	who	slaughter	and	sell	poultry	are	more	at	risk	because,																																																											218	Interview	in	Lampung,	10	April	2012.	219	Interview	in	Lampung,	26	July	2012.	220	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	221	Interview	in	Lampung,	9	April	2012.	
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	 they	tend	to	make	contact	with	the	birds	while	we	[other	people	in	the		 market]	just	breathe	the	air...	We	are	not	prone	to	be	infected	from	the		 disease.	We	never	make	contact	with	the	birds.	We	just	breathe	the	air		 every	day.222				It	is	important	to	note	that	when	interviewed,	this	seller	was	marketing	fish	no	more	than	a	few	yards	from	someone	selling	chicken	carcasses.	Wheelbarrows	were	passing	by	stacked	with	dead	birds,	and	blood	and	feathers	littered	the	ground.	For	this	seller,	direct	contact	with	birds	was	risky,	and	he	wanted	people	who	slaughter	and	sell	birds	to	be	relocated	-	isolated	from	the	other	sellers	at	the	market.	He	also	thought	it	best	to	establish	limits	on	when	birds	could	be	slaughtered.	When	we	asked	this	fish	seller	if	anybody	had	ever	suggested	to	PWP	that	poultry	should	be	slaughtered	and	sold	in	a	separate	space,	he	indicated	clearly	that	any	such	suggestion	would	be	inappropriate:	“We	cannot	say	that	in	front	of	them	[the	poultry	sellers].	We	can	only	talk	like	this	when	they	are	not	around.	This	is	the	way	it	is.”223		In	Lampung,	a	former	policeman	from	Java	who	retired	to	Bandar	Lampung	and	now	sells	a	few	dozen	chickens	a	week	to	restaurants	for	uang	kecil	–	small	money	–	said,	“When	people	were	talking	about	avian	influenza	it	was	scary.”	Addressing	Sari	directly,	he	stated:	“That	[avian]	influenza	is	contagious,	Miss.”	Asked	specifically	whether	or	not	flu	burung	is	dangerous	for	humans,	this	respondent	confirms	that	it	is,	and	suggests	more	nuanced	technical	knowledge	on	virulence:	“Of	course	it	is,	especially	if	[infected]	people	go	late	to	the	hospital.”224	Indeed,	one	reason	for	higher-than-average	mortality	rates	among	H5N1-infected	Indonesians	is	that	infected	individuals	across	the	country	delay	their	arrival	at	health	care	facilities	(Adisasmito	et	al.	2013).	That	this	policeman	alone	reflects	these	data	is	likely	due	to	his	proximity	to	past	channels	of	official	messaging	rather	than	penetration	of	public	health	messaging,	as	there	are	no	other	PWP	who	share	his	opinion.			While	concern	about	human	infection	with	avian	influenza	among	PWP	in	Serang	is	largely	absent,	there	was	a	notable	exception	when	one	individual	–	a	man	who	raises	a	few	birds	at	home	-	concluded	that	flu	burung	can	infect	humans.	This	story,	however,	was	not	heard	directly	from	the	person	in	question,	but	delivered	second-hand	by	a	NGO	official	based	in	the	city.	In	their	words,	this	man			 ...went	to	his	wife’s	parents'	house	and	was	told	that	their	neighbour’s		 chickens	were	suddenly	dying.	He	thought,	and	told	me,	‘This	could	be		 bird	flu’.	He	cut	[killed]	the	chickens...[then]	cooked	and	ate	them.	Then,		 he	immediately	became	sick.	‘Really	sick’,	he	said,	‘this	is	the	only	time		 I’ve	ever	felt	a	fever	like	this	–	it	must	mean	that	bird	flu	is	real’,	he		 thought.	I	asked	him	why	he	did	not	report	this	outbreak	or	tell	his																																																									222	Interview	in	Aceh,	7	February	2010.	223	Interview	in	Aceh,	7	February	2010.	224	Interview	in	Lampung,	28	July	2012.	
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	 doctors.	‘I’m	afraid	I’d	be	yelled	at’	he	said.	So	he	did	not	report.	He	went		 to	the	clinic	but	did	not	say	he	ate	a	sick	chicken.	He	just	wanted	to	prove	if		 bird	flu	is	true	or	not...	No,	he	didn’t	die...	He	was	trying	hard	to	prove	and		 show	people	[that	bird	flu	is	real].	It	was	a	thrilling	story.225		Although	relayed	by	a	third	party,	this	story	illustrates	how	respondents	claim	to	gather	evidence	to	interpret	government	claims	about	flu	burung,	as	well	as	how	these	accounts	are	relayed	(and	possibly	embellished	or	otherwise	altered)	by	NGO	workers.	That	properly	cooked	chicken	is	unlikely	to	transmit	H5N1	(Thomas	and	Swayne	2007)	is	not	addressed.	According	to	this	narrative,	official	assertions	alone	were	neither	trusted	nor	convincing	enough	to	alter	this	man’s	constructions	of	risk	–	he	had	to	live	it	to	believe	it.	While	this	story	is	unique,	the	inductive	method	that	he	employed	is	characteristic	of	the	tendency	for	most	PWP	to	gather	knowledge	through	first-hand	experience	and	observation.	Moreover,	that	this	individual	was	worried	about	being	“yelled	at”	by	medical	professionals	suggests	an	underlying	sense	of	intimidation	surrounding	authority	figures.	Disease-control	programming	for	avian	influenza	is	more	effective	when	people	thought	to	be	infected	with	the	virus	seek	assistance	promptly	(Adisasmito	et	al.	2013).	This	individual	self-diagnosed	his	H5N1	infection;	the	fact	that	he	thought	he	was	infected	with	avian	influenza	and	still	did	not	tell	animal-	or	human-health	care	professionals	that	birds	were	dying	and	that	he	had	eaten	a	sick	bird	suggests	a	hesitancy	to	engage	with	official	institutions,	with	significant	implications	for	the	mechanisms	on	which	avian	influenza	surveillance	hinges.			On	the	opposite	end	of	the	spectrum	to	those	who	think	that	avian	influenza	can	infect	humans,	there	is	a	small	minority	who	voice	more	aggressive	opposition	to	the	idea	that	poultry	transmit	disease	to	humans.	In	Banten	two	sellers	openly	question	the	idea	that	humans	are	susceptible	to	avian	influenza.	One,	an	older	seller	at	Pasar	Kelodoran,	says	that	he	would	confront	officials	who	claim	that	flu	
burung	can	infect	humans,	stating:	“Here,	I	will	drink	chicken	blood	from	a	bird	that	is	sick”	to	show	that	there	is	no	risk.226	The	other,	a	younger	seller	at	Pasar	Rau,	said	that	“if	there’s	a	chicken	diagnosed	with	bird	flu,	‘here	let	me	eat	it.’	I	keep	on	eating	chickens	and	I’m	still	healthy	[laughing].227	Like	the	story	recounted	by	the	NGO	official	above,	these	sellers	draw	on	experiential	proof,	using	their	consumption	habits	as	evidence	that	humans	are	not	susceptible	to	H5N1.	In	Lampung	a	PWP	also	professed	a	willingness	to	test	whether	avian	influenza	can	infect	humans	when	Sari	inquired	if	he	was	worried:	“No,	I	don’t	care	about	those	issues.	It	[poultry	diseases]	naturally	happens.	If	someone	bets	me	to	eat	a	chicken	that	is	suspected	[to	be	infected	with]	avian	influenza	I	will	eat	it.”	From	here,	Sari	followed	up,	asking	if	any	people	that	work	in	the	market	are	worried	about	flu	burung:		
																																																								225	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	226	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	227	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.	
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	 Pak	Muji:	I’ve	been	a	long	time	working	in	this	site,	if	there	is	any	worry		 from	someone	[about	avian	influenza]	that	means	that	person	is	stupid.			 Sari:	Stupid?			 Pak	Muji:	Yeah,	they	forget	that	we	will	die.	Who	takes	care	of	all	of	this?		 God...228		Once	again,	this	respondent	raises	the	idea	that	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	for	animals	and	humans	are	partly	considered	to	be	issues	that	remain	beyond	human	control	-	a	sense	of	fatalism	intertwined	and	articulated	within	professed	religiosity.	Such	fatalism	is	also	reported	in	relation	to	other	diseases	in	Indonesia,	and	notably	those	identified	as	able	to	infect	humans	(Hay	2001).	Though	in	the	current	study,	these	more-overt	deviations	from	constructions	of	risk	represented	by	scientific	authorities	were	unique,	it	is	nonetheless	important	to	consider	their	implications	for	policy	and	programming.	In	citing	their	consumption	of	chicken	as	proof	that	H5N1	does	not	infect	humans,	PWP	indicate	the	importance	of	experiential	evidence	in	their	assessments	of	the	potential	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza.	Public	messaging	about	H5N1	prevention	already	highlights	the	importance	of	cooking	chicken	thoroughly	(UNICEF	2007),	but	it	may	be	important	to	communicate	a	more	explicit	message	explaining	human	susceptibility	to	address	the	type	of	beliefs	illustrated	above.		
Sources	of	information	or	authority	about	avian	influenza	As	the	previous	sections	illustrate,	PWP	routinely	draw	on	their	own	observations	and	long	histories	of	involvement	with	the	poultry	industry	to	arrive	at	their	understandings	of	the	risk	posed	to	animals	and	humans	from	bird	flu.	This	section	outlines	why	other	sources	of	information	or	authority	presenting	a	different	construction	of	risk	about	H5N1	are	considered	secondary	to	experience	and	observation.	Across	all	three	sites,	though	television	is	near	unanimously	identified	as	the	source	that	first	introduced	the	idea	of	flu	burung,	as	a	label	and	an	affliction,	this	does	not	suggest	that	people	first	learned	about	poultry	diseases	from	television.	As	has	been	shown,	poultry	diseases	are	not	considered	novel	phenomena	–	yet	the	concept	of	flu	was	first	introduced	to	respondents	across	Indonesia	via	official	television	messaging.229			Across	the	three	sites	very	few	respondents	report	that	government	officials,	public	health	workers,	or	veterinary	authorities	provided	them	with	information	about	flu	
burung,	despite	the	fact	that	there	was	relatively	active	programming	by	the	American	Red	Cross	and	PMI	promoting	avian	influenza	awareness	in	each	of	these																																																									228	Interview	in	Lampung,	7	April	2012.	229	This	observation	draws	on	a	long	tradition	in	HIV	research	suggesting	that	the	reputation	of	the	original	source	for	information	about	disease	becomes	invariably	intermingled	with	the	disease	itself	(Steinberg	2008;	McNeill	2009).	With	avian	influenza,	official	television	messaging	associated	with	the	government	renders	the	disease	“a	government	name”	and	little	else.	
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sites	at	least	as	late	as	2009.	In	Aceh	two	sellers	recall	how	the	Indonesian	Red	Cross	came	to	Pasar	Bireuen	once	around	2006	to	distribute	soap	to	PWP	–	about	“one	[bar	of]	soap	for	five	people”.	But,	as	these	respondents	recall,	“They	didn’t	bring	a	big	amount	of	soap”	and	“they	didn’t	tell	us	anything...	They	came	by	themselves	[while]	we	were	busy	with	our	own	work”	and	have	not	since	returned.230	For	most	PWP,	interfacing	with	officials	is	rare.	“So	far,	the	government	never	gave	[us]	any	news”	about	avian	influenza,	concludes	one	respondent	in	Lampung.231	This	stands	in	contrast	with	statements	by	officials,	who	say	that	they	had	actively	disseminated	information	to	PWP	in	live	bird	markets	about	the	risk	of	human	infection	with	avian	influenza.232	Along	with	interventions	in	LBMs,	officials	state	that	they	used	both	radio	messaging	and	Ustads	–	people	who	teach	about	Islam	-	to	disseminate	news	about	the	risk	to	human	health	posed	by	H5N1.233			Despite	these	programs,	television	messaging	is	by	far	the	most	remembered	medium	for	information	about	flu	burung	among	PWP.	Some	form	of	these	official	messages	likely	linger	with	a	minority	of	those	working	at	the	human-animal	interface,	as	is	suggested	above	with	reference	to	the	“falling	from	the	tree”	anecdote.	Nonetheless,	receiving	official	messaging	that	avian	influenza	is	a	new	disease	that	poses	a	significant	risk	to	poultry	and	human	health	does	not	influence	respondents’	opinion	about	the	novelty	of	the	disease	or	their	constructions	of	the	risk	associated	with	H5N1	for	humans,	largely	because	these	messages	are	not	corroborated	to	any	degree	by	their	experience.	On	the	strength	of	their	history	of	involvement	in	the	market	and	working	with	birds,	PWP	suggest	that	they	have	all	the	information	that	they	need.	Whether	they	would	be	receptive	to	new	information	if	their	circumstances	changed	–	for	example,	if	they	observed	the	occurrence	of	widespread	human-to-human	transmission	–	is	open	for	debate	and	future	study.		PWP	are	not	self-conscious	or	anxious	about	their	levels	of	knowledge;	indeed,	PWP	are	not	actively	searching	for	more	information	about	flu	burung.	Rather,	most	PWP	profess	sufficient	expertise	about	poultry	diseases,	among	which	flu	burung	is	included.	Nonetheless,	these	data	identify	certain	gaps	between	lay	knowledge	and	biomedical	understandings	about	avian	influenza.	PWP’s	basis	of	knowledge,	derived	through	extensive	experience	of	working	at	the	human-animal	interface	can,	at	times,	lead	them	to	overlook	important	aspects	of	avian	influenza	pathogenesis	that	are	not	readily	observable.	An	example	of	this	is	the	belief	that	avian	influenza	does	not	affect	ducks	but	is	solely	a	disease	for	chickens.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	ducks	are	often	asymptomatic	reservoirs	for	infection	with	avian	influenza,	and	as	such,	are	capable	of	transmitting	the	virus	to	chicken	populations	without	appearing	sick	themselves	(Wibawa	et	al.	2013).	Thus,	it	is	easy	to	perceive	that	ducks	are	not	affected	by	avian	influenza.	In	this	way,	PWP	may	be	able	to	claim	expertise	in																																																									230	Interview	in	Aceh,	10	February	2010.	231	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	232	Interview	in	Aceh,	4	February	2010.	233	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	
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recognizing	a	sick	chicken,	but	they	are	less	capable	of	recognizing	the	more	complex	population	dynamics	of	avian	influenza.	Similarly,	PWP	may	have	a	tendency	to	conflate	diseases	among	poultry	that	have	similar	or	identical	clinical	presentations;	avian	influenza	infection	in	chickens	appears	in	much	the	same	manner	as	infection	with	Newcastle	Disease	(Gardner	and	Alders	2014;	Alders	and	Bagnol	2007).	This	would	lead	PWP	to	potentially	overestimate	the	prevalence	of	either	avian	influenza	or	Newcastle	Disease	in	chickens.	Most	importantly,	as	illustrated	throughout	this	chapter,	inductively-derived	constructions	of	risk	also	lead	PWP	to	erroneously	conclude	that	humans	are	not	susceptible	to	avian	influenza,	because	human	infections	are	rare	(Patel	et	al.	2014).		That	most	PWP	do	not	think	that	poultry	diseases	can	infect	humans,	and	that	they	dismiss	constructions	of	risk	that	deviate	from	these	assessments,	is	acknowledged	by	officials	responsible	for	controlling	avian	influenza	in	the	sites	where	this	research	was	conducted.	To	make	people	aware	of	the	risk	that	H5N1	poses	to	humans,	one	official	responsible	for	animal	health	recognized	the	importance	of	having	recent,	vivid	encounters	with	the	disease	to	furnish	proof	of	these	claims,	saying	that	in	the	future,	he	“hoped	there	was	an	example	[of	people]	dying	because	of	avian	influenza	(laughing).”234	While	stated	in	a	seemingly	perverse,	yet	joking	manner,	this	official’s	statement	confirms	that	in	the	absence	of	an	epidemic,	very	few	people	at	the	human-animal	interface	in	Indonesia	feel	that	the	risk	of	becoming	infected	with	H5N1	is	familiar	or	salient.	As	a	result,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapter,	they	are	unlikely	to	modify	their	behaviours	in	significant	ways	in	order	to	contribute	to	the	attainment	of	the	global	public	good	of	preventing	and	containing	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	in	humans.			Here,	it	is	important	to	reiterate	that	these	data	derive	from	research	in	LBMs	during	times	when	there	were	not	exceptional	disease	events	in	humans	or	in	poultry.	If	human	morbidity	and	mortality	from	H5N1	began	to	increase,	along	with	mass	die-offs	in	the	poultry	population,	and	decreasing	economic	opportunities,	risk	perceptions	among	PWP	might	drastically	alter.		
	
Economic	and	political	risks	presented	by	avian	influenza	In	contrast	to	the	current	lack	of	anxiety	around	the	threat	posed	by	avian	influenza	for	humans	discussed	above,	anxiety	is	apparent	in	PWP’s	remarks	in	relation	to	the	economic	losses	sustained	from	both	public	perceptions	about	disease	outbreaks	in	poultry,	and	from	interventions	designed	to	contain	the	spread	and	impact	of	disease.	PMI	officials	in	Banten	recall	how	PWP	resist	PMI’s	awareness	and	education	activities	associated	with	flu	burung	in	LBMs,	including	in	Pasar	Rau	in	Serang.	As	one	PMI	official	describes:	“In	schools,	the	response	was	great,	and	also	in	social	situations	[in	communities].	But	in	the	markets,	we	usually	tell	them	[PWP]	the	information	[about	avian	influenza],	but	they	take	it	as	if	we	are	trying	to	frighten	them…	yeah,	people	[who	work	in	LBMs]	tend	to	get	angry”	when	we	speak																																																									234	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	
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with	them.	Another	PMI	official	adds,	“Yeah,	they	think	that	because	of	this	[PMI’s	presence],	their	chickens	won’t	sell.”235		Some	respondents	suggest	that	more	cynical	motives	may	underpin	the	practice	of	calling	attention	to	what	are	perceived	to	be	long	established	older	diseases	by	giving	it	this	new	name.	236	Pak	Haji,	an	older	live-bird	trader	at	Pasar	Kelodoran	implicated	domestic	political	and	economic	aims,	stating:			 		 Bird	flu	is	just	an	issue	to	create	anxiety.	There	has	always	been	different		 names	[for	poultry	disease]	from	long	time	ago...	yes,	this	issue	[of	bird		 flu]	was	made	to	lower	the	business	of	small	sellers...	As	usual,	Indonesia		 has	political	games	in	it.237		 	Pak	Haji	did	not	go	into	further	detail	and,	unfortunately,	we	did	not	follow	up	his	comment	to	better	determine	the	nature	of	the	“political	games”	that	he	alludes	to.	While	other	PWP	in	Serang	did	not	voice	Pak	Haji’s	opinion,	his	words	resemble	those	of	three	sellers	in	Bandar	Lampung,	a	family	made	up	of	three	men	–	a	father	and	two	sons	–	who	work	at	Pasar	Tugu.	This	family	echoed	the	belief	that	relabeling	flu	burung	was	motivated	by	cynical	interests,	as	the	following	conversation	with	the	father	and	his	younger	son	suggests:			 Pak	Muji:	The	disease	that	everybody	is	talking	about	is	avian	influenza,		 but	it	doesn’t	exist...	Chicken	diseases	have	existed	since	a	long	time	ago.		 It	is	seasonal,	because	after	hot	weather	it	changes	to	cold	and	chickens		 become	sick.			 Sari:	So	there	is	no	avian	influenza?			 Pak	Muji:	No,	there	is	no	avian	influenza.	It’s	just	the	work	of	smart		 people.			 Sari:	If	avian	influenza	is	only	a	rumour,	who	made	this	rumour?			 Pak	Muji:	Yes,	it’s	made	by	smart	people	–	the	more	smart	people	that		exist		 the	more	rumours	exist.				 Mas	Siswoyo:	Yeah,	it’s	doctor’s	work.			 Sari:	What	do	you	mean?			 Mas	Siswoyo:	It’s	doctors	business...	there	will	inevitably	be	new		 medicine.	If	[they	are]	correct	and	avian	influenza	exists,	the	one	who	will																																																									235	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	236	Interview	in	Lampung,	7	April	2012.	237	Interview	in	Banten,	31	July	2012.	
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	 be	the		most	easily	infected	must	be	the	sellers.	But	why	then	are	there	no		 sellers	infected	by	the	disease?		 	Although	these	opinions	are	not	widely	held	in	Lampung	or	elsewhere,	it	is	notable	how	these	respondents	draw	attention	to	both	the	financial	incentives	that	might	motivate	some	to	claim	avian	influenza	as	a	novel	affliction,	and	the	implications	these	claims	have	for	PWP’s	own	livelihoods.	They	further	illustrate	how	the	observed	lack	of	mortality	among	sellers	is	used	to	furnish	proof	that	H5N1	does	not	exist.		Another	instance	where	the	economic	risks	of	being	associated	with	flu	burung	seems	to	outweigh	any	other	concern	is	raised	by	an	Acehnese	government	official	who	works	in	animal	health.	He	confirms	that	some	PWP	are	concerned	about	being	officially	labelled	as	flu	burung-affected,	and	targeted	by	interventions	such	as	depopulation	programmes.	He	explains:			 Usually	the	compensation	[for	culling]	is	very	cheap,	I	mean	under	the	usual	price.	If	one	chicken	costs	20,000	IDR	then	the	compensation	is	only	4000	IDR,	and	that	is	also	problematic.	[For	example],	ayam	jago	[fighting	cocks]	cost	almost	one	million	IDR…	[If]	we	kill	their	chickens	and	provide	only	5000	IDR	for	compensation,	they	will	attack	us.238		Thus,	whether	bird	flu	is	seen	to	be	a	real	affliction	or	just	a	renamed	risk,	PWP	view	avian	influenza	primarily	as	a	threat	to	the	revenues	of	people	who	sell	in	markets.	As	such,	these	economic	losses	constitute	a	far	more	familiar	and	salient	risk	to	PWP	than	any	risk	to	themselves	from	disease.		
Conclusion	The	findings	outlined	in	this	chapter	suggest	that	PWP’s	constructions	of	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	to	animals	and	to	humans	are	primarily	mediated	by	personal	experience	and	observation.	Through	these	inductive	processes,	PWP	conclude	that	poultry	diseases	are	seasonal,	thus	largely	outside	of	human	control,	and	operate	in	a	species-specific	manner,	which	obviates	the	perception	of	threat	for	humans.	The	majority	of	respondents	draw	this	conclusion	from	experience:	they	have	long	worked	in	close	contact	with	poultry	and	remain	healthy.	It	should	be	noted	that	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk,	while	not	precisely	reflective	of	the	established	scientific	data,	are	loosely	aligned	with	such	consensus.	As	Chapter	2	outlined,	the	actual	risk	of	transmission	between	poultry	and	humans	is	quite	low,	as	is	the	absolute	number	of	human	cases	of	H5N1	infection.	Thus,	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza,	particularly	in	contexts	where	outbreaks	among	humans	have	not	been	prevalent,	are	not	unreasonable.			A	more	salient	risk	for	PWP	is	the	potential	for	public	perceptions	of	disease	to	drive	customers	away	from	LBMs,	thus	threatening	their	livelihoods.	An	additional	threat																																																									238	Interview	in	Aceh,	9	February	2010.	
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is	posed	by	government-led	disease	interventions,	which	can	resort	to	depopulation	programmes	without	adequate	compensation,	with	deleterious	consequences	for	PWP’s	sources	of	income.	Thus,	governmental	involvement	in	LBMs	is	seen	primarily	through	the	lens	of	threat	rather	than	as	a	resource	to	provide	information	or	assistance	to	control	disease.			The	findings	reported	in	this	chapter	suggest	that,	as	each	risk	is	evaluated	and	assessed	in	its	own	right,	based	on	available	evidence,	the	relationship	between	these	different	dimensions	of	risk	do	not	correspond	to	a	hierarchical	model.	PWP’s	constructions	of	the	risks	posed	by	H5N1	to	themselves	are	unlikely	to	change	even	if	the	economic	risks	posed	by	disease	outbreaks	were	alleviated.	Put	another	way,	perceptions	of	risks	to	humans	are	not	“waiting	in	the	wings”,	but	rather	are	established	by	inductive	processes	of	reasoning	and	will	likely	shift	only	when	and	if	a	different	set	of	empirical	observations	become	available.			Such	was	the	case,	according	to	PWP,	when	earlier	public	health	campaigns	were	seen	to	cause	customers	to	become	concerned	about	avian	influenza,	leading	them	to	avoid	the	markets.	The	fact	that	no	significant	outbreak	materialized,	however,	led	customers	to	return	to	their	habitual	practices.	Thus,	these	respondents	allude	to	how	risk	perceptions	evolve	over	time	and	with	new	information.	These	findings	echo	other	studies	showing	waning	concern	about	avian	influenza	infection	in	humans	over	time,	in	the	absence	of	wide-scale	human	morbidity	and	mortality,	in	Yogyakarta,	Indonesia	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008),	and	among	the	general	population	in	Viet	Nam	(Figuie	and	Fournier	2008),	and	Hong	Kong	(Q.	Liao	et	al.	2011).	As	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	conclusion	of	this	thesis,	future	interventions	would	be	well	advised	to	consider	that	constructions	of	risk	are	not	static	or	immutable.			Having	highlighted	in	detail	the	varied	constructions	of	risk	among	PWP,	discussion	will	now	turn	to	examine	how	these	risk	constructions	are	invoked	in	their	behaviours	in	LBMs.	
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Chapter	10:	Understanding	behaviours	of	PWP	at	the	human-animal	interface			
Introduction		Humans	are	infected	with	H5N1	through	some	degree	of	exposure	to	live	virus	in	a	contaminated	environment,	on	a	fomite,	or	from	an	infected	host.	Human	behaviour	is	intrinsically	linked	to	such	exposure.	As	Janes	and	colleagues	contend,	“the	probability	of	the	emergence	of	a	pandemic	strain	[of	avian	influenza]	is	greatly	enhanced	by	social	and	demographic	factors...”	such	as	human	behaviour	(2012,	2).	Nonetheless,	they	continue:		 		 In	the	causal	chain	of	emergence,	substantial	gaps	or	uncertainties	exist,		 which	are	often	related	to	insufficient	social	and	behavioural	data	for		 epidemiologically	significant	aspects	of	the	human-animal			 interface	(2012,	2–3).		Epidemiological	studies	in	Indonesia	find	that	most	diagnosed	cases	of	H5N1	in	people	are	associated	with	direct	or	indirect	exposure	from	infected	poultry	(Aditama	et	al.	2012;	Adisasmito	et	al.	2013).	People	who	work	in	and	around	LBMs	engage	in	frequent	daily	acts	identified	as	having	the	potential	for	exposure	to	disease:	behaviours	that	go	beyond	simply	touching	birds,	an	action	that	is	an	essential	part	of	their	job	description.	Despite	this,	there	are	no	known	qualitative	studies	documenting	and	interrogating	the	rationale	for	behaviours	of	PWP	in	LBMs	–	behaviours	that	may	amplify	environmental	contamination	with	H5N1,	or	the	potential	for	disease	in	poultry	and	people.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	most	studies	looking	at	behaviour	employ	quantitative	methods,	with	data	derived	from	self-reporting	(deZwart	et	al.	2007;	Fielding,	Lam,	Ho,	Lam,	Heley,	et	al.	2005;	I.	Kristiansen,	Halvorsen,	and	Gyrd-Hansen	2007;	Lau	et	al.	2007;	Peltz,	Avisar-Shotat,	and	Bar-Dayan	2007;	SteelFisher	et	al.	2012;	Tam,	Lee,	and	Lee	2007;	Santhia	et	al.	2009).	This	method	of	data	collection	is	vulnerable	to	social-desirability	bias.	As	SteelFisher	and	colleagues	acknowledge	in	their	study	of	H1N1-related	health	behaviours,	“people	could	have	overestimated	behaviours	perceived	as	socially	desirable”.	Nonetheless,	they	argue	that	self-reporting	is	necessary	to	get	at	these	data	because	“observing	many	of	the	behaviours	asked	about	in	the	poll	would	have	been	difficult”	(2012,	849).	While	getting	at	these	data	through	qualitative	methods	takes	time,	it	is	not	impossible.	In	an	attempt	to	overcome	the	limitations	inherent	in	self-reporting,	the	data	presented	in	this	chapter	derive	from	observations	and	semi-structured	interviews	undertaken	over	the	course	of	multiple	visits	to	each	site.		Studies	that	employ	qualitative	methods	to	look	at	behaviour	are	often	part	of	interventions	aimed	at	behaviour	change	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Kosen	et	al.	2009),	or	derive	from	short-term	fieldwork	(Lohiniva	et	al.	2012),	and	do	not	focus	
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exclusively	on	PWP	in	LBMs	(Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008;	Forster	2012).	Only	Samaan	and	colleagues	(2012)	look	at	behaviours	of	PWP	in	Indonesian	LBMs;	yet	they	do	not	aim	to	understand	the	rationale	for	PWPs’	behaviour,	but	rather	identify	that	certain	behaviours	are	present	in	order	to	alter	them,	so	that	ultimately	PWP	will	adopt	“hygienic	practices”	(2012,	297),	as	laid	out	in	the	WHO	(2006)	guidelines.	While	noting	the	prevalence	of	such	behaviours	is	important,	research	needs	to	go	beyond	simple	documentation.	As	Liao	and	Fielding	contend,	“an	important	aim	of	behavioural	research	in	epidemics	is	to	reveal	the	underlying	determinants	of	individual	and	population	behavioural	responses”	(2013,	567).		Behaviours	that	are	seen	to	amplify	the	risk	of	infection	or	transmission	are	usually	presented	as	resulting	from	a	lack	of	information	about	disease	and	a	limited	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	transmission	(FAO	2011;	WHO/FAO/UNICEF	2006;	Fielding	and	Lam	2007).	This	chapter	sees	behaviour	as	shaped	by	more	than	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	deficit	of	knowledge,	and	explores	the	extent	to	which	the	different	constructions	of	risk	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter	–	relating	to	animal	and	human	health,	economic	impacts	to	livelihoods,	and	political	involvement	–	animate	PWP’s	behaviours.	While	much	of	the	focus	is	on	what	respondents	do,	this	chapter	also	highlights	what	people	do	not	do,	asking,	for	example:	why	do	respondents	at	the	human-animal	interface	not	wash	their	hands	with	soap	and	water	after	touching	birds?	Why	do	they	not	wear	personal	protective	equipment	such	as	gloves	or	a	facemask?		This	chapter	organizes	its	discussion	of	behaviours	in	relation	to	the	biosecurity	strategies	advocated	in	the	World	Health	Organization’s	Measures	to	reduce	
transmission	of	avian	influenza	in	wet	markets	in	developing	countries	(WHO	2006).239	Though	these	WHO	guidelines	are	intended	to	reduce	the	risks	of	transmission	between	poultry,	they	are	largely	aligned	with	a	disease	narrative	representing	the	primary	risk	posed	by	H5N1	to	be	in	relation	to	human	health.	It	outlines	ten	measures	to	mitigate	environmental	contamination	and	disease	exposure,	including	washing	hands,	using	PPE,	and	ensuring	there	is	adequate	drainage	in	the	markets.	These	measures,	however,	do	not	all	relate	to	the	behaviour	of	PWP;	the	issue	of	drainage,	for	example,	is	a	wider	structural	concern	and	more	an	issue	for	officials	than	PWP.	Thus,	I	address	the	WHO’s	recommendations	focusing	on	individual	behaviours	of	PWP,	first	examining	washing	behaviour,	and	particularly,	hand-washing	and	the	cleaning	of	surfaces	and	equipment	used	to	slaughter	and	sell	poultry,	followed	by	personal	protective	equipment,	examining	the	rationale	for	why	the	majority	of	respondents	do	not	wear	PPE.	Next,	behaviours	associated	with	sourcing	and	caging	poultry	–	including	noticeably	sick	birds	–	are	discussed	and	analysed,	followed	by	behaviours	associated	with	the	sale	and	disposal	of	poultry	and	their	by-products.			
																																																								239	Measures	to	reduce	transmission	of	avian	influenza	in	wet	markets	in	developing	countries	is	published	as	Annex	3	in	the	WHO’s	A	guide	to	healthy	food	markets	(2006).	
	 188	
At	the	outset,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	majority	of	behaviours	discussed	in	this	chapter	are	normalized	and	openly	observable	in	each	of	the	three	sites.	As	has	been	made	clear,	respondents’	behaviour	is	not	mediated	by	concern	for	human	vulnerability	to	avian	influenza,	and	as	such,	PWP	do	not	actively	seek	to	mitigate	against	the	potential	for	exposure	to	disease.	Data	from	interviews	and	observations	show	that	the	concerns	to	maximize	profits	and	minimize	losses	are	primary	influences	on	PWP’s	behaviour.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	shows	that	the	behaviours	of	PWP	-	taken	together	–	reinforce	the	constructions	of	risk	highlighted	in	Chapter	9.			As	noted	above,	the	findings	of	this	chapter	are	juxtaposed	with	the	WHO	guidelines.	These	guidelines	are	informed	by	available	technical	data	on	how	to	prevent	the	spread	of	avian	influenza,	and	as	such,	reflect	“objective	(non	personal)	inputs	rather	than	subjective	(experiential)	information”	(Plough	and	Krimsky	1987,	8).	It	is,	of	course,	not	their	function	to	reflect	the	beliefs,	preferences,	or	rationales	of	those	who	work	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Nonetheless,	if	the	biosecurity	measures	contained	within	the	WHO’s	Healthy	Market	guidelines	are	to	find	traction	in	the	diverse	environments	that	are	currently	the	focus	of	avian	influenza	control	initiatives,	it	is	crucial	to	interrogate	them	in	relation	to	the	normalized,	everyday	practices	of	PWP.	As	discussed	below,	in	some	instances,	the	guidelines	are	significantly	out	of	touch	with	these	daily	realities	and	would	be	hard	to	implement	without	significant	adjustments.	In	other	cases,	implementation	of	the	guidelines	might	actually	increase	the	risk	of	disease	transmission.	In	both	instances,	comparing	the	directives	of	the	WHO	guidelines	with	the	behaviours	of	PWP	serves	to	underscore	the	limitations	of	disease	control	initiatives	that	are	not	appropriately	attuned	to	the	experiential	risk	rationalities	of	target	populations.		
Washing	in	the	markets	The	Healthy	Market	guidelines	state	that	“Hand-washing,	when	done	correctly”	–	with	“soap,	potable	water,	disposable	towels	and	correct	procedure”	–	is	an	effective	way	to	“reduce	the	likelihood	of	[avian-influenza]	transmission	between	hands	and	face,	and	therefore	it	is	a	high	priority	measure”	which	should	be	prioritized	in	programs	designed	to	control	avian	influenza.	For	PWP,	“hand-washing	should	occur	straight	after	handling	the	birds	to	prevent	transmission	to	the	person	and	surfaces	as	well	as	equipment	that	might	be	handled”.	A	complementary	measure	promoted	in	these	guidelines	is	ensuring	that	all	surfaces	that	come	in	contact	with	poultry	during	slaughter	and	sale	are	“cleaned	adequately”,	meaning	“washed	with	hot	soapy	water,	rinsed	with	potable	water	and	sanitized	with	a	disinfectant”	(WHO	2006,	34–35).			Prior	to	discussing	data,	however,	it	is	important	to	note	that	personal	hygiene	is	paramount	for	followers	of	Islam,	and	washing	oneself	is	intrinsically	bound	to	the	cultural	context	where	this	research	took	place.	In	each	site	the	vast	majority	of	PWP	are	Muslim.	In	Indonesia,	wudhu	is	the	term	borrowed	from	Arabic	to	refer	to	washing	one’s	body	in	preparation	for	formal	prayers,	an	ablution	performed	five	
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times	daily.	Outside	of	LBMs	I	frequently	witnessed	PWP	undertake	this	ritual	purification	when	they	returned	home,	or	before	going	to	mosque.	Indeed,	in	Indonesia,	“cleanliness	of	body	and	spirit	is	integral	to	individual	and	group	identity”	(K.	van	Dijk	and	Taylor	2011,	xii).	While	some	PWP	finish	work	early	on	Fridays	to	go	to	the	mosque,	I	did	not	witness	PWP	openly	praying	at	the	market,	and	thus	conclude	that	they	do	not	habitually	perform	ablution	throughout	the	day	when	working	with	poultry.	To	be	clear,	in	the	discussion	that	follows,	I	do	not	contend	that	PWP	in	general	do	not	wash	in	a	manner	concomitant	with	disease	control,	as	set	out	by	the	WHO	(2006).	Rather,	data	collected	at	LBMs	suggest	that	PWP	do	not	wash	in	this	way	when	working.		Additionally,	I	acknowledge	a	long	and	problematic	history	in	identifying	others	as	dirty	and	unclean,	and	in	need	of	proper	washing.	Such	labelling	often	followed	colonial	encounters	in	Africa	and	Asia	(W.	Anderson	2006;	K.	van	Dijk	and	Taylor	2011).	Dijk	comments	that	Javanese	people,	for	example,	were	recognized	by	Dutch	and	British	colonial	officials	to	bathe	“more	times	a	day	than	a	Westerner	would	do.	All	this	[however]	was	inessential.	It	did	not	count.	By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	the	belief	in	the	dirty	native…”	in	places	like	Indonesia	was	widespread	(K.	van	Dijk	2011,	16).	In	these	encounters,	bathing	in	itself	was	not	enough	–	whether	or	not	people	used	soap	was	an	essential	marker	of	being	civilized	(K.	van	Dijk	2011).	In	this,	I	recognize	that	the	WHO’s	concept	of	“cleaning	adequately”	(2006)	is	a	relative	term,	and	I	do	not	seek	to	reinforce	colonial,	racial	stereotypes	about	hygiene,	nor	do	I	seek	to	reinforce	labelling	of	PWP	as	dirty	or	diseased.	Indeed,	as	highlighted	in	Chapter	2,	given	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	relative	risk	of	H5N1	virus	present	in	LBMs,	this	research	can	not	definitively	determine	whether	people’s	behaviour	places	them	at	increased	risk	for	infection	but,	rather,	interrogates	the	extent	to	which	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	about	H5N1	is	an	influence	on	their	behaviours.	The	remainder	of	this	section	examines	washing	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface,	beginning	with	a	look	at	water	usage.			The	way	that	PWP	obtain	the	water	they	use	during	their	workday	differs	in	each	fieldsite.	In	Lampung	only	the	bigger	sellers	with	storefronts	have	private	access	to	water,	with	the	majority	of	PWP	reliant	on	water	they	bring	from	home	or	buy	at	the	market.	Sellers	who	bring	their	own	water	to	work	do	not	slaughter	on	site	and	thus	do	not	require	the	same	amount	of	water	as	PWP	who	store,	kill,	and	prepare	in	
Pasar	Tugu.	These	smaller	sellers	primarily	use	water	to	keep	birds	looking	fresh,	to	wash	work	surfaces	and	equipment,	and	to	rinse	their	hands.	These	sellers	dump	what	water	remains	before	leaving	the	market	at	the	end	of	work	to	ease	the	burden	of	returning	home.	The	bigger	poultry	traders	in	Lampung	use	more	water,	not	because	they	have	access	to	it,	but	because	they	require	more	water	for	the	slaughtering,	defeathering,	and	processing	of	birds.		In	Banten,	both	large	and	small	poultry	traders	buy	water	from	private	sellers	who	constantly	carry	and	cart	jerry-cans	of	water	around	the	marketplace.	Each	jerry-can	holds	approximately	10	litres	of	water	and	costs	1000	IDR.	The	amount	of	water	used	by	people	in	Pasar	Rau	is	largely	determined	by	how	many	birds	they	slaughter	
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and	sell.	One	PWP	who	claims	to	kill	around	200	birds	a	day	uses	between	15	and	20	jerry-cans	of	water	every	day.240	When	this	seller	was	asked	if	he	changed	the	water	in	which	he	boils	birds	before	defeathering,	he	answered	promptly:	“Well	of	course,	how	can	I	not	[change	the	water]?	The	water	is	always	used	everyday,	so	I	have	to	buy	some	more”	at	the	beginning	of	each	day.	Water	is	used	constantly	throughout	the	slaughter	and	sale	of	poultry.	Only	a	minority	of	PWP	in	Pasar	Rau	store	more	than	a	day’s	worth	of	water	on	site;	those	that	do	use	large,	blue	plastic	containers	with	lids.	Most	PWP	here	use	what	they	acquire	daily,	and	purchase	more	the	next	day.		Image	40:	Water	being	drawn	from	well	located	in	the	poultry	slaughter	area	
																																																																		240	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	
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Image	41:	Well	being	used	during	slaughter	of	poultry	(note,	the	well	is	green)	
		During	the	course	of	this	research	Pasar	Bireuen	in	Aceh	underwent	a	renovation	that	altered	the	source	of	the	market’s	water.	During	roughly	the	first	half	of	this	study,	the	central	water	source	for	people	selling	fish,	poultry,	and	red	meat	was	an	open	well	sunk	in	the	middle	of	the	poultry	sale-and-slaughter	area	(Images	40	and	41).	Every	day	hundreds	of	birds	were	slaughtered	and	cleaned	within	yards	of	this	well.	At	the	end	of	each	day	PWP	repeatedly	threw	buckets	of	water	across	the	ground	to	clear	faeces,	blood,	and	other	remnants	of	the	slaughtering	process;	inevitably,	as	the	slaughtering	area	surrounded	the	well,	some	of	this	runoff	spilt	back	into	the	main	water	source.	This	water	was	also	used	by	people	selling	fish,	meat,	and	vegetables,	as	well	as	PWP,	to	wash	away	effluence	that	built	up	on	their	equipment	and	bodies.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	in	the	right	conditions,	H5N1	can	persist	in	water	for	days	(Brown	et	al.	2007).		If	disease	is	present,	these	behaviours	may	facilitate	environmental	contamination	and	the	potential	for	disease	exposure	in	markets.			When	the	market	was	rebuilt	in	2010-2011	the	central	water	source	was	moved	roughly	20	yards	away	and	relocated	between	a	storefront	where	birds	are	slaughtered	on	one	side,	opposite	an	ice	seller	and	coffee	shop	on	the	other.	This	new	water	source	is	not	a	bucket-drawn	well,	but	an	above-ground	concrete	basin	where	water	is	stored,	drawn	from,	and	refilled	by	a	pump	and	tap.	This	open	tub	of	water	is	utilized	by	people	who	sell	poultry,	fish,	and	meat,	as	well	as	vegetable	sellers,	market	cleaners,	and	other	market	vendors.	Mugees	draw	water	to	wash	their	motorbikes	and	their	cages.	After	touching	poultry,	some	customers	rinse	their	hands	in	this	water.	Slaughterers	and	sellers	frequently	submerge	their	buckets	in	this	tub	to	draw	water.	These	buckets	are	used	throughout	the	slaughter	and	selling	processes	and	thus	routinely	in	contact	with	poultry	and	their	by-products.	Although	water	is	freely	and	consistently	available	in	Aceh,	it	is	important	to	
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consider	how	external	interventions	promoting	hand-washing	in	markets	with	a	shared	water	source	may	have	the	unintended	consequence	of	increasing	pathogen	exposure	and	spreading	disease,	if	disease	is	present	in	the	market.			The	amount	of	water	used	by	PWP	is	determined	largely	by	whether	slaughtering	occurs	on	site,	and	to	a	lesser	degree,	whether	the	water	is	publicly	available.	Aceh,	for	example,	has	open	access	to	water	but	PWP	here	do	not	noticeably	use	more	water	than	PWP	in	Pasar	Rau,	in	Serang,	the	other	market	where	slaughtering	on	site	is	common	practice,	despite	the	fact	that	sellers	in	this	latter	market	pay	for	all	the	water	they	use.	Comparatively,	sellers	in	Lampung	use	the	least	amount	of	water,	largely	because	most	PWP	here	do	not	slaughter	at	the	market.	Yet,	regardless	of	ease	of	access	to	water	or	cost,	PWP	across	the	three	sites	use	water	to	wash	in	a	similar	manner.	This	suggests,	ultimately,	that	structural	and	economic	barriers	to	obtaining	water	are	not	the	dominant	influence	on	washing	behaviours.	There	are,	however,	other	economic	and	cultural	factors	that	help	shape	PWP's	washing	behaviour.		PWP	constantly	wash	away	blood,	feathers,	and	other	by-products	that	continually	build-up	throughout	the	day,	and	keep	separate	what	is	sold	from	what	is	thrown	away.	At	the	end	of	each	day	people	who	boil	barrels	of	water	to	blanch	birds	dump	this	water	into	the	streets	and	gutters	of	markets,	regardless	of	whether	they	brought	the	water	from	their	homes,	bought	it,	or	sourced	it	freely	on	site.	The	slaughter	and	cleaning	processes	quickly	turn	translucent	water	murky,	and	water	that	is	discoloured	with	blood	and	feathers	is	disposed	of	daily	in	each	site	because	it	is	dirty.	There	are	clear	economic	incentives	for	PWP	to	keep	their	selling	area	visibly	free	of	poultry	by-products,	such	as	blood	and	pools	of	water	that	accumulate	under	carcasses	on	display.	PWP	in	LBMs	pay	a	daily	tax,	part	of	which	goes	to	rubbish	removal,	which	usually	occurs	in	the	afternoon,	after	the	rush	of	the	morning	slaughter	and	sales,	and	mostly	consists	of	the	removal	of	feathers	and	other	parts	not	highly	valued.	As	a	seller	at	Pasar	Rau	remarks,	while	part	of	the	daily	taxes	go	to	market-cleaner	fees,	it	is	still	“our	own	responsibility	to	clean	the	inside	of	our	area.	If	our	area	is	dirty	the	customers	won’t	come.”241.	To	this	end,	PWP	routinely	rinse	and	sweep	away	undesirable	by-products	in	the	area	where	they	interact	with	the	public,	and	often	increase	the	frequency	of	this	practice	when	customers	approach	their	selling	tables.			Hand-washing	with	soap	and	potable	water	is	promoted	as	a	cheap	and	technically	effective	way	to	help	prevent	human	exposure	with	avian	influenza	viruses	in	LBMs	(WHO	2006).	Officials	stated	that	a	primary	aim	of	a	recent	intervention	promoted	in	each	site	was	to	teach	people	who	raise	birds,	as	well	as	those	in	LBMs,	“the	right	way	to	wash	[their]	hands.”242	Individual	bars	of	soap	were	distributed,	and,	as	one	official	confirmed,	“people	are	now	getting	more	concerned	about	washing	hands	than	before.”	This	same	official	went	on	to	remark	on	the	difficulty	of	changing																																																									241	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	242	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	
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people’s	behaviour:	“You	need	to	remember	that	any	counselling	programmes	take	a	while	to	get	the	desired	results.	It	has	a	process.	It’s	not	instant.	It	takes	time	until	they	realize.”	243	For	this	official,	information	and	time	are	required	before	people	use	what	the	Healthy	Market	guidelines	term	“correct	procedure”	to	wash	their	hands,	including	soap,	potable	water,	and	disposable	towels	(WHO	2006).		A	few	respondents	in	Aceh244	and	Lampung245	spoke	about	avian	influenza	and	hand-washing	in	relation	to	information	they	received	during	these	interventions.	A	respondent	in	Aceh	recalls	being	given	“one	[bar	of]	soap	for	5	people,	[because]	they	didn’t	bring	a	big	amount	of	soap”,	and	confirmed	he	and	others	used	the	soap	until	it	was	finished.246	A	seller	in	Lampung	also	recalled	being	told	to	wash	her	hands	“often”,	but	did	not	discuss	receiving	soap.247	In	all	sites	PWP	rinse	their	hands	throughout	their	workday	but	do	not	follow	a	pattern	of	washing	with	soap	after	each	interaction	with	poultry.	That	is	not	to	deny	that	respondents	wash	with	soap	when	they	return	home	from	LBMs,	or	before	prayer,	for	example,	but	to	highlight	that	soap	is	not	used	by	PWP	during	the	workday	at	LBMs;	this	may	be	because	of	structural	factors.		Implicit	in	the	official’s	perspective	on	hand-washing	behaviour,	cited	above,	is	neglect	of	structural	considerations	that	may	make	it	difficult	for	people	to	use	“correct	procedure”	to	wash	their	hands.	While	water	is	ubiquitous	and	necessary	for	work	in	each	market,	soap	and	disposable	paper	towels	cost	money,	and	are	not	considered	necessary	for	slaughtering	or	selling	poultry.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	8,	most	PWP	work	with	small	margins	and	are	diligent	about	maximizing	profit	and	minimizing	loss.	Perhaps	more	people	would	use	soap	in	LBMs	if	it	was	freely	and	routinely	available.	It	is	also	important,	however,	to	consider	whether	providing	soap	and	promoting	hand-washing	in	contexts	like	Aceh,	where	customers	and	other	traders	share	a	common	water	source	with	PWP,	may	actually	increase	the	likelihood	of	human	exposure	to	pathogens	like	H5N1.			Though	soap	is	not	used	to	wash	with	during	the	workday,	PWP	in	each	site	routinely	rinse	their	hands	of	visible	signs	of	their	line	of	work	-	a	process	influenced	by	cultural	norms	and	economic	incentives.	This	was	made	clear	through	the	juxtaposition	of	two	distinct	experiences	during	fieldwork.	The	first	occurred	in	Serang.	Here,	while	I	was	observing	the	slaughtering	process,	one	of	my	legs	was	splattered	by	chicken	faeces	and	blood.	Seeing	this,	the	slaughterer	took	a	small	bucket	of	water,	approached	me	and	-	in	a	sincere	yet	joking	manner	-	rinsed	the	bird	by-products	from	my	leg	with	his	bare	hands.	It	was	not	unusual	for	PWP	to	assist	somebody	-	PWP	often	provide	water	and	hand-towels	to	customers	when	they	come	in	contact	with	blood	or	by-products.	It	was,	however,	rare	that	this																																																									243	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	244	Interview	in	Aceh,	10	February	2010.	245	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	246	Interview	in	Aceh,	10	February	2010.	247	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	
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respondent	physically,	and	personally,	washed	my	leg	for	me.	To	me,	while	this	gesture	confirmed	a	mutual	familiarity.	It	also	underscored	that	such	by-products	are	considered	dirty	and	undesirable,	but	not	potential	sources	of	disease.					The	second	experience	occurred	in	Aceh	in	April	2012,	and	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	9.	To	reiterate:	during	an	interview,	a	mugee	stated	that	one	of	his	birds	had	died	earlier	in	the	day	from	flu	burung.	He	ushered	Sammy	and	me	towards	his	bike,	hand-selected	the	dead	bird	from	a	bag	attached	to	his	motorbike,	and	then	displayed	the	limp	carcass	in	his	hands.	Thereafter,	he	retied	the	bag,	shook	our	hands,	and	then	left	the	market	for	home.	In	the	first	episode,	the	PWP	went	out	of	his	way	to	remove	what	he	saw	as	undesirable	dirt	from	my	body.	In	the	second,	the	
mugee	was	untroubled	by	the	act	of	touching	Sammy	and	me	after	handling	a	bird	he	suspected	had	died	from	flu	burung.	As	stated	earlier,	the	majority	of	human	cases	of	H5N1	are	associated	with	contact	with	infected	poultry	(M.	Van	Kerkhove	et	al.	2011),	and	thus,	this	mugee’s	actions,	and	his	interaction	with	us,	may	have	exposed	himself	as	well	as	us	to	live	virus.	To	mitigate	this	risk,	soon	after	this	interaction	we	discretely	applied	hand	sanitizer,	as	we	did	throughout	the	course	of	fieldwork.	While	these	two	examples	are	disparate,	and	derive	from	different	fieldsites,	taken	together	they	suggest	that	PWP	are	mindful	of	removing	obvious	dirt	from	themselves	and	their	worksite,	but	do	not	avoid	birds	or	their	by-products	because	of	concerns	about	disease.	These	instances	further	support	the	notion	that	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	do	not	indicate	a	risk	to	humans.		These	observations	were	reinforced	by	PWPs’	handshaking	behaviours	across	the	three	markets.	During	the	course	of	fieldwork	I	routinely	shook	hands	with	PWP,	though	only	when	PWP	initiated	the	handshake,	so	as	to	reduce	the	possibility	of	exposing	myself	to	disease.	I	soon	noticed	that	PWP	who	slaughter	and	sell	routinely	avoid	fully	embracing	handshakes	with	others	when	at	work,	recognizing	that	their	hands	may	be	covered	with	poultry	parts	and	fluids.	As	one	Acehnese	respondent	states:	“Chicken	excrement	is	not	dangerous,	it’s	just	dirty,	especially	when	it	gets	on	my	hand	[that]	I	use	to	eat....	[But]	it’s	not	dangerous.	I	have	never	heard	[about]	people	dying	because	their	hands	accidentally	touch	chicken	excrement.”248	When	PWP	are	in	the	middle	of	work	–	and	consider	their	hands	dirty	-	the	common	embrace	in	greeting	does	not	include	an	interlocking,	reciprocal	grip,	but	rather	consists	of	briefly	touching	the	palm	of	the	right	hand	with	fingers	extended,	and	then	gesturing	towards	the	heart.	That	PWP	do	not	engage	in	a	fully	clasped	handshake	when	their	hands	are	in	contact	with	poultry	by-products	shows	that	they	acknowledge	their	work	to	be	a	dirty	job,	while	also	expressing	concern	about	being	perceived	as	impolite.	Yet	this	does	not	imply	that	they	also	view	their	work	as	dangerous.	Indeed,	although	bloody	and	wet	hands	are	considered	dirty	and	somewhat	socially	and	culturally	undesirable,	they	are	not	also	considered	by	respondents	to	be	a	potential	vector	for	disease	transmission.																																																											248	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.		
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PWP	are	primarily	responsible	for	maintaining	the	visual	cleanliness	of	the	area	where	they	slaughter	and	sell	poultry	to	entice	customers.	Some	PWP	have	an	additional	cost	associated	with	acquiring	the	water	they	need	to	work	each	day.	Regardless	of	cost	or	access	to	water,	however,	PWP	do	not	wash	in	a	way	that	aligns	with	WHO	recommendations.	Even	in	Aceh,	where	water	is	free,	PWP	wash	in	a	similar	fashion	to	those	PWP	in	Serang	who	purchase	water.	Structural	factors	such	as	cost	may	limit	the	use	of	soap	and	disposable	towels,	as	recommended	by	the	WHO	(2006).	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	PWP	do	not	routinely	wash.	Throughout	work	PWP	rinse	their	hands	and	behave	in	a	manner	illustrative	of	a	desire	to	avoid	touching	others	with	blood	or	other	by-products	that	build	up	on	their	hands	during	work	(Image	42).	In	short,	across	all	three	sites	PWP	routinely	clean	their	workspace	of	visible	refuse	with	water	and	rinse	their	hands	-	not	out	of	a	presumed	fear	of	contagion	but	to	attract	customers	and	observe	cultural	norms.	These	data	further	confirm	that	PWP	do	not	construct	the	risks	of	H5N1	as	dangerous	for	humans,	and	in	this	way	reinforce	the	theory	of	species-specific	infection	that	was	outlined	in	Chapter	9.	The	next	section	looks	at	behaviours	related	to	personal	protective	equipment.		
Personal	protective	equipment	The	WHO	recommends	that	personal	protective	equipment,	or	PPE,	such	as	gloves,	masks,	plastic	aprons,	boots,	and	eyewear,	be	worn	by	people	working	with	poultry,	and	especially	those	undertaking	activities	with	an	elevated	risk	for	disease	exposure,	including:	transporting	birds;	assessing	flocks;	slaughtering,	defeathering,	or	cleaning	birds;	processing	carcasses	and	by-products;	cleaning	the	selling	area;	and	disposing	of	feathers,	faeces	and	dead	birds	(WHO	2006,	33).	These	activities	are	commonly	observed	daily	routines	for	most	PWP	in	LBMs.	Yet,	during	three	rounds	of	fieldwork	in	each	site,	there	was	not	a	single	PWP	wearing	the	WHO-recommended	combination	of	protective	equipment.	Although	the	use	of	PPE	is	widely	promoted	as	part	of	behaviour-change	programmes	in	Indonesia,	few	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface	wear	PPE,	even	after	receiving	information	about	how	PPE	protects	humans	from	exposure	to	disease	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Kosen	et	al.	2009).	In	Bali,	people	who	raise	and	sell	fighting	cocks	chose	not	to	wear	masks	that	were	provided	freely,	even	after	their	birds	were	diagnosed	as	infected	with	H5N1	–	an	event	where	all	of	their	birds	were	stamped	out	by	local	officials	and	followed	by	an	intervention	aimed	at	altering	their	behaviour	by	promoting	and	providing	PPE	(Naysmith	2013b).										
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Image	42:	Washing	at	the	end	of	work	with	water	used	during	the	day	to	slaughter	and	clean	poultry	
			Image	43:	A	PWP	wears	an	apron	before	defeathering	chickens	
			The	vast	majority	of	PWP	in	Aceh,	Banten,	and	Lampung	do	not	wear	PPE.		If	PPE	is	used,	the	two	pieces	most	commonly	worn	are	aprons	and	boots;	masks	or	gloves	are	extremely	rare.	With	so	few	PWP	wearing	PPE	in	these	markets,	the	aim	of	this	section	is	not	to	document	PPE	use,	but	rather	examine	the	underlying	
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motivations	for	why	the	majority	of	PWP	do	not	wear	PPE.	As	with	the	practice	of	washing,	the	question	arises:	are	particular	constructions	of	risk	underpinning	PPE	use?	As	detailed	below,	PPE	use	is	limited	not	solely	because	these	garments	and	equipment	are	expensive	or	difficult	to	access.	Rather,	PWP	do	not	use	PPE	because	they	impede	work	and	are	uncomfortable,	potentially	thought	of	as	a	deterrent	to	would-be	purchasers	of	their	birds	and,	ultimately,	because	they	are	not	seen	as	necessary.	These	data	reinforce	the	distinction	held	by	most	PWP	that	the	market	is	a	dirty	environment,	but	not	one	that	poses	a	risk	for	disease	transmission.			Asked	whether	people	working	in	live	bird	markets	in	Serang	wear	alat	pelindung	
diri	–	literally	“tools	to	keep	oneself	safe”	but	understood	as	personal	protective	equipment	-	representatives	from	NGOs	responsible	for	health	programming	confirm,	“Yes,	they	wear	aprons,	masks,	and	gloves.”249	Other	officials	state	that	people	working	in	the	markets	rarely	wear	PPE250	despite	the	fact	that	it	is	widely	promoted.251	Observations	over	repeated	visits	confirm	that	PWP	do	not	wear	most	of	the	recommended	PPE.	Boots	are	expensive	and	worn	by	roughly	one-quarter	of	the	sellers	in	Pasar	Rau,	and	only	a	few	sellers	at	Pasar	Kelodoran.	Of	the	minority	that	wear	boots,	most	spend	the	majority	of	their	time	slaughtering;	it	is	rare	for	
mugees	or	other	agens	to	wear	boots.	Only	a	few	PWP	at	the	larger	selling	tables	in	Lampung	wear	boots;	this	may	be	because	there	is	limited	slaughtering	on	site	at	
Pasar	Tugu.	In	Aceh	around	half	of	the	PWP	slaughtering	and	selling	wear	boots,	with	sandals	also	worn	by	some	PWP.			If	people	who	raise	and	sell	poultry	wear	aprons	they	are	made	from	fibrous	material,	like	cotton,	not	from	disposable	plastic,	as	promoted	by	past	interventions	in	Indonesia	(Samaan	et	al.	2012)	and	by	the	WHO	(2006).	These	aprons	often	show	extensive	wear	and	discolouration,	especially	among	people	who	slaughter	and	prepare	poultry,	as	Image	43	illustrates.			Those	who	wear	aprons	use	them	routinely.	When	PWP	have	a	permanent	location	at	the	market,	they	often	lock	their	apron	with	other	equipment	on	site;	those	without	a	dedicated	location	at	the	market	for	storing	belongings	commute	with	their	apron	and	other	equipment,	a	process	with	the	potential	to	expose	others	to	disease	if	it	is	present	in	the	market.	That	not	all	PWP	can	store	their	aprons	or	other	equipment	on	site	suggests	that	there	may	be	barriers	leading	to	behaviour	with	the	potential	for	disease	spread,	as	these	respondents	were	required	to	take	their	equipment	home	with	them	daily	–	equipment	and	materials	on	which	H5N1	may	persist	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	The	finding	by	Samaan	and	colleagues	that	PWP	in	live	bird	markets	are	more	likely	to	wear	aprons	if	they	are	provided	(2012)	suggests	that	there	may	be	economic	barriers	to	wider	adoption	of	aprons.	However,	that	these	respondents	refused	masks	and	gloves	at	the	same	time	as	wearing	an	apron	suggests	that	PWP	are	more	concerned	about	soiling	their	clothes																																																									249	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.		250	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	251	Interview	in	Banten,	5	May	2011.	
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and	being	comfortable	than	preventing	disease	exposure.	Such	behaviour	also	indicates	that	there	are	factors	beyond	structural	and	economic	barriers	that	limit	the	wider	adoption	of	PPE	among	PWP.			While	aprons	and	boots	appear	to	be	utilized	when	provided,	masks	and	gloves	remain	unused	even	when	they	are	provided	free	to	PWP.	It	is	not	necessarily	that	people	do	not	have	access	to	masks	and	gloves,	but	rather	that	they	see	no	reason	to	wear	them,	or	see	them	as	an	impediment	to	work	(Image	44).	One	slaughterer	in	Aceh	explains	that	even	after	he	and	others	each	received	gloves	and	a	mask	for	free	from	their	boss,	“nobody	used	them”.	When	asked	why,	this	respondent,	in	an	unconcerned	manner,	says	that	he	“forgets	to	wear	it”.252	Another	PWP	in	Aceh	says	that	he	does	not	wear	a	mask	because	when	he	wears	one	he	“cannot	breathe”,	and	goes	on	to	say	that,				 It	is	fine	for	me	not	to	use	a	mask	because	the	chicken	that	I	sell	are		 healthy.	There	is	no	indication	of	avian	influenza.	I	have	been	trading	for		 almost	15	years	and	have	never	had	a	problem...”253			Although	this	respondent	was	not	wearing	PPE,	he	raises	the	issue	of	human	vulnerability	to	a	poultry	disease	in	a	way	that	suggests	past	exposure	to	some	external	public	health	campaign,	and,	in	turn,	a	degree	of	consideration	for	the	possibility	that	flu	burung	can	infect	humans.	Nonetheless,	with	reference	to	his	extensive	experience	in	the	market,	he	concludes	that	avian	influenza	is	not	a	risk	for	humans.		In	Aceh	there	is	only	one	young	slaughterer	who	routinely	covers	his	nose	and	mouth,	yet	he	does	not	use	a	mask	and	does	not	cover-up	to	prevent	disease	exposure.	Rather,	he	uses	a	bandana	to	filter	the	air	because	he	is	allergic	to	dust	and	feathers;	even	so,	he	does	not	always	wear	the	bandana	when	working.	This	particular	PWP	has	worked	at	the	market	for	8	years	and	confirms	that	he	is	the	only	person	in	Pasar	Bireuen,	apart	from	the	garbage	collectors,	who	wear	a	mask.	Surprised	to	see	a	PWP	covering	their	nose	and	mouth,	we	enquired	whether	other	PWP	or	customers	ever	comment	on	his	mask.	He	responded:			 There	were	one	or	two	people	[PWP]	who	commented,	but	I	do	not	care.	If		 they	insult	me	I	do	not	care	because	this	[wearing	a	mask]	is	for	me.	[They		 only	commented]	when	I	wore	the	mask	for	the	first	time	but	no	more	today.		 They	made	jokes	about	me	wearing	a	mask	but	now	it	is	common.254				
																																																								252	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	253	Interview	in	Aceh,	4	February	2010.	254	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	October	2010.	
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Image	44:	Two	PWP	kill	a	chicken	without	gloves		
			Image	45:	A	child	plays	in	crates	used	to	transport	live	poultry	
		Another	seller	here	said	that	PWP	do	not	use	PPE	because	customers	may	think	that	people	wearing	gloves	or	a	mask	are	covering	a	“skin”	infection.255	Such	opinions	were	not	widely	held,	and	wearing	a	mask	was	not	openly	stigmatized.	Masks	are	not	worn	primarily	because	they	are	felt	to	be	uncomfortable.																																																									255	Interview	in	Aceh,	31	March	2012.	
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	There	was	only	one	respondent	in	Lampung	who	wears	a	mask,	but	she	too	does	not	always	wear	it.	This	lady	is	a	boss	at	a	poultry	yard	in	Bandar	Lampung	and	chooses	to	wear	the	mask	when	new	shipments	of	ayam	potong	arrive	“because	the	smell	is	not	really	good”.256	Another	female	employee	at	this	poultry	yard	confirms	that	she	does	not	use	a	mask	even	though	they	are	freely	provided,	and	despite	the	fact	that	her	son,	who	used	to	live	with	her	on	site	developed	an	“acute	respiratory	infection”	which	a	doctor	attributed	to	constant	exposure	to	poultry	in	the	environment	where	the	child	was	living.	As	a	result,	this	woman	sent	her	two	older	children	to	live	with	their	grandmother.	“Only	a	third	child	who	didn’t	get	sick”	remains	with	her;	“hopefully	he’s	strong”,	she	concludes.	When	hundreds	of	birds	are	sorted	on	these	premises,	this	child	plays	in	a	familiar	manner	amongst	the	cages	(Image	45).	Distinctly	aware	of	the	negative	health	implications	of	working	closely	with	poultry,	this	respondent	does	not	wear	a	mask	-	even	though	they	are	free	-	because	they	make	her	too	“sweaty”	when	she	works.257		There	was	one	seller	in	Lampung	who	wears	one	glove	on	the	hand	that	she	uses	to	hold	birds’	bodies	with	when	cutting	their	carcasses	into	pieces	because,	she	says,			 		 I	cut	a	lot	of	chickens:	if	it’s	only	100-200	chickens	it’s	ok.	But	for	400-	600	chickens	it	[my	hand]	will	become	hot	–	just	the	same	as	people		 playing	badminton.258		For	this	seller	wearing	one	glove	facilitates	work.	For	others,	gloves	are	an	impediment	to	productivity.	A	female	seller	in	Lampung	who	sells	innards,	heads,	and	feet	of	ayam	kampung	says	that	she	tried	wearing	gloves	after	presenting	with	a	rash	on	her	hands	that	she	attributes	to	preparing	these	by-products,	but	quickly	abandoned	wearing	them	because	they	hindered	her	productivity.259	Some	think	that	gloves	make	slaughtering	more	dangerous	because	you	cannot	grip	the	birds	properly	and	thus	may	cut	yourself.260	In	sum,	observations	and	interviews	confirm	that	very	few	people	wear	masks	or	gloves.		PPE	are	not	regularly	used,	even	when	freely	provided.	As	reported	in	other	studies	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Kosen	et	al.	2009),	most	PWP	who	speak	explicitly	about	not	wearing	PPE	state	that	such	equipment	can	be	uncomfortable	or	hinder	productivity:	wearing	a	mask,	for	example,	is	too	hot.	PPE	use	is	largely	mediated	by	practical	economic	calculations:	wearing	gloves	slows	down	work.	Even	those	who	voice	a	degree	of	concern	about	human	infection	with	avian	influenza	do	not	wear	PPE.	These	data	on	PPE-related	behaviours	make	it	clear	that,	while	most	PWP	acknowledge	that	working	in	the	market	can	be	dirty	and	that	certain	behaviours,																																																									256	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	257	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	258	Interview	in	Lampung,	7	April	2012.	259	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.	260	Interview	in	Aceh,	4	February	2010.	
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like	wearing	an	apron,	can	keep	blood	and	other	bird	by-products	from	staining	clothes,	there	are	few	perceived	benefits	and	significant	perceived	disadvantages	from	wearing	a	mask	or	gloves.		
Sourcing	and	caging	poultry	This	section	looks	at	behaviour	associated	with	buying	birds	-	including	sick	birds	-	and	caging	practices	in	the	market.	As	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	1	and	Chapter	8,	poultry	from	larger	commercial	farms	as	well	as	backyard	birds	are	traded	via	an	elaborate	and	dynamic	network	determined	largely	by	supply	and	demand.	When	sourcing	birds,	the	WHO	recommends	that	PWP	buy	from	“reputable	and	trusted	suppliers”	and	“be	educated	to	undertake	visual	checks	on	the	health	status	of	birds	to	look	for	signs	of	infection”,	thereafter	removing	sick	birds	from	the	market	(WHO	2006,	32–33).	When	new	birds	are	bought,	they	should	be	caged	separately	from	other	species,	as	well	as	birds	from	other	stocks,	to	avoid	the	potential	for	disease	transmission	and	viral	replication	(WHO	2006).			This	section	begins	by	reiterating	the	manner	in	which	birds	are	brought	to	the	market	to	illustrate	the	difficulties	in	identifying	the	origin	of	most	poultry.	From	here,	it	proceeds	to	discuss	behaviour	related	to	sourcing	birds	and	to	examine	what	people	do	with	sick	birds,	before	moving	on	to	look	at	the	rationale	for	caging	practices.	This	section	has	a	similar	conclusion	to	the	two	previous	sections:	maximizing	economic	gains	and	minimizing	economic	losses	are	primary	influences	on	behaviour	related	to	sourcing	and	caging	both	sick	and	healthy	poultry.		Markets	where	PWP	primarily	sell	commercial	broiler	or	layer	chickens,	as	is	the	case	in	Pasar	Tugu	in	Lampung,	can	normally	track	the	origin	of	poultry	to	one	of	a	few	larger	companies	that	source	their	birds	from	contract	farmers.	However,	in	markets	that	sell	a	variety	of	species,	such	as	Pasar	Rau	and	Pasar	Bireuen,	tracing	the	origin	of	birds	is	difficult.	Village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	are	most	often	brought	to	these	two	latter	markets	by	independent	poultry	traders	–	agens	and	
mugees	respectively	–	who	travel	by	motorbike	to	source	birds	from	multiple	households	across	different	villages	and	from	rural	markets	where	small-hold	farmers	sell	birds.	When	traders	bring	birds	to	the	market,	these	animals	may	have	changed	hands	multiple	times,	and	in	the	process	been	carried	across	district	and	provincial	borders.			Pak	Isan,	for	example,	is	a	mugee	who	buys	birds	from	villages	in	Bireuen,	and	other	Acehnese	districts	to	the	south.	He	sometimes	drives	his	motorbike	as	far	as	Medan,	in	North	Sumatra,	to	buy	birds.	Although	he	normally	sells	these	animals	at	Pasar	
Bireuen,	he	takes	bigger	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	over	the	Gayo	Mountain	range	to	Meulaboh,	the	largest	city	on	the	west	coast	of	Aceh	because	“these	types	of	birds	are	rare	there”	and	he	can	make	around	10,000	IDR	more	per	animal.	261	When	Pak	Isan	arrives	in	Meulaboh,	the	birds	he	carries	with	him	may	have	travelled	hundreds																																																									261	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2012.	
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of	kilometres	from	where	they	hatched	-	all	for	incremental	economic	gain	–	a	prime	example	of	how	difficult	it	can	be	to	trace	the	origin	of	non-commercial	poultry.		The	WHO	recommends	that	PWP	“be	educated”	to	inspect	birds	and	identify	illness	(WHO	2006),	despite	the	fact	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	accurately	diagnose	a	bird	with	H5N1	through	observation	alone.	Nonetheless,	most	PWP	in	this	research	self-identify	as	relative	experts	in	vetting	the	health	of	poultry	–	expertise	derived	from	extensive	time	working	in	markets	and	with	poultry.	PWP	may	not	be	able	to	prevent	illness,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	9,	but	they	claim	ability	in	distinguishing	a	sick	bird	from	a	healthy	one.	As	one	PWP	in	Pasar	Rau	states	with	reference	to	knowing	when	a	bird	is	sick:	“I	see	chickens	often	enough	to	know	if	anything	strange	is	going	on”.262	Drawing	on	their	expertise,	however,	may	not	lead	PWP	to	the	desired	WHO	outcomes;	when	PWP	identify	a	sick	bird	they	do	not	remove	and	report	it	to	government	officials.	Rather,	economic	considerations	predominate.			Both	customers	and	PWP	intensively	inspect	birds	they	are	looking	to	buy	to	determine	the	health	and	value	of	each	bird.	PWP	often	scrutinize	individual	animals,	feeling	their	breasts,	throat,	and	feathers,	before	turning	each	bird	over	to	examine	their	anus.	PWP	touch	birds	as	a	point	of	entry	for	negotiating	price	with	independent	poultry	traders	and	individuals	who	bring	a	few	birds	to	the	market	to	sell	(Image	46);	the	price	of	commercial	birds	is	mostly	set	between	company	and	buyer	and	not	open	to	daily	renegotiation.		When	PWP	identify	a	sick	bird	among	a	flock	that	they	are	thinking	of	purchasing,	they	will	either	buy	the	sick	bird	for	a	cheaper	price	or	avoid	it	altogether	because	it	will	die	soon.	Some	poultry	traders,	however,	seek	out	sick	birds	because	they	are	cheaper	than	healthy	birds.263	One	small-hold	farmer	in	Aceh	says	that	he	sells	sick	birds	to	mugees.264	A	mugee	in	Aceh	confirms	that	he	buys	birds	that	he	knows	to	be	sick:	“Yeah,	I	will	buy	it	[a	sick	bird]	and	sell	it	again”	because	it	is	“cheaper,	about	half	the	price”	of	a	healthy	bird.265	Another	mugee	says	“there	are	many	sick	chickens	brought	here	[to	Pasar	Bireuen],	it	is	often.	If	the	standard	price	of	a	chicken	is	30,000	IDR,	they	[sick	chickens]	sell	only	for	15,000	IDR	if	it	is	not	dead	yet.”266	PWP	in	Aceh	more	frequently	discuss	buying	visibly	sick	birds	than	PWP	in	other	sites	-	a	phenomenon	that	may	result	from	the	fact	that	birds	brought	to	Pasar	Bireuen	are	usually	slaughtered	and	not	caged	at	length	in	the	market.	In	Pasar	Rau,	in	Serang,	for	example,	birds	are	kept	on-site	for	longer	periods	of	time	and	thus	PWP	there	are	more	hesitant	to	buy	sick	birds	that	may	die	before	they	are	able	to	sell	them.267		While	some	PWP	sell	sick	birds,	most	PWP	who	own	a	bird	that	becomes	sick	will	kill	it	and	eat	it.	As	discussed	in	the	next	section,	birds	that	die	naturally	are	haram																																																									262	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	263	Interview	in	Aceh,	30	March	2012.	264	Interview	in	Aceh,	2	February	2010.	265	Interview	in	Aceh,	1	April	2012.	266	Interview	in	Aceh,	5	February	2010.	267	Interview	in	Banten,	6	May	2011.	
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and	not	sold	for	consumption	or	eaten.	As	one	of	the	larger	sellers	in	Serang	explains,	“if	I	knew	the	chicken	was	sick,	before	they	die	I	will	kill	the	bird	to	eat.	It’s	okay	[to	eat]	if	a	bird	is	sick.”268	Other	PWP	in	Pasar	Rau	agree	that	if	a	bird	is	sick	they	will	kill	it	promptly	and	consume	it	themselves.269	Sick	birds	are	killed,	not	because	they	are	considered	disease	vectors,	but	rather	because	PWP	want	to	minimize	economic	loss	by	killing	sick	birds	before	they	die.	Economic	considerations	also	influence	caging	practices.			The	Healthy	Market	guidelines	recommend	that	birds	be	kept	with	like	species	and	separated	from	birds	that	are	not	from	the	same	stock	(WHO	2006).	In	each	of	the	three	markets	poultry	from	myriad	stocks	can	arrive	throughout	the	day,	caged	or	bound	to	poultry	traders’	motorbikes,	contained	in	crates	on	the	back	of	trucks,	or	in	the	hand	of	an	individual	trying	to	sell	a	few	birds.	Whether	these	animals	are	eventually	caged	alongside	other	birds	depends	largely	on	the	market.			In	Bandar	Lampung,	birds	rarely	stay	overnight	in	the	market;	if	birds	are	kept	at	
Pasar	Tugu	they	are	commercial	broilers	from	the	same	source.	There	are	ayam	
kampung	at	the	market,	but	these	village	chickens	are	sold	by	individuals	who	take	all	unsold	birds	home	at	the	end	of	the	day.	In	Serang,	by	contrast,	most	sellers	keep	poultry	in	cages	at	the	market	until	they	are	slaughtered.	PWP	here	actively	buy	birds	throughout	the	day:	chickens	are	caged	with	chickens	of	a	similar	size,	while	ducks,	and	geese	are	kept	separate.	These	birds	may	remain	in	the	market	for	multiple	days.	In	Bireuen,	mugees	bring	non-commercial	birds	to	the	market	in	cages	on	their	back	of	their	motorbikes.	These	village	chickens,	ducks,	and	geese	are	also	usually	separated	in	each	cage	according	to	species	and	size	rather	than	by	their	source.			PWP's	separation	of	poultry	in	these	sites	is	not	driven	by	a	construction	of	risk	for	animal	health	that	suggests	one	type	of	poultry	pose	a	risk	to	another.	The	decision	to	separate	birds	in	Serang	and	Bireuen	is	economically	motivated.	PWP	in	these	sites	are	concerned	that	smaller	birds	will	be	crushed	or	injured	by	larger,	heavier	ones.	As	one	seller	in	Serang	states:	“If	chickens	and	ducks	are	put	together,	the	young	chicken	may	die.	Ducks’	bodies	are	heavy,	and	they	also	have	sharp	nails	on	their	feet”	that	can	injure	other	birds	if	they	are	placed	in	a	cage	together.270	These	findings	echo	Kosen	and	colleagues	(2009),	who	found	that	some	PWP	cage	sick	birds	with	healthy	ones	because	of	a	lack	of	space.																																																																268	Interview	in	Banten,	8	May	2011	269	Interviews	in	Banten,	4	May	2011,	7	May	2011.	270	Interview	in	Banten,	30	July	2012.	
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Image	46:	A	PWP	inspects	ducks	brought	to	him	by	an	independent	trader	
		Image	47:	A	dead	chicken	thrown	away	with	general	market	refuse	
		This	section	illustrates	the	confidence	that	PWP	possess	in	relation	to	their	knowledge	about	sourcing	and	caging	birds.	Their	behaviours	confirm	that	economic	considerations	are	paramount,	and,	ultimately,	further	illustrate	that	PWP	
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are	not	concerned	about	becoming	sick	from	diseased	poultry	-	findings	that	reinforce	their	construction	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	as	a	species-specific	infection.			
Disposal	of	unsold	dead	birds	and	bird	by-products	H5N1	can	persist	outside	of	a	host	species	for	days,	including	in	water	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Nicholls,	et	al.	2012;	J.	D.	Brown	et	al.	2007),	in	mud	and	soil	(Horm,	Gutiérrez,	Sorn,	et	al.	2012),	and	on	bird	by-products	such	as	faeces	(Kandun	2010),	feathers	(Yamamoto	et	al.	2008)	and	in	their	meat	(Nazir	et	al.	2011).	Environmental	contamination	is	pointed	to	as	the	potential	source	of	exposure	for	multiple	human	infections	with	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia	(Aditama	et	al.	2012).	The	Healthy	Market	guidelines	contain	several	recommendations	regarding	disposal	of	birds	and	their	by-products	to	limit	human	exposure,	disease	spread,	and	environmental	contamination,	including	that	there	should	be	daily	disposal	of	“solid	and	liquid	waste	containing	potentially	infectious	materials	such	as	feathers	and	faeces”	(WHO	2006,	36),	and	that	separate	areas	in	LBMs	should	be	reserved	for	disposal	of	birds	and	by-products	(2006,	34).	The	expectations	underlying	these	recommendations	are	that	the	disposal	of	waste	products	will	occur	regularly	and	discretely,	and	that	the	exchange	between	customer	and	seller	is	essentially	the	end	point	of	the	poultry	trade.	Observations	and	interviews	reveal	a	more	dynamic	trade	where	most	bird	by-products	are	used	or	passed	on	to	other	sellers	for	marginal	economic	gains,	processes	that	lead	various	by-products	to	be	transported	outside	of	the	market	for	further	use.	This	section	outlines	and	explains	various	practices	associated	with	the	disposal	of	birds	and	their	by-products,	and	is	divided	into	two	subsections.	The	first	examines	what	PWP	do	with	birds	that	die	naturally.	The	second	looks	at	what	PWP	do	with	bird	by-products	such	as	innards	and	feathers.		PWP	do	not	eat	or	sell	dead	birds	for	human	consumption.	Islamic	dictates	prohibit	the	sale	or	consumption	of	birds	that	die	of	natural	causes,	as	one	seller	in	Pasar	Rau	confirms:	“it’s	prohibited”	-	to	sell	dead	birds	-	“because	it’s	haram.”271	When	a	bird	dies	naturally	in	Indonesia,	most	PWP	either	throw	the	bird	in	the	river,	dispose	of	it	with	the	market’s	garbage,	or	sell	the	carcass	to	fish	farmers	for	feed.			Respondents	from	each	site	who	have	experienced	die-offs	in	their	flocks	say	that	they	discarded	dead	birds	in	a	nearby	river.	A	man	who	raises	fighting	cocks	in	Lampung	recalls	that	after	losing	almost	60	birds	to	“flu	burung”	a	few	years	earlier	he	threw	their	bodies	into	the	river	adjacent	to	his	house.272	A	respondent	in	Aceh	confirms	that	birds	die	frequently:	“Sometimes	they	are	crushed	[in	their	cage],	sometimes	they	are	sick...	[Recently]	two	chickens	were	sick	and	then	died.	We	then	threw	them	away,	we	threw	them	into	the	river.”	When	asked	what	happens	to	the	carcasses	once	they	are	in	the	river	this	respondent	says	that	“there	is	a	lizard”	that	
																																																								271	Interview	in	Lampung,	28	July	2012.	272	Interview	in	Lampung,	25	August	2012.
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eats	them.273	Other	studies	in	Indonesia	confirm	that	people	discard	dead	birds	in	rivers	(Kosen	et	al.	2009;	Forster	2012).	The	question	arises:	Why	a	river?	Kosen	and	colleagues	believe	that	PWP	use	a	river	to	get	rid	of	dead	birds	because	it	is	a	zero-cost	means	of	disposal	(2009,	46).	Such	calculations	do	not	see	water	as	an	environment	where	H5N1	can	persist.	As	highlighted	in	Chapter	9,	there	was	only	one	PWP,	an	older	man	in	Serang,	who	attributed	disease	transmission	to	dead	poultry	and	thus	threw	birds	that	died	from	“flu	burung”	into	the	river	rather	then	leave	them	in	an	“open	area	[where]	the	disease	will	spread	and	attack	other	chickens.”274	This	respondent,	however,	was	exceptional.	Given	the	widespread	belief	that	sick	poultry	do	not	pose	a	threat	to	other	birds,	it	is	likely	that	most	respondents	opt	for	the	river	because	it	is	cheap	and	convenient.			When	a	dead	bird	arrives	at	the	market	or	is	pulled	from	a	cage,	some	PWP	throw	the	carcass	in	among	other	refuse	that	is	removed	by	market	cleaners	daily	(Image	47).	These	carcasses	are	not	treated	as	exceptional.	When	asked	how	often	he	sees	dead	birds	in	refuse	piles,	one	cleaner	in	Aceh	responds	“sering”	–	often	–	and	goes	on	to	confirm	that	he	routinely	places	dead	birds	in	with	the	market’s	general	refuse.275	Turning	to	leave	following	our	discussion,	this	cleaner	pushed	his	waste	cart	away,	and	a	steady	trail	of	blood	dripped	from	the	bottom	of	the	cart’s	metal	frame.	In	short,	dead	birds	are	not	considered	dangerous	-	simply	garbage	and	inedible.	For	some	PWP,	however,	dead	birds	and	their	by-products	still	offer	an	economic	opportunity,	with	many	sellers	in	each	site	selling	dead	birds	and	by-products	from	both	sick	and	healthy	birds	to	petani	lele	–	catfish	farmers.		Each	day	PWP	across	the	three	fieldsites	place	dead	birds,	as	well	as	innards,	heads,	and	feet	from	healthy	animals,	into	plastic	bags	for	fish	farmers	(Image	48).	These	relationships	are	often	longstanding,	and	provide	an	opportunity	for	PWP	to	make	money.	A	slaughterer	in	Aceh	says	that	he	receives	100,000	IDR	per	month	from	a	fish	farmer	to	bag	dead	birds	and	unsold	innards,	feet,	and	heads	each	day.276	A	fish	farmer	in	Aceh	confirms	that	he	pays	around	300,000	IDR	a	month	for	upwards	of	8	bags	of	dead	chicken	and	their	by-products	each	day.277	While	not	all	PWP	charge	fish	farmers	for	dead	birds	and	by-products278	these	exchange-based	relationships	also	exist	in	Lampung279	and	Serang.280	Products	that	provide	an	opportunity	for	economic	gain	are	not	often	wasted.			While	the	innards	of	birds	that	die	naturally	are	discarded	with	the	bird	or	reserved	exclusively	for	fish	farmers,	slaughtered	birds’	by-products	are	either	sold	as	fish	feed,	given	to	customers	along	with	the	bird	that	they	buy,	or	marketed	separately																																																									273	Interview	in	Aceh,	3	February	2010.	274	Interview	in	Banten,	4	May	2011.	275	Interview	in	Aceh,	1	April	2012.	276	Interview	in	Aceh,	4	February	2010.	277	Interview	in	Aceh,	1	April	2012.	278	Interview	in	Lampung,	7	April	2012.	279	Interview	in	Lampung,	27	July	2012.	280	Interview	in	Banten,	16	March	2012.		
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to	customers.	Innards	are	available	to	purchase	separately	from	birds	in	each	site,	but	are	most	popular	in	Lampung,	and	especially	during	Ramadan.281	There	are	also	PWP	who	feed	the	innards	of	slaughtered	birds	to	other	poultry.	This	latter	practice	was	observed	only	in	Aceh,	and	by	only	a	few	sellers.282			During	the	first	round	of	fieldwork	in	Bireuen	I	noticed	one	PWP	exiting	the	slaughter	area	with	two	blue	plastic	bags	filled	with	pieces	of	chickens.	When	I	enquired	about	his	destination,	he	explained	that	the	bags	were	filled	with	innards	that	he	was	taking	to	feed	to	his	ducks,	and	asked	if	I	wanted	to	join	him.	There	were	stacks	of	empty	orange-colour	cages	in	the	back	of	his	truck,	and	he	placed	the	blue	bags	in	between	the	cages	while	we	drove	to	his	home,	roughly	20	kilometres	south	from	Bireuen.	As	we	drove,	he	explained	that	he	held	a	bachelor’s	degree	in	agricultural	studies283	but	had	been	raising	and	selling	poultry	for	around	six	years.	When	we	arrived	at	his	house	he	promptly	took	the	blue	bags	into	a	nearby	netted	enclosure	that	housed	a	flock	of	ducks	and	a	few	banana	trees.	The	ducks	were	expectant	and	crowding	his	feet	as	he	poured	the	innards	from	the	bags	into	two	well-worn	plastic	saucers.	They	struggled	to	swallow	the	longer	intestines	and	shook	their	heads	violently	in	their	effort	to	work	down	the	beige	entrails	(Images	49	and	50).	In	minutes	both	saucers	were	emptied	of	their	contents	and	the	ducks	retreated	to	scavenge.	When	asked	why	he	feeds	chicken	innards	to	his	ducks,	this	PWP	stated	that	these	by-products	make	his	ducks	lebih	kuat	–	stronger	–	than	feed	that	he	buys	or	food	that	they	scavenge.	While	this	example	is	exceptional,	it	illustrates	how	PWP	attempt	to	utilize	the	whole	bird	for	economic	gain.	It	also	confirms	once	again	that	PWP	do	not	see	poultry	or	their	by-products	as	disease	vectors	that	pose	a	risk	to	other	birds.284			Along	with	trade	in	intestines,	feathers	of	slaughtered	birds	are	also	bagged	and	sold	to	external	customers	who	use	them	for	multiple	applications.	One	respondent	in	Serang	explains	that	he	sells	feathers	to	people	who	make	shuttlecocks	for	badminton.	A	strong	white	feather,	he	says,	may	sell	for	50	IDR,	“more	expensive	than	the	ones	made	into	dusters...	or	car	or	motorcycle	seat	filling.”	Feathers	for	dusters,	the	seller	claims,	do	not	have	to	be	washed	and	are	sold	in	bulk	for	about	3000	IDR	per	kilogram.285	PWP	in	Aceh	also	save	soft	feathers	from	ayam	kampung	and	ducks	to	sell	to	those	who	make	shuttlecocks.286	In	Pasar	Bireuen	there	is	a	young	man	who	walks	through	the	market	each	day	with	a	red	wheelbarrow,	stopping	to	sort	through	piles	of	bloody,	wet	feathers	in	search	of	those	from	ducks	and	geese	–	bulu	engkot	dan	bebek	(Image	51).	He	arrives	each	day	before	the	cleaners	remove	waste	from	the	market,	and	each	month	he	sends	bags	full	of	feathers	that	he	collects	from	LBMs	across	Bireuen	to	buyers	in	Surabaya,	a	city	on																																																									281	Interviews	in	Lampung,	25	July	2012,	8	April	2012.		282	Interview	in	Aceh,	4	February	2010.	283	This	is	the	only	PWP	I	know	about	who	has	completed	post-secondary	education.	284	Seeing	that	avian	influenza	viruses	can	reside	in	the	intestinal	tract	of	some	birds,	feeding	intestines	to	ducks	may	amplify	the	potential	for	disease	transmission.	285	Interview	in	Banten,	7	May	2011.	286	Interview	in	Aceh,	6	February	2010.	
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Java	that	is	hundreds	of	miles	southeast	of	Aceh.	He	does	not	wash	these	feathers	and	receives	350,000-400,000	IDR	a	month	for			Image	48:	A	bag	of	innards	is	set	aside	for	fish	farmers	
	
	
	Image	49:	A	PWP	feeds	chicken	innards	to	ducks	
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Image	50:	A	duck	struggles	to	swallow	a	chicken’s	intestine	
		Image	51:	Sorting	through	piles	of	feathers	for	duck	and	geese	feathers	to	resell	
		this	work.287	These	practices	further	illustrate	the	extent	to	which	PWP’s	behaviours	are	determined	in	large	part	by	economic	rationales	rather	than	by	constructions	of	the	risk	posed	by	H5N1	as	a	threat	for	humans	or	animals.																																																									287	Interview	in	Aceh,	28	March	2010.	
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	This	section	has	focused	on	examining	the	behaviours	of	PWP	as	they	relate	to	the	disposal	of	unsold	dead	birds	and	bird	by-products.	Data	show	that	little	is	wasted.	If	birds	and	their	by-products	are	thrown	away,	they	are	discarded	because	they	are	culturally	unfit	for	consumption.	Almost	everything	else	has	economic	value.	While	behaviours	associated	with	the	disposal	of	dead	birds	and	bird	by-products	are	influenced	by	economic	priorities,	ultimately,	such	behaviours	are	also	evidence	that	PWP	do	not	perceive	avian	influenza	as	causing	a	personal	health	risk,	or	as	a	disease	that	can	be	transmitted	between	birds.		
Conclusion	This	chapter	draws	on	observations	in	LBMs	and	semi-structured	interviews	with	PWP	to	examine	what	people	do	-	and	don’t	do	-	in	LBMs	that	may	increase	their	risk	of	disease	exposure,	exploring	why	people	undertake	these	behaviours	and	how	these	practices	reflect	underlying	constructions	of	risk	about	H5N1.	It	juxtaposes	PWP’s	behaviours	with	the	WHO	Healthy	Market	guidelines	to	highlight	the	gap	between	the	WHO	prescriptions	that	reflect	the	dominant	outbreak	narratives’	preoccupation	with	averting	human	exposure	to	H5N1	-	and	the	constructions	of	risk	among	PWP	that	frame	H5N1	largely	as	a	virus	that	does	not	pose	a	significant	risk	to	humans.	Rather	than	being	guided	by	a	desire	to	mitigate	personal	risk,	PWP	approach	the	slaughtering	and	selling	process	with	an	eye	for	profit	maximization.	Personal	protective	equipment	that	impedes	work	is	rarely	used.	PWP	prefer	to	sell	as	much	of	the	bird	as	they	can,	rather	than	discard	dead	birds	or	by-products.	Reinforcing	the	distinction	that	their	work	can	be	dirty	-	but	not	diseased	or	dangerous	-	most	PWP	try	to	avoid	touching	others	when	their	hands	have	blood	or	other	by-products	on	them	by	wiping	their	hands	on	their	apron,	or	by	adopting	a	modified	handshake.	Absent	from	these	behaviours	is	any	committed	attempt	to	avoid	contact	with	birds	in	order	to	reduce	their	own	potential	for	exposure	and	infection,	or	to	keep	birds	separated	by	stock	and	species	to	avoid	transmission	between	poultry.	Interventions	that	seek	to	align	PWP’s	behaviours	with	the	Healthy	
Market	guidelines	will	find	greater	traction	in	the	environments	where	avian	influenza	is	endemic	if	they	take	into	account	PWP’s	experiential	risk	rationalities.		These	data	confirm	conclusions	drawn	in	Chapters	9,	including	the	theory	of	species-specific	infection.	Considered	on	their	own,	data	about	PWP's	constructions	of	risk	from	Chapter	9	could	have	conceivably	been	generated	by	disingenuousness	in	PWP’s	responses	during	our	discussions	about	these	issues.	Perhaps	the	majority	of	PWP	are,	for	example,	actually	concerned	that	avian	influenza	poses	a	threat	to	their	health	but	were	reluctant	to	admit	this	publicly	to	a	foreign	researcher.	When	data	from	Chapter	9	are	examined	in	conjunction	with	data	presented	in	this	chapter	on	behaviours,	however,	it	becomes	clear	that	PWP	do	not	construct	H5N1	as	a	virus	that	puts	them	at	risk	in	their	daily	exposures	to	poultry.	Indeed,	their	routine	behaviours	–	whether	the	normalized	touching	of	birds	during	each	day,	or	the	habitual	practices	of	slaughtering	birds,	cleaning	and	washing,	and	disposing	of	by-products	–	reflect	and	reinforce	their	opinions	and	ideas	about	avian	influenza,	
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and	provide	further	evidence	that	PWP	are	largely	unconcerned	about	the	threat	of	being	infected	with	a	poultry	disease	that	is	not	perceived	as	contagious.		As	a	result,	the	emphasis	in	dominant	disease	narratives	on	the	role	PWP	can,	and	some	argue,	should	play	in	achieving	the	global	public	good	of	preventing	or	containing	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	does	not	carry	over	in	PWP’s	own	lives.	Their	deviation	from	prescribed	behaviours,	however,	is	not	the	result	of	a	self-interested	disregard	for	others.	Indeed,	PWP	demonstrate	a	keen	sense	of	social	responsibility	towards	those	in	their	community	when	they	think	their	actions	may	negatively	impact	others.	Rather,	as	long	as	PWP	apprehend	avian	influenza	to	be	a	wholly	manageable	problem	exclusive	to	animal	health,	they	are	unlikely	to	modify	their	behaviours	in	significant	ways.	The	next	chapter	concludes	this	study,	and	focuses	on	overall	conclusions,	the	limitations	of	this	study,	ideas	for	further	research,	and	implications	for	policy	and	practice.			
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Chapter	11:	Conclusion	
Introduction	This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	complementary	sections.	It	summarizes	the	key	findings	as	they	relate	to	the	research	questions	posed	in	Chapter	1	before	examining	the	policy	implications	of	these	data	for	avian	influenza	containment	and	control	programming.	It	then	outlines	several	researchable	hypotheses	that	stem	from	the	findings	of	this	study,	and	finally	goes	on	to	look	at	the	limitations	of	this	study	and	points	to	some	priorities	for	future	research	and	policy.		
Summary	of	findings	This	qualitative	study	investigates	three	related	topics	of	inquiry:	one,	how	people	who	work	with	poultry	construct	the	risks	associated	with	H5N1,	for	human	health,	animal	health,	for	their	own	livelihoods,	and	in	their	engagement	with	political	officials	and	organizations,	and	whether	these	constructions	vary	significantly	across	the	three	sites;	two,	what	kinds	of	evidence	are	employed	in	order	to	make	these	assessments	about	risk;	and	three,	to	what	extent	these	constructions	of	risk	inform	or	underpin	PWP’s	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface.	The	findings	related	to	each	of	these	inquiries	will	be	summarized	and	analysed	below.	
	
Similarities	and	differences	Although	not	strictly	designed	as	a	comparative	study,	this	research	aimed	to	draw	out	similarities	and	differences	among	the	three	fieldsites:	while	slight	variations	are	apparent,	there	are	also	many	similarities	across	the	three	sites.	Among	the	differences,	there	appears	a	greater	willingness	to	discuss	flu	burung	and	the	possible	loss	of	poultry	or	business	due	to	avian	influenza	in	Bandar	Lampung	and	Serang	than	in	Bireuen.	This	may	reflect	the	fact	that	there	have	been	more	cases	in	poultry	and	in	people	in	the	former	two	sites,	rather	than	any	reluctance	to	discuss	poultry	diseases	in	Aceh.	As	indicated	in	accordance	with	the	availability	heuristic,	people	who	have	more	exposure	to	disease	outbreaks	–	greater	familiarity	with	the	risk	–	may	be	more	likely	to	speak	about	them	openly.		In	Aceh,	where	outbreaks	have	been	less	common,	the	extent	to	which	PWP	think	flu	
burung	exists	in	the	province	appears	to	be	determined,	at	least	in	part,	by	their	amount	of	contact	with	birds,	suggesting	that,	again,	familiarity	is	an	important	factor	shaping	constructions	of	risk.	Birds	are	not	caged	overnight	in	Pasar	Bireuen	and	people	who	slaughter	and	sell	carcasses	and	other	by-products	here	do	not	have	to	care	for	the	animals	for	multiple	days.	Birds	sold	at	the	market	in	Bireuen	arrive	each	morning	and	any	unsold	birds	leave	each	afternoon.	Mugees,	on	the	other	hand,	keep	birds	that	they	source	from	myriad	locations	at	their	houses	for	multiple	days,	and	are	thus	witness	to	more	of	the	birds’	life	cycle	than	those	who	strictly	slaughter	and	sell.	This	may	be	one	explanation	of	why	mugees	are	generally	more	willing	than	other	PWP	to	admit	that	flu	burung	is	present	in	Aceh.			
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While	most	respondents	think	that	flu	burung	is	simply	a	new	name	for	older	poultry	diseases,	in	each	site	the	majority	of	PWP	acknowledge	that	some	form	of	flu	
burung	exists.	Only	in	Aceh	do	a	minority	of	PWP	believe	that,	while	avian	influenza	exists,	it	simply	does	not	affect	poultry	in	their	province	because	there	are	no	pigs	in	Aceh.	These	few	respondents	may	be	reflecting	remnants	of	past	public	health	campaigns	for	H1N1,	also	known	as	Swine	Flu.	Nonetheless,	a	sense	of	pious	superiority	is	intertwined	in	this	minority’s	aetiological	beliefs.	Beyond	these	small	variations,	there	are	far	more	similarities	than	differences	across	the	three	field	sites.	These	are	discussed	in	more	detail	below.		
Constructions	of	risk		These	data	provide	a	comprehensive	representation	of	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	and	how	these	underpin	PWP’s	behaviours,	and	illustrate	the	extent	to	which	these	constructions	are	largely	informed	by	their	long	experience	of	working	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Thus,	PWP	develop	what	Plough	and	Krimsky	call	“experiential	risk	rationalities”,	meaning	assessments	of	different	forms	of	risk	that	draw	primarily	on	extensive	and	intensive	experience	and	observation	(1987).	These	types	of	assessments	are	particularly	salient	when	constructions	of	risk	between	expert	and	lay	individuals	diverge	significantly,	as	Fischer	explains:			 		 When	citizens	have	compelling	reasons	to	suspect	that	a	risk	assessment	is		 superficial	or	false,	they	can	only	turn	to	their	own	cultural	logic	and		 examine	the	results	in	terms	of	previous	social	experiences	(2000,	137).		What	becomes	apparent	in	these	data	is	that	when	PWP	are	confronted	by	a	novel	disease	–	and	consequently	forced	to	make	an	assessment	of	the	risk	for	themselves	and	their	animals	–	they	draw	upon	their	own	observations	and	experiences	that	implicitly	suggest	a	theory	of	species-specific	infection	in	relation	to	H5N1.	In	this	theory,	disease	is	seen	as	exclusive	to	distinct	species.	Certain	diseases	infect	particular	chickens,	certain	diseases	infect	ducks,	and	certain	diseases	infect	humans.	In	this,	zoonotic	transmission	is	not	plausible.	The	majority	of	PWP	therefore	conclude	that	humans	are	not	susceptible	to	poultry	diseases	because	their	experiences	and	observations	provide	no	support	for	such	a	conclusion.	Though	PWP’s	experiential	risk	rationalities	are	not	wholly	reflective	of	established	scientific	understandings,	they	are	loosely	aligned	with	such	consensus,	in	that	available	evidence	suggests	the	actual	risk	of	transmission	between	poultry	and	humans	is	low,	as	is	the	absolute	number	of	human	cases	of	H5N1	infection.	Thus	although	PWP	articulate	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	that	are	not	precisely	in	line	with	the	scientific	consensus,	their	general	perceptions	of	the	risks	posed	to	humans	from	avian	influenza	are	not	unfounded.				It	is	important	to	reiterate	that	PWP	do	not	report	confusion	about	flu	burung	and	are	thus	not	actively	seeking	clarification	about	the	disease.	They	appear	generally	content	with	their	basis	of	knowledge	about	avian	influenza	although	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	their	beliefs	are	static	and	unresponsive	to	new	information.	It	is	thus	conceivable	that	PWP	might	alter	their	attitudes	and	perceptions	in	the	future	if,	for	
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example,	they	observed	an	increase	in	H5N1-related	morbidity	and	mortality.	At	present,	however,	in	a	non-outbreak	context,	they	find	their	theory	of	species-specific	infection	persuasive.		
	
Implications	for	behaviours	That	the	majority	of	PWP	do	not	consider	themselves	to	be	at	risk	from	poultry	diseases	is	manifested	in	their	behaviour	at	the	human-animal	interface.	PWP	consistently	demonstrate	that	their	workplace	practices	are	shaped	by	a	desire	to	mitigate	threats	to	their	economic	wellbeing	while	maximizing	the	potential	for	profits.	Their	constructions	of	risk	about	avian	influenza	are	revealed	through	various	behaviours.	PWP	place	importance	on	removing	visible	poultry-related	effluents,	such	as	blood	and	faeces,	without	extending	their	behaviours	to	include	practices	–	such	as	hand-washing	with	potable	water	and	soap	–	that	can	help	eliminate	live	virus.	They	eschew	personal	protective	equipment	because	it	would	interfere	with	their	comfort	and	efficiency	in	the	workplace.	Sick	birds	are	killed	and	eaten	rather	than	allowed	to	die	naturally,	and	dead	birds	that	do	die	naturally	are	avoided,	not	because	they	are	seen	as	potentially	infectious	agents	posing	a	threat	to	human	health	or	other	birds,	but	because	they	are	haram.	Bird	by-products	are	sold	onwards	to	extract	further	profit;	feathers	and	innards	find	other	uses	rather	than	go	to	waste.	In	all	of	these	behaviours,	the	desire	to	maximize	priorities	and	protect	livelihoods	is	paramount.		As	noted	in	relation	to	constructions	of	risk,	the	behaviours	consistently	documented	in	this	study	might	well	change	with	new	information	and	experiences,	or	if	there	are	conspicuous	increases	in	disease	events	among	poultry	or	in	people.	Indeed,	PWP	describe	prior	disease	outbreaks	in	poultry	when	both	their	own	behaviour	and	that	of	customers	did	change	in	response	to	news	of	disease	events	in	poultry	or	perceived	risks	associated	with	flu	burung.	Barring	such	disease	events	or	rising	human	incidence,	however,	PWP’s	behaviour	is	likely	to	remain	driven	primarily	by	economic	considerations.			From	the	perspectives	of	PWP,	these	constructions	of	risks	and	priorities	obviate	consideration	of	their	societal	obligations	to	others.	Though	some	PWP	describe	instances	when	they	modified	their	behaviours	in	order	to	avoid	having	a	negative	impact	on	their	colleagues	or	neighbours,	most	do	not	believe	that	their	behaviours	at	the	human-animal	interface	require	such	adjustments.	Rather,	driven	by	their	belief	that	avian	influenza	is	a	species-specific	infection,	incapable	of	infecting	other	types	of	poultry	than	chickens	and	unable	to	affect	humans,	PWP	pursue	their	own	self-interest	of	maximizing	economic	profit.	Should	their	constructions	of	risk	evolve	in	response	to	changes	in	observable	disease,	it	is	conceivable	that	notions	of	societal	obligations	towards	others	would	evolve	commensurately.		Taken	together,	these	explorations	into	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	–	provide	a	more	complete	picture	of	what	underpins	PWP’s	practices	in	LBMs,	and	in	turn,	how	these	practices	could	influence	assessments	of	risk	among	
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animals	and	humans.	The	section	below	will	now	highlight	specific	aspects	of	the	study	that	demonstrate	a	unique	addition	to	knowledge.		
	
Methodological	and	empirical	contributions	This	study	makes	five	novel	contributions	to	existing	literature	on	emerging	infectious	diseases.	First,	findings	from	this	study	lend	empirical	support	to	Rhodes’	challenge	to	a	“shared,	even	single,	rationality	of	risk	avoidance”	(2002),	by	indicating	how	constructions	of	risk	among	people	who	work	with	poultry	diverge	significantly	from	the	constructions	of	risk	reflected	in	some	dominant	disease	narratives	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	As	Leach	and	Dry	argue,	dominant	narratives	create	the	“appearance	of	a	consensus	about	the	risks	of	global	outbreaks”	that	both	“hide	a	set	of	assumptions”	and	mask	the	amount	of	variation	between	narratives	(2010,	3).	In	providing	an	in-depth	representation	of	how	PWP	conceptualize	certain	risks	in	their	lives,	these	data	align	with	Keck’s	claim	that	various	“rationalities	of	risk”	(2008)	rather	than	a	single,	correct	construction	of	risk,	are	reflected	in	the	diverse	narratives	surrounding	avian	influenza.	Furthermore,	in	highlighting	the	role	of	inductively	derived	assessments	shaping	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk,	this	study	illustrates	the	underlying	reasons	why	alternative	narratives	about	H5N1	differ	so	significantly	from	dominant	outbreak	narratives,	and	calls	into	question	the	extent	to	which	deficits	of	knowledge	are	the	predominant	factor.	In	sum,	this	study	contributes	to	the	effort	of	addressing	the	dearth	of	literature	on	the	perspectives	of	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface.		Second,	providing	evidence	that	findings	from	this	study	are	mostly	consistent	across	the	three	fieldsites	suggests	that	these	data	may	provide	a	cautious	baseline	for	understanding	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	of	those	working	at	the	human-animal	interface	in	LBMs	in	non-outbreak	contexts	in	Indonesia.	Consistency	across	the	fieldsites	also	facilitates	analysis	of	the	extent	to	which	cognitive	heuristics	can	provide	insights	into	constructions	of	risk.	The	majority	of	respondents	across	all	sites	identify	certain	risks	as	more	familiar,	salient,	and	recent	than	others,	suggesting	that	the	availability	heuristic	offers	insight	into	how	risks	are	assessed	in	this	population.	Most	PWP	view	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	to	humans	to	be	negligible	or	non-existent,	indicating	an	almost	complete	non-familiarity	with	the	nature	of	that	particular	risk.	In	contrast,	PWP	indicate	familiarity	with	both	the	importance	of	maximizing	economic	profit	as	well	as	minimizing	losses	due	to	recent,	salient	encounters	with	fluctuating	customer	demand	brought	about	by	media	and	government	communications	about	disease	risk.	In	short,	the	familiarity,	salience,	and	timing	of	personal	experiences	with	disease	and	a	range	of	other	risks	play	a	significant	role	in	how	PWP	construct	different	risks	in	their	lives.			These	data	lend	further	empirical	support	to	the	notion	that	PWP	are	called	upon	to	assess	a	range	of	risks	in	their	lives	and	offers	a	provisional	challenge	to	conceptualizations	of	multiple,	simultaneous	risk	assessments	as	a	hierarchy,	of	the	
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sort	ventured	in	some	literature	(Forster	2012;	Padmawati	and	Nichter	2008).	This	representation	suggests	that	constructions	of	risk	are	formed	in	relation	to	one	another,	such	that	people	may	discount	subtle	and	complex	threats	because	of	the	sheer	multitude	of	direct	and	obvious	threats	in	daily	life.	In	relation	to	this	study,	this	kind	of	conceptualization	would	indicate	that	a	decrease	in	perceptions	of	economic	risks	would	lead	to	an	associated	rise	in	perceptions	of	risk	for	human	health.	The	findings	from	this	study	suggest,	rather,	that	PWP	do	not	engage	in	such	compensatory,	relational	risk	re-calibration.	People	assess	each	type	of	risk	on	its	own	merits,	based	on	their	own	inductively	derived	reasoning.	Thus,	even	if	the	economic	risks	associated	with	disease	control	programmes	were	somewhat	alleviated,	for	instance,	by	introducing	appropriate	compensation	schemes,	PWP	are	unlikely	to	suddenly	revise	their	theory	of	species-specific	infection	and	conceptualize	the	risks	posed	to	humans	on	completely	different	terms.			Third,	this	study	provides	empirical	insights	into	the	challenges	that	may	be	faced	in	attempting	to	change	behaviours	through	imparting	informational	resources	from	external	sources	of	authority.	As	discussed	above,	PWP	regularly	suggest	that	they	have	little	to	no	contact	with	or	trust	for	established	veterinary	or	public	health	authorities,	nor	that	they	desire	more	involvement	or	information	from	these	government	officials.	This	may	be,	in	part,	due	to	scepticism	about	levels	of	competence	among	government	bureaucrats	in	post-Suharto	Indonesia	(Robertson-Snape	1999).	There	is	still	widespread	nepotism	and	other	forms	of	corruption	in	lower	levels	of	government	service,	leading	many	in	the	general	population	to	conclude	that	those	in	positions	of	power	have	not	earned	their	way	(Mcleod	2005).	Yet	as	data	from	this	study	suggest,	an	additional	reason	may	be	because	PWP	consider	their	basis	of	knowledge	to	be	complete.	As	Kramer	observes,	trust	in	others	is	predicated	on	feelings	of	uncertainty	(1999).	This	notion	is	echoed	in	Siegrist	and	Zingg’s	study	of	public	trust	during	pandemics:	“Trust	is	most	important	in	situations	in	which	people	lack	the	knowledge	needed	to	make	a	decision”	(2014:	23).	Yet	this	relies	on	the	premise	that	people	are	in	agreement	that	they	lack	certain	kinds	of	knowledge.	In	contexts	where	people	do	not	feel	they	have	a	deficit	of	knowledge,	trust	in	others	may	be	a	peripheral	concern.	Thus,	though	trust	has	been	associated	with	adopting	recommended	preventative	behaviours,	“it	is	unlikely	that	trust	influences	people’s	behaviour	if	no	personal	risk	is	perceived”	(Siegrist	and	Zingg	2014:	25).	These	insights	suggest	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	significant	change	in	observable	incidence	and	prevalence	of	human	cases	of	avian	influenza,	PWP	may	not	perceive	there	to	be	significant	gaps	in	their	basis	of	knowledge.	As	a	result,	they	have	no	reason	to	invest	trust	in	external	sources	of	information	or	authority	to	manage	what	they	perceive	to	be	a	wholly	manageable	problem	residing	exclusively	with	poultry,	and	may	continue	to	have	little	to	no	reliance	on	veterinary	and	public	health	authorities	for	information	or	resources.		Of	course,	PWP’s	reliance	on	inductively-derived	assessments	means	that	any	aspects	of	avian	influenza	pathogenesis	that	are	not	readily	observable	by	a	lay	person	may	be	unheeded.	Such	is	the	case	with	respect	to	asymptomatic	infections	
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of	avian	influenza,	of	the	kind	often	manifested	in	ducks.	Thus,	PWP	may	note	the	presence	of	a	sick	chicken	and	attribute	the	cause	to	avian	influenza,	but	they	may	not	connect	that	incidence	back	to	the	wider	population	dynamics	of	avian	influenza,	wherein	ducks	can	act	as	reservoirs	of	infection.	PWP	are	also	liable	to	conflate	diseases	in	poultry	that	bear	similar	characteristics.	For	instance,	the	clinical	presentation	of	avian	influenza	in	chickens	is	similar	to	those	stemming	from	Newcastle	Disease	(Balasubramaniam	et	al.	2012;	Gardner	and	Alders	2014;	Alders	and	Bagnol	2007),	making	it	challenging	to	correctly	diagnose	avian	influenza	infection	without	the	assistance	of	laboratory	diagnosis.	Experientially-derived	constructions	of	risk	also	obscure	certain	invisible	risks,	such	as	the	presence	of	virus	in	certain	environments	(Indriani	et	al.	2010).	Lastly,	as	noted	throughout	this	thesis,	PWP	are	unlikely	to	construct	the	risks	of	avian	influenza	for	humans	to	be	severe	in	the	absence	of	widespread	human	infection.			Fourth,	investigating	how	PWP	conceptualize	and	assess	risk	alongside	exploring	factors	underpinning	their	behaviour	facilitated	a	degree	of	triangulation	in	analysis	and	discussion	that	would	not	have	been	available	if	another	methodological	approach	had	been	taken.	For	instance,	had	this	study	only	used	semi-structured	interviews	to	investigate	constructions	of	risk,	one	could	suspect	that	respondents	answered	in	disingenuous	ways	because	they	were	reluctant	to	speak	openly	about	threats	to	human	health	or	their	livelihoods,	or	because	of	my	presence	as	a	foreigner.	Similarly,	if	this	study	had	only	explored	behaviours	through	observation,	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	ascertain	the	underlying	constructions	of	risk	that	animated	such	practices.	Additionally,	from	the	examination	of	behaviours	alone,	it	would	be	natural	to	conclude	that	PWP	are	engaging	in	certain	behaviours	because	they	do	not	have	enough	information	about	avian	influenza.	Only	by	examining	these	data	together	does	it	become	clear	that	PWP’s	constructions	of	risk	for	themselves,	their	animals,	and	their	livelihoods	align	with	their	observed	and	reported	behaviours.			These	data	thus	confirm	that	PWP's	behaviour	can	best	be	explained	as	motivated	by	a	theory,	grounded	in	their	own	experience,	of	species-specific	infection,	coupled	with	the	desire	to	maximize	profits	and	avert	losses.	These	findings	provide	strong	support	for	the	importance	of	calibrating	the	methodological	approach	with	the	underlying	aims	of	the	study.	Particularly	in	instances	where	research	is	intended	to	develop	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	reasons	for	particular	behaviours,	self-reporting	alone	is	insufficient.	While	the	biases	introduced	into	research	through	respondents’	desire	to	respond	in	socially	desirable	ways	have	been	well-documented	(Lewis-Beck,	Bryman,	and	Liao	2004),	this	study	provides	additional	insight	into	how	research	can	circumvent	such	obstacles.			Fifth,	this	study	contributes	to	discussions	about	how	qualitative	social	science	studies	can	compliment	interdisciplinary	research	on	emerging	infectious	diseases.	While	calls	for	greater	involvement	of	social	scientists	are	increasing	(Kleinman	et	al.	2008b;	Janes	et	al.	2012),	the	study	of	emerging	infectious	diseases	including	avian	influenza	has	historically	been	more	the	domain	of	biomedical	scientists,	
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disease	modellers,	and	veterinarians,	than	of	anthropologists,	sociologists,	or	political	scientists.	A	more	holistic	understanding	of	“risk	environments”	(Rhodes	et	al	2002)	such	as	live	bird	markets	requires	a	complementary	combination	of	disciplinary	perspectives	and	methods	(Liverani	et	al.	2013).	Data	from	this	study	lend	weight	to	arguments	for	greater	involvement	of	qualitative	social	scientists	in	the	study	of	emerging	infectious	diseases.	In	the	future,	the	number	of	social	scientists	looking	at	EID	will	surely	increase,	spurred	on	in	part	by	global	initiatives	such	as	One	Health.			The	One	Health	agenda	is	defined	as	the	“collaborative	efforts	of	multiple	disciplines	working	locally,	nationally	and	globally	to	attain	optimal	health	for	people,	animals	and	our	environment”.288	The	initiative	is	upheld	as	the	way	forward	for	interdisciplinary	collaborations	to	control	zoonosis,	and	is	endorsed	by	the	WHO,	the	FAO,	and	the	OIE	–	the	three	multilateral	bodies	charged	with	global	policy	development	for	avian	influenza	and	other	zoonotic	pathogens.289		Though	a	lot	of	lip	service	is	paid	to	the	value	of	interdisciplinary	collaboration	in	the	study	of	emerging	infectious	diseases,	the	specific	form	of	these	collaborations	remains	underspecified	and	largely	untested	(Coker,	Rushton,	et	al.	2011).	No	existing	studies	outline,	for	example,	how	epidemiologists	and	anthropologists	can	usefully	collaborate	to	collect	and	analyse	complementary	data	on	EID.	Any	such	future	collaboration	must	first	contend	with	the	fact	that	these	two	disciplines,	for	example,	approach	the	study	of	problems	in	the	world	in	fundamentally	distinct	ways	(Buckley	and	Chapman	1996;	Kanbur	2001;	Bardhan	and	Ray	2008).		Attempts	to	identify	disciplinary	differences	and	uncover	the	possibilities	of	bridging	between	them	have	occurred	in	a	number	of	other	public-policy	areas,	which	may	be	instructive	for	interdisciplinary	research	on	EID.	In	a	classic	study	of	interdisciplinary	collaborations	to	address	common-pool	environmental	issues,	The	
Contested	Commons:	Conversations	between	Economists	and	Anthropologists,	the	authors	observe	that	“economists	and	anthropologists	are	still	divided	on	their	views	of	human	agency,	on	what	constitutes	data,	on	how	to	interpret	their	respondents’	words,	and	on	what	counts	as	an	adequate	explanation”	(Bardhan	and	Ray	2008,	4).	These	epistemological	differences	do	not	make	collaborations	impossible,	but	they	do	create	challenges	and	require	careful	consideration	to	overcome.	A	similar	initiative	among	a	diverse	group	of	researchers	involved	in	poverty	appraisal	identified	some	key	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods:																																																										288	See:	www.onehealthinitiative.com	289	At	present,	however,	there	are	no	social	scientists	who	employ	qualitative	methods	to	focus	on	zoonosis	working	as	permanent	staff	at	either	the	FAO	or	the	OIE;	whether	or	not	there	are	social	scientists	dedicated	to	these	concerns	at	the	WHO	is	unknown.	The	absence	of	social	sciences	in	the	dominant	global	policy	organizations	speaks	to	a	more	general	deficit	of	qualitative	social	science	engagement	with	EID.		
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Those	in	the	qualitative	tradition	agreed	that	some	numerical	information	could	and	should	be	collected	in	participatory	poverty	appraisal.	There	was	also	agreement	(less	strong)	that	the	credibility	of	qualitative	studies	with	policy	makers	and	others	would	be	greater	if	site	selection	could	be	put	into	a	sampling	frame…	By	the	same	token,	those	in	the	quantitative	tradition	agreed	that	the	introduction	of	more	subjective	and	open	ended	questions	in	a	standard	household	survey	could	in	fact	provide	a	better	handle	on	defining	and	measuring	poverty	even	in	standard	income/consumption	terms	(Kanbur	2001,	2).		These	forays	into	the	specifics	of	interdisciplinary	collaboration	could	be	instructive	for	future	implementation	of	a	truly	interdisciplinary	research	agenda.	Indeed,	with	increased	interest	and	funding	for	EID,	more	social	scientists	will	surely	engage	in	this	research,	and	they	will	contribute	valuable	disciplinary	perspectives	to	the	more	holistic	understanding	of	risk	environments	and	the	human-animal	interface.	Simply	tacking	a	qualitative	component	onto	basically	quantitative	studies,	however,	is	not	sufficient,	and	may	actually	present	a	danger	to	research	teams.	While	the	involvement	of	qualitative	researchers	in	EID	research	is	desirable,	perhaps	even	necessary,	the	exact	manner	of	collaboration	between	different	disciplines	needs	further	attention.	This	study	offers	substantive	reflections	on	the	practice	and	ethics	of	conducting	qualitative	research	on	EID	in	contexts	where	researchers	must	endeavour	to	reduce	opportunities	for	infection	among	themselves	and	their	research	team,	while	also	prioritizing	respectful	and	trusting	relationships	with	respondents.		The	next	section	looks	at	how	data	from	the	current	study	may	complement	and	inform	biosecurity	interventions	in	live	bird	markets	and	disease	surveillance	at	the	local	level.	Drawing	from	this,	thereafter,	I	propose	two	hypotheses,	focused	on	testing	low-cost	interventions	to	bolster	biosecurity,	and	which	may	ultimately	help	to	prevent	disease	introduction,	maintenance	and	evolution	in	LBMs,	and	the	dissemination	of	avian	influenza	viruses	from	these	environments.	
	
Policy	recommendations		Biosecurity,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	is	broadly	defined	as	“the	product	of	all	the	actions	taken	to	prevent	the	introduction	of	disease	agents	into	a	specific	area	and	to	safeguard	the	health	of	living	organisms	from	hazards”	(FAO	2013b,	50).	Biosecurity	measures	are	primarily	preventative,	and	broadly	aimed	at	exclusion	and	containment	of	disease	at	source,	in	animals,	along	with	the	promotion	of	hygiene.	While	increasing	biosecurity	across	farms,	and	in	backyard	flocks,	for	example,	are	important	elements	in	the	promotion	of	biosecurity	(FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008),	building	better	biosecurity	in	live	bird	markets	is	increasingly	prioritized,	as	seen	in	recent	interventions	to	limit	human	H7N9	infections	in	China	through	market	closure	and	restructuring	programmes	(Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013).	Biosecurity	measures	often	work	in	combination,	and	in	LBMs	can	include:	market	restructuring,	the	implementation	of	rest-days,	market	closure	(both	temporary	and	
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permanent),	cleaning	and	disinfection,	waste	removal,	and	behaviour	change	communications.	While	the	FAO	and	others	readily	acknowledged	that	the	appropriate	combination	of	interventions	in	any	particular	LBM	will	necessarily	be	contextually	determined,	overall,	it	is	understood	that	biosecurity	measures	need	to	be	difficult	to	avoid	and	easy	to	comply	with	(FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008).			Biosecurity	interventions	to	decrease	the	risk	of	H5N1	infection	and	transmission	among	poultry	and	in	people	at	the	human-animal	interface	may	benefit	from	consideration	of	the	findings	from	this	study.	Below,	five	such	interventions	-	behaviour	change	communications,	market	restructuring,	market	cleaning	and	surveillance,	disease	surveillance	through	particular	poultry	traders,	and	greater	interface	between	officials	and	PWP	–	are	discussed	with	reference	to	data	from	this	study.		
Behaviour	change	communications	Significant	attention	and	resources	have	been	focused	on	building	the	scientific	literacy	of	people	working	at	the	human-animal	interface.290	As	Kim	and	colleagues	write,	“increasing	knowledge	and	risk	perceptions”	are	the	“cornerstone”	of	avian	influenza	control	programmes	implemented	among	people	working	in	LBMs	(J.	H.	Kim	et	al.	2011).	The	primary	aim	of	these	programmes	is	to	impart	knowledge	about	the	risks	associated	with	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people,	with	the	expectation	that	once	these	respondents	are	able	to	accurately	recall	modes	of	transmission,	appropriate	preventative	behaviours,	they	will	align	their	conceptualizations	of	risk	with	scientific	understandings,	and	consequently	adopt	preventative	behaviours.	These	programmes	remain	a	priority	in	spite	of	evidence	that	increasing	scientific	knowledge	about	H5N1	in	poultry	workers	in	Indonesia	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	risk-avoidance	behaviours	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Naysmith	2013b).	Attempts	to	raise	scientific	literacy	must	take	into	account	the	question	whether	competing	aetiologies	are	prominent	among	PWP,	and	whether	these	populations	consider	themselves	to	be	lacking	information.		Findings	from	this	study	pose	challenges	for	behaviour	change	communications.	In	demonstrating	that	PWP	derive	their	assessments	about	risk	largely	through	inductive	processes,	these	data	suggest	that,	barring	changes	in	the	observations	and	experiences	available	to	PWP,	their	assessments	about	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	are	unlikely	to	be	swayed.	Furthermore,	data	from	this	study	show	that	the	majority	of	Indonesian	PWP	do	not	consider	themselves	to	be	lacking	knowledge	when	it	comes	to	flu	burung,	or	other	poultry	diseases.	On	the	contrary,	most	PWP	believe	that	they	are	well	informed	about	afflictions	that	infect	their	birds.			Efforts	to	convince	PWP	of	the	truthfulness	of	claims	that	are	not	readily	observable	–	such	as	the	notions	that	humans	are	susceptible	to	infection,	or	that	ducks	can	become	infected	with	avian	influenza	–	may	be	stymied	by	the	lack	of	empirical																																																									290	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	most	of	these	behaviour	change	communication	programmes	have	been	undertaken	by	UNICEF	
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evidence	in	support.	These	claims	may,	however,	be	bolstered	by	explicit	references	to	the	experiential	manner	in	which	PWP	derive	their	constructions	of	risk.	Thus,	rather	than	simply	informing	PWP	that	avian	influenza	can	infect	humans	–	a	supposition	likely	to	be	dismissed	as	nonsensical	–	communication	efforts	could	explicitly	address	the	fact	that	there	have	not	been	widespread	human	infections,	and	provide	explanations	for	why	this	is	the	case.		In	short,	data	from	this	study	suggest	that	behaviour	change	communications	may	face	difficulties	gaining	traction	among	PWP,	precisely	because	they	are	easy	to	avoid	–	being	voluntary,	and	hard	to	comply	with	–	requiring	adjustments	in	behaviour	that	are	unsubstantiated	by	PWP’s	own	experiential	reasoning.	Similar	challenges	exist	for	other	common	biosecurity	interventions	in	live	bird	markets.		
	
Market	restructuring	An	overarching,	long-term	aim	in	the	promotion	of	biosecurity	is	the	modernization	of	the	poultry	industry,	especially	in	countries	with	a	high	proportion	of	birds	sold	through	LBMs.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	market	restructuring	and	the	temporary	or	permanent	closure	of	markets	are	measures	that	are	increasingly	utilized	in	endemic	countries	(H.	Yu	et	al.	2013;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008,	20;	Samaan	et	al.	2012).	Market	restructuring,	however,	is	expensive	to	implement,	especially	in	countries	like	Indonesia	with	thousands	of	LBMs,	and	thus	likely	unsustainable	to	implement	widely.	Although	temporary	or	permanent	market	closure	has	been	associated	with	decreased	risk	for	disease	in	humans	(H.	Yu	et	al.	2013),	such	interventions	may	have	unintended	consequences,	in	that	PWP	may	seek	to	market	their	birds	through	more	informal	channels,	and	thus	potentially	outside	the	reach	of	disease	surveillance.	In	short,	although	market	restructuring	and	closure	may	limit	environmental	contamination	and	disease	in	poultry	and	people,	these	interventions	can	have	negative	impacts	on	PWP	and	thus	they	may	not	always	be	accepted	or	adhered	to	by	those	who	work	in	the	markets	(Samaan	et	al.	2012;	Fournié	and	Pfeiffer	2013;	Naysmith	2013b;	Forster	2012).			These	challenges	raise	the	question	of	whether	there	are	alternative,	low-cost	interventions	that	are	both	easy	to	comply	with,	and	difficult	to	avoid.	Findings	from	the	current	study	identify	several	key	points	of	entry	for	bolstering	biosecurity	in	LBMs.	These	include:	supporting	existing	market	cleaning	structures,	utilizing	poultry	traders	–	agens	or	mugees	–	as	resources	for	surveillance,	and	increasing	the	interface	between	PWP	and	government	officials.			
Market	cleaning	and	surveillance	in	LBMs	The	isolation	of	waste	from	slaughtering	and	sale	sites	in	LBMs,	and	the	application	of	disinfectant	to	surfaces	used	in	these	processes,	can	greatly	decrease	environmental	contamination	and,	in	turn,	limit	human	exposure	to	pathogens	and	disease	spread	between	animals	(FAO,	OIE,	and	WHO	2008).	Data	from	the	current	study	suggest	that	existing	cleaning	structures	in	live	bird	markets	could	be	better	utilized.	Each	LBM	has	dedicated	personnel	who	clean	the	market	daily,	including	the	areas	where	PWP	cage,	slaughter,	and	sell	poultry.	These	cleaners	derive	their	
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salary	in	part	from	taxes	PWP	pay	to	operate	each	day.	Although	different	parts	of	the	markets	are	considered	dirty,	they	are	not	widely	regarded	as	diseased	and	cleaners	are	not	stigmatized	for	wearing	PPE	such	as	gloves	or	a	mask	when	they	work.	Interventions	aiming	to	bolster	biosecurity	in	these	environments	would	be	well	advised	to	allocate	resources	to	improved	training	for	market	cleaners,	alongside	salary	support	and	necessary	equipment,	including	PPE	and	disinfectant,	so	as	to	promote	routine	and	effective	cleaning	of	markets.	Structural	changes	to	waste	sites	may	also	be	needed.		Cleaners	could	also	bolster	disease	surveillance	in	LBMs.	To	recall,	salvaging	dead	birds	that	died	naturally	for	human	consumption	is	not	common	in	Indonesia.	If	a	bird	dies	naturally	they	are	considered	haram,	and	either	thrown	away,	or	perhaps,	sold	to	fish	farmers	for	feed.	Birds	that	die	naturally	at	the	markets	where	this	research	was	undertaken	were	often	seen	thrown	in	the	communal	garbage,	to	be	picked	up	later	in	the	day	by	market	cleaners.	In	this	process,	for	example,	market	cleaners	can	offer	an	overview	of	trends	in	the	market	place,	and	whether	or	not	there	are	increasing	numbers	of	dead	birds	in	the	garbage.		
Disease	surveillance	through	particular	poultry	traders	People	who	only	slaughter	and	sell	carcasses	and	their	by-products	do	not	have	the	same	degree	of	extensive	experience	with	poultry	diseases	as	do	poultry	traders	-	
agens	or	mugees	-	who	buy	birds	from	multiple	communities	to	resell	at	LBMs.	These	poultry	traders	are	likely	to	be	among	the	first	to	witness	disease	events	in	rural	communities.	Indeed,	there	are	economic	incentives	for	them	to	find	sick	birds.	Local	disease	surveillance	systems	for	a	range	of	pathogens	may	be	made	more	robust	by	working	closely	with	poultry	traders	who	travel	between	different	communities.	Even	if	the	data	they	supply	is	general,	poultry	traders	can	provide	informal	early	warning	signals	to	enable	officials	to	plan	for	future	disease	threats.	Compensation	must	be	appropriately	calibrated	and	promptly	dispersed	to	encourage	these	traders	to	share	information	about	disease	events,	as	well	as	to	ensure	that	people	raising	birds	are	not	negatively	affected	by	any	intervention	resulting	from	these	data.	In	this	way,	rather	than	see	poultry	traders	as	potential	vectors	for	transmission,	it	is	possible	to	consider	these	traders	as	key	sources	of	knowledge.			
Greater	interface	between	officials	and	PWP	An	essential	part	of	biosecurity	in	LBMs	is	the	participation	of	people	at	the	human-animal	interface.	This	study	suggest,	however,	that	the	interface	between	officials	–	from	government,	NGOs,	and	international	and	bilateral	agencies	–	and	PWP	in	LBMs	is	either	extremely	limited	or	non-existent:	very	few	PWP	have	ever	directly	interacted	with	an	official	working	as	part	of	a	disease-control	programme.	The	Participatory	Disease	Surveillance	Response	programme,	outlined	in	Chapter	3,	trained	thousands	of	Indonesian	civil	servants.	As	these	government	employees	continue	to	be	integrated	into	animal	health	ministries	more	generally,	future	programming	could	include	a	dedicated	policy	of	providing	these	officials	with	opportunities	to	interact	routinely	with	PWP	in	live	bird	markets	and	elsewhere.	
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This	may	assist	in	building	familiarity	and	trust	between	key	stakeholders,	and	may	serve	to	provide	officials	with	a	better	understanding	of	what	people	know	about	disease,	whether	PWP	believe	themselves	to	be	susceptible	to	infection,	and	what	factors	motivate	their	behaviour.	Spending	more	time	regularly	in	LBMs	should	also	enable	government	officials	to	help	identify	both	structural	barriers	hindering	the	collaboration	of	PWP	with	disease-control	policies,	and	specific	facilities,	such	as	public	hand-washing	basins,	that	might	constitute	important	foci	for	disease	transmission	in	people.	In	turn,	fostering	better	relations	may	facilitate	the	development	of	more	efficacious	programming	tailored	to	specific	locations.		Along	with	expanding	the	interface	between	themselves	and	PWP,	officials	from	different	jurisdictions	and	organizations	need	to	coordinate	activities	better	among	themselves.	The	spread	of	avian	influenza	across	the	archipelago	-	and	across	provincial	boundaries	-	can	be	traced	to	the	country’s	extensive	poultry	trade.	Yet	government	officials	in	neighbouring	provinces,	though	bound	together	by	the	movement	of	poultry	between	their	jurisdictions,	rarely	meet	to	discuss	strategy;	this	is	in	part	a	consequence	of	Indonesia’s	decentralization.	While	it	is	crucially	important	for	the	control	of	infectious	diseases	to	resonate	with	local	priorities,	there	may	also	be	a	need	for	a	greater	degree	of	centralized	authority	and	national	commitment.	Increasing	cooperation	and	coordination	across	political	boundaries	in	Indonesia	will	take	time,	but	should	be	an	integral	part	of	a	long-term	strategy	for	controlling	infectious	diseases	like	avian	influenza.		Having	outlined	several	policy	implications	stemming	from	the	findings	of	this	study,	the	following	section	will	highlight	two	researchable	hypotheses	that	build	on	insights	from	this	research.	
	
Hypotheses	Two	sets	of	hypotheses	to	explore	in	future	research	are	drawn	from	these	data,	the	first	focusing	on	market	cleaners,	and	the	second	on	poultry	traders.		First,	seeing	that	cleaners	are	already	employed	in	markets	to	generally	clean	the	slaughtering	and	sale	areas,	future	research	could	explore	whether	increasing	the	number	of	market	cleaners,	and	the	specificity	of	their	job	description	in	the	slaughter	and	sale	areas	would	lead	to	a	decrease	in	environmental	contamination	-	disease	maintenance	and	evolution	-	as	well	as	decrease	the	risks	posed	to	birds	and	to	people,	and	onwards	transmission	from	markets	identified	as	potential	reservoirs	of	infection.	And,	related	to	this,	seeing	that	salvage	of	birds	that	die	naturally	is	uncommon	in	Indonesia,	and	that	these	birds	are	usually	thrown	away	or	sold	on	to	fish	farmers,	could	market	workers	provide	local	surveillance	of	disease	in	poultry	through	reporting	the	frequency	with	which	dead	birds	are	found	in	the	garbage	of	LBMs?				Second,	given	that	poultry	traders	–	identified	as	mugees	and	agens	in	the	current	study	-	travel	widely,	between	villages,	farms,	and	markets,	future	research	could	
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explore	the	extent	to	which	it	is	possible	to	incentivize	these	poultry	traders	to	share	information	about	disease	events	in	poultry	across	different	communities,	and	in	doing	so,	bolster	disease	surveillance.	Seeing	that	economic	margins	are	slight,	one	such	incentive	could	be	the	provision	of	a	nominal	amount	of	petrol	at	a	specific	location	at	the	market	that	is	convenient	for	traders.	And,	related	to	this,	if	these	traders	see	an	incentive	to	gather	at	this	central	location,	would	it	be	possible	to	couple	their	reporting	of	informal	surveillance	with	a	disinfection	programme	of	their	equipment,	such	as	their	motorbikes?		Feasibility	studies	are	required	to	determine	the	acceptability	and	sustainability	of	any	interventions.	These	measures	are	likely	more	efficacious	in	combination,	and	may	complement	other	low-cost	interventions,	such	as	the	implementation	of	rest	days	rather	than	outright	market	closure	or	restructuring,	and	targeting	specific	markets	identified	as	hubs	for	traders	and	potential	reservoirs	of	infection	(Fournié	et	al.	2013;	Fournié	et	al.	2011).		Avian	influenza	viruses	are	likely	to	remain	for	a	long	time,	if	not	forever,	a	threat	to	human	health,	animal	health,	and	consequently,	the	livelihoods	of	those	who	depend	on	work	at	the	human-animal	interface.	There	is,	of	course,	no	single	intervention	that	can	comprehensively	prevent	the	spread	of	disease	in	poultry	and	in	people,	but	there	may	be	more	effective	ways	to	control	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	in	birds	or	limit	human	exposure	to	these	viruses.	However,	some	interventions	–	such	as	market	closure	or	the	promotion	of	hand-washing	–	may	in	some	circumstances	actually	amplify	disease	spread	and	human	exposure	and	infection	to	avian	influenza	or	other	pathogens.	It	is	important	that	those	designing	intervention	programmes	consider	potential	unintended	consequences.	Any	such	intervention	will	require	both	short-	and	long-term	agendas	(FAO	2013),	but	will	hinge	on	long-term	engagement	and	the	participation	of	those	at	the	human-animal	interface.	Participation,	however,	can	be	an	empty	phrase	–	and	even	problematic	-	if	it	is	not	accompanied	by	a	careful	consideration	and	calibration	of	how	PWP	assess	the	risks	associated	with	avian	influenza	and	how	these	assessments	underpin	behaviours.			Barring	widespread	outbreaks	of	human	infection	by	avian	influenza,	it	may	be	unlikely	that	PWP	will	adjust	their	conceptualization	of	human	susceptibility	to	bird	flu	or	other	zoonotic	diseases.	It	is	possible,	however,	that	incentivizing	the	reporting	of	sick	birds	by	paying	people	a	fair	price	for	them	could	prove	a	means	of	securing	the	cooperation	of	PWP	in	effective	intervention	policies	without	the	need	to	challenge	their	belief	that	disease	cannot	be	transmitted	from	birds	to	humans.		
Limitations	of	this	study	and	future	directions	for	qualitative	research	This	section	concludes	the	chapter	by	outlining	two	directions	for	future	research,	in	the	light	of	some	particular	limitations	of	the	present	study.		These	include:	One,	expanding	research	to	more	diverse	parts	of	Indonesia;	and	two,	undertaking	qualitative	research	in	post-outbreak	or	post-intervention	environments.		
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Comparable	research	in	other	sites	This	research	was	conceptualized	as	a	qualitative	study	across	three	live	bird	markets	in	one	country.	All	three	of	the	provinces	where	this	research	was	undertaken	have	majority	Muslim	populations.	While	there	is	a	degree	of	generalizability	in	these	data,	they	may	not	be	representative	of	PWP	in	other	parts	of	Indonesia	where	the	majority	of	the	population	is	not	Muslim.	How	religion	and	piety	-	among	other	local	contextual	factors	-	influence	the	actions	and	understandings	of	PWP	requires	more	research	across	diverse	sites	in	Indonesia.			
Qualitative	research	in	post-outbreak,	post-intervention	environments	Although	this	current	study	consisted	of	multiple	visits	to	each	site,	there	were	no	wide-scale,	diagnosed	disease	events	during	the	course	of	fieldwork.	In	spite	of	some	mentions	by	PWP	of	recent	disease	in	their	birds,	these	data	reflect	essentially	how	PWP	perceive	poultry	disease	and	behave	in	the	absence	of	a	major	outbreak.	Thus,	these	data	represent	and	convey	a	sense	of	normalcy.	For	example,	only	a	minority	of	Acehnese	respondents	in	the	present	research	dissociated	themselves	from	avian	influenza.	By	contrast,	in	the	aftermath	of	an	outbreak	of	H5N1	influenza	which	had	provoked	an	official	intervention	designed	to	control	it,	PWP	in	a	Balinese	LBM	readily	stigmatized	others	in	relation	to	avian	influenza	(Naysmith	2013b).	Future	research	could	examine	how	PWP	and	others	at	the	human-animal	interface	alter	their	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	when	disease	events	are	more	frequent,	when	human	morbidity	and	mortality	increase,	and	when	public-health	messaging	and	official	interventions	are	more	constant.		
Conclusion	This	thesis	draws	on	the	notion	of	disease	narratives	in	order	to	reflect	on	diverse	conceptualizations	of	H5N1	avian	influenza	in	Indonesia.	It	situates	analysis	among	those	people	who	work	with	poultry	on	a	daily	basis,	and	examines	their	constructions	of	risk	from	H5N1.	In	order	to	assess	the	risks	posed	by	avian	influenza	to	themselves,	their	animals,	and	their	livelihoods,	PWP	draw	on	their	experiential	risk	rationalities,	founded	in	empirical	observations	and	habitual	experiences.	These	constructions	of	risk	underpin	PWP’s	behaviours	in	LBMs,	reflecting	their	prioritization	of	economic	gains.	This	research	concludes	that,	barring	widespread	animal-to-human	or	human-to-human	outbreaks,	these	inductively-derived	constructions	of	risk	and	associated	behaviours	may	be	unlikely	to	change.	The	success	of	interventions	attempting	to	control	disease	transmission	in	animals	and	in	people	may	be	predicated,	to	some	degree,	on	the	extent	to	which	constructions	of	risk	and	rationales	for	behaviours	among	PWP,	of	the	kind	described	in	this	study,	are	taken	seriously.	
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Appendix	1:	Qualitative	research	guide		These	research	questions	derive	from	the	research	guide	developed	and	used	by	Padmawati	and	Nichter	(2008).		Guiding	research	questions	include:	1. What	is	the	economic	and	cultural	importance	of	different	types	of	poultry?	a. Poultry	as	food:	how	often	consumed?;	what	form?	
i. Poultry	as	food	1. What	species	of	domestic	poultry	are	important	sources	of	food?	2. Chickens,	duck,	quail,	turkey,	etc.	3. What	types	of	poultry	are	preferred	and	why:	comparative	data?	4. When	making	comparisons	consider	such	variables	as:	taste,	status,	strength	giving	qualities,	etc.		5. Broiler	(farmed)	meat	versus	domestic	(local)	meat	and	eggs	6. Wild	birds	versus	farmed	and	domestic	birds	b. Household	economics	and	backyard	poultry	raising	c. Poultry	as	flexible/convertible	capital	d. Livelihood:	consider	gender	dimension	to	this	form	of	capital	e. Human	and	animal	relationships,	etc.	f. Ritual	uses	g. Poultry	business:		stakeholders	in	poultry	business	h. Consider	cultural	preferences	i. Gender	of	bird	preferred	for	consumption,	if	any	ii. Age	of	bird	for	consumption:	local	and	broiler	iii. Preference	in	terms	of	what	bird	consumes	as	source	of	food	iv. Use	rank	order	technique	to	rank	birds	by	consumption	preference,	cost,	social	status,	etc.	2. Markets	and	market	price	for	different	poultry	products:	domestic	and	farm	bred	birds	a. What	is	consumed	locally	and	what	is	sent	to	more	distant	markets	–where?	b. Fluctuation	of	prices	by	season,	etc.	3. Susceptibility	of	Birds	to	Disease:	Domestic	vs.	farmed	vs.	wild	birds	a. Consider	opinions	of	different	stakeholders:	backyard	vs.	commercial	farmers,	consumers,	etc.	about		b. General	ideas	of	birds’	susceptibility/resistance	to	disease	c. What	do	people	think	makes	different	types	of	birds	relatively	susceptible/resistant	to	disease?	d. Backyard	poultry	raising			i. If	birds	are	kept	in	houses,	where	are	they	caged?	
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ii. Safety,	to	harvest	manure,	part	of	ecological	system,	etc.	iii. If	left	free,	are	they	allowed	to	enter	the	home?	iv. Poultry	farms:	what	are	common	patterns	of	bird	housing	for	broilers	and	egg	layers?	4. Human	Contact	with	Birds	a. With	different	types	of	birds	b. Poultry,	pets	(exotic	birds)	c. Adults,	children	d. Within	family	farm	contact	e. Chicken	farms:	contact	with	others	outside	farm	workers		f. Precautious	taken	not	to	infect	birds	with	human	disease	and	humans	with	chicken	disease	g. Document	all	practices		5. Sick	Birds	a. Sick	birds	separated	from	other	birds?	b. Sick	birds	eaten?			i. By	whom?	c. Sick	birds	sold?	i. To	whom?	ii. Legal	or	illegal?	d. Document	vendors	who	purchase	dead	birds	form	farms	e. Sick	Birds	buried	or	burned?	i. How	and	where?	6. Food	Safety	a. Follow	the	chain	of:	production,	distribution,	sale	and	preparation	of	poultry	and	eggs	for	consumption	b. Poultry		c. Eggs	d. Look	for	all	points	of	contact	and	contamination	e. Practices	taken	to	reduce	contamination	at	each	nodal	point	f. Practices	of	cooking	poultry:	details	on	how	cooked,	and	for	how	long	g. How	much	do	health	concerns	play	into	cooking	process,	and	does	this	vary	if	bird	already	dead	vs.	purchased	alive?	h. Consumption	of	uncooked	eggs	or	meat	for	health	or	ritual	or	in	indigenous	health	care	purposes	7. Poultry	Purchases	a. Patterns	of	purchase:	pre-cooked	or	processed	chicken,	live	chickens	in	the	market?	b. If	live,	where	cleaned	–home	or	butcher	c. Preferred	patterns	of	purchase	and	why?	d. Consider	by	social	class	8. Wet	Market	a. What	kinds	of	birds	sold	and	how?	b. Contact	with	public	c. Hygiene	of	market	–	all	aspects	(photo	document),	droppings,	feathers,	blood,	contact	with	other	animals	
	 228	
d. Birds’	slaughter	in	market—by	whom?	e. Contact	with	children	in	market	place	9. Bird	Dropping	a. Disposal	and	Use	b. How	and	where	are	droppings	disposed?	c. Backyard	birds	vs.	poultry	farms	of	different	sizes	d. How	often	collected,	by	whom,	how	e. Practices	to	protect	collector	f. How	are	dropping	collected	for	use	as	fertilizer?	g. Follow	the	fertilizer	trail	from	bird	faeces	à	to	how	often	collected	à	how	processed	à	how	they	are	transported	and	stored	à	how	they	are	sold	à	how	they	are	used	and	stored	at	the	farm	level	h. Is	fertilizer	transported	to	distant	locations?	i. How	handled	at	point	of	use?	10. Bird	Illness	a. Diagnosis	i. What	types	of	poultry	illness	are	recognized	locally:	symptoms,	how	distinguished?	ii. Terminology	for	diseases	like	Newcastle's	disease	(chicken	cholera),	etc.	iii. When	are	illnesses	thought	to	be	most	common	during	the	year?	iv. Perceptions	of	cause	of	these	illness	and	whether	or	not	contagious	v. How	sick	poultry	treated,	or	disposed	of	?	b. What	have	people	heard	about	avian	flu?	i. What	do	they	think	are	causes	of	avian	flu?	ii. What	are	prominent	symptoms?	iii. How	do	they	diagnose	avian	flu	in	birds?	iv. Who	do	they	consult	for	diagnosis	–	after	how	many	birds	have	died?	c. Is	the	disease	associated	with	different	symptoms	in	different	types	of	birds?	i. Wild	birds	ii. In	backyard	poultry	iii. Broilers	iv. In	young	birds	versus	older	birds	d. Sources	of	Risk	i. What	sources	are	seen	as	greatest	risk	in	spreading	avian	flu?	1. Poultry	from	backyard	farms		2. Small	farms	3. Large	commercial	farms,	Layer	farms	4. Wild	birds	5. Exotic	birds	as	pets	6. Quail	and	pigeons	that	come	and	go		7. Pigs	
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e. Perceptions	of	Contagion	i. What	are	perceived	vectors	of	transmission?			1. Poultry	to	poultry?		2. Wild	birds	to	poultry?	3. Poultry	to	wild	birds?	4. Poultry	to	humans?	5. Humans	to	poultry?	6. Spread	between	other	animals,	e.g.	pigs?	7. Between	poultry	products	(e.g.	faeces)	and	birds	or	humans?	ii. How	do	people	think	the	bird	disease	is	transferred	between	different	species	of	birds?	iii. Between	poultry	and	other	animals	on	a	farm,	such	as	pigs?	f. Poultry	Risk	to	Avian	Flu	i. What	increases	the	risk	of	poultry	infection	with	avian	flu?	1. Age	of	bird	2. Overall	health	or	resistance	to	disease	3. Stress	4. Type	of	bird	5. Hygiene	of	farm	6. Exposure	to	faecal	matter	7. Exposure	to	other	birds,	humans		ii. Method	for	assessing	perceptions	of	relative	risk:		1. Rank	order	within	poultry	with	relationship	to	perceived	susceptibility	and	risk	of	avian	flu	2. Also	rank	order	of	non-domestic	birds,	and	risk	3. Then	rank	order	complete	list	of	birds	g. Seasonality	i. When	do	outbreaks	happen	across	the	seasons?			1. In	which	seasons	do	avian	flu	outbreaks	(as	well	as	other	poultry	diseases)	usually	happen?	2. How	does	this	effect	reporting,	testing,	and	surveying	poultry?	3. Are	delays	in	reporting	associated	with	seasonality?	4. How	do	local	explanations	for	outbreaks	change	according	to	season?	11. Response	to	interventions	a. Testing	of	Birds	for	Avian	Flu	i. What	types	of	diagnostic	tests	are	used	by	different	testing	facilities?	1. On	live	and	dead	birds,	and	droppings	2. In	what	order	are	tests	administered	if	more	than	one	is	used?	3. Time	needed	for	farmers	to	get	results	4. Test	results	reported	to	whom	
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5. How	does	public	understand	tests	in	terms	of	suspected	and	confirmed	cases?	ii. What	are	farmers	most	likely	to	do	when	they	suspect	a	case	may	be	avian	flu?	1. Who	do	they	inform	and	how?	2. How	fast	do	they	send	birds	for	testing?	3. Do	they	send	dead	or	live	sick	birds,	feces,	etc.?	4. What	are	the	most	common	places	for	testing?		5. How	long	is	the	wait	period	for	results?			6. Does	anyone	visit	farm	–when	in	the	process?	iii. What	tests	are	available	from	different	vets	and	agencies?			1. How	is	the	accuracy	of	tests	given	by	different	people	or	agencies	viewed	in	terms	of	trust	iv. Delay	in	Reporting	Birds	or	Bringing	for	Testing	1. Logistics	2. Delay	in	distributor	or	farmer	communication	3. Chain	of	command	–who	decides	when	to	go	for	testing	and	where	to	go	4. Confidentiality	b. Vaccinations	i. What	are	perceptions	of	the	effectiveness	and	need	for	poultry	vaccinations?		1. What	are	the	perceived	goals	and	effectiveness	of	vaccinations?			2. Differing	opinions	about	live	and	dead	vaccine	3. Consider	expense	of	vaccine	in	relation	to	perceived	effectiveness	4. When	are	vaccinations	deemed	appropriate?	5. For	example	in	different	seasons	and	age	of	birds?	6. What	are	perceptions	of	risk	and	benefit	for	birds	of	different	ages	(early	first	vaccinations	versus	vaccinations	later	in	the	life	cycle)	and	health	status	of	birds?	ii. Are	there	different	vaccination	policies	for	different	birds,	e.g.	layers,	broilers,	domestic	poultry?	1. How	does	the	length	of	breeding	cycle	for	broilers	affect	acceptance	of	vaccinations?	2. When	in	breeding	cycle	are	birds	vaccinated?		How	often?	3. Does	timing	of	vaccination	affect	willingness	to	accept	vaccination?	iii. Is	there	trust	in	vaccinations	and	vaccinators	associated	with	the	government	as	distinct	from	vaccine	purchased	in	private	sector?	1. After	a	bird	flu	outbreak,	how	do	farmers	respond	to	government	offers	of	:	
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2. Free	vaccine	to	be	administered	by	farmers	themselves	3. Offers	of	government	contracted	vaccinators	to	administer	vaccines	to	poultry	directly	4. Consider	relationship	of	farmer	to	administrator/vet		
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